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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation is the first scholarly study to comparatively analyze the mutinies of 
Anglo, immigrant and African American soldiers in the Union Army. Those collective 
and individual military protest actions were part of the war’s capacity, in the words of 
historian David Blight, to “unleash, reinforce, and reshape nineteenth century values and 
attitudes.” I contend that mutinies reveal Civil War volunteers who possessed a 
conception of soldier rights derived from membership in free associations and the 
citizenry’s long history of local control. While republicanism and the market contributed 
a language and ethos, it was native-born Anglo soldiers’ real practice of self-government 
in peacetime that led them to demand its continuation in the interstices of military law 
during wartime. At the same time, though hardly acknowledged by Anglos, northern free 
blacks took part in the associational and print culture of their day and conceived of 
themselves as active citizens. Their military protest actions continued their practice of 
self-government even as it risked being labeled as disloyalty. European immigrants who 
volunteered to prove their allegiance to the republic could resort to mutiny if they 
detected a violation of their soldier rights. Yet, these moments actually served to prove 
the very fitness for citizenship originally questioned by nativist opponents before the 
war. Most surprisingly, the mutinies by emancipated Southern blacks drew on their 
culture of confrontation and resistance during bondage to assert their new rights under 
the rule of law as soldiers of the United States. When they protested unequal treatment 
while in uniform they took their first steps in using the war to achieve political and civil 
equality in American society. My project analyzes the proceedings of general courts-
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martial as well as relevant manuscript collections, regimental histories, and newspapers 
to construct a web of popular constitutional citizen action both at home and in the 
military against perceived violations of Americans’ right to rule themselves in 
association with one another. Regardless of ethnic origin, citizen-soldiers’ mutinies are a 
window on their campgrounds and drill fields as another theater of the war where they 
debated its grand questions of loyalty, self-government, Union, and freedom. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Young Philadelphian William Colton quickly “decided” in the summer of 1862 that 
volunteering for the Union Army was his “duty.” Colton initially accepted non-
commissioned rank in the 121st Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry Regiment. The colonel 
soon cautioned that it was as yet “not accepted as part of the quota from Philadelphia” 
for the impending 1862 enrollment. Colton considered noxious the idea of serving 
alongside the draftees who might be necessary to bring the regiment to full strength.1 
Just as loathsome, he and his friends might be “consolidated with other regiments.” Any 
of these meant “the possibility of being sent by U. S. to some other Regiment.” They 
“refused to be sworn in” for national service, therefore, and ended their association with 
the 121st Pennsylvania. Organizing their own company failed to attract the notice of 
recruits. Finally, they gained entry into an elite cavalry formation known colloquially as 
the Anderson Cavalry. The boys “were ‘sworn in’ by Alderman McCohen,” happy that 
their new colonel was “very particular” and accepted “only respectable young men, on 
reccommendation [sic].” At the time, Colton had the “firm conviction that it was the best 
thing I could do.”2 
                                                
1 Pennsylvania was charged by the national government with contributing to the 2 July 1862 call of 
300,000 additional soldiers. By meeting its quota based on population established by the War Department, 
a state could preempt conscription that year under the 17 July 1862 Militia Act, James M. McPherson, 
Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 491-93. 
2 Emphasis added, 5-9 August 1862, Vol. 1, William F. Colton Diaries, Coll. 10246, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter HSP). Hereafter, I will refer to infantry regiments by their number 
and state only. I will append the terms “Cavalry” and “Heavy Artillery” where appropriate. Unless noted 
otherwise, the units considered in this project were volunteer. 
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Colton’s experience is redolent of two bedrock principles of antebellum Northern 
life: membership and self-government. The citizen’s membership in the political 
community comprised by local institutions and affiliations was his most palpable 
participation in “the Union.” Union volunteers navigated their enlistment corporately 
and earnestly sought terms of enlistment that would be least injurious to their personal 
freedom. Even in a crisis like the Civil War, soldiering meant external controls on the 
citizen’s freedom. The possibility that the Army might interfere in his regimental 
membership struck Colton as a kind of tyranny. Against it, he chose to renege out of the 
volunteer’s privilege to choose his fellow comrades. Once decided, the civil swearing-in 
ceremony reinforced antebellum notions about citizen consent, self-government, and the 
common good. Many civic associations—fraternal societies, trade unions, reform 
leagues, and militia companies—formally incorporated themselves with their state. 
Militia companies routinely pledged allegiance to state and nation before their creation. 
Through the oath at muster-in the citizen became a temporary member of the Army, a 
martial institution sanctioned by his civilian representatives to protect the future of self-
government. 
Historians of Civil War soldiers stress that volunteers took an active role in shaping 
the meaning of the war to their societies. For instance, Charles Brooks places 
Confederate soldiers’ making and unmaking of their regiments within the tradition of 
popular sovereignty to explain why Southern yeomen nevertheless remained “loyal to 
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the Confederate cause and fought a slaveholders’ war.”3 This project likewise finds a 
mechanism of self-government in the mutinies of Union soldiers. It proposes they 
possessed a particular notion of rights derived from membership in their localities, which 
would inform their membership in the Union Army. Whether Anglo or emancipated 
slave, white ethnic or Northern free black, Union soldiers recognized the importance of 
membership. Through military protest actions they defended these “soldier rights” 
against local officers or Army policies. As a result they expanded the content and 
meaning of their rights and membership, both in the Army and in the nation, by war’s 
end. It will argue that this pattern of military self-government obtained among Anglo, 
European ethnic, and Northern free black soldiers. More unexpectedly, it will also 
present evidence of this dynamic among soldiers who were recently emancipated slaves. 
This project is not an attempt to explain why mutinies did not happen. It does not 
claim to be a comprehensive study describing every mutiny that occurred between 1861–
1865 in the Union Army. And it is not a study proposing a general “theory of Civil War 
mutinies” as a phenomenon. Were that the goal it would be tempting to suggest that 
because mutinies predominated in the first three years of the war they are a sign of the 
Army’s initial institutional weakness or simply the unwillingness of young men to bend 
to authority of any kind. But it could also be argued, if they had clustered in the last thee 
                                                
3 Charles E. Brooks, “Popular Sovereignty in the Confederate Army: The Case of Colonel John Marshall 
and the Fourth Texas Infantry Regiment” in The View from the Ground: Experiences of Civil War 
Soldiers, Aaron Sheehan-Dean, ed., (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2007), 218. See also, 
Charles E. Brooks, “The Social and Cultural Dynamics of Soldiering in Hood’s Texas Brigade” Journal of 
Southern History 67, no. 3 (August 2001): 535–72, which proposes the notion of soldier culture, the 
“unique mix of ideological and cultural resources” that “common soldiers” used for “defending and 
justifying their right” to fight “the Civil War mainly on their own terms.” 
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years of the conflict, that mutinies as a historical problem would be signs of war 
weariness. Or because they are mostly absent from the last two years of the conflict that 
soldiers had become inured to the privations of war or the Army had become a more 
coercive institution. 
Instead this project, shaped by the quality and quantity of documentary sources 
which reveal these protest actions, tries to use the mutinies that did happen as a window 
on Union soldier culture. Union veteran Walter Kempster agreed when “the editor of the 
Rebellion Record [Frank Moore] told me not long since that a more perfect history of the 
war of the rebellion could be written from the illustrations of camp and field life…than 
from any other source.”4 To that end, it relies on the techniques of microhistory, an 
historical investigation particularly suited to studying in detail the features of 
communities in order to underscore conventional wisdom about a particular era as well 
as reveal new lines of change and social processes previously hidden without close 
examination. In the words of one scholar, “Microhistory observes historical change up 
close and notes how historical forces operated on individuals.”5  
                                                
4 Walter Kempster, “The Volunteer Soldier in Relation to the Progress of Civilization,” in War Papers 
Read before the Commandery of the State of Wisconsin, Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the United 
States, Vol. I (Milwaukee: Burdick, Armitage & Allen, 1891), 74. 
5 Nicole Etcheson, “Review Essay: ‘Microhistory and Movement: African American Mobility in the 
Nineteenth Century,’” Journal of the Civil War Era 3, no. 3 (Sept. 2013), 393 [392–404]. 
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Since the late 1980s, a growing contingent of Civil War historians have devoted their 
scholarly efforts to the experiences of ordinary Union and Confederate soldiers.6 
Scholars have given sustained attention to Union soldiers’ attitudes about slavery, race, 
manhood, loyalty, and community.7 Some valuable studies have examined the sources of 
volunteers’ expectations of Army life, their models for soldiering and manliness, and 
how they adapted to life in uniform.8 These efforts privilege the ordinary soldier’s 
                                                
6 These scholars rejuvenated the body of literature created by Bell Irvin Wiley, The Life of Johnny Reb: 
The Common Soldier of the Confederacy (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1943) and The Life of Billy Yank: 
The Common Soldier of the Union (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1952). James I. Robertson, Jr., Soldiers 
Blue and Gray (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1988) updated Wiley while applying his 
approach to the experience of the United States Colored Troops. The theoretical keystone for the new 
scholarship was John Keegan, The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme (New 
York: Viking, 1976). Key concerns for Civil War scholars have remained motivation and combat 
experience, as well as questions about political ideology, manhood, and community life. See Gerald 
Lindemann, Embattled Courage: The Experience of Combat in the American Civil War (New York: Free 
Press, 1987); Reid Mitchell, Civil War Soldiers (New York: Viking, 1988); Randall Jimmerson, The 
Private Civil War: Popular Thought during the Sectional Conflict (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1988); Earl J. Hess, Liberty, Virtue, and Progress: Northerners and their War for the 
Union, 2nd ed., (New York: Fordham University Press, 1997) though not confined only to soldiers’ 
experiences; James M. McPherson, What They Fought For, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1994) and For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1997); Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat 
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1997). 
7 Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New York: 
Knopf, 2007); Nina Silber, Gender and the Sectional Conflict (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 2009); Christian G. Samito, Becoming American Under Fire: Irish Americans, African 
Americans, and the Politics of Citizenship during the Civil War Era (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2009); Nicole Etcheson, A Generation at War: The Civil War Era in a Northern Community (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2011). 
8 Reid Mitchell, The Vacant Chair: The Northern Soldier Leaves Home (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1993); Lorien Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union 
Army (New York: New York University Press, 2010); Steven J. Ramold, Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline 
in the Union Army (De Kalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 2009); Ricardo A. Herrera, “Self-
Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861,” The Journal of Military History 65, no. 1 
(January 2001): 21–52; Thomas Rodgers, “Billy Yank and G. I. Joe: An Exploratory Essay on the 
Sociopolitical Dimensions of Soldier Motivation,” The Journal of Military History 69, no. 1 (January 
2005): 93–121. 
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experience in order to understand not only how the war shaped the soldiers, but also how 
the soldiers shaped the war.9 
 As the first scholarly study of mutiny in the Union Army across its major ethnic and 
racial divides, it will link military service, self-government, and associationalism in a 
relationship of membership and rights to shed additional light on the nature of 
miD.C.entury citizenship and the effects of four years of war. 
Writing after the Civil War, Union veteran General John Logan, classified the 
American volunteer as “a soldier, a citizen, and a legislator” who was “an integral part of 
the government and country for which he fights.”10 In Logan’s experience the ordinary 
American citizen wielded a “personal and direct interest in the government” and a 
“voice” equal to “the richest and most prominent citizen” in the “direction of national 
affairs.” He “belongs to it; he is part of it” even while in uniform. But only from within a 
culture of associationalism could Logan have reasonably contended that the citizen 
literally “helps to make its laws, to elect its officials, to direct its affairs.”11 
                                                
9 Valuable appraisals of this scholarship are Aaron Sheehan-Dean, “The Blue and the Gray in Black and 
White: Assessing the Scholarship on Civil War Soldiers” in Sheehan-Dean, ed., The View from the 
Ground, and Jason K. Phillips, “Battling Stereotypes: a Taxonomy of Common Soldiers in Civil War 
History,” History Compass 6 (September 2008): 1407–1425; Ricardo A. Herrera, “A People and Its 
Soldiers: The American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861,” International Bibliography of Military History 
no. 33 (2013): 9–34. 
10 John A. Logan, The Volunteer Soldier of America (Chicago: R. S. Peale & Company, 1887), v. Logan is 
an example of the celebratory veteran literature that appeared after 1880. Gerald Linderman, Embattled 
Courage, 275, calls this period until about 1910 a “revival” that followed a “hibernation,” 266, during 
most of Reconstruction. The period of revival saw the largest wave of veteran literature published 
including battle accounts, memoirs, and regimental histories.  
11 Logan, Volunteer Soldier, 90-91, emphasis added. 
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Historians have broadened nineteenth-century political participation through the 
notion of associational culture.12 Told most comprehensively in Mary P. Ryan’s Civic 
Wars, this story lies not in the “centers of government” but in “the far more dispersed 
and elusive habitats of the people.” Those were places of civic encounter and contest like 
Manhattan’s avenues, parks, and boulevards; its fraternal halls, neighborhood saloons, 
and ethnic enclaves. There the denizens of America’s most polyglot city collaborated 
and contended with one another.13 
The legal historian William Novak in turn offers a mechanism in his theory of 
associationalism for how those “dispersed and elusive habits” manufactured self-
government. He identifies the common law of association and membership that defined 
the antebellum citizen’s package of rights. Returning to the antebellum jurist Francis 
Lieber’s 1853 tome Civil Liberty and Self-Government, “institutional self-government” 
was a form of “articulated liberty” possessing an “inter-guaranteeing, and consequently, 
inter-limiting character.” Nowhere was is it better and more essentially articulated than 
in local self-government, where “every institution” must have “the right to pass such by-
laws as it finds necessary for its own government.”14 
                                                
12 Ronald P. Formisano, “The Party Period Revisited,” Journal of American History 86, no. 1 (June 1999): 
107-20 (93-120); John Lauritz Larson, The Market Revolution in America: Liberty, Ambition, and the 
Eclipse of the Common Good (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 110-11. Of course, the 
earliest observer of American associationalism was Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, J. P. 
Mayer, ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969 [orig. 1832]), 513. 
13 Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth 
Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 81, 129–31. 
14 Francis Lieber, On Civil Society and Self-Government (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1874), 319. In 
fact, “the by-law is the rule in our system” to the point that they were “laws which any set of men have the 
right to pass for themselves within and under the superior law, charter, etc., which constitutes them into a 
society,” 322, 323n. 
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With Lieber in clear view, Novak defines associationalism as “an activist practice of 
well-regulated governance encompassing all levels of cooperation, from the formal 
institutions of national and local governments to voluntary groups and economic 
partnerships.” This network of self-government depended on “the right of institutions 
and associations to pass the laws and regulations” conducive to their harmonious 
collective life. It produced a political culture in which persons accrued specific rights, 
privileges, and obligations as members of an incorporated body—be that a business, a 
church, a fraternal order, or even a volunteer militia company. American citizens became 
legislators through these voluntary associations anytime they enacted such 
democratically conceived statutes. Like Lieber before him, Novak considers by-laws the 
“root of the Anglo-American tradition of self-government.”15 
Associationalism, as much as voting, was how antebellum citizens took part in the 
nations’ civic institutions. The country’s information revolution that historians have 
increasing identified as “print culture” furthered amplified the strains of associational 
life. Peter Parish rightly states that “it can hardly be disputed that the United States was 
the most literate society, with the most widespread popular education, in the mid-
nineteenth-century. Americans were the champion newspaper readers and the champion 
letter writers of the nineteenth century.”16 Literacy made Americans avid consumers of 
political tracts, speeches, and essays. They followed political developments closely in 
                                                
15 William J. Novak, “The American Law of Association: The Legal-Political Construction of Civil 
Society,” Studies in American Political Development 15 (January 2001), 173, 174. 
16 Peter J. Parish, “The Distinctiveness of American Nationalism” in The North and the Nation in the Era 
of the Civil War, ed. Adam I. P. Smith and Susan Mary-Grant, (New York: Fordham University Press, 
2003), 59. 
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the era’s partisan newspapers. And associationalism made this culture of critical 
engagement possible in a real way. Public laws incorporated the schools, newspapers, 
civic organizations, and fraternal societies of America’s local communities and granted 
legal standing and powers like acquiring and disposing of property to those private 
associations. 
Northern volunteers could also find ammunition for their challenges to military rules 
and regulations in the strain of populist democratic action named by historian Larry D. 
Kramer as popular constitutionalism, habits of self-government that the sovereign people 
employed against wayward magistrates.17 In the antebellum view, it “was ‘the people 
themselves’—working through and responding to their agents in the government—who 
were responsible” for ensuring the Constitution “was properly interpreted and 
implemented.”18 Mutinies and military protest actions reveal this belief at work in 
soldiers’ conviction that they could properly adjudicate the boundaries between their 
soldier rights and military law such as the Articles of War.  In the context of popular 
constitutionalism soldier rights drew on the tradition of  “customary constitutions” 
                                                
17 Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 23-24. His complete definition of popular constitutionalism is: “the 
invocation of a specific set of legal remedies by which “the people”—conceived as a collective body 
capable of independent action—were empowered to enforce the constitution against errant rulers. The 
community itself had both a right and a responsibility to act when the ordinary legal process failed, and 
unconstitutional laws could be resisted by community members who continued to profess loyalty to the 
government and to follow its other laws,” 25. It also indicates the intellectual affinity between his theory 
of popular constitutionalism and that of active sovereignty laid out by Christian G. Fritz, American 
Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition before the Civil War, (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). 
18 Kramer, ibid., 7.  
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reaching back to English common law.19 Customary constitutions likewise strengthened 
the standing of Logan’s notion that citizen volunteers remained legislators in uniform 
who “interpreted and implemented” military law through the prism of their soldier 
rights. 
Granted that the particular manifestations of soldiers’ rights were particular to each 
company or regiment, and no organization adhered to all of the following simultaneously 
or perfectly, it is still helpful to make some general descriptions of what they entailed. 
First, many volunteers claimed that the very fact of membership in a martial association 
permitted them to condone or condemn potential applicants, to choose their officers, and 
even to freely leave the organization. Second, the self-governing nature of association 
spawned a class of foundational rights and one of procedural rights. Foundational rights 
preserved the regiment as the bedrock of self-government and local attachments through 
state affiliation, organizational integrity, and a calendar of service (i.e., soldiers’ exact 
muster in and out dates). Procedural rights protected the founding rights through actions 
like scrutiny and interposition as well as protection from what they considered unjust 
discipline and manipulation of pay. The soldiers’ right to scrutiny depended on the 
venerable Anglo-American levers of citizen sovereignty identified by Christian Fritz: 
“petition (requests for governmental action), remonstrance (protests of governmental 
policy), and instructions (directives by voters to their representatives).”20 The right to 
interposition was an antebellum understanding of federalism whereby different levels or 
                                                
19 Customary constitutions were mechanisms of the English common law tradition in which accrued rights 
and obligations between lord and subject served as “the framework for argument” used by a community to 
ensure “an appropriate balance between liberty and power, Kramer, 13, 21-24. 
20 Fritz, American Sovereigns, 18. 
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branches of government protected citizens’ rights by jealously guarding their own place 
in the constitutional order.21 
Association, localism, print culture, and popular constitutionalism together made for 
a rich matrix that nourished the soldier rights claimed by diverse groups of Union 
volunteers in varying degrees and contrasting ways while in uniform. In turn, mutinies 
were conspicuous moments when volunteer soldiers asserted these rights and demanded 
that the Army satisfy its contractual obligations. Historians have typically noted 
Northerners’ commitment to associationalism during the Civil War through the political 
clubs and benevolent organizations that sprang from prewar reforming impulses. 
Therefore, even prior to the 1860 election must be included the Republican “Wide 
Awakes.” Once hostilities commenced national bodies like the United States Christian 
Commission and the United States Sanitary Commission appeared. During the war local 
associations staffed largely by women and often in close affiliation with the regiments 
from their towns and counties also made indispensable contributions. Union Clubs 
deepened loyalty, Soldiers’ Aid Societies provided necessities to troops in the field, 
nurses and caregivers ministered to wounded soldiers, and fund-raising drives provided 
                                                
21 On scrutiny see Fritz, American Sovereigns, “Elected officials were the people’s “servants, subject to 
election and dismissal” if they failed to be “open to instruction” and “directly responsible” to those they 
served,” 18, and also 45–46, 169, 182–84. Interposition depended on separation of powers and a vigorous 
application of checks and balances. It was most famously deployed in the campaign against the Alien and 
Sedition Acts in 1798–99. See ibid., 193-94; Larry Kramer, The People Themselves, 106-07; Kenneth M. 
Stampp, “The Concept of Perpetual Union” in Stampp, The Imperiled Union: Essays on the Background 
of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 28-9. 
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for destitute soldiers’ families.22 Building on these insights, this study sees multiple 
ethnic groups participating, each through its particular lineage of membership and self-
government. It adds the prewar volunteer companies and regiments to the list of 
significant realms of associational life. And among Anglos, ethnic soldiers, and Northern 
blacks it proposes a continuing dialogue between citizen-soldiers and their home 
communities through the workings of popular constitutionalism alongside associational 
culture. 
Volunteers brought that cultural matrix into play when they joined their wartime 
companies and regiments. By doing so they provided for the common defense while 
claiming soldier rights in a tradition stretching back to the mid-seventeenth century.23 In 
times of emergency colonial citizens had volunteered for militia companies where they 
kept their own payment records; took note of who enlisted them, for which specific 
campaign, and for what agreed pay; and complained of unsatisfactory or insufficient 
provisions and weapons. Militiamen responded with mutinies or mass desertions when 
                                                
22 Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1894), 1:129, while 
living in Galena, Illinois “occasionally met with the ‘wide-awakes’—Republicans—in their rooms, and 
superintended their drill;” likewise, William Jackson Palmer was elected the secretary of the Philadelphia 
Young Men’s Republican Club in 1860 and marched in the Wide-Awakes’ demonstrations throughout the 
city, Isaac H. Clothier, ed., Letters, 1853-1868 General William J. Palmer (Philadelphia: Ketterlinus, 
1906), unpaginated appendix. For more on the Wide Awake movement see John Grinspan, “‘Young Men 
for War’: the Wide Awakes and Lincoln’s 1860 Presidential Campaign,” Journal of American History 96 
“Abraham Lincoln at 200” (September 2009): 357–78. Phillip S. Paludan, A People’s Contest: The Union 
and Civil War, 1861-1865, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 237, 353-55; J. 
Matthew Gallman, The North Fights the Civil War: The Home Front (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1994), 110-
115; Peter J. Parish, “Conflict by Consent,” in The North and the Nation in the Era of the Civil War, ed. 
Adam I. P. Smith and Susan Mary-Grant (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), 159-60. 
23 Allan R. Millett and Peter Maslowski, For the Common Defense: A Military History of the United States 
of America, Rev. Ed. (New York: Free Press, 1994), 6, view the volunteer, local militias as “little 
societies” raised to meet a specific emergency as distinct from the town’s common, standing militia. 
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these aspects of the contract were violated.24 Mutinies also broke out in the Continental 
Army more frequently as the Revolutionary War progressed. They happened across the 
regiments of the conventional force; those in the Pennsylvania and New Jersey 
regiments in 1781 are merely the most spectacular. Men in the Continental Army served 
an institution that claimed unusually extensive authority over their lives in uniform, but 
routinely could not meet their most basic human needs and frequently would not respect 
their most basic freedoms. A failure of morale as it related to faith in the cause, however, 
was rarely their motivation.25 
Continental soldiers, while they had important differences in class and status from 
the Anglo volunteers of this study, were kindred spirits with many of the Civil War’s 
African American and white ethnic soldiers. Drawn increasingly from the lowest and 
poorest levels of colonial society, Continentals had different concerns and a different 
interface with political institutions than the “middling sorts” who made up the state 
militias. Striking out in defense of a moral economy derived from the Anglo-American 
culture of deference, Continental mutinies typically arose over issues of soldiers’ 
sustenance and the Army’s obligations of pay, clothing, and shelter.26 Likewise, mutinies 
by emancipated slave soldiers also carried with them condemnations of the Army for 
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failing to make good on its promises of equal pay and humane discipline. Revolutionary 
War soldiers dissented when service in the Continental Army appeared to violate their 
perception of the Revolution’s “larger struggle to preserve local interests.”27 
With antecedents in the Revolutionary struggle, therefore, the localism of nineteenth-
century American life meant that Civil War soldiers also did not understand or act on 
their rights of membership identically across ethnic and racial boundaries, or even from 
regiment to regiment. It is important to understand that soldier rights were not 
synonymous with what a modern American would think of as one’s cache of political 
and civil rights. Although rooted in the American system of constitutional rights, soldier 
rights defined what modicum of power ordinary volunteers—individually and 
corporately—had over the organization and day-to-day operation of their military 
association. Yet these rights were not one codified and consistent system, but rather a 
mosaic of idiosyncratic and parochial privileges, immunities, and duties collectively 
asserted from regiment to regiment. 
The colonial legacy of the service contract, the utter centrality of localism to 
Revolutionary War soldiers,28 and the pervasiveness of Northern associational culture 
ensured that 1861’s citizens in uniform placed great faith in their company or regiment 
as the best defense of their rights as soldiers. Because they created the organization and 
agreed on key terms of service they effectively legislated and governed its existence. It 
belonged to them as much as any peacetime political party or ethnic brotherhood. For 
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example, in April 1861 the male citizens of Springfield, Illinois, organized the Zouave 
Greys and the German-born Turners of Cincinnati, Ohio, formed their companies in 
May.29 Word of Robert E. Lee’s 1863 invasion prompted one group of discharged 
soldiers to meet at the hall of the Diligent Engine Company (a body of voluntary 
firemen) in central Philadelphia, form the “Dana Cavalry” with a term of six months, 
and “go into active service immediately,” convinced that “our services are needed for 
defense of our State.”30 Organizations such as these reflected their communities and 
remained tied to them throughout the war.31 
Citizens’ self-government through association gained the “legal recognition of their 
right to exist” via incorporation by the state.32 Participation in them reinforced that 
membership had its privileges; drafting constitutions and passing by-laws among them. 
State laws incorporating these military companies rested on the relationship between 
membership and rights. For example, an 1837 Illinois act to stimulate the formation of 
volunteer companies empowered their members to adopt a constitution and by-laws. 
                                                
29 Illinois description found in Henry Burell Papers, Civil War Miscellaneous Collection, USAMHI. The 
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Any associate could inspect their founding documents at any time. The rank and file 
possessed a right of election for their major and other staff officers in addition to their 
company officers. Rights of membership also took on a corporate character as when  
companies retained a right to only be consolidated into battalions with others from their 
county.33 
The entwining of military service and associational culture was so strong that Anglo 
settlers carried it with them into the territories. When Minnesota incorporated the 
volunteer Pioneer Guards in 1858, its constitution gave a board of direction with 
commissioned officers and five other ranks the power to change its by-laws. Those rules 
contained fines for “nineteen different types of neglect or violation of rules.”34 The by-
laws of one Kansas militia company stipulated the duties of officers—elected by soldiers 
through a formal vote—and fines for “neglect of their duties.” Finally, militia members 
could amend their by-laws by majority vote.35 
By the time citizen volunteers found themselves in the Union Army, these privileges 
of membership became elevated to the status of soldier rights because soldiers accepted 
the first duty of citizenship: laying down their lives in the Republic’s defense. By-laws 
were simply legal manifestations of the solidarity that bound “individual members of the 
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association for the good of the whole,” what Novak calls “the heart of true self-
government.”36 But the tradition and practice of membership rights coexisted uneasily 
with the ordinary law of the United States Army—its regulations and Articles of War—
and could be transgressed by bureaucratic expediency or be trampled on by asinine 
officers. General Logan’s soldier–legislators dissented when they believed that officers 
or the Army violated their rights as members of a volunteer company. In response, 
citizen-soldiers could identify matters of constitutional importance hanging in the 
balance. And that could call forth from them a range of military protest actions, the most 
grave being mutiny. 
The military law of the Union Army, in the Articles of War and the Army’s 
regulations, structured citizen-soldiers assertions of their role as “legislators.” Enacted 
by Congress to govern the military, these statutes functioned as constitutional and 
ordinary law to govern soldiers’ lives. The citizens’ representatives in Congress had 
enacted the one hundred odd Articles of War in 1806, extending the rule of law to all 
soldiers, providing them with basic protections of citizen rights, and assuring them a 
means of redress through the military justice system.37 
Article 1 of the Army regulations—“Military Discipline”—served as a kind of 
customary constitution for the relations between soldiers and officers across the entire 
institution. It “required” subordinate officers and soldiers “to obey strictly” and “execute 
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with alacrity” all “lawful orders” of their “superiors.” When subordinates failed in this 
duty superiors had to exercise discipline “strictly conformable to military law” with no 
recourse to “tyrannical or capricious conduct, or by abusive language.”38 A soldier’s 
rank determined his relative superior or inferior status and served as the starting point for 
all power relations in the Army. 
In addition to the principles outlined at the beginning of the Army regulations, the 
Articles of War defined the legality of soldiers’ actions and set maximum penalties for 
the violations of these statutes. Several articles impinged directly on the mutinies 
covered herein. Article 6 punished soldiers for “contempt or disrespect” toward 
commanders; Article 7 mandated capital punishment for any member of the Army “who 
shall begin, excite, cause, or join in, any mutiny or sedition;” Article 8 allowed the same 
punishment for soldiers who did nothing to stop a mutiny or report on an “intended” one; 
Article 9 provided the possibility of capital punishment for soldiers who “offer any 
violence” against their superior officer or “any lawful command” of his; Article 10 
mandated that soldiers have the Articles of War read to them upon muster-in; Article 35 
permitted soldiers to complain of abuse by their company officers to their colonel and 
receive a regimental court-martial; Article 44 demanded that soldiers attend parades and 
exercises on time; Article 45 condemned drunkenness on duty; Article 46 mandated 
death for sleeping on guard duty; Article 54 expected all members to “behave 
themselves orderly in quarters and on their march;” Articles 64–76 governed the 
                                                
38 Revised United States Army Regulations of 1861, with an Appendix Containing the Changed Laws 
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Department, Government Printing Office, 1863), Article I, nos. 1-3. 
  19 
proceedings of courts-martial; Article 79 extended habeas corpus protections to those 
charged with crimes; Article 83 provided for officers convicted of “conduct unbecoming 
an officer and a gentleman” to be “dismissed the service;” Article 87 required two-thirds 
of the panel in a court-martial to sign off on a death sentence as well as extending 
prisoners protection from double jeopardy; Article 89 covered the powers of department 
commanders to suspend death sentences and the power of the President to “pardon or 
mitigate;” Article 97 made volunteers in the pay and service of the United States 
“governed by these rules and articles of war;” Article 99 allowed that other uncited 
“crimes not capital,…disorders and neglects…to the prejudice of good order and 
military discipline” could still be tried by a court-martial; and Article 101 mandated that 
the Articles should be read to troops every six months.39 
These strict relationships of authority and conduct do not accurately reproduce the 
reality of soldiers’ interface with the institution. Military protest actions like 
insubordination and mutiny erupted when officers violated the Army’s statutes 
governing military life. At the same time, military law could also provoke soldiers’ 
protest when they believed their more foundational soldier rights of self-governance and 
membership had been transgressed. Even in the regiments of the USCT, however, the 
more hierarchical arrangements of power could still produce mutiny by freedmen-
soldiers against white officers who only honored the Articles and regulations in the 
breach. Particularly the regulations’ requirement that punishment be “strictly 
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conformable to military law” resonated with any Union soldier. When the basic 
protections against abuse and the promise of due process were not observed, soldiers’ 
responses could be increasingly strenuous military protest actions. 
Exactly how associationalism and localism came into conflict with the Army’s 
prerogatives to produce military protest actions requires returning to the two principles 
of membership and self-government stated at the outset. Midcentury America’s 
pervasive parochialism accounts for the “national war fought by local communities” that 
was the Union war effort. It resulted in the national government creating a literal Federal 
army involving volunteer regiments organized by the states under the administrative and 
legal authority of the United States Army. In the Union Army, “localism aided rather 
than hindered national patriotism.”40 All ethnic groups knew what it meant to be 
members of a local community, enclave, or neighborhood. Those local attachments 
carried strong attributes of mutuality and reciprocity. 
Anglos began the war tied most intimately to their town or state. Without a doubt 
service in the Army drew upon volunteers’ home-grown models of soldiering and 
manliness. These models of behavior helped hold men to their new memberships within 
their local company or regiment. This bound soldiers more palpably to the nation and led 
them to equate the prospects for self-government in their regiment with the health of the 
Union cause. Mutinies were expressions of Anglos’ felt ownership over their regimental 
associations against the Army hierarchy. They possessed a lived experience of self-
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government in their municipalities and voluntary associations. There they enacted 
constitutions and charters, passed by-laws, elected their governing officers and had the 
power to say with whom they would collaborate. This culture disposed them to 
understand these prerogatives as their soldier rights once in uniform. Mutinies became 
moments when Anglo soldiers reasserted self-government in the Army and by doing so 
cleaved more closely to the Union cause in the aftermath. 
Ethnic citizens similarly felt membership in their neighborhood or district most 
intimately. Like their Anglo fellow citizens, European ethnic soldiers like the Irish and 
Germans came from communities fully enmeshed in Northern society’s print and 
associational cultures. Therefore, they too expressed many of the same basic kinds of 
complaints about soldier rights as Anglos, alongside whom many fought with in units 
from their towns or regions. Significant numbers also organized ethnically homogenous 
companies and regiments that “represented the basic loyalty and patriotism of 
immigrants as well as their skill in manipulating political practices and institutions to 
their advantage.”41  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
41 Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, x. 
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Yet immigrants and first-generation Americans remained one of Americas “outside 
groups,” though to a lesser extent than African Americans, differentiated from the 
mainstream by language, religion, and customs.42 Ethnic Americans contended with 
nativism even though they considered themselves loyal citizens.43 Still they participated 
in the North’s political culture before the war and had a vibrant network of associations 
while maintaining a keen sense of affiliation with their own ethnic group. When war 
broke out, America’s ethnic citizens had plenty of confidence that their patriotism 
equaled or surpassed that of native-born Anglos, yet they displayed a need throughout it 
to prove that loyalty to the wider society. In this case, often countervailing tendencies 
                                                
42 Susannah J. Ural, “Introduction” in Ural, ed., Civil War Citizens: Race, Ethnicity, and Identity in 
America’s Bloodiest Conflict (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 3. 
43 Historians have written a great deal on the phenomenon of nativism beginning with John Higham, 
Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925 (New York: Athenaeum, 1966). For the 
Irish see, Kerby A. Miller, Emigrants and Exiles: Ireland and the Irish Exodus to North America (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1985); Noel Igantiev, How the Irish Became White (New York: Routledge, 
1995); Kevin Kenny, Making Sense of the Molly Maguires (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); 
David Noel Doyle, “The Remaking of Irish America, 1845-1880,” in Joseph J. Lee and Marion R. Casey, 
eds., Making the Irish American: History and Heritage of the Irish in the United States (New York: New 
York University Press, 2006), 213-255. Pertinent studies in English for German-speaking immigrants are 
Kathleen Neils Conzen, Immigrant Milwaukee, 1836-1860: Accommodation and Community in a Frontier 
City (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976); Hartmut Keil, “German Immigrant Workers in 
Nineteenth-Century America: Working-Class Culture and Everyday Life in an Urban Industrial Setting” in 
Frank Trommler and Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-
Hundred-Year History, vol. 1: Immigration, Language, Ethnicity (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1991); Walter D. Kamphoefner, “German-Americans and Civil War Politics: A 
Reconsideration of the Ethnocultural Thesis” Civil War History Vol. 37 (1991): 232-46. 
  23 
toward separateness and assimilation could not only coexist, but work hand in hand.44 To 
that end, their circle of membership expanded to encompass a larger statewide, and even 
national, ethnic community. In a way similar to Anglos, this wider field of vision while 
working within America’s public culture to articulate loyalty, also demonstrated their 
ethnicity’s practice of self-government. 
In remarkable proximity to European ethnic Americans in terms of membership and 
self-government were the Northern free black communities. By the same token they 
were rather farther away from their racial brethren in bondage. Despite exclusion from 
the statehouse and the polls, Northern blacks formed civic organizations to press for 
suffrage, conducted parades to mark the anniversaries of state emancipation laws, and 
inaugurated a national convention movement to articulate a vision of full citizenship. 
Through a network of black newspapers they interjected their collective voice into 
contemporary print culture while rallying their churches to shape the era’s wave of moral 
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reforms, most notably through abolitionism. According to historian Patrick Rael, 
Northern “antebellum black protest” gained “power from precisely the factors that 
rendered northern free blacks less culturally and intellectually autonomous of the white 
world than their enslaved brethren.”45 
As the sectional crisis of the 1850s intensified, Northern blacks remained loyal to 
their race and to the principles of the Revolution. The free blacks of Boston and other 
Northern cities publicly interfered with federal officials’ arrest and remanding of 
escaped slaves under the national Fugitive Slave Law of 1850.46 In response to news of 
John Brown’s Harper’s Ferry raid, African Americans convened a Providence, Rhode 
Island, public meeting in November 1859. Its proceedings were carried in an organ of 
the Northern black press. Speaking to the gathered throng to express they “fully 
sympathize with our friend Capt. John Brown” was Leonard Phenix, who went on to 
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serve as a sergeant in the 14th Rhode Island Colored Heavy Artillery in 1863.47 The 
1853 Colored National Convention anticipated the transformation that would be wrought 
on Northern black citizen-soldiers when it proclaimed: “We are Americans” who 
“address you as American citizens asserting their rights on their own native soil.”48 
Service in the Army confronting the problems of unequal pay and abusive treatment 
opened free blacks to charges of disloyalty rather like European ethnics. In an equally 
powerful way, Northern blacks returned the basis of their claims to soldier rights and the 
practice of self-government to their membership in the nation and their just inheritance 
of the country’s founding ideals. 
Perhaps no group traversed a civic distance so great as the freedmen who joined the 
Union Army. They negotiated a place for themselves structured by their membership in 
the institution of slavery. Masters treated the enslaved as second-class children of an 
imagined household who received sustenance, but owed obedience and labor. At the 
same time, the enslaved created self-sustaining and mutually-supportive neighborhoods 
stretched across their immediate locale. Localism acted as a similarly powerful molder 
of community even though enslaved African-Americans never completely accepted their 
membership in the formal arrangements insisted on by the master class. While the most 
exceptional were slave revolts and maroon communities, they achieved more permanent 
gains by turning slavery’s labor arrangements to their advantage. 
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Rather, they found ways through degrees of confrontation to gain capricious 
protections and privileges from their overlords. In turn, they built their own artifice of 
rights—though nothing approaching the degree of self-government available to Northern 
free blacks. What developed within the peculiar institution’s internal economy was a 
precarious system of customary obligations, privileges, and prerogatives vis-à-vis the 
master. The enslaved used them to protect their fledgling dreams of freedom. Often over 
a span of decades a neighborhood of slaves won concessions from their master through 
confrontations over kin-based work parties, free time on weekends, and routines of paid 
labor. While these reciprocities rested on slaves’ membership in the fictive household, 
historian Steven Hahn argues such confrontations constituted nothing less than a 
“politics of slaves.” The freedman-soldier, therefore, came from a background where 
membership had a distinct meaning and it was the avenue to an ersatz version of rights, 
ones forming a launching pad for self-government through membership in the Army.49 
Their legal status as soldiers conferred on them a wholly new form of membership 
and in turn protection of the rule of law and a grant of legal rights under the Articles of 
War. When these new rights were transgressed through flogging, for example, freedmen-
soldiers drew upon their practice of confrontation and resistance to assert their 
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possession and defense of soldier rights. By doing so, they expanded their rights as 
members of the new national community that they were themselves defining through 
their military service. This defining of new categories of rights was accomplished in part 
by the military protests of both freedmen-soldiers and Northern free blacks in uniform. 
Their joint efforts in turn forged a more robust membership in a nationwide racial 
community. 
Chapters I and II relate the experience of Anglo soldiers who carried a culture of 
associational self-government into the Army and refused to completely part with it as 
they fought the war for Union. Along the way the retained their ties to their local 
communities and drew heavily upon the intervention of civilian allies in blunting the 
complete control by the national government and Army high command over the internal 
affairs of their local military community. Moreover, mutinies among them reveal a direct 
relationship between their handicapping of the Union’s chances for victory and the 
preservation of self-government in their own regiments. 
Chapter III presents the experience of free African Americans from Northern states 
in a new light by explaining their military protest actions not only in the context of the 
black freedom struggle but also as artifacts of associational culture. Northern black 
soldiers’ endemic culture of antebellum dissent against racism, which also became a 
useful source of citizen advocacy during the war, turned their mutinies into battles over 
the larger civic implications of the soldier rights they could claim while under arms. 
Their use of Northern public culture and the structures of associationalism to justify their 
actions remain powerful evidence of their participation in Northern public culture 
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alongside Anglos. And in this respect Northern free blacks and white ethnic soldiers, 
particularly German Americans, had much in common. 
In Chapters IV and V the remarkable transition from slavery to freedom is lent new 
power through the mutinies of recently emancipated slaves in uniform. Drawing on their 
struggles against the master class for customary rights as members of the plantation 
household, they entered the Army and gained a new status as soldiers who could claim a 
new deposit of legal rights under the rule of law. When they used mutinies to define and 
defend these soldier rights, the formerly enslaved demonstrated their fitness for self-
government. At the same time, it committed them to seek their membership in the nation 
as a function of the rule of law that had first provided the structural framework for their 
soldier rights. 
Finally, chapters VI and VII  explain how the Union’s ethnic soldiers used protest 
actions and mutinies to define their rights in uniform while remaining committed to the 
defense of their adopted nation. Much like their Anglo comrades they did it in 
cooperation with citizen partners at home. The networks of ethnic institutions endemic to 
the North’s ethnic communities enhanced the impact of soldier protest on the Army high 
command and in the political arena. Ethnic soldiers’ acts of protest in cooperation with 
the home front solidified their rights in uniform. Membership in their ethnic 
communities undergirded their membership in the national political community. 
Moreover, protest actions demonstrated ethnic soldiers’ capacity for citizenship and 
formed a component of their claim to full participation in the nation once the war 
finished. 
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Individual and corporate rights belonged to Anglo, ethnic, and African American 
volunteers in the Union Army as a result of their soldier status. The initial character of 
that status depended on the diverse array of rights and membership possessed by the 
social groups within the political community of the United States from which these 
volunteers came. Mutinies reveal how soldiers at the local level of their regiments made 
the war into a struggle to secure the Union and self-government from erosion. 
Membership in the Army had expanded self-government to increased numbers of 
members of the nation and, by extension, revitalized the Republic. 
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CHAPTER II 
“NEVER MORE COMPLETELY DUPED”: 
MEMBERSHIP, SOLDIER RIGHTS, AND MUTINY 
IN THE ANDERSON CAVALRY 
 
“Never more completely duped”: those were the words that Eb Allison, a sergeant in 
the “Anderson Cavalry,” used to explain the depressing circumstances in which he and 
his comrades found themselves a few days into 1863.1 It was a result of his regiment’s 
mutiny that began on 26 December 1862. Orders had arrived to move to the front in 
support of the Union advance that would eventually culminate in the Battle of Stones 
River (31 December 1862–2 January 1863) or Murfreesboro, Tennessee. The regiment 
divided at its camp into an obedient contingent numbering about 300 men when it 
entered the battle on 29 December and a mutinous band of more than 400 that stacked its 
arms and refused to move. Major General William S. Rosecrans, commanding the Army 
of the Cumberland, tried inveigling and then threatening the mutineers to come to heel. 
To no avail. After the battle’s end, he imprisoned them in Nashville to await court-
martial. But contrary to all expectations, the Anderson Cavalry reorganized in March 
and closed out the war intact and in good standing. 
The mutiny of the Anderson Cavalry was a brand of military protest action by Anglo 
volunteers who charged the Army with betraying the founding and procedural rights 
belonging to them as members of a military association. When it became depressingly 
clear to many soldiers in the Cavalry by late December 1862 that these rights were in 
                                                
1 Eb to Dear Parents and Brother, Camp near Nashville, 3 January 1863, Eb Allison Collection, Gibson 
Civil War Letters Collection, GLC03523.24 (#35), Gilder Lehrman Collection (hereafter GLC). 
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jeopardy—that they had been “duped”—their mutiny functioned as a popular 
constitutional salvage operation. 
Their bid for control had a complex genesis and an equally meaningful denouement. 
This intricate nature has hindered its full appraisal.2 Unraveling these threads, however, 
yields a useful microhistory that explains the relationship between soldier rights and 
associational membership under the pressure of the Federal war effort. The origins of the 
mutiny are found in a rivalry between two volunteer organizations with a common point 
of origin. The dual (and dueling) histories of the 1861 Anderson Troop and the 1862 
Anderson Cavalry (officially the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment) involved 
conflicts over membership, consolidation, commissions, and terms of service that 
identify the content and meaning of soldier rights for one population of Union Anglo 
volunteers. First, the soldiers of the 15th Pennsylvania saw their mutiny as a check 
against the machinations of outsiders from the Anderson Troop. Second, the mutineers 
directed a corollary vector of dissent at the Army’s institutional failure to guarantee 
these rights. The mutineers gained support for their actions from family and community 
allies in Pennsylvania who waged a joint public campaign to justify and explain the 
actions of their fellow citizens in uniform. In the mutiny of the 15th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry localism, associational culture, and soldier rights structured both a mutiny 
against Army authority and between the men themselves. 
                                                
2 The mutiny’s most careful student, Stephen Z. Starr, The Union Cavalry in the Civil War, vol. 3, The 
War in the West, 1861-1865 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1985), 595–601, covers it in 
an appendix—itself evidence that he thought it simply strange. Starr chalks it up to litigious, privileged 
recruits who were confused about their future due to in part to their commander’s capture. While not 
without merit, this confines analysis of the mutiny too narrowly to the questions of unit cohesion and 
military leadership. 
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Thus, the Anderson Cavalry’s mutiny extends antebellum public culture into a most 
unlikely place: the authoritarian institution of the military. The priorities of military 
discipline and regimentation did not extinguish volunteers’ deep commitment to the 
practices of citizenship they had learned from associational life. Military protest actions 
carried on modes of self-government during wartime. This mutiny is one of the most 
dramatic instances of the concrete ways in which wartime Anglo men acted like citizens 
because they were soldiers. 
Finally, the Anderson Cavalry mutiny clarifies what “Union” meant for Anglo 
volunteers in the context of the larger war effort. Preserving their soldier rights through 
mutiny ensured they continued to have some say in the internal affairs of their regiment. 
For these citizen-soldiers their achievement, albeit within the interstices of the Articles 
of War, was a barometer to measure self-government’s prospects in the Army and in the 
nation generally. Seeing their soldier rights tarnished locally ruptured their confidence 
that their service and sacrifice was indeed furthering the cause of Union and republican 
government. When they restored a healthy associationalism in their regiment their faith 
increased that victory would reestablish domestic tranquility and promote the general 
welfare for them and their communities upon returning home. 
Anglo volunteers in blue had come of age in Northern public culture. They took their 
cues as soldiers from the antebellum tradition of citizen self-government within a 
volunteer military company. Pennsylvania law had made this practice a norm among its 
prewar militias. Companies were almost parochial in the depth of their attachments and 
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makeup. Years earlier during the compulsory service era, the State House still passed 
laws like this 1832 statute stipulating that, 
The enrolled militia and volunteers attached to the seventeenth 
regiment…residing within the following bounds, shall hereafter compose a 
separate battalion…that is to say, the townships of Washington and Clinton, 
except that part of the latter north of the Bald Eagle mountain, and west of the 
Loyalsock Gap.3 
Militias also enjoyed a fundamental right of local self-government through officer 
elections. The 1832 law observed that “the enrolled militia and volunteers of the 
battalion aforesaid, shall be entitled to elect one major, one adjutant, and one quarter 
master, for said battalion.” Local attachments ensured that militias had the right to abjure 
serving beside men not of their own choosing, such as the 1834 Pennsylvania law that 
empowered a regiment’s current officers to approve or deny any newly organized 
companies joining their regiment. It too mandated that officer elections be held.4 
In 1849 the Pennsylvania legislature dispensed with the old enrolled militia in 
preference for a voluntary force along associational lines. Citizens eligible for militia 
service were to “form themselves into companies…and elect their own officers, make 
their own by-laws, regulate, collect, and apply their own fines and forfeitures.”5 For 
example, the members of the National Blues of Portsmouth drafted detailed by-laws 
                                                
3 Section VII, “A Further Supplement to the Act, Entitled ‘An Act for the Regulation the Militia of this 
Commonwealth,’” 4 May 1832, in John Purdon and George McDowell Stroud, comps., A Digest of the 
Laws of Pennsylvania: From the Year 1700 to the 13th Day of October, 1840, 6th ed. (Philadelphia: 
McCarty & Davis, 1841), 783. 
4 Section VII, “A Further Supplement to the Act, Entitled ‘An Act for the Regulation the Militia of this 
Commonwealth,’” 4 May 1832 and Section IV, “An Act for the Relief of Sundry Volunteer Companies,” 
15 April 1834, ibid., 783. 
5 Sections I and II, “An Act to Revise the Militia System and Provide for the Training of Such Only as 
Shall Be Uniformed,” 17 April 1849, emphasis added in James Dunlop, comp., The General Laws of 
Pennsylvania from the Year 1700 to April 1849 (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson, 1849), 1199. 
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when they organized themselves in December 1851. What is more, they amended them 
in 1861 with a signed pledge to enter national service against the rebellion.6 
Thus, Pennsylvania’s Anglo volunteers came to the colors in 1861 with ingrained 
habits and expectations of associationalism within the confines of the military. But their 
tradition of carefully crafted cohorts failed to keep up with the demands of the war that 
arrived on 12 April 1861. In Pennsylvania only five volunteer companies existed to meet 
the crisis. President Abraham Lincoln’s call three days later for 75,000 volunteers to 
national service, therefore, required improvised responses. Citizens’ patriotic fervor and 
determination to defend the Constitution produced dramatic scenes of local 
volunteerism. In Lewistown the Logan Guards, which had drilled since 1858, had only 
twenty-six men to meet Governor James Curtin’s 16 April orders to march immediately 
for Washington. Word spread so fast in the borough that eighty men volunteered on the 
spot within an hour. Most communities responded like the townships of Northhampton 
County whose citizens organized a public meeting two days before Lincoln’s call. A 
number of speeches galvanized the attendees and by 18 April four companies of citizens 
in uniform had been accepted by the governor and were on the road to the state capitol at 
Harrisburg.7 
Even in these hectic weeks, however, associational culture continued to shape 
Pennsylvanians’ response to war. Take Norristown in Montgomery County. Volunteers 
expanded the existing militia regiment to six hundred men. Public resolutions 
                                                
6 Papers and Constitution of the National Blues of Portsmouth, MS 0061, Box 3, Manuscript Group 7, 
Military Manuscripts Collection, 1758-1931, Pennsylvania State Archives, Harrisburg. 
7 Samuel Penniman Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5 Prepared in Compliance with Acts 
of the Legislature (Harrisburg, PA: B. Singerly, State Printer, 1869), 1:3-5, 13 
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committing the community to provide for the families of enlistees encouraged the surge. 
The regiment stood below wartime strength, but the governor urged that it begin 
marching for Harrisburg. Additional Montgomery volunteers would be sent to join them 
at “Camp Curtin,” a hastily conceived troop rendezvous for companies from across the 
commonwealth. Keystone State officials anxious to move troops down to Washington 
determined that the regiment’s additional manpower would come from the available 
unattached companies. Following the 1834, law the officers approved these companies, 
then supervised new elections for officers. The results confirmed the existing leadership 
and had the effect of nominally, but quickly, knitting the regiment together.8  
In Philadelphia—the state’s largest city, cultural heart, and transportation hub—
attention focused in the first weeks on fears of a Confederate attack. Citizens pressured 
the city council into creating a volunteer Home Guard. At the same time, groups of 
citizens met publicly to fill up the depleted rosters of the city’s existing militia 
organizations or form new companies. By August of 1861, when William Jackson 
Palmer opened recruiting offices for the Anderson Troop on Chestnut Street, citizens 
were busily forming themselves into at least twenty-five different regiments.9 
A brevet brigadier general of Union cavalry and Medal of Honor winner by war’s 
end, William Jackson Palmer was born into a Quaker farming family on 17 September 
1836 in Kent County, Delaware. The family moved to Philadelphia in 1841 and in 1857 
Palmer used his connections among the city’s prosperous Friends to earn the post of 
                                                
8 Bates, ibid., 1:40. 
9 J. Thomas Scharf and Thompson Westcott, History of Philadelphia, 1609-1884 (Philadelphia: L. H. 
Everts & Co., 1884), 1:760–776. 
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personal assistant to J. Edgar Thomson, president of the Pennsylvania Railroad. But 
Palmer was also a budding abolitionist, organizing a lecture series for the city in 1859. 
He joined the Republican party and marched with other “Wide-Awakes” during the 1860 
campaign. At the war’s outset he was assisting the national government to coordinate 
rail traffic between Washington, D.C., and Annapolis, Maryland.10 
These early displays of zeal, ambition, and initiative foreshadowed Palmer’s decision 
to join the military crusade. Eager to enter the fray but sagacious enough to recognize his 
advantages over the typical volunteer, he organized his own company of cavalry in the 
autumn of 1861. He secured the approbation of Governor Curtin, Secretary of War 
Simon Cameron and the hero of Fort Sumter, Brigadier General Robert Anderson, at 
whose headquarters in Kentucky it would serve. 
Palmer generated interest in the company by providing men of “influence” across the 
state with a copy of his “PLAN ‘The Anderson Troop’” as well as an explanatory cover 
letter. Palmer requested recipients of the letter to sponsor recruits who would “fairly 
represent the intelligence, respectability, and patriotic spirit of the young men of Penna 
[sic].”11  Although no formal constitution and by-laws remain, these foundational 
documents are evidence that Palmer operated within the Pennsylvania tradition of 
voluntary soldiering and he had in mind the fundamental rights of the Troop’s members 
when he conceived it. 
                                                
10 Brit A. Storey, “William Jackson Palmer: A Biography,” Ph.D. diss., University of Kentucky, 1968, 
passim; William Jackson Palmer, Letters, 1853-1868, ed. Isaac H. Clothier (Philadelphia: Ketterlinus, 
1906), 119–128. 
11 Palmer, Letters, 1853-1868, 91-97. 
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The plan laid out the company’s membership, its duties, and some of the soldiers’ 
basic rights and obligations. Members were to be “young men of respectability” from 
across the State who had secured a letter of recommendation from a prominent man of 
their community and would hold themselves to a temperance pledge. The Troop would 
perform “special service” at the general’s request such as reconnaissance, courier, and 
provost duty “in addition to service on the field of battle.”12 Recruits understood the 
promise of headquarters duty and elite status as a necessary condition of their service. 
According to Private William Blackburn’s expectation, “One thing is certain we can not 
[sic] act in any other capacity than as an independent troop” or “we will return home for 
other service.”13 
Blackburn’s presumed right of alienation—of rejecting association—if the 
volunteer’s terms of service were violated was complemented by another of the Troop’s 
soldier rights: a right of selection. Palmer used the letters of recommendation to ensure 
that the Troop’s membership retained traditional features of kinship, community, and 
familiarity endemic to antebellum associational culture.14 Word of mouth encouraged 
                                                
12 Palmer, ibid., 91-97. 
13 William Blackburn to Dear Earpie, 25 November 1861, Anderson Troop, William Blackburn Letters, 
Collection 22B Society Small Collection, Box 3, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia. 
14 For example James Watson Over, a law student in 1862 likely could have claimed a commission in 
typical volunteer regiments, but served as a private in the 15th Pennsylvania throughout the war, David 
Murdoch, “Allegheny County’s Lawyer-Generals in the Civil War,” Civil War Misc. Collection, 
USAMHI. In hindsight, Palmer admitted that many of these upstanding young citizens saw the Regiment 
as a more palatable and safe form of military service that they might have to perform anyway given the 
Militia Act of 17 July 1862’s threat to draft another 300,000 nine-month men, Palmer, Introduction, draft 
“History of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry,” Series II, David Allen Cronin Papers, NYHS. For a 
discussion of the threat of conscription in 1862 see James W. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The 
Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 491-94, 500. 
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prospects’ friends and kin to seek sponsorship too.15 Once the company was assembled 
the citizen-soldiers had an opportunity to exercise their right of selection. Palmer 
emphasized in the Troop’s organic documents that “no member will be bound by his 
acceptance” into the Troop “until after he has seen his comrades, and been mustered into 
service.”16 Importantly, these rights adhered to their membership as soldiers in this 
particular unit. If they could not alienate themselves from membership when the terms 
of contract were violated then their service was not truly consensual. If they could not 
choose their comrades then their association was not truly free. At the same time, it is 
significant that Palmer added the caveat about muster-in.  He recognized early on that 
any associational rights and privileges had to accommodate the demands of military law 
and Federal service. His soldiers’ reluctance to make the same accommodation with the 
powers that be set the stage for the eventual mutiny.      
The plan admitted to specific terms of service, foundational rights of alienation and 
selection, and finally procedural rights like election. General Anderson’s acceptance of 
the Troop had hinged on his prerogative of selecting its commander (who turned out to 
be Palmer). In the plan, Palmer followed existing practice and stipulated that, “The 
remaining officers and non-commissioned officers to be elected by the Co. after it shall 
have been filled up.” Those elections took place just before the Troop’s muster-in to 
                                                
15 Barnes to Palmer, 24 September 1861; Andrew Reeder, a former territorial governor of Kansas (but a 
Pennsylvania native), believed his son could imbue the Troop with “the education and training of a 
gentleman” and identified that “duty requires him to go” into military service, Reeder to Palmer, 30 
September 1861; Covode to Palmer, 30 September 1861, all contained in MSS 477 William Jackson 
Palmer Papers, Box II, Folio 80, Colorado Historical Society, Denver (hereafter CHS). 
16 Palmer to “Dear Sir,” Pennsylvania Rail Road Company, 24 September 1861, in Palmer, Letters, 1853-
1868, 96. Emphasis added. 
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national service in December 1861. With its organization completed and the Troopers 
confident in their soldier rights, they headed west to Kentucky. By the time the company 
reached the Army of the Ohio’s headquarters in Louisville, General Anderson had been 
replaced by Major General Don Carlos Buell who nevertheless ratified the company’s 
role.17 
The Troop performed sterling service for Buell at Louisville, Shiloh, Corinth and 
along the hamlets and roads in between. Service he so prized that on 18 July 1862 Buell  
requested War Department authority to raise a new battalion of “special service” 
headquarters cavalry. Palmer, assisted by twelve recruiters detailed from the Troop, was 
to raise three new companies of cavalry in Pennsylvania. After a period of rudimentary 
training they would be united in Tennessee with the original Anderson Troop. Buell 
expected Palmer to lead the new battalion as a major and its officers were to be veterans 
of the Troop—mostly from the recruiting party—appointed by Governor Curtin.18 
The new recruits’ preexisting convictions about membership and association 
generated rising levels of dissent between September and December 1862. Only 
gradually did the new recruits realize how their contorted relationship to the Anderson 
Troop deprived them of crucial soldier rights. And how, in turn, making sure those rights 
were honored eventually meant risking disciplinary action by the Union Army. 
                                                
17 Thomas Maple, “Anderson Troop,” in Charles H. Kirk, ed., History of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania 
Volunteer Cavalry which Was Recruited and Known as the Anderson Cavalry in the Rebellion of 1861–
1865 (Philadelphia: Society of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1906), 605–07.  
18 William Jackson Palmer, Introduction written c. 1904 for a draft “History of the 15th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,” Series II, David Allen Cronin Papers, NYHS; Kirk, ed., History of Fifteenth Pennsylvania 
Cavalry, 13-15. See the copy of Department of Ohio Special Order No. 111, 28 July 1862, that gave 
Palmer his recruiting authority in Maple, “Anderson Troop,” in Kirk, ed., History of Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, 623, as well as Buell’s plans for officers, 622. 
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Like the Troop before them, the members of the new Anderson Cavalry claimed a 
panoply of soldier rights peculiar to their regiment flowing from the terms of service 
under which they voluntarily associated themselves. This presupposition followed very 
naturally from the culture of volunteering 1) instantiated in public acts like 
Pennsylvania’s law of 1849 and 2) adhered to in the organization of units to that point in 
the conflict. Reunited in Pennsylvania, Palmer and his fellow citizens “formed 
themselves” into self-governing companies. As he proposed terms and they assented, 
male citizen volunteers jointly put “their own by-laws” into operation. 
As with the Troop, there was universal agreement among recruits to the Anderson 
Cavalry that they would be equipped, uniformed, and trained as cavalry serving directly 
at a general’s headquarters for “independent,” “special service.”19 Word that enlistment 
had entailed for this special unit garnered enormous interest in Pennsylvania.20 Palmer 
stationed himself in Philadelphia while his recruiters fanned out across the state, rented 
offices in their home towns, and combed their kinship and professional networks for 
potential volunteers.21 Sixteen year-old Eli Hewitt, from rural Greene County, followed 
                                                
19 William Jackson Palmer, Introduction written c. 1904 for a draft “History of the 15th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry,” Series II, David Allen Cronin Papers, NYHS; John F. Conaway, “Inception and Organization of 
the Regiment,” in Charles H. Kirk, ed., History of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry which 
Was Recruited and Known as the Anderson Cavalry in the Rebellion of 1861-1865 (Philadelphia: Society 
of the Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 1906), 13-15. 
20 “The Anderson Troop,” Philadelphia Press, 2 August 1862; “Anderson Troop,” Pennsylvania Daily 
Telegraph (Harrisburg), 21 August 1862. 
18 “The recruiting officers from the Anderson Troop were stationed throughout the state at their 
hometowns, and naturally drew recruits from the circles in which they moved themselves, John F. 
Conaway, “The Inception and Organization of the Regiment,” in Kirk, ed., History of the Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, 14. 
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his older brother Jacob into the Regiment, a recruiter from the Troop.22 Paul Hersh 
reported to his brother that, “The Adams County boys are all together in one company.” 
So parochial were their attachments that they believed the county to “have one 
Comissioned officer, Capt. Lashell and three non Comissioned ones, Sergt. Geo 
Hildebrand, Petersburg, Corporal Geo. Shields, Gettysburg, and myself.”23 Interested 
parties still had to furnish a recommendation of their fitness for membership. This 
produced recruits for the Cavalry whom George Fobes recalled as “well-connected, 
ambitious” young men with good “physique, intelligence and spirit.” In Palmer’s 
recollection they were a varied lot from “railroads, farms…law offices, stores and 
counting houses, machine shops…or but just out of school or college.”24 
Enlistments of the kind outlined above flooded Palmer in the first weeks of August. 
In exasperation he prodded Buell on 10 August 1862 to secure authorization from the 
War Department for a full regiment of cavalry. At Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania on 22 
August 1862 over 900 men mustered into Federal service for three years as the 
“Anderson Cavalry,” officially designated the 15th Pennsylvania Volunteer Cavalry 
                                                
19 Obituary clippings for Jacob Randolph Hewitt and Eli Hewitt, Eli Hewitt Letters, Civil War 
Miscellaneous Collection, USAMHI. 
23 Paul Hersh to James Hersh, 12 October 1862, Carlisle, PA, “Camp Alabama,” Paul Hersh Letters, Civil 
War Miscellaneous Collection, USAMHI, emphasis added. When Lashell arrived home in Adams county 
to recruit new men to the battalion he was a sergeant in the Anderson Troop, “Adams County Volunteers,” 
Republican Compiler (Gettysburg, PA), 11 August 1862. Hersh hailed from New Oxford, Paul to James 
Hersh, 15 June 1864, Hersh Letters, USAMHI. 
24 George S. Fobes, “An Account of the Mutiny in the Anderson Cavalry, at Nashville, Tenn., Dec., 1862,” 
in Leaves from a Trooper’s Diary by John A. B. Williams (Philadelphia: self-published, 1869), 47; 
Palmer, Introduction, draft “History of 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry,” Series II, David Allen Cronin Papers, 
NYHS. The capsule biography for “Anthony Taylor,” Encyclopædia of Contemporary Biography of 
Pennsylvania, vol. 2 (New York: Atlantic Publishing and Engraving Company, 1890), 112, who was 
eventually promoted to Captain from the ranks notes he graduated from the Protestant Episcopal Academy 
in Philadelphia and had clerked at the large dry goods firm of John Farnum & Co. prior to his enlistment. 
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Regiment.25 That total amounted to roughly 600 men beyond the numbers required for 
the battalion that Buell initially conceived. 
No matter how many volunteers there were in 1862 to the new “Anderson Cavalry,” 
they prized their rights of alienation, selection, and election. George Fobes recalled that 
men joined the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry because they abhored “forced association” 
with lesser classes.26 Eb Allison, a lawyer’s son from Pittsburgh, commented favorably 
that almost all the men in the Regiment were “gentlemen.”27 These sentiments reflect the 
fact that the new men were recruited along the same basis and with the same service 
expectations as the 1861 volunteers who enlisted them. In their efforts to reel in 
enlistments, the recruiters likely would have catalogued the Troop’s soldier rights for 
any potential comrades. 
And there is good evidence as well in the statements of soldiers in the Cavalry at the 
time of the December mutiny. At its height, a mutineers’ petition alerted Secretary 
                                                
25 Colonel James B. Fry, Headquarters, Army of the Ohio, Huntsville, AL, 16 August 1862, to Captain 
William Jackson Palmer, Anderson Cavalry, Philadelphia, PA, War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the 
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 128 vols. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1886), I, XVI, 2, 348–49, provided the enabling order to recruit the full regiment; John F. 
Conaway, “The Inception and Organization of the Regiment,” in Kirk, ed., History of the Fifteenth 
Pennsylvania Cavalry, 14; William McGee to Charles H. Kirk, [n.d.], reminiscence on Antietam and 
Palmer, Introduction, both in a draft “History of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry,” Series II, David Allen 
Cronin Papers, NYHS; Paul to James Hersh, 12 October 1862, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Hersh Letters, 
USAMHI; Maple, “Anderson Troop,” in Kirk, ed., History of Fifteenth Pennsylvania Cavalry, 622-23. 
Recruits also received a $27 state bounty and Philadelphians a $50 city bounty as well, Sergeant Charles 
M. Betts, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, entries for 7 September, 16 October 1862, “Memos from Diary, 
1862-1865,” Charles M. Betts Papers, HSP. 
26 Fobes, “An Account of the Mutiny in the Anderson Cavalry,” 79. Specifically, Fobes classified this 
undesirable element as “a class that frequently composed our eastern regiments” which resulted in the 
Regiment containing recruits “the like of which…never before entered into the composition of an army.” 
27 Eb to Brother, Aug. 27th, 1862, Camp Alabama, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, Eb Allison Collection, Gibson 
Civil War Letters Collection, GLC03523.24, Gilder Lehrman Collection, New York. Demographic 
information drawn from letters 24.5 and 24.40 in the collection. 
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Stanton that “promises were made by the recruiting officer in charge that, should we not 
be assigned to the service for which we were enlisted, we should at once receive our 
discharge.” They continued that they had also been “deprived of the privilege of 
selecting our own officers.”28 Both units appear to have been firmly convinced that they 
could nullify their membership if the terms of service were violated. And they both 
claimed, as a matter of membershipt, to have a say in their tent mates and in their 
leaders. 
As soon as they arrived at Carlisle, however, their rights of membership generated 
serious problems with the reality of their military association—what they often referred 
to as their “organization.” Enormous confusion entailed about the unit’s size, due 
ironically to Palmer’s successful recruiting techniques. Expanding the Cavalry from a 
battalion to a regiment ran counter to the expectations of the earliest 1862 recruits. 
Septimus Knight maintained Palmer had enlisted him into “a Battallion [sic] of men.”29 
Another incredulous volunteer on arriving at “Camp Alabama” in Carlisle explained 
that, “When I enlisted it was in a Battalion…the Battalion or Troop not to exceed Four 
hundred men” and “I find all the men here enlisted under the same impression.” 
Realization that his organization might be unraveling before it began left the soldier 
dismayed. “I was completely surprised at the number of men in camp…I do not 
                                                
28 Petition of W. D. H. Reeder, et al. to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 31 December 1862, OR, I, 
XX, 2: 367. The OR notes that 535 additional names were inscribed on the original petition. 
29 Septimus Knight Diary, 21 August 1862, MS 317, Virginia Military Institute Archives, Lexington 
(hereafter VMI). 
 44 
understand this.”30 A mutineers’ petition in January 1863 alluded to the soldiers’ concern 
for their rights to clear terms of service when it cited the widespread fear that “they were 
not to be used as specified when enlisted.”31 Shock and deflation of expectations about 
the size of the Cavalry was only the first and most obvious attack on members’ rights. 
Other volunteers experienced threats to their right of selection. Along with gathering 
men from specific towns and districts, some recruiters had led them to believe they 
would serve in the same company.32 Pennsylvania law sanctioned this practice and it 
constituted the ordinary mode of organization among volunteers. The expansion of the 
battalion into a regiment appeared to threaten these expected terms and from their point 
of view grossly infringed on the soldiers’ right of selection. According to an anonymous 
cavalryman, “I am not satisfied with the way things are going. I enlist in a certain 
company and a Battalion. I am deceived in each.”33 On the day of the Cavalry’s 
conversion to a regiment, a recruiter startled Eb Allison with the news that his company 
of Pittsburghers would be “disorganized” and the Cavalry “reorganized entirely in the 
new.…in such direct conflict with the understanding which we had had.” Allison 
                                                
30 Anonymous, diary entry, 26 August 1862, emphasis added, 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment 
Collection, Carlisle Barracks Collection, USAMHI. 
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decided “to inquire further into the matter before being sworn into the service of the 
Government.” Luckily for him and his associates, their sponsor secured Palmer’s 
assurance that they could safely muster in and then transfer to their original company.34 
Allison’s experience is good evidence that recruits to the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 
like those to the Troop before them, believed they too possessed a right to choose with 
whom they served. His determination to clarify his “understanding” before mustering-in 
exactly conforms with the right of selection that Palmer sanctioned for his 1861 recruits. 
The right of selection in this context also underscores that soldier rights were not only 
wielded individually but corporately. Allison wrote of the “understanding which we had” 
about forming themselves into a company from their home city. Finally, this episode 
also demonstrates the close connections between soldier rights and soldiers’ home 
communities. Allison’s response to the change in organization echoes William 
Blackburn’s earlier threat to quit the Troop if it did not serve independently. Both 
soldiers bolstered their rights to selection and alienation by relying on their connections 
to home. Therefore, the petitions, open letters, and public meetings that would 
characterize the December mutiny grew organically out of the relationship between 
soldiers, their rights, and their home communities. 
Unanswered questions about the Cavalry’s size created a number of command 
problems. The new recruits wondered what should be its quotient of officers, who those 
officers would be, and how they would be selected. Each of those questions implicated 
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the Troop to some degree. It should first be observed that Palmer had grown completely 
opposed to officer elections by this time; already exultant in January 1862 that, “The 
business of men electing their officers has been wisely stopped in most of the states.”35 
Buell and Palmer’s plans for officers in the new organization, therefore, should come as 
no surprise. The 1862 enlistees had at best “a general understanding” of this. The 
Regiment’s first company was designated “B” because, they had been told, the Troop 
would become Company “A.”36 Some of the the old unit (particularly the erstwhile 
recruiters) would also be a cadre of officers for the proposed battalion. In fact, one 
soldier reported from Carlisle in August that, “Some of the old Troop are acting as 
officers in some of the Companys [sic],” but in an ominous foreshadowing of the 
Cavalry’s grievances about securing a full complement of officers he added, “no one 
seems to have command of this company.”37 In a further blow to rights of election, 
Palmer informed the new men on 22 August that he would “appoint” non-commissioned 
officers based on merit and only then “several Lieutenants will be chosen from the 
number” once they reached Louisville and General Buell’s headquarters.38 
These arrangements contradicted volunteers’ sense of their foundational rights. It 
transgressed their rights of selection and election within their own organization. 
Preserving the distinct character of the Cavalry respected the rule of law. The Regiment, 
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not the Troop, was their object of membership. Electing officers from amongst 
themselves protected the members’ authority over their own affairs. Selection and 
election were mutually supporting pillars for self-government. Both of these founding 
rights continued local control and popular sovereignty within the military association. 
As time went on, the Troop became a focal point for three grievances on the part of 
the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry: that it lacked the proper complement of officers; that 
Palmer should rectify this through elections from within the Regiment; and that once 
properly organized it should assume its promised role as headquarters escort to General 
Buell and replace the Troop.39 The new recruits became convinced that the Regiment 
had to take precedence over the Troop. Worse still, in the Cavalry’s view, the Troop 
enjoyed an unfair advantage because it continued to serve in its original capacity as 
Buell’s bodyguard. It could lobby for its position with the general while the men of the 
Cavalry had no such leverage. 
With these conflicting circumstances of service ongoing, Robert E. Lee’s invasion of 
Maryland interrupted the completion of the Cavalry’s organization and in the process 
robbed it of Palmer, its guding, visionary leader. The question of officers thrust to the 
fore when a detachment of the Regiment was ordered to patrol the Pennsylvania border 
during the Antietam Campaign. In the course of their reconnaissance and scouting duties 
Palmer was captured in the battle’s aftermath and the regiment had to complete its 
organization at Camp Carlisle without him. 
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Palmer’s capture had profound consequences. Numerous dispositions about the 
Regiment’s organization remained unfinished, despite his assurance just prior to 
Antietam that the Cavalry still retained its designation as General Buell’s body guard. In 
his absence volunteers’ anxieties about their soldier rights proliferated. These concerns 
accumulated unresolved, grew into grievances, generated suspicion, and gave birth to 
rumors. Shortly after the Regiment reunited at Carlisle in the wake of the Confederate 
withdrawal from Maryland, their own governor trampled the volunteers’ rights of 
selection and election. Because of Palmer’s capture at Antietam and acting Lieutenant 
Colonel William Spencer’s continuing illness, Governor Curtin appointed Sergeant 
Frank Ward of the Troop as a temporary captain in the Regiment with instructions to 
submit ten additional names for commissions—less than one-third of  the regiment’s 
paper complement. It should come as no surprise that Ward selected from among his 
fellow recruiters. And some non-commissioned appointments appear to have been made 
at this time on the basis of personal connections, rather than merit as Palmer had 
promised earlier.40 
The continuing discrepancy between expectations and reality became increasingly 
unbearable for the volunteers of 1862. The confusion between September and December 
1862 about the status of their corporate and individual rights in uniform centered on the 
lack of officers and in turn, their disgust at being led by men forced upon them. They 
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also grew more convinced with time that the Regiment’s unjust organization might 
necessitate acting on their right of alienation. 
Changes in command at higher levels soon exacerbated conditions in the Regiment. 
Buell blunted a Confederate invasion of Kentucky at the Battle of Perryville on 8 
October 1862, but refused to invade eastern Tennessee as President Lincoln desired. On 
30 October Lincoln turned over Buell’s command, now renamed the Army of the 
Cumberland, to Major General William S. Rosecrans. Some of Rosecrans’s first 
correspondence with the Army’s general-in-chief, Major General Henry W. Halleck, 
pertained specifically to the 15th Pennsylvania. Unwittingly, Rosecrans did the most to 
inflame fears in the Regiment that its promise of “special service” would be revoked. 
When he reorganized the Army of the Cumberland he placed the 15th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry in the reserve of his newly formed cavalry corps commanded by Brigadier 
General David S. Stanley. For the time being the Troop remained as his headquarters 
escort.41 On 2 November Halleck ordered the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry to move to 
Nashville via Louisville, Kentucky, where they would receive their full complement of 
horses.42 
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Thus, a little over two months after their muster into Federal service, the members of 
the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment could claim no part in the election of their 
officers; men who came instead from an entirely separate organization. The size and 
composition of the Regiment had changed before their eyes since recruitment. The fate 
of their organization and their attendant rights continued to be twisted by the existence 
of the Troop—over which they also had no control. Already, their fortunes and futures 
were in the hands of distant officials—governors, generals, cabinet officials—over 
whom they could exert no restraint or influence. Now they had been ordered to leave 
home with no assurance that the role promised them at muster-in would be maintained. 
While many soldiers, men like William Colton, doubtless greeted orders for their 
move west as “glorious news,”43 the most paranoid soldiers seized on word that Buell 
had been sacked to argue that the terms of service promising them headquarters escort 
duty had been voided. Sure that this time they had been duped, they submitted a petition 
to the sickly Lieutenant Colonel Spencer prior to their departure for Kentucky, around 6 
November 1862. They demanded the Army dissolve the Cavalry without delay “in 
justice to us.”44 Prescient about Rosecrans's different plans for them, this would not be 
the last time that their right of alienation would prompt the disobedience of orders. But 
the Army had violated their service terms at the same time that it condoned the 
continued outsized influence of the Troop. 
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Convinced of the need to answer his soldiers’ criticisms, Frank Ward issued a special 
order to the entire Regiment asserting (without sanction) that their organization’s future 
remained secure. Governor Curtin had elevated him to a provisional major’s rank in 
September. Now second-in-command, he stepped forward to act for the debilitated 
Spencer. His order reaffirmed the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry’s permanent attachment to 
General Rosecrans’s headquarters, performance of special service as promised, and a full 
complement of officers determined after arrival in Louisville. Their concerns about 
election remained unresolved, but Ward’s show of leadership eased their worries. For 
the moment, the men reneged and agreed to embark for the West. Yet, they understood 
their choice as at best a decision to “forego any decisive action to attain our just rights at 
this time.” Continued service was contingent “according to the promises made.”45 
The Regiment arrived in the Bluegrass State on 11 November,46 expecting to be 
welcomed by enough officers to complete their organization. Unfortunately, only 
Sergeant Adolph G. Rosengarten, also holding a temporary major’s commission in the 
Cavalry, stood on the platform. Upon inquiry, neither the Army nor their governor 
seemed to have any plans to commission additional officers from within the Regiment to 
bring it to full strength. The regiment’s acting quartermaster reported that not even 
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Pennsylvania’s adjutant general “knew whether we belonged to the State or to the 
General Government.”47 At that moment, no competent authority could guarantee the 
protection of these citizens’ individual and corporate rights directly connected to their 
status as soldiers. 
The situation was so precarious that Septimus Knight remarked at the time, only 
“two or three commissioned officers” were on duty with the Regiment.48 An inspection 
of the lists of officers in the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry prior to the mutiny indicates he 
had good reasons for his perception. Its colonel languished in a Confederate prison and 
its lieutenant colonel in a sick bed. That left two majors and the adjutant on the 
regimental staff. Another thirteen recruiters from the Troop comprised the company 
officers. On paper a Union cavalry company in 1862 had three commissioned officers: a 
captain and two lieutenants. In the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry—a regiment that had not 
seen heavy combat—no companies had their full complement of officers. Only five had 
a captain. Of its eleven companies, four had two officers, five had only a single officer, 
and two had none.49 One of the bereft was Knight’s Company D. Reconstructing the 
insufficiency of the Cavalry’s officer corps contextualizes Knight’s shocking statement, 
but also speaks to its genuine disorganization. The distribution of officers crystalized for 
                                                
47 Septimus Knight, entry for “October November and December,” 1862, Knight Diary, VMI; Brit A. 
Storey, “William Jackson Palmer,” (PhD diss., University of Kentucky, 1970), 86; Fobes, “An Account of 
the Mutiny,” 78-80, 82. 
48 William Colton gives the date of arrival, 11 November 1862, William F. Colton Diary, HSP; Septimus 
Knight, entry for “October November and December,” 1862, Knight Diary, VMI. 
49 Bates, History of Pennsylvania Volunteers, 1861-5, 899–901. By the New Year, there were twelve line, 
seven staff, and about two-thirds of the non-commissioned officers, Charles Betts, John S. Bourne, 
William Cowan, “Statement of Grievances,” Co. E., 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, 7 January 1863, Charles 
M. Betts Papers, 1862-64, Coll. 1889, HSP. 
 53 
the soldiers their conviction that the Regiment had lost its self-governing character and 
was at the same time incapable of military operations. Certainly in their view, if whoever 
was in charge of them (be that the Army or the state of Pennsylvania) had allowed them 
to simply elect officers from among themselves, all would have been well. Instead, their 
entire endeavor at uniformed service in defense of a self-governing Republic had been 
undermined by “roguery;” the Regiment was not even “properly organized and officered 
after reaching Louisville.”50 
These signs of neglect and manipulation made Louisville the scene of another 
“rumpus”51 when more soldiers suspected that Rosecrans intended to move the Cavalry 
from headquarters to the field. “A large percentage” of them refused to proceed 
southward, believing it “our duty” instead to “demand our rights.”52 When formally 
“ordered to Nashville” these men “refused to go until that previous order was complied 
with,”53 namely Ward’s promise of final organization. Nearly five hundred men served 
another petition to Lieutenant Colonel Spencer. Citing Ward’s imprudent assurances, 
they demanded to be fully officered or else disbanded. In addition, “about fifty or one 
hundred soldiers” performed a “demonstration of disorganization” when they “swore to 
Major Ward and others…that they would not go any farther with the regiment, and then 
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cheered! Several of them made their word good by not only remaining in Louisville 
when we left that place, but returned to their homes!”54 
The Louisville rumpus revealed how much faith in regimental self-government had 
been lost. The very idea of temporary officers from the Troop had become intolerable 
while at the same time emblematic of the erosion of soldier rights. Men found 
themselves taking orders from fellows whom they had not elected nor even chosen to 
serve alongside. The Troopers assumed the Regiment “was their exclusive property by 
virtue of their belonging to the body-guard.” Even Troopers on leave from Nashville 
were “invested by their friends with the authority” to act as officers of the day. The 1862 
volunteers “looked upon this appropriation of themselves with no great meekness” and 
they “began at length to feel that they had been enlisted not for the good of the service, 
but for the purpose of furnishing commissions to a body of men who looked upon them 
as their aristocratic right.” Rather than avoiding “forced association” as they had hoped, 
the Cavalry’s members had been lured right into it. The entire phenomenon of making 
the Troopers into officers for the Regiment had turned into an “unauthorized handing 
over of a regiment bodily to privates of another organization.”55 
In the view of men from the Cavalry, control and supervision over the regiment 
rightly belonged to them. They were consensual members whose status granted them 
these founding and procedural rights. These rights had been established by Pennsylvania 
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law and common practice in the years before the war. The state’s first Civil War 
regiments had been organized along the same lines. Most importantly, the 1862 
volunteers had been assured by their recruiters of their specific soldier rights as members 
of the Anderson Cavalry. Unjust authority sapped the regiment’s morale and inflamed 
belief that governance of their free association seemed to be slipping away. The gradual 
erosion of their soldier rights, hardly arrested by the two petition campaigns, must be 
judged a necessary yet not sufficient cause of the mutiny in December. 
In that light, these early petitions were the first shoots of the popular constitutional 
actions that climaxed in the mutiny of December 1862. First, the men of the regiment 
demonstrated a clear commitment to associationalism. The regiment's corporate rights 
and their individual soldier rights were meant to be a brake on centralized power of any 
kind. The regiment’s organization, destination, and deployment were their concern. 
Their status as soldiers invested them with rights to establish self-government. When it 
broke down, protest actions tried to repair any breeches and remind authorities of the 
people’s role in opposing tyranny. 
From these convictions flowed the petitions’ second purpose: they initiated a 
challenge by the Regiment’s members to Army and civil officials over the boundaries 
between military necessity and citizen self-government. In November 1862, citizens in 
the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry offered a strict interpretation of their responsibilities to the 
Union war effort. They refused to accept officers imposed from outside and they 
demanded the Regiment serve at headquarters as promised. These soldier rights should 
not be compromised merely to expedite the polices and plans of their governor, their 
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commanding general, or the secretary of war. By Christmastime a majority of the men in 
the Anderson Cavalry believed only the extreme protest action of mutiny could restore 
the proper measure of control over their lives in uniform. 
As surprising as it might seem, Lieutenant Colonel Spencer’s promise that Rosecrans 
could be depended on to resolve the regiment’s difficulties got the 15th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry to Nashville by 24 December 1862 without further incident during a two-week 
ride from Louisville.56 Still, a potent mixture of fears about the Regiment’s integrity, 
worries about who would lead them, and whether they would be coerced into duty 
different than their terms of service kept their anxieties alive on the way to Tennessee. 
Those worries did not abate upon reaching the “Athens of the South.” 
Scuttlebutt suggested an imminent battle and added to the urgency of solving the 
Cavalry’s predicament. On Christmas Day, therefore, a committee “representing every 
company in the regiment” confronted Spencer and intended to hold him to his pledge. 
The prospect of combat demanded that sufficient officers, preferably from within the 
Regiment, be provided. Private Lancaster Thomas reported the soldiers “were not 
satisfied with the officers.” Sergeant Eben Allison identified the lack of officers as the 
“chief” cause of all the Regiment’s troubles. Sergeant Septimus Knight went even 
further and cited the volunteers’ “demands in regards to proper officers being 
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commissioned” for the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, “instead of men out of the old 
Anderson Troop.”57 
Despite efforts to organize the Regiment on their terms, military events proceeded 
apace. The expected orders appeared the day after Christmas—reconnaissance duty in 
advance of Rosecrans’s movement against the Confederate Army of Tennessee around 
Murfreesboro—unaccompanied by additional officers. A moment of decision was at 
hand. Public meetings, akin to those in which Pennsylvanians had first organized the 
1861 regiments, occurred in every company. Friends of the Cavalry back home would 
hold similar gatherings in January and February 1863 to organize civic action on the 
mutineers’ behalf. These kinds of political actions were possible because of a regimental 
camp’s structure and appearance defined by the regulations that in turn structured the 
place, timing, and nature of officer-soldier interaction. Soldiers’ living quarters, although 
set apart from one another, were connected by “streets” running alongside the rows of 
each company’s tents that facilitated the interchange of officers and men. These streets 
permitted officers to easily move about the camp and observe the activities of their 
soldiers. They also permitted the soldiers to congregate with one another in prayer 
meetings, games of chance, letter writing and reading, and common fellowship. Finally, 
the company streets permitted avenues of access for soldiers to their officers when it was 
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necessary to make routine reports, request the replacement of issued equipment, or even 
bring complaints against another soldier or officer.58 
The most visually prominent space when looking at any camp diagram is the large 
open area of the parade ground. Here was the place of the closest, most regular, and most 
regimented contact between soldiers and officers. It was also the literal public square for 
a regiment. For it was here that the regiment assembled for the reading of general and 
special orders, for inspection by their brigade commander, for the award of meritorious 
conduct medals, and the reading of unit citations. It was also a place of punishment. 
Drunks would be publicly shamed standing at attention wearing a board stating their 
misdeed. Insubordinate soldiers would be made to march with full pack or be bucked 
and on display for the entire regiment to witness. At its most grave, the parade ground 
could serve as the site of public execution for soldiers convicted of capital crimes in the 
sight of all officers and men.59 
The layout of camps and the way they directed human interaction had many 
functional similarities to those of antebellum cities. Hundreds of side streets and alleys 
fed pedestrians, carts, and wagons onto major arteries like Broadway in New York City 
or Canal Street in New Orleans. Once there citizens took part in commerce, 
entertainment, and politics.  The city streets at once united them and highlighted their 
eclecticism. Military camps, like the urban centers, became stages on which citizens (in 
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uniform) defined the boundaries of self-government. America’s antebellum streets 
routinely witnessed raucous, vexed confrontations between urban dwellers hailing from 
different classes, neighborhoods, races, and genders; each one staked their claim to 
personal independence through use of the street. City streets also served as the 
thoroughfares for parades and marches. Most antebellum cities also featured a central 
open-air gathering place quite similar in function to the parade ground. These became 
citizens’ “public arenas in which popular sovereignty could be exercised.”60 
John Tweedale, who won a Medal of Honor at Murfreesboro, left an account of the 
civic proceedings in Company B. “I was marching up and down my [guard] post” when 
“I saw the men in the company streets stacking their arms.” Inquiring of the officer of 
the guard, “he said the men had refused to march, and he said we had better settle that in 
our companies.” Although it violated the Articles of War, they left their guard stations, 
returned to camp, “went to our several messes and took a vote.” In Tweedale’s mess 
“five decided to go into the fight and one to stay with the command in Nashville.”61 In 
other companies the process was the same. William Colton in Company C noted that he 
and all five of his messmates voted by majority to obey orders.62 
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Army life accustomed soldiers to living in such close proximity to other people 
whether through sharing a tent or eating in common. They grew familiar with using the 
company streets to pass information and the parade ground to gather in mass for public 
meetings. Their parade grounds and company streets were where officers and men 
rubbed elbows, practiced the soldierly arts, performed much of their daily routine, and 
performed the rituals of command and obedience. They also became, therefore, soldiers’ 
sites for defiance and expressions of personal independence. 
As a consequence, tent after tent across the Regiment held similar votes. Even 
though individuals followed their consciences and either obeyed or mutinied, the mess 
votes give dramatic evidence that Anglo soldiers retained an instinct for subsidiarity that 
was endemic to self-government. Even informally they devolved decisions to the 
smallest constitutive unit possible—the five or six men who shared a tent—in order to 
make those results reflective of “local” feeling without pressure from outside parties. In 
the end, a curious outcome resulted that is perhaps reflective of America’s distinctive 
electoral system. 
While a majority of soldiers opted to obey orders on 26 December, six out of ten 
companies could be called “mutinous.” Only companies E and L were overwhelmingly 
obedient. By contrast in company F, more than eight out of ten soldiers went against 
orders. Companies C, D, G, I, and K each had three-fifths or more mutinous men while 
company H had just under four-fifths of its personnel follow orders. Finally, only in 
company B came close to an even split; the men divided forty-five to forty-one in favor 
 61 
of going to the front. Thus, on 26 December, 453 men obeyed orders to assemble with 
the other regiments of General Stanley’s cavalry corps and 408 soldiers refused.63 
Except that the numbers arrived at in these lists,collected during the Army’s January 
1863 inquiry into the mutiny, conflict with the later testimony of General Rosecrans, the 
eyewitness testimony of soldiers at the time, and the regiment’s oral tradition. 
Throughout the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry’s official history, as well as the published and 
unpublished accounts of veterans, those who went to the front were uniformly known in 
the Cavalry’s shorthand as “The Three Hundred.”64 Eb Allison explained in his letters 
home “there were only between two and three hundred of us.”65 The mutineer Septimus 
Knight derided them at the time as “The noble 300???”.66 General Rosecrans stated 
definitively in postwar testimony that, “Only 300 went to the front.…No 400 went to the 
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front.…It was only 300 that went into the fight.”67 Therefore, it is entirely plausible that 
around 400 mutinied “until their rights were inquired into and redress obtained.” About 
300 or so obeyed orders. And another 150 absented themselves from battle due to 
skulking, capture, or outright desertion.68 
The Andersons’ initial choices between defiance and obedience marked a traumatic 
end to 1862 and a tumultuous New Year. Those men who believed their highest duty 
was to obey orders spent from 26 December to 1 January in either continual movement 
or combat. The most deadly encounter came on 29 December. Two battalions 
commanded respectively by Majors Frank Ward and Adolph Rosengarten impulsively 
charged after retreating Confederate cavalry near Wilkinson’s Cross Roads. Except they 
ran head-long into entrenched Georgia and South Carolina infantry regiments. 
Rosengarten died instantly, Ward was mortally wounded, along with another eleven 
killed, twenty-five wounded, and nine missing among the ranks.69 
Back in Nashville, its commandant, Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell, exerted 
what leverage he could. He encouraged the mutineers to “take up your arms” while 
admitting, “I have no right to command you without orders.” In addition he crafted a 
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communiqué to his superior presenting the mutineers as “perfectly peaceable,” despite 
having been “deceived,” and requesting only to be “officered and organized.” Unsure 
what further steps he could take on his own initiative, he somewhat sheepishly asked for 
“instruction what to do with them.”70 
Such instructions came in succession from Rosecrans. Perhaps influenced by 
Mitchell’s outlook, Rosecrans wanted to signal he recognized the legitimacy of the 
mutineers’ grievances. He recalled to the Troop any man detailed as a temporary officer 
in the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Acknowledging that official commissions required the 
governor’s seal, he drafted entirely new “acting appointments” for a cohort of Troopers 
to command the Regiment. But Majors Rosengarten,Ward, and the current officers who 
had departed for the front with the “Three Hundred” never received these orders. His 
new dispositions only confirmed the dissenters’ convictions that their soldier rights were 
being honored in the breach: again they had to accept outsiders rather than officers of 
their own. The men in camp at Nashville refused to unstack their arms. Furthermore, 
Rosecrans offended those Troopers who had been temporary officers but did not make 
the new list. Out of spite, they encouraged the dissenters to stand their ground.71 
Rosecrans also relayed again, through Mitchell, to the mutineers that they should 
march to his headquarters and expect to be placed in the field unless they wanted to be 
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seen as “kid glove soldiers.”72 Captain Henry O. Tintsman, acting in command of 
Company F, explained to headquarters on 29 December that some 400 men still refused 
to serve.73 Tintsman could only rouse thirty men from various companies to march with 
him to Rosecrans’s headquarters at Stewart’s Run near Murfreesboro on the morning of 
30 December.74 
Later that same morning, Brigadier General James D. Morgan arrived at the 
mutineers’ camp with the 10th Illinois Infantry and a detachment from the 5th Kentucky 
Cavalry.75 He carried orders from a frustrated Rosecrans. After two unheeded appeals to 
the mutineers, he had resolved on punitive measures to “disgrace” them. He wanted an 
intimidating show of force that would convince them to serve as ordered. If they refused, 
Morgan was to “take such measures and use such force as you may deem necessary to 
make them march.” Charles Weller reported that once he and his fellow mutineers were 
promised a chance to “state our grievances we accordingly started 250 of us” for General 
Rosecrans’s headquarters.76 In reality, something much closer to a popular constitutional 
standoff ensued on the parade ground that morning. 
                                                
72 Colonel J. P. Garesché, Chief of Staff, Army of the Cumberland, Headquarters, near La Vergne to 
Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell, Commanding, Nashville 29 December 1862, OR, I, XX, 2: 357; the 
“kid glove” comment is from Rosecrans’s testimony, “Records of the Rebellion,” 25. 
73 Captain Henry O. Tintsman to Brigadier General Robert B. Mitchell, Commanding Post of Nashville, 29 
December 1862, Betts Papers, HSP. 
74 Captain Henry O. Tintsman, Camp Ward, to Major N. H. Davis, Assistant Inspector-General, U. S. 
Army, 28 January 1863, OR, I, XX, 2: 358–59. These erstwhile mutineers joined the “Three Hundred” on 
New Year’s Eve. 
75 James D. Morgan, Brigadier General, Commanding Fourth Division, to Captain John Pratt, Assistant 
Adjutant General, Post, 29 December 1862, OR, I, XX, 2: 359-60. 
76 Weller to McElwain, 18 January 1863, Weller Letters, USAMHI. 
 65 
In the absence of a commanding officer since Tintsman’s departure, Morgan ordered 
the men to stand for review. They had thirty minutes to ready themselves and their 
mounts to march.77 Soldiers “equipped themselves as for dress parade, but without arms” 
and “marched out by companies…with a precision and celerity” that would have marked 
the most disciplined regiments. Cognizant of this still defiant stance, Morgan signaled 
his troops to load their weapons, read his orders to the 15th Pennsylvania, and queried “if 
they still refused to march.” A number of mutineers, while keeping ranks, bravely 
reiterated their grievances about poor organization and a lack of officers. Morgan was 
unmoved and granted them five minutes to decide their fate.78 
In his later report, Morgan explained that, “Some few of the members commenced 
saddling up, the remainder refusing, and expressing a strong desire to be arrested.”79 
George Fobes, as the only eyewitness for the mutineers, believed that this desire for 
arrest sprang from a attested to their just claim to self-government. He characterized the 
mutineers as “strong in their conviction of right, facing two regiments that might in a 
few moments more cut them to pieces.” He petitioned General Morgan for more time “to 
go amongst the men” and urge compliance. According to Fobes, the Andersons’ cool 
defiance in the face of dread forced the general’s hand. Morgan insisted that General 
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Rosecrans “would do them justice,”80 while granting to “the Cavalry that, after all, their 
wishes and his orders were about the same; that his desire was to lead them to Gen. 
Rosecrans, who would see, he doubted not, that they were at once properly organized.” 
As Ward and Spencer before him, Morgan’s promise finally “had the desired effect.”81 
They began to mount, “making a request that an officer be detailed to lead them.” After 
putting the mutineers under the command of the 10th Illinois’s Lieutenant Colonel 
Wood, Morgan led this provost force back to Nashville.82 
Yet only a hundred mutineers reached the city and Rosecrans’s headquarters. The 
column was harassed by three regiments of Confederate cavalry which forced the 
majority to return to the Anderson’s camp. The Army tried again on 31 December to 
rally the mutineers, but to no avail. Only eighteen men, including Charles Weller, 
relented and served as couriers for General Mitchell. At this point, with the Battle of 
Stones River underway, an exasperated Rosecrans ordered the stalwarts be placed under 
arrest at Nashville. About 200 men suffered imprisonment in a workhouse, “a building 
used by the city authorities as a lockup for drunken and disorderly rabble” according to 
the mutineer Septimus Knight. By 10 January some 100 stragglers from Wood’s original 
column also found themselves confined there and about the same number in the nearby 
county jail. Roughly 300 men were accounted either dead, in hospital wounded, or 
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missing. Finally, just over 200 obedient soldiers now encamped separately. In the 
recollection of George Fobes, many of the Three Hundred “courageously gave up their 
arms and joined their comrades in the Workhouse” from a “determination which they 
had formed with their comrades, to compel a reorganization of the regiment.83 A broad 
feeling persisted in the Cavalry that the maintenance of their soldier rights was a serious 
matter, one so grave that it merited sacrifices and privations atop those recently endured 
on the battlefield 
That both loyal and mutinous soldiers recognized the ongoing threat to their soldier 
rights of membership, selection, and election is born out by a petition dated 31 
December and endorsed by 536 soldiers. Addressed to Secretary Stanton, it reiterated the 
soldier rights upon which they had based the mutiny.84 A campaign for redress followed 
that eventually encompassed national, state, and military authorities as well as citizen 
allies in Pennsylvania. Although the Battle of Stones River concluded on 2 January 
1863, until well into February the men of the Cavalry—whether mutinous or obedient—
engaged in a calculated popular constitutionalism aimed at exercising their soldier rights 
and thereby achieving a measure of local control over their regiment. 
Hoping to end the mutiny, Rosecrans tried to frustrate the Andersons’ solidarity 
through special orders on 9 January that praised the Three Hundred’s gallantry but 
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shamed the mutineers for betrayal of their “kin” and the “honor of their native state.” 
But he extended clemency to them as well, reversing the mutineers’ own contractual 
logic. In these remarks he drew on the bonds of associational culture, urging them to 
“resolve on some reparation” to restore their broken oath to the Army and the Union 
“before covering them with that deserved infamy which will blast them forever in the 
esteem of their fellows.”85 
By March, Rosecrans settled on withholding pay in order to force the most 
intransigent soldiers to resume service. He could have court-martialed them for mutiny 
under the Articles of War and its verdict might well have been death. The decision to 
interrupt their pay suggests that Rosecrans did not believe the Cavalry’s complaint was 
completely baseless. The punishment also hearkened back to the modes of correction 
countenanced in antebellum volunteer soldiering wherein punishment either took the 
form of fines or dismissal from the association. Therefore, Rosecrans appeared to be 
encouraging a change of heart rather than seeking definitive retribution. Again, his 
change of course seemed to indicate that he believed, in regards to matters of contract 
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and organization, that citizens in uniform should be handled differently than regulars.86 
Even so, the mutineers’ pay did not resume until April 1863.87 
Rosecrans’s repeated willingness to bear the mutiny patiently probably encouraged 
the Cavalry to dig in its heels and provided time for its advocates at home to launch their 
own efforts. On 10 January 1863 the mutineers provided a detailed public letter to their 
allies in Philadelphia who had styled themselves as a committee “deputed to inquire into 
the condition of the Anderson Cavalry.” They retold the Regiment’s history from 
recruitment to stacking arms. Citing their “hopeless and useless condition,” the 
petitioners set the now familiar grievances as grounds for “simple justice from the hands 
of a Government we would have died to save.” Moreover, they believed such justice 
meant honorable discharges “from an organization that has become odious.” Not only to 
escape confinement, but for the right to “re-enlist” with another regiment, “where they 
can do justice to themselves, their country, and God-given principles of self-
government.”88 Here then, the right of alienation made possible the integrity of the 
citizen’s right to associate with a new organization; to form, in a local paradigm, a more 
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perfect union. For the soldiers of the Anderson Cavalry, their regiment’s “organization” 
was that of the Union writ small. 
Individual companies also drafted their own memorials and public letters. Soldiers 
who had obeyed orders on 26 December helped draft both of these petitions. Company 
E, for instance, believed it had been “completely deceived” about the size of the 
Anderson Cavalry and its service. Promises about its officers had “never been fulfilled.” 
Now they faced the prospect of serving as “common cavalry” in a brigade, not in an 
independent command attached to Rosecrans’s headquarters as their recruiters had 
assured them.89 
As petitions and letters flowed eastward from the Regiment, citizen advocates and 
family members in Pennsylvania pressured the Army and civil authorities to release the 
prisoners. Dating back to the mutiny’s outbreak, the Andersons’ camp had been 
inundated with visitors. At first merely curious soldiers and Nashvillians, voices 
emanating from the Keystone State increasingly intervened as December turned to 
January.90 They became a vital link between the camp ground and meeting hall. Kin and 
neighbors of the mutineers held public meetings in Philadelphia and Pittsburgh (and 
presumably other locales too) during December and January. Home-grown inspectors 
and investigators left these meetings for Nashville, with their expenses paid and their 
agendas determined through the kinds of spontaneous local initiative that had raised so 
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many Pennsylvania regiments. For example, An elected chairman opened a meeting held 
at the Young Men’s Christian Association (YMCA) in Philadelphia with a prayer before 
asking that its correspondence with the mutineers and the military authorities be reported 
out. The meeting also raised money to pay for attorneys hired in the men’s defense. The 
chairman’s pointed address summed up the gathering’s raison d'etre: “Let these boys 
receive the sympathy they deserve, and let an effort be made to relieve them from a 
terrible military despotism.”91 In fact, citizens like W. W. Ward, brother of deceased 
Major Frank Ward, had already corresponded with General Rosecrans and announced 
that he and other prominent Pennsylvanians intended to pressure the War Department for 
the mutineers’ release.92 
The matrix of soldier and citizen activism produced results, none more impressive 
than the effect on Washington and the Army. On 16 January a committee of 
Pennsylvania citizens wrote Secretary Stanton recounting the men’s grievances, 
recommending the regiment be disbanded, and requesting honorable discharges for the 
men of the Cavalry. The authors claimed too that Rosecrans had the mutineers “confined 
in loathsome prisons.”93 Only a day later, Adjutant General of the Army Lorenzo 
Thomas dispatched an assistant inspector-general, Major Neriah H. Davis, to “inquire 
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minutely into…everything connected with the arrest and confinement of these men.”94 
Stanton also followed his orders to Thomas with a sharp rebuke to General Mitchell. 
Accepting the claims of the petitioners on their face, Stanton accused Mitchell of 
handling the mutineers “in a cruel and improper manner.”95 
Secretary Stanton’s sudden intervention into the affair prompted Rosecrans to seek a 
quick and generous resolution. Private Milton Shaw observed that “as soon as the 
Officer came from Washington [Major Davis] and saw how we had been swindled he 
ordered us to be released.”96 In fact, only two days after Stanton’s missive to Mitchell, 
Rosecrans proposed a gracious pardon to all the imprisoned men of the Cavalry. He 
further promised them “officers of their own selection, re-equipment, and offered to take 
them on duty at his headquarters if they would go to duty.”97 In one fell swoop they had 
secured their essential soldier rights on the good authority of their commanding general. 
In the words of Eb Allison, Rosecrans had “granted them all they had asked” for over the 
previous three months.98 
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At this juncture, however, the rights to election and to service terms came into 
conflict with the right of alienation. As a result the Cavalry lost its chance to have 
Rosecrans meet all their demands. Private Shaw chalked the lost opportunity up to 
“underhanded deviltry.”99 It may have been, but the blame rested on those dissenters 
who pressed increasingly for disbandment and drew conviction from the citizen 
committees. Eb Allison summed it up accordingly: 
Some of the men being tired of the service and under the impression that they 
would be disbanded if they held out awhile longer, rejected General Rosecrans’s 
order and dissuaded their comrades who were inclined to accept it from doing so. 
They were encouraged in this course by letters received from home, too. They 
had it in their power to atone to a great extent for their misstep, but unfortunately 
let the opportunity pass by without taking advantage of it. General Rosecrans has 
since rescinded his order and now the recusants will be compelled to return to the 
regiment.100 
There were about 200 of these “recusants.” They had gone from treating the mutiny 
as a proper means of securing their rights while in uniform to using it as an occasion to 
negate what they had come to see as the arbitrary and unjust actions of the Army; what 
their Pennsylvania friends earlier termed “the doctrine of military despotism.”101 As they 
had expressed in their petition to Stanton above, gross disorganization demanded that 
soldiers have the right to disassociate. 
The public meetings by civilians at halls in Pennsylvania, as well as those by citizen-
soldiers in their tents in Tennessee, are unmistakable sites of antebellum self-
government. Each case offers examples of citizens acting as legislators of their own 
                                                
99 Milton E. Shaw to Dear Cos, Murfreesboro, TN, 16 March 1863, CWMC, USAMHI. 
100 Eb Allison to Dear Brother, 4 March 1863, Camp near Murfreesboro, Allison Collection, GLC03523.24 
(#45), GLC. 
101 Palmer to Fry, 15 February 1863, OR, I, XX, 2: 376. 
 74 
local affairs by voting on ballot questions and then directing a course of action. 
Furthermore, the citizen committees likely required the crafting of procedural and 
administrative apparatuses to conduct meetings, raise and distribute funds, and elect 
officers. Military protest actions alongside citizen popular constitutionalism both stood 
in the breach to preserve self-government. Mutiny, and its ancillaries before and after, 
put soldiers’ foundational and procedural rights into action. When their citizen partners 
adopted the soldiers’ concerns as their own and launched instances of scrutiny and 
assembly themselves, they acknowledged that defending soldiers’ rights of membership 
against the Army’s instrumentalism was the latest contest in the Republic’s interminable 
struggle against unconstitutional authority.102  
The mutiny secured the Regiment its service as an independent unit and propelled it 
toward perhaps one of the most exciting records in the entire Army, if not the most 
consequential. Immediately after the Battle of Stones River, it came under the direct 
control of a district commander and performed reconnaissance, intelligence, and raiding 
missions. For the balance of 1863 and all of 1864 it continued under army-level 
command. For example, during December 1864 under the direct control of Major 
General George H. Thomas (Rosecrans’s successor), the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry 
marched 360 miles, touching parts of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama. They attacked 
three Confederate supply trains in that time, taking forty-seven prisoners and destroying 
310 wagons. In 1865 more laurels accumulated. In March, Palmer gained a brevet 
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brigadier-general’s star and command of First Brigade, First Cavalry Division, 
Department of East Tennessee prior to joining Major General George Stoneman’s raid 
through Virginia and North Carolina. With Charles Betts in command as colonel, the 
Regiment pursued Confederate general P. G. T. Bureaugard, captured General Braxton 
Bragg, and was within miles of capturing Jefferson Davis on 10 May 1865. By war’s 
end, the Regiment claimed six Medal of Honor winners, including Betts and Palmer.103 
But none of this might have come to pass were it not for the mutiny and the dramatic 
return of Colonel William Jackson Palmer from Confederate capture on 7 February 
1863. In his first speech to the Regiment on 22 February he spoke proudly of the 15th 
Pennsylvania’s service at the Battle of Antietam and looked forward with hope to the 
future. He promised them that, “This regiment will be reorganized.” Addressing them as 
“fellow soldiers,” he asked for “your earnest and willing cooperation” to institute a new 
schema. With Rosecrans’s approval, he shuffled the personnel in every company, 
rebuilding each one around cadres from the Three Hundred. He had already begun to 
relocate the Cavalry to a new camp near Murfreesboro on 14 February such that most of 
the loyal men were there by the beginning of March. Gradually Palmer reintegrated the 
mutineers, moving them down to “Camp Curtin” in groups of seventy and distributing 
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them throughout the regiment—after they assented to the new arrangements. He did his 
best to put a stop to the isolated discharges, which highly-placed Pennsylvanians 
arranged for their friends or family. By this point, sensitive to the men’s claim on 
organizational integrity, Palmer endeavored to preserve an intact, albeit rearranged, 
regiment. Finally, he inaugurated a regimen of drill and fatigue to keep the men 
occupied and reestablish the Cavalry’s esprit d’corps.104 
Even after its reorganization, the Regiment was no panacea. The role of the Troop 
was initially problematic, even for Palmer. In his speech he announced that he would 
continue to honor the expectation that the Troop would be the Regiment’s Company A. 
But this looked like special treatment in the eyes of the Regiment’s original companies 
being broken up. Palmer, however, might have believed the mutineers’ complaints could 
best be neutralized if he sequestered the object of their ire in a single company. Yet, 
Palmer’s own plans for officers did not hew to this logic of isolation. In his speech, 
Palmer outlined that the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry would have 33 commissioned and 
165 non-commissioned officers. Palmer extended 145 non-commissioned slots to the 
“new men,” but only 11 commissions—the rest belonged to the Troop. These numbers 
meant that Troopers would either be some of the officers in the reorganized companies 
of “new men” or serving with their fellows in Company A. Either way it seemed 
destined to replicate the very associational cleavages that led to the mutiny. All he could 
                                                
104 Address of Colonel William Jackson Palmer to the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry Regiment, in “Camp 
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promise was that “your regiment shall be the best officered of any regiment in the 
service.”105 
It appears that Palmer felt almost beholden to the Troop to honor its expectations in 
connection with the Regiment. But it might have had as much to do with issues of place. 
Judging by Eli Hewitt’s comments to his brother, “there will always be dissatisfaction” 
because it seemed Palmer instinctively privileged the Troop due to its Philadelphia 
origins. “Do not join this regiment…if you ever wish to be promoted; you cannot do it as 
long as there is [sic] any Philadelphians in the regiment.”106 Eb Allison also explained 
with some wit that, “Those commissioned from the regiment [after reorganization] were 
all Philadelphians showing which way the wind blows, tho [sic] it is considered a 
Philadelphia organization, especially by the Philadelphians.”107 
Nevertheless, Colonel Palmer’s return and his plan of reorganization resurrected the 
15th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Men who wanted to leave the Regiment or see it disbanded 
in the weeks immediately following the mutiny eventually changed their minds.108 Eb 
Allison’s decision to remain in the Anderson Cavalry was influenced by Palmer’s 
remarks, 
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in which he said that matters had been badly conducted in the regiment, 
made good promise, and created a feeling akin to admiration in me for 
him, which I would have thought impossible before hearing him. And I 
must say that he had made a good beginning.109 
Nearly all these citizen-soldiers remembered their binding pledge of association with 
their fellows and for the Union. They accepted Palmer’s plan of reorganization in 
February as a necessity to recommit and rejoin the Regiment. The handful who refused 
remained confined and eventually were dishonorably discharged. 
Yet, as Palmer seemingly placated the Troop, Rosecrans grew more convinced that 
honoring the Regiment’s terms of service as his headquarters escort meant disbanding 
the Troop. It brought the conflicting soldier rights of the two units to a final reckoning. 
Palmer announced his officer appointments in February and Rosecrans approved a 
transfer to the 15th Pennsylvania for any member of the Troop. As March approached, 
only six captains and six first lieutenants had been appointed; three of each from the old 
Troop and the Regiment. And most of the Troop did not seek membership. Prior to his 7 
February speech Palmer met with the Troop’s acting commander, First Lieutenant 
Thomas W. Maple, to establish a working relationship between the two bodies. Palmer 
explained he wanted the Troop as Company A and outlined his plans for commissions. 
Speaking for the forty-four men whom he commanded, Maple respectfully stated “the 
objection of the Old Anderson Troop to uniting with the Regiment.” Perhaps a bit too 
optimistic, Palmer went public with his plans anyway, likely believing he would be able 
to change their minds. 
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Shortly afterwards, however, Rosecrans intervened and shifted to retaining the 
Regiment alone. He ordered that due to the Troop’s reduced numbers and because “the 
Regiment was raised with the understanding” that it would serve at headquarters, he 
would provide honorable discharges to those Troopers who requested them. The dutiful 
soldier Eb Allison believed the Troop balked at amalgamation because it was they who 
had been “recruited as an independent company.” With the shoe on the other foot, a 
forced merger with the 15th Pennsylvania would have transgressed their own rights of 
selection and alienation. Quietly and semi-officially, the Anderson Troop rejected 
consolidation and stood by the integrity of their organization at the price of its continued 
existence. Consequently, on 26 March 1863 Rosecrans ordered them mustered out and 
the Anderson Troop disbanded.110 
That still left those erstwhile Troopers whom Palmer had already proposed as officer 
candidates for the Regiment in February 1863. Both Governor Curtin and the War 
Department were reluctant to confirm them once Rosecrans had settled on dissolving the 
Troop. Learning that their organization was to be disbanded heightened the Troopers’ 
sense that they were now interlopers. In what amounted to a “shoulder-strap” mutiny on 
8 May 1863, these officers refused en masse to continue their service with the Regiment 
and Rosecrans relieved them of their duties.111 This move, combined with the 
disbandment of the Troop, essentially purged the Regiment of its presence. In fact, its 
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only members remaining with the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry were the solitary captain of 
Company I, W. W. DeWitt, and Palmer himself. The members of the Cavalry had at 
long last secured their rights to selection. With the mutiny and its reverberations finally 
addressed, there remained little doubt about who were its victors. 
The Anderson Cavalry’s mutiny was a clear victory for soldier self-government. It 
protected nearly all of their essential rights. The soldiers of the Regiment established 
their claims to selection and alienation. The Army also largely validated the Cavalry’s 
terms of service. The 15th Pennsylvania secured its posting as an independent, 
headquarters escort. It obtained a full slate of officers drawn entirely from within the 
ranks of those men who were members in 1862. The integrity of their Regiment as a 
unique organization was affirmed. With the removal of the Troop, even Company A 
shed any connection to its lineage. In only one fundamental respect—officer elections—
did the mutiny fail. 
This microhistory of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry’s dual mutiny establishes a firm 
connection between Anglo soldiers’ rights, the nature of their regimental membership, 
and their attachment to the Union war effort. First, the Army underwrote the soldiers’ 
constitution of the Regiment. Second, the mutiny definitively ended the Troop’s sway 
over it. Third, it is clear that although the joint home/front agitation on behalf of the 
Andersons cost them a complete victory, without the civil dimension to the military 
protest the mutineers would have gained much less. 
All three of these revelations point back to Eb Allison’s lament in the mutiny’s 
immediate aftermath that the Andersons had been duped—tricked into unwittingly 
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jeopardizing their few rights as soldiers—and left with “a stain” on the Regiment’s 
reputation and theirs as fighting men. He insisted at the time that if given “a voice in the 
selection of our officers” and “ordinary attention at the hands of the authorities” the 
Anderson Cavalry could have achieved a “glorious name.” Instead it was “an exploded 
bauble” and “Pennsylvania’s bastard regiment.”112 
It was the mutiny that reversed all of these trends. It yoked localism and 
associational culture to the cause of soldier rights. The military protest action, sustained 
through Pennsylvanian citizen allies, restored the Cavalry’s voice over its organization 
and captured the attention of the Army. Those developments led inexorably to the 
Troop’s demise. As the Regiment increased, so the Troop decreased. Membership in a 
voluntary association demanded civic action from citizens both in and out of uniform. 
The dynamic on display in the soldier/citizen mutiny of the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry 
demonstrated how soldier status reinforced Anglos’ understanding of themselves as 
rights-bearing citizens. 
Finally, the microhistory of the Anderson Cavalry mutiny helps to understand what 
“Union” meant for Anglo volunteers. It enriches interpretations of broader wartime 
debates about loyalty and free speech typically identified with the Merryman case, the 
suspension of habeas corpus, the draft riots, and the Vallandingham affair. Mutinies 
reflected the capacity of Northern public culture to channel public dissatisfaction with 
the war effort in useful directions. Duteous soldiers like Lancaster Thomas realized the 
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mutineers were “not satisfied with the officers” and guessed 100 men had already 
deserted at Lousiville “because we could not go [to Nashville] as Buell’s Body Guard.” 
But Thomas explained that, “I went to guard my own body and that of my country.” So 
far he had been “submissive to its demands, but should things remain in a disorganized 
state much longer I will leave active service” for the Commissary Department. Yet, on 
the eve of Palmer’s reappearance Thomas was willing to “consign my fate” with the 
Regiment “if it be properly officered and organized again.” Eb Allison did not deny the 
justness of his comrades’ complaints. “The men had sad grievances of which to 
complain, but they did it in the wrong manner, and at the wrong time.”113 Still, he 
“feared that as a regiment, it was in too bad order with the public.” But Palmer’s return 
had worked a change. “Now that matters seem to be in a fair way for settlement I am 
satisfied to try the new regime.” Renewed in his “hope to serve through the war,” he 
retained his conviction that “we both can and will whip the rebellious hounds into good, 
law abiding citizens.” Only then could he “go home to remain there,” confident he might 
live “in peace the rest of my days.”114 Nor were mutineers like Charles Weller simply 
soldiers who had lost faith in the cause. “Our Army has not gained a decided victory 
since 61…Still I feel like seeing the thing through and have no wish to leave the Army 
until the rebellion is at an end.”115 
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Of more significance, the three soldiers’ voices reveal that the Anglo volunteer’s 
ideas of “Union” and “regiment” were, in effect, synonymous. Thomas conflated 
accepting the Republic’s “demands” on its citizen-soldiers with the expectation that 
“things” in the Regiment—like the exercise of his soldier rights—would be “organized 
again.” Allison, although in less explicit terms, sensed that his conviction to fight on 
towards final victory rested to a degree on how the “public” judged the Regiment as a 
repository of good “order” and self-government. Here is a significant bridge between 
associational culture and the local communities who fought this national war. The 
Regiment was an extension of the home community and “matters” within it like officer 
elections and terms of service had to be in a “fair way” if the volunteers were to see “the 
thing through” and “whip” the enemies of civil society before returning to enjoy the 
fruits of peace. 
Because in general, Northern “opposition to the war was open, organized, and 
active,” critics had plenty of means and opportunities to air their various grievances. The 
mutineers of the 15th Pennsylvania joined the “many men” across the nation “who 
preferred to risk defeat at the hands of the enemy rather than submit to arbitrary 
government.”116 They ran such a risk because they believed that upholding the Union 
was predicated on upholding their soldier rights. And the subsequent reorganization and 
career of the Regiment indicated that in the long run their mutiny in defense of self-
government held them more firmly to the cause and did not lessen their commitment to 
achieving final victory. 
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The following chapter considers additional military protest actions by Anglo citizen-
soldiers. These affairs ran from petitioning regimental officers, refusing orders, and 
resisting the arrest of a comrade to corporate protest and mutiny. A culture of soldier 
rights underpinned them all. Soldiers’ home communities, through the exchange of 
correspondence, petitions to civic and military leaders, and by publishing accounts of 
mutinies in local and national newspapers, continued to play a vital, sustaining role. As 
in the mutiny of the Anderson Cavalry, protest actions clarify how military service had 
the capacity to bring habits of associationalism and self-government—the foundations of 
soldier rights—into conflict with the Army’s organizational priorities and its need for 
uniform discipline through the chain of command.
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CHAPTER III 
“GOOD AND INTELLIGENT ASSOCIATES”:  
ANGLO VOLUNTEERS, SOLDIER RIGHTS, AND UNION 
 
In reviewing the testimony from a general court-martial, the officer serving as judge 
advocate took the opportunity to offer a cogent explanation for mutiny’s existential 
threat to the Army and its mission. “Mutiny as such can never be justified. Men may not 
presume to decide upon the legality or propriety of their orders or of the conduct of their 
superior officers—when that power is conceded there is an end of Military discipline.”1 
The Anderson Cavalry’s mutiny offers a pointed challenge to this outlook. Membership 
in the Cavalry was the basis of the mutineers’ terms of service and their rights to 
election, selection, and alienation. And upon these soldier rights they judged the 
propriety of their organization and the legality of their officers. Their military protest 
action was not in fact the end of military discipline. It strengthened the Regiment for the 
long term and recommitted the volunteers to the Union cause. It could not have 
succeeded without crucial support from citizen allies in Pennsylvania. Far from never 
being justified, military protest actions had the potential to bind cause and comrades 
more closely.  
Consideration of additional protest actions by Anglo volunteers provides further 
evidence of soldiers’ definition and defense of their rights. Yet, no two regiments 
                                                
1 Proceedings and papers of the general court-martial in the case of Sergeant Andrew Jessup, 7th Kansas 
Cavalry Regiment, MM411, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National 
Archives, Washington, D.C.. All general court-martial case files come from RG 153 unless noted 
otherwise. Subsequent references to previously cited cases will be by the defendant’s last name, e.g., 
Jessup court-martial. Emphasis added. 
 86 
claimed exactly the same terms of service; rarely conceived of perfectly identical soldier 
rights. Because the existence of soldiers’ rights rested on membership, and membership 
was first of all local, it engendered a politics of reciprocity by establishing what 
members of a regiment owed to the association and what it owed to them. The vigilance 
inherent to associational culture applied not only to fundamentals like alienation and 
election, but to terms of service including a regiment’s tactical function, its length of 
service, and the soldiers’ pay. Soldiers remained active participants in setting the terms 
on which they fought to defend the nation. As a corollary, they drew on practices of 
popular constitutionalism and self-government for the forms by which they exercised 
these rights. In this respect, they were not limited to the paths of redress offered through 
the Articles of War any more than were civilians restricted to constitutional procedures 
alone.2 Their pledge of service to the national government—a solemn, consensual 
promise to defend the body politic—was carried out through membership in a martial 
organization of fellow citizens who came together on clear, mutually-agreed terms. Lest 
they accept tyranny, they could not allow the Army to flaunt the rule of law. 
The Union Army’s Articles of War, on the other hand, were in fact a punitive 
military code to maintain discipline and enforce obedience through corporal punishment 
and the military justice system. Yet the culture of associational self-government could 
not be completely extinguished and military protest actions are the evidence. Volunteers 
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relied on them as extra-legal (illegal from the Army’s point of view) tools to scrutinize 
and instruct the military authorities on policies and procedures that transgressed their 
soldier rights. Because the military law so severely constricted the civic life of the 
citizen-soldier any attempt to push back against its encroachment became an occasion of 
military protest. Therefore when disagreements arose about subjects traditionally within 
the orbit of volunteers’ constitutions and by-laws (such as contract, commissions, 
discipline, and organization) they faced a choice: submitting to authority or defending 
their soldier rights. And choosing the latter meant facing arrest or worse after they 
employed the ordinary forms of associational governance (like meetings and petitions) 
or extraordinary ones (including resisting punishment or mutiny). 
Manipulation of their soldier rights, however, threatened the most immediate realm 
of the public welfare. In the words of constitutional scholar Christian Fritz, threats to the 
common good “justified the people in taking steps to redress practices inconsistent with 
the constitution.”3 Associational culture’s web of membership and self-government were 
how citizen-soldiers constituted their regiments. When those pillars were threatened, so 
was the welfare of their organization. Moreover, defending the civic welfare in the ranks 
went hand in hand with defending the Union. The citizen’s most basic duty was to 
defend the polity because it was the Union that shielded self-government.  
Although these episodes were ignited by the local concerns of soldiers, they could 
quickly involve outsiders, whether the Army high command, civil government, or citizen 
allies. In some cases, these examples of mutiny became occasions when the 
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constitutional powers of national and state authorities, held in delicate tension by 
federalism, came into open conflict. Support from the home front played a familiar role 
as well, although not always to the degree it did in the Andersons’ mutiny. Because of 
these developments, mutinies became some soldiers’ way of preserving, as an agent of 
the common good, the Union they fought to protect. 
“Our Time Is Out!”: Soldier Rights, Calendars of Service, and the Mutinies in the 2nd 
and 9th New York Infantry Regiments  
The Anderson Cavalry mutinied, in part, over the fear that its guarantee of 
headquarters service would not be met. As late as 1864, soldiers faced losing the tactical 
role that had been promised their regiments by the Army. Ahead of Grant’s Overland 
Campaign, the 21st Pennsylvania Cavalry was one such unit. That summer they were 
“dismounted, and changed into an infantry organization.” Hometown papers reported the 
“order for the change caused great indignation among the officers and men.”4 Concerns 
about changes in tactical role, however, appear to have been fairly rare. 
Of much wider extent and more serious concern was the risk soldiers ran by the 
Army extending their duration of service. A right of selection, as well as loyalty to both 
nation and state, complicated questions about the length of service. When enlistees 
joined a local company during the Civil War they usually rendezvoused with other 
companies from their state at a common training ground. Sometimes independent 
companies languished for months at these training areas waiting to be associated with a 
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regiment and mustered into national service. Furloughs might be promised then revoked 
as news of imminent deployment came and went. Pay and bounties could go uncollected 
until muster was completed. Yet, in the soldier’s mind because he was subject to military 
discipline and physically separated from home and community during this limbo he was 
nevertheless fulfilling his duty and it should count against his promised time in service 
to his country. 
These tensions remained throughout the conflict, but they particularly afflicted 
Union forces for the first time on a wide scale after the First Battle of Bull Run (21 July 
1861), notably in mutinies by two Empire State regiments, the 2nd and 9th New York. 
Both regiments drew their recruits predominantly from the state’s largest cities, young 
men reared in associational culture and the antebellum public sphere. The members of 
the 2nd New York came from Troy, Rensselaer’s county seat on the eastern bank of the 
Hudson River. In 1860 it was the state’s fifth-largest city with 39,000 citizens busily 
engaged in the commerce between the Erie Canal and New York City. It was also one of 
America’s early centers for the industrial production of iron. Enlistments for the “Troy 
Regiment” came forward from the city’s fire department, its volunteer marching band, 
the Moulders’ Association, and the Troy Young Men’s Association. Under New York’s  
enlistment act of 14 April 1861, they mustered into state service for two years in late 
April and into national service for a two-year term on 14 May, rather than the more 
widespread three-year term among volunteer regiments. A portion of the regiment saw 
action during the skirmish at Big Bethel, Virginia, on 10 June before they were 
transferred to Hampton Roads on 5 August. During these early months considerable 
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disorganization dogged the regiment. The men were obliged to elect a different colonel 
(their first choice failed to obtain a release from the Regular Army); tardy medical 
examinations forced the discharge of 118 men; countervailing marching orders fueled 
doubt about their mission. And this was in addition to gloom brought on by news of the 
defeat at First Bull Run on 21 July.5  
The men of Troy encamped the remainder of the summer near Newport News about 
thirteen miles from two other Empire State regiments at Fortress Monroe: the “National 
Guard Zouaves” in the 10th New York and “Hawkins’s Zouaves” of the 9th New York. 
The latter regiment would be the other principal in the mutinies to come. Attracting great 
attention and expectation among the public, both zouave regiments organized in New 
York City. Although they included their share of working-class and immigrant soldiers, 
most of their soldiers were professional, middle-class men. According to the 10th New 
York’s regimental history, 
At no time was there any difficulty in obtaining men; the recruits came singly, or 
in squads of three or four or more, brothers or friends, all determined to enlist, 
and if possible to go in the same company or regiment. Each company thus, to a 
certain extent, represented so many homes and firesides bound together by 
friendships of years’ standing and united in what was, to all of them, a just and 
holy cause. 
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In a way similar to the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry, these recruits of 1861 formed 
themselves around an existing cadre: the volunteer military companies that had 
incorporated themselves in 1860.6 
There in the country’s largest metropolis, associational culture strengthened ethnic 
and religious ties. At the same time, common political and civic interests among like-
minded citizens produced all manner of incorporated bodies to carry out numerous 
public projects.7 Both regiments’ official histories devote attention to these voluntary 
organizations that grew up before the war. Like in Pennsylvania, small circles of friends 
and business colleagues or extended family members responded to the crisis atmosphere 
in 1860 to call public meetings and pass resolutions pledging to seek official 
incorporation as military companies. They then commenced drilling, raising funds for 
equipment, and eventually electing officers.8 In the case of the 9th, that activity gave rise 
to its antecedent prewar volunteer company, the “New York Zouaves.” The wartime 
regiment’s historian begins his tale of the 9th’s exploits by including the story of the 
“Old Company.” Delineating the matrix of self-government and membership that 
characterized associational culture he explains: 
The organization was, to the core, democratic, and yet an unbending despotism, 
the despot being the laws and regulations which were impartially and justly 
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construed. For the enforcement of orders there was no military code to fall back 
upon. The authority for all action rested solely upon the voluntary consent and 
loyal approval of the governed.9 
The tension between democracy and despotism yielded self-government. In it those 
opposing forces were held in balance through the members’ submission to, and creation 
of, the rule of law. He noted the absence of external regulations and statutes—like the 
Articles of War—with pride.  They were an awkward fit for citizen-soldiers habituated 
to authoring the laws under which they lived. The regiment’s history deliberately 
included its constitution and by-laws (all twenty-three articles). Article III covered the 
“application for membership” that enacted an inherent right to selection on the part of 
members. Article IX provided for the election of company officers at one of the monthly 
meetings. Articles XII and XIII laid down specific fines for absences and sloppy 
uniforms and kit. Three absences in a row meant expulsion. Article XVI laid out the 
election and duties of the civic department, citizen members who handled the equivalent 
of an army’s judge advocate, quartermaster, paymaster, and commissary roles. Men in 
the company attending these meetings, offered resolutions, and participated in debate. 
Articles XVII and XIX provided for the operation of a court-martial that could sentence 
members with fines or expulsion. Finally, Article XXII stipulated that, “These by-laws 
shall not be altered or changed, except by a two-third vote of the whole corps.” 
Members’ approbation of these associational rules flowed from their role in creating 
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them, the “heart of true self-government.”10 Associational life truly was a microcosm of 
American constitutionalism. 
The New Yorkers garrisoning posts like Fort Monroe on the Virginia peninsula, 
however, had a diminishing sense that they had control over anything. It began with the 
daily drudgery of garrison duty. They felt increasingly like they were living under the 
thumbs of the Articles of War and the Regulars (the long-service professional soldiers of 
the United States Army) who drilled them. Only recently removed from a public culture 
of self-government, many of the New Yorkers recoiled at submitting to the authority of 
men they regarded as strangers.11 By late July 1861 the weeks of confinement to their 
garrisons with its regimen of drill, inspections, and fatigue duty had begun to breed 
discontent. Life was a far cry from their initial notions of active service on the 
battlefield. Courts-martial from this period in the 10th New York abounded with 
instances of individual soldiers simply walking off to get something to eat when their 
company officers ordered them to fall in for drill. Other soldiers often found themselves 
on work details ordered about by Regular non-commissioned officers. In charge of a 
garrison police (i. e., refuse and debris cleaning) detail, Corporal James Leary of the 3rd 
U.S. Artillery ordered Private James McMahon of the 10th New York to get to work 
moving some dirt. McMahon stood by silently until the corporal grabbed him and 
threatened to break a shovel over his head. McMahon demanded to be released, finally 
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11 On the interface between volunteers and Regulars in the Union Army, see Clayton R. Newell and 
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retorting, “Go to hell! I will do what I like God damn you.” The volunteer had chaffed at 
being ordered about as an automaton. During the ensuing court-martial he questioned 
Leary: “Did I not want you to let me pick up the dirt?”12 On the surface this small 
incident looks like mere aversion to physical labor. But the citizen recently in uniform 
sought a measure of consent in any duty he performed. Of the greatest import was his 
revulsion at submitting to orders from a man with whom he had no ties of association. 
The collision of associational culture with the realities of service and military law 
created the circumstances for the protests in the 2nd and 9th New York. Their specific 
disputes with the Army concerned two violations of their service terms. They had not 
been paid as promised and they were held beyond their calendar of service. What today 
appear as species of bureaucratic incompetence or administrative lassitude were also in 
part the result of the exigencies of the moment. As needs arose and problems presented 
themselves, politicians and generals crafted and implemented the procedures and 
methods to create the United States’ largest military force to that point in its history. As 
surveyed in Pennsylvania in the previous chapter, much was ad hoc and idiosyncratic. 
For example, volunteers in several companies of the 4th Maine mutinied in September 
1861 when they were not mustered out after three months of national service. Their 
erroneous “supposition” had resulted from an “informality in mustering them into 
                                                
12 Proceedings of general courts-martial in the cases of Privates Edward Moran, James McLean, and James 
McMahon, 31 July 1861, Fortress Monroe, Virginia 10th New York, KK866, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 
153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National Archives, Washington, D.C. 
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service.”13 Thus, what were merely extemporaneous measures looked to volunteers like 
attempts to subvert their soldier rights.  
Slow pay was an especially persistent and pernicious influence that sapped the 
morale of even the best regiments. It turned the thoughts of an Anglo regiment towards 
mutiny in April 1862. A sympathetic officer observed his men had been “six months in 
the service and no pay, many of them with families suffering for want of the money.”14 
Signing their regiment’s muster roll initiated a contract between the soldier and the 
government. Under Army regulations, a regiment’s pay was scheduled to be disbursed 
every two months. More often than not paymasters arrived late through no fault of their 
own; delayed because of bad weather, transportation mishaps, or Confederate cavalry.15 
Endemic delays to the delivery of pay added to the Paymaster Department’s alleged 
inefficiency and corruption that made it reviled among many of the Union Army’s 
volunteers. For some soldiers theft of government property or pillage of civilians—more 
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common the farther Union troops penetrated into Confederate territory as the war went 
on—became a means to surviving nonexistent pay.16 
The burden of slow pay was not these soldiers’ only heartache. From the beginning 
of New York’s enlistment efforts, confusion and chaos could resulted from state 
recruitment policies. On occasion constituent companies of particular regiments 
mustered in for varying lengths of national service. Acknowledging the national 
government’s requests in August 1861 to retain three-month companies, the state 
enforced uniformity and by fiat extended them for two years of Federal service. For 
example, men in the “First Buffalo” regiment—raised the city of the same name—had 
been mustered by companies into state service for two-years between 1 and 10 May 
1861. Afterwards they were formally assembled into a regiment as the 21st New York. 
But their national service ran for only three months beginning on 20 May 1861. At the 
request of the national government, on 2 August 1861 Special Order No. 324 of the State 
of New York directed the 21st New York would continue in United States service for the 
remainder of their state enlistment. Similar special orders had the same effect on other 
New York regiments.17 
On the basis of similar circumstances, twenty-eight zouaves in the 9th New York 
began by petitioning their colonel on 10 August. Abiding by the avenue of appeal 
                                                
16 An authoritative discussion of the organization and function of the Pay Department is found in Newell 
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al., 20th New York, NN63, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National 
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provided in the Articles of War, they sought interposition on their behalf. They delivered 
a written remonstrance citing lapsed pay and the extension of their national service 
without their consent. They refused “to do duty longer” until their grievances were 
satisfied. Accordingly, the next day additional men simply “refused to turn out for 
inspection.”18 Arrests and close confinement followed for them as well. 
While incarcerated the soldiers tendered a statement of grievances to Major General 
Benjamin Butler (a volunteer general commanding the post where they were confined) 
on 12 August. Its purpose was to “ascertain the cause” of “not getting moneys dues [sic] 
us, that the Government could pay, and had not, [and] as yet refused to pays [sic].” The 
volunteers in the 9th New York also saw evidence of foul play in informal mustering 
practices. They deplored being “held for two years” by the national government since 
they had never been assembled to sign a new muster roll past their initial three months of 
Federal service. Butler reported in a letter to Major General Winfield Scott, general-in-
chief of the Army, “I think the whole trouble has arisen from…discontent because they 
are not paid” and from “want of proper clothing.” Anxious that mutinies over pay were 
spreading to other regiments and troubled that a number of companies across three New 
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York regiments “have served more than three months without any pay,”19 Butler gave 
little credence to soldiers’ distress about their calendar of service. 
Instead, Butler blamed erroneous reports in the New York Times that had led the 
men to believe they would only be three months in national service. The absence on 
recruiting and detached service of six officers in the 9th New York (including the colonel 
and lieutenant colonel) probably allowed such wishful thinking to go unchecked.20 
Unwilling to accept the volunteers’ stated grievances against their soldier rights, 
Harper’s Weekly later blamed the mutiny on the soldiers electing weak, malleable 
company officers.21 This charge is unwarranted. In the context of self-government, 
elections would have produced officers more cognizant of the concerns of the men and 
likely more willing to defend their soldier rights. As a negative proof of this point, the 
men took matters into their own hands while their were so few officers in the regiment—
a situation not unlike that faced by the Anderson Cavalry in 1862. 
Although the zouaves followed procedure by appealing to their colonel, they did not 
wait for the proceedings of a court-martial and they went over his head by involving 
Butler as well. Thus, it was military law that contorted the New Yorkers’ exercise of 
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their procedural soldier rights into illegal challenges to authority. The justifications 
offered by the mutineers under the language of “government,” “just demands,” and “due 
attention” not only echo Eb Allison’s claim that “ordinary attention” to the Andersons’ 
organization would have staved off protest, but point back to the most fundamental 
practices of self-government in America as outlined in the introduction. 
Mutinous action had also enveloped the nearby 2nd New York on 13 August. The 
soldiers in the “Troy Regiment” also submitted a letter of grievance to their colonel. 
They wanted to know why they had not been paid since their enlistment three months 
prior, how he should expect them to take care of their families since they had no pay to 
remit and, given this state of affairs, if the colonel might not allow them to return home 
the next day. They realized their New York state enlistment ran for two years, but they 
claimed their three months of national service would be up in twenty-four hours.22 
Unfortunately, while the first two grievances had some legitimate basis, the third did not. 
The regiment’s official history proposed that after seeing three-month national service 
regiments from New York decamp, the men from Troy convinced themselves that home 
beckoned as well. Yet, at his general court-martial the petitioner Zalmon Van Ness 
explained that “it was reported to me that we might [be] in the State service for two 
years, but that we could not be turned over to the United States for that [length of] time. 
                                                
22 Petition of Private Zalmon Van Ness and nine others in Company A, 2nd New York to Colonel Joseph B. 
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I enlisted with that understanding.”23 It would appear that like in the 4th Maine, 
informalities in recruiting and mustering volunteers produced citizen-soldiers who 
believed advantage had been taken of them. 
When 14 August passed with no information concerning their release from Federal 
service, these dissenting soldiers from Company A stacked their arms on the morning of 
15 August, saying “Our time is out!” Like the mutineers in the Anderson Cavalry, it 
signaled they were “determined” to literally hold their service to the Union in abeyance 
beyond what their soldier rights strictly stipulated; in this case their three months of 
national service. After the mutineers skipped reveille and drill that morning they were 
escorted from camp and interned in Fort Calhoun on the Rip Raps, an artificial island at 
the entrance to Hampton Roads, Virginia.24  
Although classified by the military as mutiny or mutinous conduct, when the 
mutinies by New York regiments in 1861 are placed in the contexts of associationalism 
and the reciprocities of soldier rights, they fit into the long Anglo-American tradition of 
the people’s role in “scrutinizing governments.”25 Distressed by their regiment’s 
disorganization, the soldiers of Troy asked to be apprised of the “policy and intentions” 
of the “Government.” Claiming the welfare of the “rank and file” had been undermined 
by the failure to issue pay, they felt obliged to “safely” ask “what government (if any), 
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State or Federal, now has a right to demand our services.” The petitioners clearly 
believed that the national government had voided the bond of reciprocity with its citizen 
volunteers. They insisted that only “proper attention to our just demands” could possibly 
renew those ties between soldiers and civil authority. In the minds of the New Yorkers 
and the Andersons, confidence in the utility of continued sacrifice for the national cause 
was related in direct proportion to the proper, ongoing organization of their state 
regiments. The men of the 2nd New York even suggested that it might be prudent to 
explore a different path toward serving the cause. They reminded their colonel that 
“should it be necessary for us to be mustered out of service” and “if due respect to 
condition of our family relations will admit of it, we will again enter a new regiment, 
under your command.”26 
In fact, the volunteer officers called to adjudicate these court-martials were quite 
sensitive to the bedrock constitutional issues. A curious pattern is stamped on the 
lengthy series of court-martial records documenting the mutinies. Later in the war 
mutinous soldiers were increasingly tried collectively for reasons of expediency. At this 
early date, each man in the 2nd and 9th New York received his own trial. But then another 
divergence appears. The trials in the 2nd New York handed down harsher sentences and 
proceeded along standard lines using witness testimony. In these trials only a handful of 
volunteers received reductions of sentence by the reviewing officer. In the 9th New York, 
however, strict courts-martial gave way to a process more reflective of associational 
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culture. Several of the trials called no witnesses for the prosecution. Each accused 
soldier simply presented an oral defense on his own behalf and was found guilty. 
Officers from the other New York regiments stationed at Newport News composed the 
entirety of the panels. In writing they requested Major General John E. Wool, an officer 
of the Regular Army commanding their division, for clemency on behalf of each soldier. 
A New Yorker himself, Wool promptly remitted the entire sentence and ordered the 
soldier returned to his regiment. 
The trials in the 9th New York turned official proceedings into fora that citizen-
soldiers used to articulate specific violations of their rights to service terms, timely pay, 
and their grievances. The institutional power of the Army was leveraged, through the 
mechanism of the court-martial, to arrive at verdicts that did justice to the letter of 
military law while recognizing the validity of citizen-soldiers’ complaints. These 
particular volunteer soldiers and officers used other components of the military justice 
system to their own ends. It illustrates the basic reality of self-government carried on 
through associational culture. Regimental association, state affiliation, and community 
led to a reconfiguration of the Army’s rules of jurisprudence that more closely hewed to 
the system of penalties for misbehavior common to antebellum volunteer companies. In 
this way, officers and men together negotiated a verdict on the mutiny—among 
Hawkins’s Zouaves, at least—that acknowledged the legal and institutional authority of 
the Army without compromising the soldier rights and citizen voice of the volunteer. 
Evidence of this sort of citizen-soldier collaboration in the interstices of military 
regulations was a wartime reality, but it rarely appears in the records (for good reason): 
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running afoul of regulations meant loss of rank, pay, even a court-martial. Nevertheless, 
individual examples can be found from time to time. Towards the end of 1863 a 
Connecticut soldier wrote home proud of how he had corrected his regimental adjutant 
who had been ready to report him as absent without leave. Although his comrades had 
told to him to make haste and report himself present, this sergeant “knew I was all right, 
therefore did not trouble myself.” He presented his official furlough to the adjutant 
“when I got ready.” The officer quickly admitted his mistake and the soldier reported to 
his company without repercussion.27 
“That Is What We Call Soldiering”: Rights of Election and Selection Gauged 
Officers’ Fitness for Command 
Anglo soldiers did not engage in self-government only to protect rights like their 
calendar of service and proper pay. They exercised rights as uniformed legislators to 
check the illegitimate actions of their commanders. The potential for incompetence, 
sloth, and vanity among Civil War officers was legion. Making their voices heard 
concerning the fitness of officers inside their wartime regiments reflected antebellum 
practices of associational life. Fitness encompassed an officer’s intelligence and 
judgement, his physical bravery, and his application of discipline. It also considered 
whether the status of his associational membership gave him grounds to wield his 
authority. Rights of election and selection gave soldiers’ a lever to counter the weight of 
officers’ authority. They reinforced soldiers’ convictions that they should mock, petition, 
remonstrate, confront, and even mutiny, if an officer failed in his constitutional 
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Griswold Family Papers, MSC 6158, New York Public Library. 
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responsibility mandated by the regulations to give lawful orders and to avoid tyrannical 
or capricious conduct.28 Thus, these rights also strengthened soldiers’ appeals for 
interposition from higher authorities, appeals sanctioned by the Articles of War. Despite 
the military protest actions below not exploding into mutinies, they nevertheless convey 
that volunteers believed soldiering required them to police the boundaries of the Army’s 
legitimate authority as present in its officer corps. By so doing they carried on self-
government, the Union’s very raison d’être. 
Soldiers did not necessarily have to resort to mutiny or personal confrontations. 
Depending on the scale of the officers’ neglect, measured means could be used like 
shaming or mocking, to point out shortcomings in the organization’s responsibilities to 
the men. For example, two lieutenants lounged in the shade while their routine 
wooD.C.utting detail stood at the edge of the woods outside Portsmouth, Virginia. The 
one hundred soldiers from the 15th Connecticut lacked sufficient tools and waited 
impatiently that August day in 1863. The officers had ordered the sergeants to take it 
from there but, according to Sergeant Charles Griswold, he “thought that [the officers’ 
actions] a very good example.” The sergeants promptly stood aside and ordered the 
corporals to lead the men in the chopping and hauling. But the corporals followed suit 
and also “sat down,” letting “the men do as they liked.” Griswold summarized the whole 
affair sardonically: “that is what we call soldiering.” If officers were going to abuse their 
positions for personal leisure, Griswold and his fellow non-commissioned officers found 
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a good-natured, but purposeful, way to chastise them for it. While he admitted the non-
commissioned officers’ conduct was not “proper” according to regulations, neither was 
the officers’ according to the reciprocities of regimental membership. Griswold firmly 
believed that “if officers won’t get decent tools and tell the men what to do and where to 
work,” he was “not going [to] blame them for not working.”29 
Of course, officers who were not only occasionally lazy, but downright incompetent 
and a danger to their men’s survival on the battlefield could be forced out by their men. 
Barely a week after their muster-in on 22 August 1862, recruits in the 133rd 
Pennsylvania expressed a “unanimous wish” for “a change in the command of our 
company” while still in their home state. The “members of Captain John M. Jones’ 
Company” decided their second lieutenant, Francis M. Flannagan, “is not capable to 
discharge the duties required of him.” It had fallen to Private Richard M. Jones “twice a 
day to drill the company which he does in a first rate manner.” Such expressions of their 
membership rights echo those from the Anderson Cavalry. 
The fifty-seven men of the company addressed these complaints in a public letter to 
Flannagan. They would be ill trained if he remained “in office” because “of your 
incapability to discharge the duties” of command. It was the “desire of the whole 
company” to “remove” him and to “elect a man who is thoroughly acquainted in the 
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 106 
knowledge of drill” to “fill the vacancy.”30 Expressing their “wish” and “desire,” their 
letter hints that they likely had tent meetings like the Andersons had before deciding on 
their course of action. Convinced Flannagan should be ousted, they performed an act of 
remonstrance against incompetent authority. It exercised their just rights to select the 
men with whom they served and choose from that pool competent individuals to wield 
command. 
When the lieutenant “answered in the negative,” the citizens in uniform turned to the 
popular constitutional tactic of interposition. They wrote letters of appeal to their colonel 
and to the governor of Pennsylvania, Andrew G. Curtin. They explained “certain 
grievances” to Colonel Franklin B. Speakman that they hoped he would rectify “for the 
sake of us.” When the volunteers called on Curtin as “the highest authority that a soldier 
can appeal to” they desired nothing less than the kind of proper attention eventually 
given to the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry. He should “interfere on our behalf” and “remove 
our Second Lieutenant.” Both officials learned the basis of Flannagan’s incompetence 
and were instructed on how to resolve the matter. The subaltern had no inkling of proper 
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drill but Private Jones, once a lieutenant in a three-month regiment and a “first class drill 
master,” would have “the company perfect in the manual of arms.”31 
In this example the grand constitutional principle of interposition—most familiar in 
the public campaigns of remonstrance against the Alien and Sedition Acts that 
culminated in the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions—is woven into the workings of 
associational governance. In 1798 James Madison declared that membership in the 
Union through the “compact” of the U.S. Constitution gave the states collectively a 
“right” to “interpose,” in order to preserve “the authorities, rights and liberties 
appertaining to them,” against the national government’s extension of “powers” beyond 
the “grants enumerated in that compact.”32 
The Cambria County soldiers’ campaign, though obviously not perfectly congruent, 
operated on the same logic. Flanagan’s duties were measured by the rule of military law 
and his membership in the regiment. The members of the company stood on their “rights 
and liberties” of election and selection when they judged him wholly inadequate and 
asked him to step down. Failing that they abided by the Articles of War to appeal to their 
colonel. At the same time, by the conventions of interposition, they sought the force of 
the governor arrayed on their side. In this way their actions linked notions of 
associationalism, remonstrance, and interposition as procedural soldier rights that defend 
                                                
31 Company F, Camp Chase to Colonel Franklin B. Speakman, 23 August 1862, and Company F, 
Arlington Heights to Governor Andrew G. Curtin, 26 August 1862, emphasis added, both in 133rd 
Pennsylvania, Civil War Muster Rolls, PSA. No records could be found of either Speakman or Curtin’s 
replies to these memorials. 
32 The Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and ‘99 with Jefferson’s Original Draught thereof, Also 
Madison’s Report, Calhoun’s Address, Resolutions of the Several States in Relation to State Rights with 
Other Documents in Support of the Jeffersonian Doctrines of ‘98 (Washington, D.C.: Jonathan Elliot, 
1832), 21. 
 108 
foundational right of membership like selection and election. This all points back to 
historian Christian Fritz’s analysis of interposition’s legacy in the antebellum period. It 
“focused attention on whether the government was acting in conformity with the 
people’s mandates in their constitutions.” Elected officials, including volunteer officers, 
were the people’s “servants, subject to election and dismissal” if they failed to be “open 
to instruction” and “directly responsible” to those they served.33 
The vigilance of the soldiers in the 133rd Pennsylvania countered poor leadership, 
that if allowed to fester, could be ruinous for regimental organization. This reality seems 
especially clear in the case of the 10th New York Cavalry. The wartime diary of Private 
Asa Story opens a window on how his officers’ collective failure to discharge their 
duties, and instead pursue petty internal politics, frayed the bonds of membership and 
provoked soldiers to resist military authority. Story’s low opinion of his officers 
stemmed from their hypocrisy. In one company, the captain arrested his lieutenant 
without cause. Another captain, John Ordner, was a habitual drunk who murdered the 
camp sutler’s clerk.34 Story’s own captain, Delos Carpenter, was arrested for 
drunkenness in February 1863. Carpenter, who had to read from the manual for mounted 
saber drill while instructing the company, was as inept as Flanagan. Worse, Carpenter 
was not only an incompetent officer, but also a cruel one. 
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When Story missed inspection in January 1863 his lieutenant berated him and hung 
him by his thumbs to drive home the point. Story untied himself three times before the 
lieutenant reported him to the captain.35 In exasperation, Carpenter bucked and gagged 
Story with his toes barely off the ground. But after being released from his punishment, 
the private still skipped company drill and stayed in his tent, as “I was so stiff and sore.” 
Camp discipline such as this became so typical for the eighteen-year old that he reported 
it in his diary as often as the weather.36 While there were no regulations to govern petty 
infractions, these penalties inflicted on Story called public attention to lapses in his 
soldierly bearing and his offenses against esprit d’corps. Other more painful forms of 
physical punishment including bucking and gagging shamed soldiers even as it offended 
their identities as citizens endowed with self-control and personal independence. Yet, 
even volunteer officers believed the degree to which soldiers obeyed orders and 
performed their duties in camp translated to discipline in battle. Commanders wanted to 
create a culture of respect for authority, a commitment to the organization, and a sense of 
pride in wearing the uniform.37 
All that aside, Story might have simply been a rambunctious adolescent, but he made 
a terrible soldier. His repeated run-ins with Carpenter stemmed in part from his ongoing 
horse thievery, foraging, shirking fatigue, skipping picket duty, and unauthorized 
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absences.38 An antebellum company’s by-laws would have dealt with his conduct 
through fines and then expulsion. But the Army could not afford to discharge a soldier 
for mere hooliganism. It had to set an example, and break him through discipline. That 
logic raised many volunteers’ ire at corporal punishment taken too far.  
Some soldiers bore the authority of their officers with quiet restraint in order to 
display manly self-control while others, like Story, took issue with the control wielded 
by their superiors, striking out with combative language or physical violence. As one 
historian rightly comments, “Men reared to be independent, to claim equality with every 
man, and to value individualism were now asked to respect hierarchy and to submit to 
the will of another.” Soldiers questioned the legitimacy of the officer corps’ authority 
because it transgressed the American civic values of personal independence and self-
governance, as well as the equality tied up with their manhood. Submission to officers 
meant acceptance of servitude. Soldiers sometimes referred to their officers using a 
derogatory term “gentry.” Dismissive of the respect due their commanders, they might 
make noise when addressed en masse, or undermine the chain of command when they 
refused to wear symbols of rank in or saluted their superiors lazily.39 
Quite often, officers in the normal course of their duties would have to give orders to 
soldiers who might internalize a routine military order as a specific threat to the 
boundaries of their manhood; conflict and even violence often followed. The 10th New 
York Cavalry could easily have been under consideration when one historian explained, 
                                                
38 Story Papers, 2 July, 8 July, 14 July, 17 July, 28 July, 4 August, 18 August, 29 August 1862. 
39 Lorien Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs: Violence, Honor, and Manhood in the Union Army (New 
York: New York University Press, 2010), 147, 148–49, 151–52. 
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“Because of soldiers’ attitudes toward authority, which were derived from their 
conception of equal manhood, automatic and consistent obedience to officers was never 
established in many regiments of the Union Army.”40 That said, even in regiments where 
discipline was meted out, soldiers wanted it proportionate to the offense.41 They raised 
intensifying levels of military protest action the closer camp discipline approached what 
one historian has termed “abusive punishment.”42 
And that appears to be exactly what Carpenter doled out to Story and other men in 
Company G. In a typical fortnight Private Story earned a stay in a ten-by-fifteen-foot 
“sweat box” for refusing guard duty, followed by extra drill, being tied to a post (after 
confinement in the guard house), and finally more bucking and gagging.43 Little wonder 
that Story roundly mocked his captain’s incompetence and cruelty with titles like “the 
King,” and “His Majesty.”44 Life on Carpenter’s watch felt like living under tyranny: the 
slightest infraction brought sanction with extreme prejudice. On one occasion, in his 
telling, Story was “lectured for thinking I had any rights.”45 Yet, this very remark belies 
the soldier’s conviction that he did possess rights of membership and he planned to 
                                                
40 Foote, Gentlemen and the Roughs, 158, 154. 
41 Foote, Gentlemen and the Roughs, 174, says that genteel soldiers came to justify harsh measures against 
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exercise them. For if he did not, he would be acquiescing in the subversion of republican 
government, the very reason the Union must be preserved and he was wearing a 
uniform. Justified by outlooks similar to the men of the 133rd Pennsylvania had about 
their competent officers as fit magistrates, Story drafted “a petition which is to be 
presented to the Colonel after the boys have signed it. It is to have Carpenter 
removed.”46 
Carpenter did eventually resign, but not because of Story’s petition (if he ever 
produced it). According to the regiment’s official history, “the most intense partisan 
warfare” led “many of the enlisted men [to] range themselves with the contending 
factions.”47 At the outset of its organization, two cliques formed over the fitness of 
Colonel John C. Lemmon. The “anti-Lemmon” officers, Carpenter among them, had 
their own convictions about the fitness of their commander and sought to remove him on 
charges of incompetence and old age. Although details are scanty, it all culminated in a 
near mutiny at Elmira, New York, in late 1862.48 Captain W. W. Paige demanded that 
arms be issued from the armory for his company and Lemmon arrested for going over 
his head. This lead a cabal of the Antis to “forge papers against” him. But these 
machinations failed and instead a dozen captains and lieutenants stood trial for mutiny in 
April 1863. Convicted and dismissed the service, their citizen benefactors and family, 
paralleling the Anderson Cavalry, petitioned on their behalf—in this case directly to 
                                                
46 Story Papers, 30 September 1862. 
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48 Preston, History of the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry, 21. 
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President Abraham Lincoln—for clemency. He in turn asked that Secretary of War 
Edwin M. Stanton reinvestigate.49 
The outcome was not reversed, but the regiment’s factionalism remains a startling 
example of the deep wells of self-government that citizen-soldiers brought with them 
into the service. In the 10th New York Cavalry, citizens arranged across the spectrum of 
rank believed it within their rights to judge the fitness of the officers arrayed over them, 
to resist the authority placed by the state in those commanders’ hands, and to select new 
ones in their stead. If the 10th New York Cavalry was a regiment with officers conniving 
to oust their commander, it should come as even less surprise that its enlisted men would 
be invoking their rights of selection to remove a despised captain. The episode suggests 
the potential for self-government ad absurdum when soldier rights became unmoored 
from a reciprocal relationship of members’ duties to preserve, protect, and perfect the 
association. It was for this reason that regimental self-government, if it were to be a 
centripetal force, had to be bound up with the larger meaning of Union. Otherwise, it had 
the potential to eviscerate the Army. 
The factionalism that manifested itself in the 10th New York Cavalry and the 
associational rivalry inside the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry were extreme manifestations 
of soldiers’ claim to rights of selection and alienation. They were the basis for soldiers 
checking their commanders’ conduct that verged on compromising Article 1 of the 
Regulations or their terms of service. In the enormous camps, extensive divisional 
                                                
49 Colonel John C. Lemmon, 10th New York Cavalry, to President Abraham Lincoln, 1 November 1863; 
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marching columns, and expansive battlefields, however, Union soldiers also had plenty 
of contact with officers from other organizations. 
At Harrison’s Landing, Virginia prior to the Seven Days’ battles in June 1862, 
Corporal William Gallagher of the 93rd New York faced a general court-martial for 
insubordination. After a strong shove for failing to comply with an order, he had 
exclaimed, “Don’t do that, Lieutenant.…I have had enough of that in the Army!” The 
lieutenant called for the guard and placed Gallagher under arrest. Before he could be 
restrained, Gallagher threw down his belts and cartridge box. Whether ready for 
fisticuffs or merely signaling passive resistance, he lamented, “This will cost me my 
Corporalship.” A passing Regular Army major, G. O. Haller, witnessed Gallagher’s 
disobedience and intervened. He also ordered the guards to take the man away. One of 
them, Corporal Joseph Lavoy, refused to assist. Major Haller shoved Lavoy aside, took 
his rifle, and struck Gallagher in the back with its butt. Gallagher reacted by grabbing a 
rifle from the hands of one of the other guards to defend himself. This prompted officers 
looking on to disarm him and, in the process, strangle him and punch him in the face.50 
The record is silent about the order Gallagher refused or why. But he believed it was 
necessary in that moment to check the disciplinarian from his own regiment as well as 
the interloper from outside it. Judging by Gallagher’s remark after his lieutenant’s thrust, 
he knew the heavy weight of Army discipline and was willing to lose his rank to protest 
                                                
50 Lavoy was tried immediately after Gallagher for conduct prejudicial to good order and military 
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Archives, Washington, D.C.  
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the latest example. Haller not only escalated the affair, but also employed the harsh 
means that citizens connected with the Regulars. Such a tangible example of Army ways 
dominating his life in uniform drove Gallagher to strike back violently. The New Yorker 
only recoiled verbally against his own officer, but felt justified to use physical defense 
against corporal punishment from one who was not even a fellow volunteer. 
Encounters across associational lines such as this were occasions when orders were 
given and received. Some soldiers might question, as Gallagher did, the legitimacy of an 
officer’s authority. That is, his fitness for command relative to the volunteer’s assumed 
right of selection. Associational thinking got some soldiers wondering what the 
consequences might be for them in an institution like the Army. Theoretically any 
officer (or non-commissioned officer if one was a private) had dominion over them. The 
Army seemed to present an ever-expanding circle of potential masters. The limited 
protections within military law aside, only extending the claims of their soldier rights 
into this no-man’s-land of command could enlarge the soldier’s small realm of personal 
independence. 
“We Will Serve in No Other”: The Power of Consolidation against the Right of 
Alienation in the 44th New York and the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry 
The relationship of soldiers’ right of alienation to the Army’s power of consolidation 
encapsulated the military’s fundamental tension between rights and duties. Neither were 
often used because they were radical, opposing responses to the inviolability of the 
volunteers’ principle of association. Alienation offered soldiers’ the potential to dissolve 
their regiment if their terms of service or fundamental rights risked violation through 
continued duty. Consolidation ensured soldiers’ duty continued to the last full measure 
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regardless of the integrity of their association. A resort to either could represent an 
undoing of all the Union represented.  
During the Civil War the Union Army consolidated regiments on an ad hoc basis. 
Two examples of consolidation that were opposed by soldiers through military protest 
actions occurred in the 44th New York and in the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry (2nd RI 
Cavalry). For volunteers offering military service to save the Union, it was axiomatic to 
preserve the integrity of their local regiment as well. Self-government had not only an 
individual but also a corporate character. Perusing the Official Records indicates that 
plans for consolidation often arrived at the Adjutant General’s office in the War 
Department after major battles from corps and army commanders intent on reorganizing 
their commands for increased operational utility. Affirming the sanctity of state 
affiliation, these requests typically emphasized that regiments “from the same State” 
would be assimilated into one organization. Francis C. Barlow’s praise for the gallant 
officers and men from the 81st Pennsylvania consolidated to his command was unusual 
in this regard because he was colonel of the 61st New York. Benjamin Loan, a brigadier 
general in the Missouri State Militia (Union) expressed a more common attitude about 
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even consolidating men from the same state: it yielded soldiers who would subsequently 
perform only “unwilling service.”51 
Indeed, Northerners doubted not only the utility of consolidation, but its wisdom. 
Historian Kenneth Stamp explains that during the ratification debates of the 1780s 
Antifederalists used “consolidation” as a watchword for their fears that the proposed 
Constitution would lead inexorably to “the reduction of the states to impotence in a 
perpetual Union.” The sovereignty of the states would be so reduced that they would be 
eventually prevented from even peacefully resigning from Union, that is “the remedy of 
secession would not be available to a state whose citizens found the new Union 
despotic.” If a consolidated Union could nullify states’ power to alienate themselves 
then the prospects for self-government dimmed as citizens fell under the sway of distant, 
centralized power. In the Antifederalist’s constitutional order the states should be 
bulwarks against overreach by the national executive or legislature.52 
Even rumors of a potential consolidation could motivate citizen-soldiers to act 
preventatively to ensure their regiment’s cohesion. Volunteers in the 44th New York 
strove for several months to do just that. Eventually they asked their citizen allies to act 
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on their behalf. Nicknamed “Ellsworth’s Avengers” in tribute to the martyr Elmer 
Ellsworth, the regiment arose through the efforts of a public committee known as the 
Ellsworth Association for the State of New York formed at the state capital on 25 May 
1861. According to the association’s constitution and by-laws it would seek to recruit 
“one man from each town and ward in the state” equipping them through a fundraising 
campaign orchestrated by local sub-committees. These sub-committees also selected 
recruits for their physique and their “moral character.” They promised recruits from 
“contiguous counties will be placed together to form companies” and non-commissioned 
officers would be elected, but that “at present” commissioned officers “will be selected 
from those volunteering by the officers of this Association.” The recruits arrived at 
Albany for rendezvous beginning on 8 August 1861.53 
By October 1862 a sharply reduced “People’s Ellsworth Guards” was encamped at 
Sharpsburg after the Battle of Antietam. It had been held in reserve due to heavy combat 
losses during the battles of Hanover Court House, Gaines Mill, and Malvern Hill.54 Now 
the Army proposed consolidation with another understrength regiment or an injection of 
fresh recruits to bring it up to proper size.55 The veterans in the field would not 
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countenance amalgamating with a strange organization. They had enlisted with certain 
promises about the regiment’s composition as well its organizational integrity. When 
these appeared at risk they immediately harnessed the power of the civilian arm of their 
self-governing military association to insist the Army abandon any plans for 
consolidation. 
Two hundred Avengers addressed a petition to the Ellsworth Association on 1 
October 1862. The New Yorkers claimed they had been promised that their regiment 
would contain men of “certain qualifications” for the advantage of “good and intelligent 
associates.” The replacements who had begun to appear to fill the thin ranks56—lured by 
new, substantial bounties—concerned these veterans of the Seven Days Battle. Seeing 
recruits not held to the same standards as the founding associates was, “not only a 
violation of your agreement with us but an infliction of a great wrong to the original 
members.” A “still greater wrong” was potential consolidation with another regiment 
“without the consent of the members” and a “violation of your said promises made to 
us.” The petition was a remonstrance and a request for interposition: “We…appeal to 
you, to come to our aid and see that justice be done, and your promises…fulfilled.”57 
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The appeal of the soldiers swung their citizen allies into action. Recruiting notices 
went out and two new companies were recruited by 23 October. One of these was 
entirely composed of students from the Albany Normal School led by two of their 
professors. With these almost miraculous additions the regiment avoided consolidation. 
Even so, soldiers’ belief in their right to choose their comrades remained strong. “The 
reception given the new companies was not very cordial as the old members manifested 
a disposition not to receive them into full fellowship until their metal had been 
proved.”58 
The federal nature of the Republic provided the logic and the tradition of raising 
volunteer regiments with state affiliation, which encouraged the local volunteerism that 
produced regiments like the 44th New York. The Avengers’ distaste at even the prospect 
of consolidation explains how deeply intertwined regimental affiliation were the rights 
of selection and alienation. Furthermore their corporate solution to avoiding the stain of 
consolidation also reinforced the continuing close ties between home and camp. When 
the Army considered disrupting these webs of connection by combining several 
regiments, most Union soldiers still swallowed the bitter pill. But consolidation of 
regiments by the Army always carried the term’s original, ominous connotations. 
Nowhere was this more true in the exceptional cases when regiments from different 
states were proposed for consolidation. In the aftermath of the 4th Maine’s mutiny above, 
the Army proposed interstate consolidation as a punitive measure. One company was 
entirely broken up, its captain dismissed the service and both lieutenants resigned as a 
                                                
58 Nash, A History of the Forty-fourth, 108. 
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consequence. Another ninety-seven of the mutineers were forced into the ranks of the 
38th New York, a regiment in the same brigade. In its place an entirely new company 
was recruited; doubtless with no question about its three-year commitment.59 
More egregious was the interstate consolidation foisted on troopers in the 2nd RI 
Cavalry in August 1863. Their determination that the choice of who they served with 
should not be divorced from the state flag they served under was a corollary to their 
regiment’s self-governing nature. In this case consolidation was not employed as a 
remedy to combat loss or even as the punishment it was proposed to be by the 
department commander. Rather, it emerged from the politics of Federal control over 
Louisiana. In the end the Army did not get its way. Through remonstrance, mutiny, and 
their governor’s interposition, the Rhode Island men preserved their soldiers’ rights of 
organizational integrity, state affiliation, and selection. 
Louisiana was the regiment’s destination in March 1863 after being recruited in the 
summer and fall of 1862. But it remained a regiment in name only. Rhode Island’s 
minuscule population struggled to contribute sufficient recruits. Some additional 
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volunteers were swept in from New York City and Boston (including sprinklings of 
immigrants) with bounties and bonuses.60 
At that time Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, consummate Massachusetts 
politician and commander of the Army’s Gulf Department, supervised much of 
Louisiana. The white Unionists there hoped cooperation with Federal forces might 
elevate them to political power in the Army and in the state’s new government. Many 
were immigrants and recent settlers. Banks drew many of them into his orbit as allies 
against remaining Confederate sympathizers. In addition to appointing them to positions 
in the evolving military government, another Banks strategy for maintaining their 
personal loyalty was through commissions in the Union Army. One beneficiary was 
Harai Robinson, an erstwhile Confederate officer whom Banks put in command of the 
1st Louisiana Cavalry Regiment (Union).61 Robinson, who went on to make the most of 
his role as a provost marshal in 1864, made earning a field command merely a stepping-
stone.62 
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After the fall of Port Hudson on 9 July 1863 Banks devised a convenient remedy for 
the paltry enlistments into his Louisiana cavalry regiment. First, on 11 July he collapsed 
the 2nd RI Cavalry Regiment’s eight understrength companies into four and peremptorily 
mustered out the excess officers.63 Second, he manufactured a pretext for consolidating 
them into Robinson’s regiment, claiming after the fact that the Ocean Staters’ own 
officers had “acknowledged their inability to control” men who were “wholly worthless 
as soldiers.” Therefore, only grafting them onto a reliable regiment could possibly 
reform them after numerous “depredations and robberies” for which two troopers had 
already been executed.64  
Matters came to head on 29 August 1863 when the 1st Louisiana (Union) Cavalry 
arrived at the camp of the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry for an unusual dress parade. Under 
Special Orders No. 209 of the Department of the Gulf issued five days earlier by General 
Banks, the Ocean State men were henceforth “transferred” to the Louisiana regiment and 
would be “assigned to companies” by its colonel. Upon the order being read, the Rhode 
Islanders erupted “instantaneously and as if by accord,” in a Louisiana officer’s words, 
                                                
63 Special Orders No. 167, para. XIV, 11 July 1863 and Special Orders No. 168, para. II, 12 July 1863, 
Headquarters, Department of the Gulf, collected in Annual Report of the Adjutant-General of the State of 
Rhode Island, for the Year 1863 (Providence, Alfred Anthony, Printer to the State, 1864), 9. The officers 
who remained demanded discharges from the Army and condemned in principle having to go before an 
examining board for a commission in the 1st Louisiana Cavalry (Union). After all, their governor had 
approved their commissions, Governor James Y. Smith to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 
Providence, Rhode Island, 4 September 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 26, 1:270. 
64 Major General N. P. Banks to Thomas M. Vincent, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., 16 
October 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 26, 1:272 (emphasis added). Banks initially sought to combine the Second 
with a regiment of Empire State cavalry because he claimed the regiment was “enlisted from New York 
chiefly.” Yet, the men’s words and actions during the mutiny certainly cast doubt on this assertion, ibid. 
 124 
with “a tumultuous and general ‘No! No!’ ‘Rhode Island forever,’” rippling from “one 
end of the line to the other.”65 
In spite of the verbal protest, Robinson oversaw the consolidation of the two 
organizations. He ordered the Rhode Island soldiers removed not only from their original 
regiment, but their companies as well. They were dismounted, arranged in files 
alongside those of the 1st Louisiana, and then literally amalgamated with them. That 
night, however, the Ocean Staters, renewed their protest and encamped apart from the 
Louisiana men. The next day, 30 August, Robinson surrounded the Rhode Islanders with 
his soldiers, bent on imposing the consolidation order. But “not a man moved.” Richard 
Smith and William Davis arose and boldly stated: “‘Colonel, we have made up our 
minds that as we enlisted in the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry, we will, by God, serve in no 
other! We will not serve! Do as you like, but, by God, we won’t serve.” They concluded: 
“We belong to Rhode Island, and not to Louisiana!” That morning Davis and Smith died 
by firing squad on Robinson’s order. Summary execution finally brought the Ocean 
Staters to heel.66 
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 Within the week that news of these violent punishments trickled back to Rhode 
Island, that state’s governor, James Y. Smith, protested to Secretary of War Edwin 
Stanton. The Army had tried to “coolly thrust” his citizens into a “new organization” 
with no care that they would “lose all their identity with their native State.” Banks’s 
presumption to consolidate was a direct “conflict with our ideas of right and justice” and 
an “injustice to Rhode Island.” Although too late, he demanded that the 2nd RI Cavalry 
“be allowed to maintain its name and organization.” On 4 September the War 
Department cabled Banks asking for details. He summoned a military commission that 
rubber-stamped the consolidation. After primarily hearing testimony from the 1st 
Louisiana’s officers, it concluded on 6 September that Robinson’s actions had ensured 
“suppression of the mutiny.”67 
For nearly two months the matter rested there until Governor Smith wrote again on 7 
November to Secretary Stanton demanding resolution and condemning the Army’s 
violation of his soldiers’ rights. They had been “disgraced by being torn from their own 
organization and placed in one which is in every way distasteful to them. Yet these men 
are volunteers.…should they be treated so?” Either the order had to be revoked or the 
“men of the Second Cavalry transferred by special order to our First Cavalry.” “Our 
people,” Smith continued, viewed the executions as an “outrage to Rhode Island” 
especially given that the victims were “simply remonstrating against the order for 
consolidation.” Smith worried openly that future Rhode Island volunteers would not be 
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“protected in their rights.” From the content of his letter, Smith understood these rights 
of (at least) Rhode Island soldiers to include the integrity of their organization, scrutiny 
of orders which threatened that integrity, and protection of the rule of law as defined in 
the Articles of War. Smith also condemned Banks for ignoring “a protest from this 
department” about the consolidation order. The Rhode Island governor had interposed 
himself between the Army and his citizens precisely to protect them from unjust 
treatment. Rather than respected in his position as a representative of his people’s 
interest, he had been sidelined by an unelected general’s pursuit of expediency and 
occupation politics.68 
Smith’s interposition did not fall on deaf ears at the War Department, however, 
because Banks admitted in October that “I had no authority for this act whatever.” 
Despite General-in-Chief Henry Halleck’s initial approbation of Banks’s actions, he 
eventually yielded to Smith’s relentless interference. Smith insisted the order be 
rescinded and the Rhode Islanders be transferred to the state’s new 3rd Cavalry 
Regiment en route to Louisiana. These volunteers—whatever the truth of Banks’s 
charges against their conduct—finally experienced vindication when the Army agreed to 
their transfer to the 3rd RI Cavalry on 5 December.69 
As in the case of the Anderson Cavalry, New York and Rhode Island volunteers 
emerged victorious from their confrontation with the Army. Military protest actions 
                                                
68 Governor James Y. Smith to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, Providence, Rhode Island, 7 
November 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 26, 1:270–71. 
69 Major General N. P. Banks to Thomas M. Vincent, Assistant Adjutant General, Washington, D.C., 16 
October 1863, OR, I, XXVI, I: 272; endorsement of H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief, 16 November 1863 
on Smith’s letter of 7 November 1863, OR, I, XXVI, I: 271; Thomas M. Vincent, Assistant Adjutant 
General, Washington, D.C. to Major General N. P. Banks, 5 December 1863, OR, I, XXVI, I: 272–73. 
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preserved the 44th New York and it at least saved the Rhode Island soldiers from service 
in the 1st Louisiana Cavalry and distributed across its companies. This would have 
erased their state affiliation and attenuated crucial bonds of comradeship with their 
fellow countrymen. The Ocean Staters’ stand for rights of association and rights of 
protest secured the interposition of their chief executive against Banks flaunting the rule 
of law. In both affairs, the specter of consolidation also surfaced soldiers’ basic 
attachment to the right of selection endemic to associational culture. A closed circle was 
only possible with the power to draw some lines about comradeship and membership; 
about who gained rights and duties through affiliation and who did not. MiD.C.entury 
Americans’ unspoken assumptions about local control and local distinction mandated 
associational politics because they believed it best kept power and interest close to the 
people themselves, rather than in the hands of distant elites, jobbers, and speculators. 
Governor Smith, although physically distant, took a close interest in the events and felt 
an obligation to the men because he knew their communities and he was in the crosshairs 
of the newspapers that reported these events. 
The case of the Rhode Island mutiny indicates the fundamental tension between 
citizen-soldiers’ civic values of self-government and the Army’s claim of authority over 
them. It highlighted the persistent connections between soldiers and their home 
communities, and laid bare the constitutional struggle that continued in wartime between 
state and national authorities. These citizens in uniform viewed enlistment as an act of 
self-government and that act of self-government remained valid only within the original 
contract they made to the United States through their state. 
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The Rhode Island mutiny was federalism defended with blood. Davis and Smith 
insisted before their deaths, “We belong to Rhode Island and not to Louisiana.” At first 
blush this reads like a quaint bit of parochialism. But when placed in the context of 
Governor Smith’s later actions and the broader contours of wartime politics it takes on 
greater significance. At that moment in September 1863 Louisiana’s constitutional 
status—its proper relationship to the Union—was unprecedented in the history of the 
Republic. 
Its representation in Congress had been restored in February 1862 and by this 
standard of loyalty it was exempt from the operation of the Emancipation Proclamation. 
Yet as a constituent member of the Union it lacked crucial parts of the civil apparatus for 
republican government within its boundaries. And those boundaries were fluid with the 
state divided between the lower, Federal-occupied sugar parishes and the northern 
portion under Confederate control. In the Federal portion of Louisiana, although a 
provisional court system was implemented in October 1862, military government 
continued with Banks at its head. When the 2nd RI Cavalry made its stand, Louisiana had 
no state legislature and no governor. Its state constitution had been suspended. Michael 
Hahn was not elected governor until February 1864, there was no constitutional 
convention until April, and the constitution was not ratified until September. 
Davis and Smith’s defiant objection to joining a Louisiana regiment, therefore, 
rested on finding themselves directly under the thumb of General Banks and the Army 
high command against their will. There would be no civil magistrate to hear their pleas, 
no “highest authority to which a soldier can appeal,” in the Pennsylvanians’ words 
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above. In light of Governor Smith’s strenuous efforts on their behalf, their fears were 
well founded. These men cherished their affiliation with one of the Union’s individual 
states; they went to their deaths raising a mutiny to protect their sense of belonging. That 
state could, when necessary, shield them from the excesses of political expediency and 
the threats of military despotism. The Rhode Islanders received a clear lesson that self-
government required the states as intermediaries. The absence in Louisiana of the state 
government within the constitutional order made their entire, pathetic ordeal possible. 
The political tumult of Louisiana also created a striking denouement for the 1st 
Louisiana Cavalry. After casualties and hard service during the Red River Campaign in 
the spring of 1864, the 1st Louisiana went on to absorb the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry 
(Union) in September. In this instance of consolidation wholly ignored by historians is 
the now familiar tension of citizenship values and military authority. Its circumstances 
also shed some additional light on the politics of wartime Reconstruction, especially the 
always tenuous coalition between Southern Unionists, carpetbaggers, and the Army. 
Colonel Robinson used his proximity to Banks and his high position in the military 
administration to his personal advantage. The officers and men of the 2nd Louisiana 
Cavalry despised the favoritism that gave Robinson the position and privilege to besiege 
their corporate rights of integrity and self-government. They, like the men of the 2nd 
Rhode Island Cavalry, tried to resist any manipulation of their right of association. 
Lobbying for a field command with the 1st Louisiana Cavalry paved the way for 
Robinson to enrich himself with Banks’s connivance. According to Charles A. Dana 
stationed in Memphis in January 1863, “Every colonel, captain, or quartermaster is in 
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secret partnership with some operator” pursuing the “mania for sudden fortunes made in 
cotton.”70 During 1864 Robinson used his Gulf Department provost marshal’s office to 
clear tens of thousands of dollars in bribes. He used his authority from Banks to facilitate 
the sale of cotton between the lines. As with his handling of the 2nd Rhode Island 
Cavalry consolidation, it nearly resulted in his court-martial.71 
Where at least a tenuous relationship existed between the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry 
and the Anderson Troop, the only connection the two regiments of Louisiana cavalry 
had with one another was in their titles. The colonel of the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry, 
Irishman Daniel J. Keily, had expended his own resources to equip the unit and had 
spent ten months completing its organization. These efforts had cultivated an esprit d’ 
corps in this regiment recruited entirely within Union-controlled Louisiana from Anglo 
and immigrant soldiers. Some had transferred from New York and New England 
regiments stationed there since 1862. Others joined after their previous enlistments had 
ended.72 
As the consolidation on 7 September 1864 approached, the 2nd Louisiana’s officers 
smelled a rat. Quite perspicaciously, Lieutenant James McBeth expounded his belief that 
                                                
70 Dana quoted in McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom, 621.  
71 Hundreds of other speculators worked in New Orleans and Mobile doing the same, Lash, A Politician 
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General Nathaniel P. Banks (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1998), 215–18. 
72 Keily, along with many other “Wild Geese,” had fought in the Irish Battalion of St. Patrick during the 
1860 Papal War, Roger D. Hunt and Jack Brown, Brevet Brigadier Generals in Blue, rev. ed. 
(Gaithersburg, MD: Olde Soldier Books, 1997), 325; John Eicher and David Eicher, Civil War High 
Commands (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002), 328. 
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“the great object in consolidating the two regts. was to give the Col. of the 1st Regt. men 
enough” for a full-strength command.73 The 150 NCOs and privates who remained in the 
1st Louisiana following Banks’s Red River expedition still enjoyed “a full regiment’s 
compliment [sic] of officers.” At the same time, the nearly 1,000 troopers in Keily’s 2nd 
Cavalry faced a dearth of officers comparable to the Andersons’ two years before.74 Yet, 
rumors claimed “that officers without men” in the 1st Louisiana would be entertained 
with an equally valid claim to a commission “before an examining board” as officers in 
the 2nd Louisiana “who had their full companies.”75  
Here is the direct, causal connection with the 2nd RI Cavalry mutiny. Due to 
Governor Smith’s stubborn interposition, Robinson’s 1st Louisiana Cavalry remained a 
rump unit. The Rhode Island troopers joined the 3rd Rhode Island Cavalry in December 
1863. Without those contributions, Robinson’s unit finished Banks’s 1864 Red River 
Campaign severely understrength. Robinson and Banks settled on absorbing Keily’s 
regiment rather than expending time and resources on a recruiting effort. Besides, 
Robinson may have viewed the 2nd Louisiana Cavalry as a rival source of loyalty for 
white Unionists and growing numbers of carpetbaggers populating the state—including 
discharged, three-year Northern volunteers, such as the men who joined the 2nd 
Louisiana. Keily’s disgruntled officers recoiled at consolidation’s threat to the integrity 
                                                
73 Dyer, War of the Rebellion, 1213; Lieutenant James McBeth to Dear Billy, 16 October 1864, James E. 
McBeth Letters, [2nd Louisiana Cavalry (Union)], William Conrow Collection, New-York Historical 
Society, New York, NY (hereafter NYHS), original emphasis. 
74 McBeth to Dear Billy, 16 October 1864, Conrow Collection, NYHS.  
75 McBeth to Dear Billy, 16 October 1864, Conrow Collection, NYHS. 
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of their organization, to membership based on the terms of service Keily had extended, 
and their presumed rights of selection to reject association with undesirables. 
In McBeth's view, Colonel Robinson exploited the provost marshal’s office in the 
same way that he orchestrated consolidation of Keily’s regiment for his own 
aggrandizement. McBeth correctly suspected that Robinson had only gained his 
colonelcy “through red tape by a special order.” “He has wire pulled and worked himself 
into the favorable graces of that military ass—***General Banks***.”76 Like the Rhode 
Island officers before them, Keily’s men declined to appear in front of the board, much 
less accept a ruling that was in no way binding. “We made up our minds that it was all a 
farce. And we refused to be made fools of.” The Army served McBeth and his fellow 
officers with dishonorable discharges for rejecting a direct order. But McBeth planned 
“to see what I can do as a citizen” to scrutinize and instruct his magistrates. He 
composed a “carefully worded petition” intended for President Lincoln, vowing to a 
friend, “We will fight them tooth and nail at Washington” to win honorable discharges.77 
McBeth remained in New Orleans as a witness for Colonel Keily. Court-martialed 
for encouraging the officers’ dissent, the Irishman was acquitted. McBeth did not let his 
dishonorable discharge prevent him from working in the Quartermaster’s Department as 
a civilian. He was glad to be rid of the Army. “Changing from military to civil life is a 
great relief to a person. Before every damned fool who happened to be placed over me 
was clothed with powers to do to a certain extent any thing he liked. But now it is again 
                                                
76 McBeth to Dear Billy, 16 October 1864, Conrow Collection, NYHS, emphasis with asterisks original. 
77 McBeth to Dear Billy, 16 October 1864, Conrow Collection, NYHS. 
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my turn…It now resolves itself down to the question of who is the best man.”78 
McBeth’s reaction was, in a sense, a negative example of the direct relationship between 
the integrity of a soldier’s regiment and his commitment to the Union cause. 
James McBeth was a loyal citizen-soldier in 1864, committed to the Union’s 
expansive war aims as they developed over its course. The lived reality of self-
government in antebellum Northerners’ locales and free association citizens prompted 
them to fight and die from 1861–1865. Yet, these principles realized as soldier rights 
could make them despise the very instrument of Union victory. Like many of the 
dissenters presented in this chapter, James McBeth did not believe victory should erode 
America’s civic principles. In contrast to his experience, the soldiers of the Anderson 
Cavalry salvaged self-government in their organization and were victorious in their 
claims against the Army. The 1st Louisiana Cavalry unfairly absorbed McBeth’s 
regiment and he was discharged (unjustly he believed) from the service. He finished the 
war grateful to be out of the Army rather than content to finish the job if his regiment 
had been preserved in its rights. And he expressed none of the convictions about seeing 
the war through to the end. Instead, he adopted the traditional American point-of-view 
that a standing army and military service were obstacles to individual liberty and 
republican government. 
This seemed especially true in the case of the 2nd Rhode Island and 2nd Louisiana. 
These men were interchangeable parts for Federal forces, the largest army in American 
history up to that time. From that vantage point the organizing principle of state-
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affiliated volunteer regiments simply served as the best available method of sweeping 
men into the ranks, no matter what long-standing traditions were violated along the way. 
On the other hand, consolidation’s sparing use recognized that associationalism and 
regimental integrity were vital to the morale and cohesion of armies. Leaving the 
importance of comradeship aside, consolidation undermined self-government by 
weakening the citizen-soldier’s ties to home and to the Union cause. The Army’s even 
occasional recourse to consolidation resurrected the term’s nefarious connotation from 
the Early Republic. Both forms of consolidation threatened to turn the People into an 
undifferentiated mass more easily manipulated by a central authority. This could be 
accomplished in the civil realm by weakening the integrity of state governments; in the 
military realm by doing the same to state regiments. Self-government, on the other hand, 
necessitated the states as a check on the untrammeled sway of an overweening tyrant. 
Conclusion 
Northern Anglo volunteers in the Union Army held in tension a view of themselves 
as dutiful soldiers and loyal citizens invested with particular individual and corporate 
rights by virtue of their soldier status and membership in a voluntary association. 
Citizens in uniform resorted to military protest actions in order to condemn, if not 
oppose, violations of these rights. Examples of such points of conflict were slow or late 
pay, the unlawful extension of their term of service, tyrannical discipline by their 
officers, and consolidation of their regiments, and the Army’s attempts to manipulate 
their rights of selection and alienation. 
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In response to these transgressions against their soldier rights, Anglo volunteers took 
up military protest actions that paralleled the popular constitutionalism in street parades, 
petition drives, and public meetings. The origins of their regiments as locally organized, 
voluntary organizations ferried associationalism, public culture, and self-government 
into the military. There it came into conflict with the Army’s strategic priorities and its 
need for uniform discipline through the chain of command. 
The habits of popular constitutionalism continued in mutinies’ aftermaths. Citizen-
soldiers presented testimony in courts-martial, made appeals up the military chain of 
command, and petitioned their civilian political leaders for protection. They collaborated 
with their home communities in making their voices heard through the exchange of 
correspondence, petitions to civic and military leaders, and by publishing their own 
versions of protest actions in local and national newspapers. 
Mutinies by Northern Anglo citizen volunteers extended the antebellum world’s 
public culture into the most unlikely place: the authoritarian institution of the military. 
The priorities of military discipline and regimentation could not erase conventions of 
self-government. Citizen-soldiers found occasions and forms to maintain the lively 
associational culture they had lived prior to wartime. Military protest actions reached 
well into the third year of the war among Anglos. They were possible as long as 
regiments remained mirrors of local associational ties with widespread awareness among 
the rank and file of their soldier rights. 
As the war went on, regimental integrity attenuated through the myriad hazards of 
service. Rosters became increasingly listed with dead, wounded, sick, discharged, 
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detached, and even deserted soldiers. By 1863 and 1864 new recruits’ binding ties to 
their organizations were frequently artificially constructed through conscription or 
reinforced by swelling bounty payments. In a phenomenon related to consolidation, mass 
transfers parceled out the remaining soldiers from regiments shattered by combat or 
diminished by the termination of enlistments. All of these patterns that accompanied the 
turn to the “hard war” of 1864 and 1865 made it more difficult for men to envision, 
much less assert, a coherent, corporate ownership of their organizations. 
Yet victory in 1865 and the sacrifices it entailed had not snuffed out the antebellum 
public culture that citizen-soldiers had tried to preserve. It lived on, in fact, in their 
regimental veterans’ associations, in the Military Order of the Loyal Legion of the 
United States, and in Union veterans’ national organization, the Grand Army of the 
Republic. These descendants of the wartime regiments continued a line of martial 
associations stretching back to the prewar voluntary military companies. Incorporation, 
membership, and self-government through by-laws and charters continued. And in these 
postwar associations veterans asserted a new set of veteran’s rights, though more 
inchoate than what they brought with them to the Army originally. They embraced 
control over the memory of the war and the role their organization played. They 
established guidelines and programs for charitable assistance to their indigent or disabled 
members. And those efforts carried into agitation for greatly enhanced veterans’ 
pensions culminating in the legislation of 1890. Military protest actions, from petitions 
all the way to mutinies, were crucial incubators of American self-government during the 
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Civil War. Moreover, they presented specific evidence for the ways that wartime Anglos 
found the power to remain authentic citizens even while in uniform.
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CHAPTER IV 
“SOLDIERS OF OUR RACE AND COUNTRY”: 
SOLDIER RIGHTS AND MILITARY PROTEST ACTIONS 
IN NORTHERN REGIMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES COLORED TROOPS 
 
On an April night in 1864 several dozen soldiers of the 55th Massachusetts Infantry 
Regiment (Colored) mutinied aboard the transport steamer Sentinel to free Sergeant Sampson 
Goliah from what they believed to be an improper arrest. Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell had 
ordered the civilian captain of the steamer to tie Goliah to the rigging. The mutineers saw this 
as a violation of the rights and protections that belonged to them as members of their 
regiment. After a brief struggle with officers and fellow soldiers on guard detail, they spirited 
him below decks. The mutinous soldiers only savored a brief moment of triumph before 
more officers and soldiers confronted them. Even as Goliah bellowed in defiance, he was 
rearrested and the mutiny collapsed less than an hour after it erupted. After the steamer 
disembarked on Folly Island, South Carolina, the next day, the colonel ordered courts-martial 
to try Goliah and four ringleaders for mutiny.1  
Military protest actions, like the Goliah incident, in African American regiments raised in 
the North reveal free Northern black soldiers and emancipated slave soldiers articulating a 
body of soldier rights that they claimed as loyal members of the Federal army pledged to 
defend the Union and bring down the institution of slavery. Defining and defending these 
rights during military protest actions, however, put soldiers in a position of dissent—
ostensible disloyalty—against the Army; the very vehicle of their drive for freedom. 
                                                
1 Charges and specifications, Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell testimony, Second Lieutenant Josiah Bean testimony, 
and Privates David Wilkins and Charles C. Porter testimony in the general court-martial of Sergeant Sampson 
Goliah, 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (Colored), 7 May 1864, NN2479, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 
153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Goliah court-martial). 
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Northern and Southern black soldiers in the 55th Massachusetts Infantry and the 14th Rhode 
Island Colored Heavy Artillery (RICHA) located these rights in their own experience with 
Northern antebellum political culture and the enslaved’s patterns of confrontation and 
resistance, respectively. Moreover, the legal rights extended to black soldiers in Army courts-
martial formed an important basis for citizenship.2 Furthermore, the Army’s recognition of 
those rights places added emphasis on the African American military protest actions that 
gave rise to the achievements in the courtroom. 
Recognizing that these regiments comprised majorities of Northern free blacks alongside 
smaller contingents of freed blacks, this chapter builds on the work of Keith Wilson whose 
study of camp life of African American soldiers found points of cultural interaction among 
Northern and Southern blacks in folk music and religious practice as well as conflict over 
racial leadership and responses to discrimination within the military.3 While the focus of 
these protest actions is on how Northern free blacks used them to define their soldier rights, 
Southern blacks played important roles as comrades in arms. These military protest actions 
were yet another example of how the Civil War intensified African American political 
cooperation across sectional boundaries in the pursuit of freedom. Northern blacks grew 
firmer in their vision of racial solidarity across the nation in pursuit of civic rights that would 
secure the full flowering of self-government for African Americans and respectable 
membership in a new Union. In this way it links the black soldiering experience more firmly 
to the larger trends of nationalization unleashed by the Civil War and Reconstruction. 
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Intersection between Military Justice and Equal Rights: Mutinies, Courts-martial, and Black Civil War 
Soldiers,” Civil War History 53, no. 2 (November 2008): 200–03 (170–203). 
3 Keith P. Wilson, Campfires of Freedom: The Camp Life of Black Soldiers During the Civil War (Kent, OH: 
Kent State University Press, 2002), 13, 42, 52, 126, 164. 
 140 
Although the two regiments chosen for this chapter were part of the United States 
Colored Troops (USCT), they contained Northern free black men in a far greater proportion 
than most other African American regiments. Defined as a person of African descent not in a 
state of bondage at the war’s outbreak and resident in the states loyal to the Union, these 
Northern blacks were a divergent collection of volunteers from the Northeast, the Middle 
West, and the Border States. Of the roughly 2.8 million men who served for some length of 
time in the Union forces, only 33,364 “colored troops” were officially credited to the 
enlistment quotas of states in the Northern and Western states. By contrast, the slaveholding 
Border States and the seceded states contributed a staggering 139,715 such men, the majority 
of whom were emancipated slaves. Nevertheless, Northern blacks contributed members to 
several regiments beyond the well-recognized 54th Massachusetts Infantry.4 Pennsylvania 
sponsored eleven USCT regiments, New York three. Other states including Illinois, 
Connecticut, and Iowa each raised a single regiment.5 Their small numbers gave Northern 
free blacks a unique place in the Army. Although by the beginning of 1864 they accounted 
for 18 percent of all blacks under arms, probably only one in every one hundred Union 
                                                
4 Director Edward Zwick’s film Glory (1989) did the most to immortalize the 54th Massachusetts in popular 
memory. For a fine consideration of the film’s impact see the essays in Martin H. Blatt, Thomas J. Brown, and 
Donald Yacovone, eds., Hope & Glory: Essays on the Legacy of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 2001). 
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soldiers could be considered a Northern free black.6 Composed of Northern free blacks and 
Southern freedmen, these Federal regiments had a distinctive role as places of cultural 
encounter between free and freed African Americans. 
A minority in the larger USCT, Northern blacks made up the majority inside the 55th 
Massachusetts and the 14th Rhode Island. Sixty-two percent of the 55th Massachusetts’s 
soldiers had been born in non-slave, Northern states. Nearly 56 percent had been born in the 
Ohio Valley states of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Indiana. Furthermore, unlike most 
freedmen who were former agricultural laborers, nearly 45 percent of the soldiers in the 55th 
Massachusetts had been artisans, skilled workers, or unskilled laborers before the war.  This 
compared to the whole Army where the number was around 10 percent. Company A of the 
14th RICHA, the locus of its protest actions discussed below, was almost entirely 
Northeastern, drawing over 80 percent of its soldiers from New York City, Pennsylvania, or 
New England. An urban company as well, only a little more than 15 percent of its members 
claimed prewar occupations as farmers. 
In the 55th Massachusetts and the 14th Rhode Island’s first company, the percentage of 
soldiers whose state of origin allowed slavery was 36 and 13, respectively. Judging the 
proportion of freedmen-soldiers in both regiments is complicated by the reality that some 
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recruits born in the South resided in free states by the war’s outbreak.7 An escapee could 
have been living in freedom for many years before he enlisted. Take Private William H. 
Smith in the 14th Rhode Island, for example. A twenty-five year-old born in Richmond, he 
had lived with his family in Ohio since about 1844.8 Even with their components of 
emancipated slaves, these two black units reflected the demographics of the Northern, free 
African American community through their high proportions of urban, working-class 
soldiers.9  
Attention to this feature of the Civil War black soldiering population deserves attention 
because, as proposed in the Introduction, Northern blacks contributed a voice of protest 
distinct from the escapees and freedmen alongside whom they served. Northern free black 
soldiers had a particular culture of protest. It originated with their longstanding, broadly-
based participation in Northern public culture. The soldier status that both groups of African 
Americans gained serving inside regiments of the USCT afforded them a new realm for civic 
action within the prevailing culture of associational self-government. 
                                                
7 Regimental Descriptive Book, Vol. 1 of 8, 55th United States Colored Troops, Massachusetts Infantry, Book 
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In the case of this chapter’s subjects, Northern blacks had their own citizen-soldiering 
tradition that attuned them to notions of self-government and soldier rights. Black 
abolitionists such as William C. Nell recovered the record of black military service in the 
War for Independence and the War of 1812. Memories of the promises of freedom to slaves 
who served during the Revolution and with Andrew Jackson at New Orleans were reminders 
that soldier status could confer rights. Northern African Americans also participated in 
antebellum military associational culture by forming their own volunteer companies. In 1855 
Providence’s blacks organized a volunteer rifle company and Cincinnati’s African Americans 
formed a “well drilled, well uniformed, and well officered” unit called the “Attucks Blues.”10 
Although officially excluded from military service in 1861, African Americans in New York 
City, Providence, and Boston continued to form their own drill squads and militia companies 
during the war’s first two years.11 Following the advice of black abolitionist Alfred M. 
                                                
10 Seraile, New York’s Black Regiments, 7; “Colored Militia,” Frederick Douglass’ Paper (Rochester, NY), 3 
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1865,” Journal of the Early Republic 29, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 249–286; William C. Nell, Services of Colored 
Americans in the Wars of 1776 and 1812 (New York: Prentiss and Sawyer, 1851); Nell, The Colored Patriots of 
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Survey of the Condition and Prospects of Colored Americans (Boston: R. F. Wallcutt, 1855). 
11 In May 1861 some New York City blacks rented a hall which they used for military drill even after a public 
meeting rejected petitioning the governor to form a militia company, Seraile, New York’s Black Regiments, 17-
18. Blacks in Providence held two public meetings in August 1862 to plan a regiment rumored to be sponsored 
by their state’s governor. Their executive committee wanted assurances that the national government would 
accept black soldiers with the same pay and privileges as whites. If these terms of their service could not be met 
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in Boston created The First Colored Militia of the Gallant Shaw in honor of the sacrifices of the 54th 
Massachusetts Infantry at Fort Wagner in South Carolina, “For the Christian Recorder,” Christian Recorder 
(Philadelphia), 3 October 1863. 
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Green, these Northern blacks prepared themselves to “be armed” and “schooled in military 
service” with sufficient “manhood to defend the right and the sagacity to detect the wrong.”12 
The Northern USCT regiments, therefore, nurtured two distinct strains of black dissent 
joined to the potent claim that American soldiers possessed specific rights derived from their 
membership in a military association. Soldier status depended on a voluntary pledge of 
allegiance—loyalty to the nation—yet it also conferred a degree of sovereign power on the 
subject to define what rights his pledge of loyalty should entail. In this way confronting the 
arbitrary orders of officers, writing letters in the black press, and even taking up mutiny did 
not compromise a soldier’s loyalty to the nation. Rather, these forms of dissent illustrated 
self-government in the ranks. Once placed in the broader contexts identified above, military 
protest actions in Northern black regiments emerge as a method for African Americans in 
uniform to resolve their loyalty to the nation and to its ideals which their community had 
historically found in conflict. By drawing in black soldiers from both regions Northern black 
regiments also spurred a freedom struggle that was national in breadth. All of these 
experiences contributed to Northern African Americans’ calls, beginning in 1864 and 
intensifying during Reconstruction, for the legal definition of their civil and political rights. 
Seating Northern black regiments in the context of antebellum associational culture lends 
greater nuance to the wartime complaints of African Americans about their military service. 
Three violations of their soldier rights—unequal pay, discrimination in officer commissions, 
and abusive treatment—populate the record left behind by Northern black soldiers. Any one 
                                                
12 Alfred M. Green, 19 October 1861, Weekly Anglo-African (New York) collected in Alfred M. Green, ed., 
Letters and Discussions on the Formation of Colored Regiments, and the Duty of the Colored People in Regard 
to the Great Slaveholders’ Rebellion, in the United States of America (Philadelphia: Ringwalt & Brown, 1862), 
22. 
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of these complaints could evoke claims that “we should be treated in all respects like white 
soldiers” or that “we have not been treated like men and soldiers belonging to the army of the 
United States.” In both phrasings there was a sense that black soldiers had been robbed of the 
dignity due to citizens in uniform. The sense of solidarity created through corporate self-
government underlay convictions that black officers “would inspire…confidence” because 
they would be “men from their own ranks.” As a mark of soldier status under the wartime 
recruiting calls, Northern African Americans’ uncertainty that they would be able to “claim 
equal pay with other volunteers” placed “our military and civil equality at issue.”13 
These African Americans acted directly in the destruction of slavery and their actions 
helped to transform Civil War historiography. Historians have demonstrated two 
fundamental concepts. One, the over 180,000 African American soldiers were crucial to 
Union victory and two, black enlistment contributed mightily to abolition. Since the 1950s, 
scholars have revealed more about the relationship of blacks to their white officers, their 
efforts to secure equal treatment, their medical care and everyday lives, and how they made 
meaning out of their experience in uniform. Donning Union blue became the ultimate act of 
self-emancipation for the formerly enslaved. Northern blacks believed their participation in 
the struggle against slavery would “reward their sacrifices with full freedom, equality, and 
                                                
13 “Bay State” to Weekly Anglo-African (New York), 30 April 1864 in Noah Andre Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 
55th: Letters from the 55th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Dayton, OH: Morningside House, 1996), 85; 
Sergeant Richard W. White to Weekly Anglo-African (New York), 4 June 1864 in Noah Andre Trudeau, ed., 
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citizenship.”14 Therefore, military protest actions by Northern black soldiers reveal crucial 
connections between military service, prewar protest culture, and the definition of soldier 
rights which in turn shaped the national African American struggle for freedom initiated by 
the war. 
Black military service began in 1862, immediately dogged by inequalities of pay, officer 
commissions, and treatment. Without the blows to the North’s battlefield fortunes at the 
Seven Days Battles and the Second Battle of Bull Run in mid-1862, the haphazard and 
piecemeal recruitment of blacks (without the sanction of Federal law) in Kansas, Louisiana, 
and South Carolina might have continued. Those Union defeats, however, ushered in the 
bitter reality of a long war against a Confederacy with reenergized morale.15 In response, the 
U.S. Congress passed the Second Confiscation Act (17 July 1862) to extended freedom to 
escaped slaves working within Federal lines if their former masters were Confederates. The 
Confiscation Act remained silent on the pay of blacks in the service of the Army, but the 
Militia Act of the same date authorized their enlistment for $7 per month. These conflicting 
                                                
14 Dudley Taylor Cornish, The Sable Arm: Negro Troops in the Union Army, 1861-1865 (1956; New York: W. 
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War and Reconstruction (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964); Ira Berlin, Joseph P. Reidy, and 
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15 Stephen V. Ash, When the Yankees Came: Conflict and Chaos in the Occupied South, 1861-1865 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 39-40. 
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stipulations eventually created a national controversy over the pay of African American 
troops.16 
The controversy began when individual regiments’ terms of service stipulated pay equal 
to whites in spite of the Militia Act’s specifications. Case in point were the two 
Massachusetts colored infantry regiments—the famous 54th and less heralded 55th—
authorized under a specific War Department order dated 26 January 1863. It empowered 
Massachusetts Governor John A. Andrew to raise additional Massachusetts’ volunteers which 
“may include persons of African descent, organized into separate corps.” Prominent white 
abolitionists and Northern black leaders including Frederick Douglass and William Wells 
Brown recruited volunteers from across the Northern states. Eventually honored more in the 
breach, the new soldiers were promised $13 a month, a $50 bounty at muster-in and another 
$100 on muster out of service. Black non-commissioned officers, surgeons, and chaplains 
were likewise promised pay at the equivalent rate of whites.17 
The 1862 acts of Congress and the Emancipation Proclamation formed the legal 
foundation for the official recruitment of black troops across the North, but when Attorney 
General Edward Bates recognized the national citizenship of native-born, free persons of 
African descent on 29 November 1862 he extended to them the same protections and 
                                                
16 Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 89-90; Glatthaar, Forged 
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obligations as other citizens enlisted in the service of the national government.18 In the new 
paradigm of citizenship, Northern black soldiers claimed sovereignty over their soldier rights 
as white volunteers always had. Complaints proceeded apace about the denial of 
commissions to competent blacks, unjust discipline by white officers, and unequal pay. 
Both Massachusetts regiments had cadres of black non-commissioned officers who had 
been put forward early in 1863 by their colonels and Governor Andrew for commissioned 
rank.19 The War Department order precluded any possibility of integrated units, but like all 
citizen-soldiers, Northern blacks held firmly to the soldier’s right of electing the best of their 
own as company officers. “We want black commissioned officers; and only because we want 
men we can understand and who can understand us.”20 Furthermore, African American 
volunteers feared barring their commissions would discourage “the right kind of men” from 
serving.21 Instead “to the utter exclusion of intelligent soldiers” too many white officers 
(especially replacements) seemed to be from a class of “street-loafers and grog-shop 
rowdies.”22 Without attention to the demand for black commissions, condemnations of 
“white” officers in the mutinies discussed below can become disconnected from Northern 
blacks’ associational concerns that the members designate competent fellows with authority 
                                                
18 According to Bates, the Constitution was silent on color as a disability for the citizenship of natural-born 
persons, Opinion of Attorney General Bates on Citizenship (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 
1862), 14-15. 
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over the whole. Race mediated an equally complex commitment to antebellum Northern 
practices of self-government. 
Although calls for black officers never fell silent, demands for equal pay moved to the 
forefront of black military protest in the summer of 1863. The Union victories in July 1863 at 
Gettysburg, Vicksburg, and Port Hudson confirmed the government’s more expansive war 
aims as African American soldiers shed loyal blood in the battles of Milliken’s Bend (7 June) 
and Fort Wagner (18 July). Yet, on 4 June 1863 the War Department promulgated a pay 
policy to comply with the 1862 Militia Act.23 Recalling the original terms of service offered 
to the 55th Massachusetts, its first colonel, Norwood P. Hallowell, spoke the language of 
soldier rights that his Northern black soldiers would have understood: “They were promised 
thirteen dollars per month. They were insulted with seven dollars.”24 One of Hallowell’s 
Michigan soldiers agreed when he linked his service to the exploits of African American 
soldiers elsewhere, “We showed our qualities at Port Gibson and Fort Wagner…all the 
compensation that we ask is to give us our rights.”25 
Most painful of all, at the same time the Federal government had devalued black soldiers 
with the policy of unequal pay, Northern African American families endured racist pogroms 
in several cities. The most conspicuous were the New York City Draft Riots (13-16 July 
                                                
23 In response, Governor John A. Andrew implored Attorney General Bates to review Whiting’s decision and 
urged Congress to legislate a solution, Herman Belz, “Law, Politics, and Race in the Struggle for Equal Pay 
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1863). While rebels in gray shed the blood of Northern black soldiers, “the rebels that are at 
our backs” did the same to their kin at home.26  
The whirlwind of violence alongside the reduced pay rate raised fearful connections for 
Northern blacks between their soldier rights, the recently endorsed title of citizen, and their 
role as breadwinner. Unequal pay stung Northern blacks who had absorbed antebellum 
market values.27 A soldier in the 55th asked, “Are our parents, wives, children and sisters to 
suffer, while we, their natural protectors, are fighting the battles of the nation?”28 His 
question exposed how the pay discrepancy undermined soldiers’ manly ability to provide for 
their dependent wives and children. Acquiescing in unequal military compensation 
threatened to halt the revolutionary consequences of black enlistment. As the Reverend J. P. 
Campbell explained, “If we go in equal in pay, we hope to come out equal in 
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enfranchisement.”29 Demanding just pay as one of their soldier rights represented a step 
toward true self-government within the nation. 
The War Department promulgated the new pay policy right as recruiting came to an end 
for the two Massachusetts regiments. Ordered to join Union forces occupying the Sea 
Islands, the 54th Massachusetts arrived first and made its ill-fated assault before the 55th 
disembarked at Folly Island on 3 August.30 The soldiers responded to news of the pay policy 
with a boycott in which their officers initially acquiesced. Despite the Articles of War 
equating refusal of pay with mutiny, it continued into the next year. Tensions steadily rose 
between officers and men.31 
Meanwhile, Massachusetts’s tiny neighbor, Rhode Island, finally began recruiting its first 
black unit, a heavy artillery company, on 29 July 1863. The governor’s initial attempt to raise 
a regiment in August 1862 under the Confiscation and Militia Acts had prompted the public 
meeting above of Providence’s blacks.32 Their response had been enthusiastic, but at that 
time Washington was less sanguine. When the War Department finally endorsed black 
enlistment in Rhode Island, it promised to count those recruits toward the state’s 1863 
enlistment quota. Since that meant fewer white men might face conscription, public opinion 
encouraged the move. Bolstered by a $300 state enlistment bounty, news of an artillery 
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company drew interest not only from blacks in Rhode Island but surrounding states also. 
Over several months the steady black response led to the formation of additional companies 
until the War Department had authorized a substantial regiment—1700 men. Despite blacks 
comprising a tiny minority of the state’s total population, recruits from the Ohio Valley 
flocked to Company A along with a handful of former slaves.33 The recruits who organized 
the 55th Massachusetts and the first companies of the 14th RICHA “had reason to believe that 
they were entering a new world of racial equality, or at least equal compensation and 
treatment.”34 That their hopes were ultimately misplaced does not obviate their clear loyalty 
to both the cause of Union and the civic advancement of their people. If anything, it marks 
their later military protests as the efforts of loyal citizens exercising their corporate right to 
alter or abolish their local government rather than subversives aiming to undermine the 
national war effort. 
African American military service occurred within a political whirlwind in which their 
loyalty to nation was publicly celebrated but defense of their soldier rights was readily 
squelched. On the one hand, recruits to Company A of the 14th RICHA could parade through 
Providence to the cheers of its white inhabitants and receive their regimental and national 
colors from Rhode Island’s highest political officials in a public, biracial ceremony.35 Yet on 
that same day, 19 November 1863, nine hundred miles to the south emancipated slaves in the 
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3rd South Carolina Native Volunteers mutinied. Led by Sergeant William Walker they 
refused to ‘“do duty any longer for seven dollars per month.’”36 Walker’s execution on 29 
February 1864 after a general court-martial sent shockwaves through Northern black 
communities. Little wonder that one writer to The Liberator explained that because black 
soldiers had “no rights which Congress or any other white man is bound to respect,” the 
military’s attitude would be simply, “‘O if they mutiny, they can be put down with an ‘iron 
hand.’”37 The military protest actions of Northern black soldiers were, in fact, attempts to 
make the ceremonial trappings of citizenship real through self-government within the ranks. 
In this charged atmosphere at the end of December, the First Battalion of the 14th Rhode 
Island Heavy Artillery departed on 8 January 1864 for the Gulf Coast to garrison Fort 
Esperanza on Matagorda Island, Texas. The black soldiers had orders to rebuild the large 
earthen fort after the retreating Confederate garrison demolished it.38 This work quickly 
turned into the thankless, stultifying, and arduous fatigue and garrison duty performed by 
Union soldiers elsewhere. The malarial conditions and rising humidity made it worse. They 
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certainly did not salve the substandard medical care African American troops shouldered.39 
Atop it all remained the insult of unequal pay. 
The second-class status they had lived as Northern civilians, heightened by unequal pay, 
made these black soldiers alive to additional threats to the citizenship rights that they 
believed their Army service should be advancing. The protest actions in the two regiments 
surveyed here divided their members. A majority committed themselves to the boycott 
campaign. Within that group literate black soldiers leveraged Northern and African American 
print culture to publicize their plight. Most soldiers also concluded that, alongside the boycott 
and publicity efforts, loyal service was critical to establishing the moral authority of the 
soldiers in the eyes of the public and the government. Yet in select moments a smaller 
number decided that particular violations of their soldier rights required protest actions like 
insubordination or mutiny in order to advance the claim to self-government.  
In fact, the night of the Goliah mutiny, 19 April 1864, marked more than seven months of 
men in the 55th Massachusetts observing the pay boycott. The regimental surgeon contended 
that, “the non-payment of the men produces in some a marked feeling of insubordination, and 
exerts on all a depressing influence.”40 This night also came at the end of the inconclusive, 
three-month Florida Campaign. Aboard the Sentinel and other transports, both Massachusetts 
regiments returned to the Union garrisons in the South Carolina Sea Islands. The soldiers of 
the 55th had been spared any combat and were temporarily relieved of the enervating “picket, 
provost, and fatigue duty” at Jacksonville, Florida. It had frayed the nerves of both soldiers 
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and officers. Enjoying a sort of homecoming, Northern blacks and their Southern freedmen 
comrades roistered below decks late into the night.41  
One of the participants, Sergeant Sampson Goliah, had to report on deck to Second 
Lieutenant Josiah A. Bean, for “talking loud and hollering and using some profane 
language.” Bean had only joined the regiment ten days before and Goliah was a twenty-eight 
year-old farmer from Kentucky who had served without incident in the 55th Massachusetts 
since its organization at Readville, Massachusetts, in June 1863.42 As the officer forced 
Goliah topside, the sergeant objected: “I don’t allow any white man to collar me.”43 When 
Goliah emerged on deck he threatened, “You Massachusetts men have been humbugging us 
long enough. We are going to do as we please after this.”44 Goliah’s condemnations echo 
those of a Northern black comrade’s written only days before: “We, by God’s help, will 
settle it for ourselves before this war is over, and settle it right too, or die in the attempt.”45 
The “humbug” Goliah cited encompassed both general and particular violations of their 
soldier rights. The grievances of unequal pay, dependents’ destitution, respectability, and 
officer commissions loomed large, of course. The denial of black commissions specifically 
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touched on three Northern comrades in Goliah’s regiment—John F. Shorter, James M. 
Trotter, and William H. Dupree—who became second lieutenants on paper between March 
and May. Barred from assuming their new positions within the regiment, they remained de 
facto non-commissioned officers.46 Seen in the light of Anglo citizen-soldiers’ traditions 
about rights of election and selection carried forward into the Union Army, the denial of 
commissioned rank to Shorter, Trotter, and Dupree was an egregious rejection of the War 
Department authorizing Governor Andrew to organize “persons of African descent…into 
special corps” alongside “such numbers of volunteers…as he may find convenient.”47 
In the meantime, new white officers like Bean had begun issuing orders and commanding 
companies. When some “openly boast of having been active participants in the New York 
riots of last summer,” black soldiers like the correspondent “Bay State” naturally asked, 
“Why is not justice done?”48 The executions in February 1864 of three comrades also led 
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62; Berlin, Freedom, 308, 337; Hartwell to Massachusetts Governor John A. Andrew, 25 May 1864, and 
Lieutenant Charles B. Fox’s report to Hartwell, 29 July 1864, both in Regimental Letter and Endorsement 
Book, Vol. 3 of 5, 55th United States Colored Troops, Massachusetts Infantry, Book Records of Volunteer 
Union Organizations, RG 94 Records of the Adjutant General, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter 
55th Massachusetts Letter Book). Trotter felt “my present double position is not pleasant,” James M. Trotter to 
Francis Jackson Garrison, 2 August 1864, Folly Island, South Carolina in Trudeau, 143. The three black officers 
were not finally mustered in and allowed to take their place as officers in the regiment until 1 July 1865, 
Trudeau, 181. 
47 Stanton, 26 January 1863, “Message of the President.” 
48 Josiah A. Bean, 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (Colored), Union Compiled Military Service Records, 
RG 94 Records of the Adjutant General’s Office, 1762-1984, National Archives, Washington, D.C.; Goliah 
CMSR; quotes come from “Picket,” 55th Massachusetts, 30 June 1864, Weekly Anglo-African (New York) in 
Trudeau, ed., 113. 
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Corporal Nelson Browning, one of the convicted mutineers, to plead during the mutiny, “We 
have had enough of our men killed already.”49  
Thus, the open air illuminated only by the moonlight and a few candle lamps contained a 
highly volatile atmosphere. A veteran Vermonter with a positive reputation in the men’s 
eyes, Captain William H. Nutt, received Bean’s prisoner. Nutt ordered Goliah cuffed and 
threatened the gag if he continued speaking out.50 Nutt’s respected reputation might have 
contained the brewing protest. Bean’s report to Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell that shaped what 
happened next. Hartwell’s presence also should have alleviated his men’s disgust due to his 
support so far through recommendations for officer candidates and acquiescing in the pay 
boycott.51 Instead, Hartwell inexplicably ordered the boat captain, a white civilian, to 
securely tie Goliah to the rigging for two hours or until he “suffered to [sic] much.”52 
                                                
49 Testimony of Captain William D. Crane, Browning court-martial. Crane recalled a respectful, empathetic 
exchange with Browning. He believed Browning referred to a soldier shot by an officer at Readville, 
Massachusetts, in 1863 and two others hanged after trial in February 1864 at Jacksonville, Florida. These were 
for “heinous” crimes, in Crane’s words. “Heinous” signaled in Victorian language offenses like “murders, 
rapes, arson,” for example as used in, “Juvenile Crime in New York,” New York Herald, 1 February 1858. 
According to Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 19, in fact, three men were hanged at Jacksonville for raping a 
white woman. The regimental history prepared by its lieutenant colonel, identifies Private Benjamin Hayes as 
shot at Readville for resisting a Lieutenant Kingston’s orders, Charles Barnard Fox, Record of the Service of the 
Fifty-fifth Regiment of Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry (Cambridge, MA: Press of J. Wilson and Son, 1868), 
5. 
50 Nutt testimony, Goliah court-martial. Private John Posey of Indiana counted Nutt as “a good father to us,” 2 
December 1863, to Mathias Embry, in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 53. Nutt later acquitted himself to the 
satisfaction of the soldiers during the 30 November 1864 Battle of Honey Hill, South Carolina, braving 
numerous, costly assaults until his horse was shot out from under him, Sergeant William Scott to Burt G. 
Wilder, 21 November 1914 in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 169. By 1865 Sergeant James Trotter classified 
Major Nutt as “very popular with the Regt and with everybody whose regard is worth anything,” Sergeant 
James M. Trotter to Edward W. Kinsley, 1 July 1865 in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 184. 
51 Some soldiers felt genuine affection, like Sergeant Trotter, who wrote, “Everybody is jubilant because of his 
arrival” from furlough for wounds. “I tell you, sir, that we believe in Col. A. S. Hartwell! He is so true and such 
a perfect soldier,” James M. Trotter to Edward W. Kinsley, 29 January 1865 in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 
177-78; see also “Mon” to Weekly Anglo African, 24 July 1864, in Trudeau, Voices of the 55th, 127 and 
anonymous to Edward W. Kinsley, 2 June 1864 in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 107. 
52 Testimony of Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell, Bean testimony, Goliah court-martial. 
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According to the mutineers’ words at the time, and at the subsequent court-martial, the 
colonel’s rash decision inflamed the situation.53 
Many soldiers knew the risks of dissent. For instance, Private John Lewis, previously a 
waiter from Indianapolis, spoke out against Goliah’s arrest and restraint, but ultimately did 
not join the mutiny because he believed that its participants would surely suffer execution.54 
Nevertheless, many of Lewis’s comrades who witnessed the event below decks reacted in 
“sympathy” to Goliah’s predicament.55 Ninety minutes after the arrest more than a dozen 
men appeared on deck and ruptured the nocturnal calm. Two men shouted, “Let’s cut him 
down.”56 He “had been tied there long enough” and they demanded Goliah’s release or they 
would do it themselves. According to Browning, even though they knew freeing Goliah was 
“wrong,” his fetters represented a greater wrong.57 “There are other ways of punishing a man 
without having him tied up,” they asserted. It is a shame” and they “would not allow one of 
their men tied by a citizen.”58 
                                                
53 Lorien Foote concludes that even in Anglo regiments “the frustrated officers of the Union Army, faced with 
continual resistance to authority and constant back talk from soldiers, often resorted to force immediately when 
a soldier was slow to obey orders,” The Gentlemen and the Roughs, 156. Steven J. Ramold, Baring the Iron 
Hand, 205, argues that white soldiers “particularly targeted punishments they deemed too harsh or that lasted 
too long.” On white soldiers cutting down comrades tied up for punishment, see Ramold, 363. 
54 John Lewis, 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (Colored), CMSR; statement of John Lewis and testimony 
of Private Alfred Perry, in the general court-martial of Private John Lewis, NN2479, Court-Martial Case Files, 
RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Lewis court-martial). 
55 Charges and specifications, Bean testimony, and Privates David Wilkins and Charles C. Porter testimony, 
Goliah court-martial 
56 Charges and specifications, Bean testimony, Goliah court-martial. 
57 Charges and specifications, testimony of Private Peter Adams in the general court-martial of Private Nelson 
Browning, NN2479, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C. (hereafter Browning court-martial). 
58 Charges and specifications, Adams testimony, Browning court-martial. Foote, The Gentlemen and the 
Roughs, 164-65, rightly states that when white officers failed to appreciate the servile overtones of certain 
disciplinary measures against black soldiers, simple disobedience could escalate into mutiny. With that as a 
baseline, Colonel Hartwell failed to appreciate how his discipline affronted Northern blacks’ convictions about 
their soldier rights as free citizens and touched off the Goliah mutiny. 
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Browning, a twenty-year-old farmer from St. Louis, encouraged the mutiny (though he 
did not join) because he “could not stand it to see one of our men tied up.” An officer called 
Browning a “moving spirit,” who reminded his comrades gathered below deck, “The man 
ought not to have been tied up there.” He urged them to, “Untie this man and take him down 
from there.”59 Browning admitted when questioned by Hartwell the next day after coming 
ashore that he had been “angry” over the treatment of Goliah.60 
An inexperienced and uncertain officer, Lieutenant Bean, stood between the prisoner and 
a group of steadily advancing soldiers who asserted that the entire boat supported them.61 
The mutineers overwhelmed Lieutenant Bean and his guard, freed Goliah, and broke his 
hanD.C.uffs. Goliah drove Bean to the deck, snatched the .44-caliber Colt Army revolver 
from his hands, and cocked it. A scuffle of mutinous and loyal soldiers broke out at the same 
time that other soldiers tried to corral members of the crowd. In this melee, Browning refused 
to relent and Bean got free as Goliah slipped below.62 
The mutiny finally came to an end below decks where it had started. Colonel Hartwell, 
Captain Nutt, and three non-commissioned officers entered the men’s quarters where 
soldiers—both mutinous and loyal—debated one another.63 Hartwell demanded silence and 
                                                
59 Private Nelson Browning, 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (Colored), CMSR; testimony of Captain 
William D. Crane, Browning court-martial; Charges and specifications, testimony of John Lewis, Browning 
court-martial. 
60 Hartwell testimony, Browning court-martial. 
61 Charges and specifications, Bean testimony, Goliah court-martial. 
62 Hartwell testimony, Crane testimony, Adams testimony, Browning court-martial; Bean testimony, Goliah 
court-martial. The lieutenant thought that Goliah had begun to untie himself with his teeth, but it is clear from 
other testimony that he was freed with the help of his comrades. Bean’s account of this confrontation with 
Goliah and his accusation of the cocking of the pistol—a threat of deadly force— used to convict Goliah went 
uninterrogated.  
63 Bean testimony, Goliah court-martial. Hartwell relied on the non-commissioned officers not only from a 
sense of procedure, but also perhaps from an acknowledgement that having fellow African Americans summon 
him would make Goliah more compliant and hopefully diffuse the situation generally. 
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Nutt convinced most of the men to quickly return to their bunks. A handful remained 
including Goliah, one of the loudest disputants, whom Nutt insisted bring himself to order. 
Although it remains unclear exactly what happened next, the sergeant attempted to strike the 
captain and Nutt retaliated with the flat of his sword. Goliah urged the soldiers to retaliate, 
then he tackled Nutt when they failed to act. In the altercation, the point of Nutt’s sword 
pierced Goliah and that finally encouraged a couple of reluctant comrades to aid him. Once 
again, Goliah used the turmoil to slip away. Guards apprehended him about thirty minutes 
later after clam had been reestablished on the boat. They returned Goliah to the deck and 
placed new irons on his wrists.64 
For Northern free blacks, the intervention of a white civilian embodied the racial injustice 
they knew too well and a violation of their rights as soldiers. What the colonel determined to 
be a practical matter—relying on the boat captain’s expertise in lashing to the rigging—had 
enormous consequences. More importantly, according to Private Young Gouch, “It would 
not do for a citizen to tie up one of our soldiers. If one of our own officers had tied him up 
they never would have said a word.”65 To their minds, the affair had been started by an 
officer barely removed from civilian life who had not yet earned their trust and respect. The 
intervention of a civilian outsider in an internal disciplinary matter further transgressed the 
soldiers’ self-government of their volunteer regiment. By taking the oath of allegiance and 
signing their muster rolls, all the Union’s volunteers had freely consented to be bound by the 
                                                
64 Nutt, Hartwell testimony, Goliah court-martial. Goliah claimed he told Nutt not to hit him because he was 
handcuffed and defenseless, but this is hard to know because elsewhere the officers said his handcuffs had been 
broken off when he escaped back below decks. And it seems from Bean's testimony they might have been 
removed when Goliah was tied, Goliah cross-examination of Hartwell, Goliah court-martial. In his final 
statement, Goliah insisted that he had raised his arms while in handcuffs to protect himself from Nutt, who drew 
his sword unprovoked, Goliah statement, Goliah court-martial. 
65 Statement attributed to Young Gouch by Private Samuel Phillips in the general court-martial of Private 
Young Gouch, NN2479, Court-Martial Case Files, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, National Archives, 
Washington, D.C., (hereafter Gouch court-martial). 
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Articles of War and the Army regulations. Nothing within them condoned the colonel’s 
course of action. These soldiers in the 55th Massachusetts mutinied to ensure that the rights 
they wanted their military service to secure would not be jeopardized.  
Goliah and four other soldiers— Privates Nathan Lane, John Lewis, Nelson Browning, 
and Young Gouch—faced trial as ringleaders. Convened 7 May 1864 at Folly Island, South 
Carolina, the testimony from these trials was often contradictory and imprecise. The 
transcripts are full of hearsay testimony mistakenly (perhaps maliciously) admitted into 
evidence. Although improper under the law for the determination of guilt, nevertheless, these 
documents convey the chaotic nature of soldier mutinies. The acceptance of hearsay was one 
of many flaws in military tribunals. 
In his closing remarks to the court before it determined guilt and pronounced sentence, 
the judge advocate quoted from Articles Seven and Nine of the Articles of War, and from 
Stephen V. Benét’s treatise on military justice that officers widely employed as their 
handbook when serving on courts-martial. The articles mandated a maximum penalty of 
death. He reminded the court that the evidence clearly indicated Goliah had been defiant and 
threatened violence, but asked his fellow officers whether “the acts of the prisoner are of that 
aggrevated [sic] nature called mutiny.” He urged the court (only one of whom came from a 
black regiment) to give weight to Hartwell's and Nutt’s testimony of the soldiers’ collective 
grievances regarding their pay which had created “extraordinary circumstances, which by no 
means excuse, yet mitigate the offense.”66 
Given that the Articles of War stipulated capital punishment for mutiny or an appropriate 
sentence determined by the court, perhaps the judge advocate's words worked some small 
                                                
66 Statement by the judge advocate, verdict and sentence, Goliah court-martial; verdict and sentence, Lewis 
court-martial; verdict and sentence, Browning court-martial; verdict and sentence, Gouch court-martial. 
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benefit for the defendants. Goliah, Lewis, Browning, and Gouch all received a sentence of 
confinement at hard labor at Fort Clinch, Florida, for the remainder of their enlistments—
nearly two years—and the loss of all pay. When their term of confinement concluded, they 
were to be dishonorably discharged. The department commander approved the sentence 
without revision. 
If there was one short-term victory for the mutineers of 19 April it came through an 
evolution in their commanding officer’s attitude. Hartwell appears to have grown more, not 
less, sympathetic with his soldiers’ predicament. On 23 April he wrote that unequal pay was 
nothing less than “non-fulfillment of contract” by the government.67 On 13 May in a concrete 
act of solidarity with two soldiers who returned late from furlough due to illness, he strongly 
recommended they be returned to duty without general court-martial.68 Finally, in the wake 
of the Goliah mutiny and later acts of insubordination, on 12 June he argued to Governor 
Andrew that the soldiers’ sense of broken “trust”69 in white authority evidenced in the 
mutiny had seriously jeopardized the regiment’s “proper efficiency and military pride.”70 
                                                
67 Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Smith, Assistant Adjutant General, Department of 
the South, 23 April 1864, 55th Massachusetts Letter Book; Wilson, Campfires of Freedom, 53-58; Donald 
Yacovone, “The Pay Crisis and the ‘Lincoln Despotism,’” in Blatt, et al., Hope and Glory, 45. Yacovone 
elsewhere in this essay gives the impression that Hartwell was an unsympathetic commander and a martinet, but 
that seems at odds with the soldier letters in Trudeau, the historical portait of him by Wilson and Samito, and 
his official correspondence in the records at the National Archives. Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 244, 
assesses him as “the best officer to lead the 55th.” 
68 Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to Lieutenant W. R. Dean, Acting Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the 
South, 13 May 1864, 55th Massachusetts Letter Book. 
69 Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to Massachusetts Governor John A. Andrew, 12 June 1864, 55th Massachusetts 
Letter Book. 
70 Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to Lieutenant Colonel E. W. Smith, Assistant Adjutant General, Department of 
the South, 23 April 1864, 55th Massachusetts Letter Book. 
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Hartwell contended “it is difficult to make them endure longer” and wondered how he and 
his officers could possibly “exercise further military authority.”71 
White officers who testified in the courts-martial viewed the character of black soldiers’ 
service through their own understanding of the soldier rights belonging to citizens in 
uniform. Colonel Hartwell explained that, “Because the Regiment had not been paid at all—
nor offered pay according to terms of enlistment,” dissatisfaction had gradually increased to 
a crisis point. Captain William H. Nutt likewise believed his soldiers’ “grumbling” stemmed 
from their pay diverging from “the terms of their enlistment” assured by Massachusetts.72 
The Army’s unilateral reduction in pay had violated the principles of self-government. The 
volunteer soldier—black or white—freely offered his loyal service to the nation as member 
of a corporate body according to specific terms of enlistment. 
Only ten days after the Goliah mutiny, another episode of unjust discipline sparked 
several more mutinies over the men’s soldier rights. A camp life of drill and fatigue had by 
then again become routine for the 55th Massachusetts. Second Lieutenant Thomas F. 
Ellsworth ordered the men of Company I onto the parade ground for afternoon inspection. As 
his comrades hurried into formation, Private Richard Morrison arrived late and unprepared. 
Thirty minutes earlier the orderly sergeant had instructed him to clean a rifle that was not his. 
The task that usually took a couple of hours remained unfinished. 
Like Josiah Bean, Ellsworth was a replacement officer for Company I who arrived in 
February 1864. Ellsworth went on to be a gallant soldier and a Medal of Honor recipient, but 
                                                
71 Colonel Alfred S. Hartwell to Massachusetts Governor John A. Andrew, 12 June 1864, 55th Massachusetts 
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72 Hartwell made these remarks in response to a question by the judge advocate, Captain James M. Walton of 
the 54th Massachusetts, as to whether there was any “general dissatisfaction” in the regiment at the time, 
Hartwell testimony, Goliah court-martial; Nutt testimony, emphasis original, Goliah court-martial. 
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all of that lay ahead. In the spring of 1864, he had been an officer in the company for only a 
few months. Northern citizen-soldiers—black or white—would have instinctively understood 
their company and the regiment as more theirs than his. More importantly for blacks, whether 
Northern freemen or emancipated slaves, Ellsworth’s sympathy to their racial cause remained 
unknown.73 
As explained in Chapter II, the regimental camp’s layout as structured by the regulations 
in turn structured the place, timing, and nature of officer-soldier interaction. Company streets 
directed the flow of movement and information. The guard house held prisoners and 
represented sanctioned military discipline, not officers’ capricious punishments meted out in 
the moment. The parade ground formed the regiment’s public square for the reading of 
orders, undergoing inspections, and the recognition of meritorious conduct. But it could also 
be used to shame drunks who sat upon ridiculous wooden horses all day, to march 
insubordinate soldiers in unending tracks wearing a full pack, or tie up recalcitrant men for 
the entire regiment to witness. The parade ground also became the site of public execution, in 
the sight of all officers and men, for soldiers’ convicted of capital crimes.74 It is no 
coincidence that Northern black citizen-soldiers performed military protest actions in defense 
of their right to self-government on the public spaces of their camps. Like its urban centers, 
                                                
73 Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 9, 163n. The first officer commissioned to the 55th was Second Lieutenant 
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corporal in the 2nd Massachusetts, to the 55th. At the 20 November 1864 Battle of Honey Hill Ellsworth risked 
his own life to drag the grievously wounded Colonel Hartwell to safety, Second Lieutenant Thomas F. 
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(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1863), Thirty-Fifth Article of War; Wilson, Campfires of 
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regimental camps became stages on which African Americans in uniform defined the 
boundaries of military self-government. 
Company streets, like city streets, moved foot traffic, but also provided thoroughfares for 
public displays. For instance, black New Yorkers had held a vibrant, festive parade on 5 July 
1855 to celebrate the twenty-eighth anniversary of state Emancipation Day. Antebellum 
cities also featured a central open-air gathering place quite similar in function to the parade 
ground. These became citizens’ “public arenas in which popular sovereignty could be 
exercised.”75 Because citizenship had such a public dimension in the antebellum era, military 
dissent unfolded out-of-doors. It was also done in cooperation with fellow soldiers. Northern 
blacks’ mutinies revealed their deployment of these mentalities and habits of self-
government—similar in important ways to those of Anglos surveyed herein—in the Army 
during wartime. 
The 29 April confrontation on the regiment’s parade ground unfolded almost identically 
to the Goliah mutiny. Keen to prove his fitness for command, Ellsworth confronted Private 
Morrison for violating regulations, in this instance about maintaining his government-issued 
weapon. The private tried to explain he was not at fault; the rifle was not his. Ellsworth 
balked at the story and ordered that Morrison would stand at attention for two hours with a 
full pack if the rifle was not cleaned. Rather than speaking out publicly like Goliah, however, 
Morrison maintained his rectitude by refusing to obey. After company inspection, he walked 
up the company street to the lieutenant’s tent to plead his case again. Although Morrison 
insisted later that he remained calm, according to Ellsworth and other witnesses he eventually 
unleashed a tirade, brought to frustration like Goliah. “The damned old gun is not mine and I 
                                                
75 Mary P. Ryan, Civic Wars: Democracy and Public Life in the American City during the Nineteenth Century 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 31, 40; Alexander, African or American?, 140. 
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won’t clean it.…I’ll have my supper first. Damned if I won’t.” Ellsworth ordered him to the 
guardhouse, but Morrison stalked off in the direction of the cookhouse yelling, “I tell you, 
Lieut., I won’t go until I get my supper” and “will swear as much as I damn well please.”76 
Ellsworth ordered a detail of two soldiers with a sergeant to arrest him.  
Unlike Goliah constrained aboard a ship, Morrison used his intervening walk to poise 
himself and instead proceeded to the guardhouse as ordered. By the time Ellsworth and his 
detail arrived there thirty minutes later, Morrison had requested that the officer of the guard, 
Captain John Gordon, send for Colonel Hartwell. Under the Articles of War a soldier could 
appeal to his colonel if he believed “himself wronged by his Captain or other officer.” The 
Articles even provided soldiers with the mechanism of a formal, written complaint that could 
initiate a regimental court-martial.77 “I will report you to the Colonel tomorrow, [even] if I 
have to run the guard.” When Hartwell did not appear, Ellsworth managed to have the private 
confined until further orders. The general court-martial convened in May found Morrison 
guilty of disobedience of orders and disrespect to a superior officer. This lesser charge spared 
Morrison a dishonorable discharge, but he still endured three months of hard labor at Fort 
Clinch, Florida, and the loss of all pay.78 
While marking time at the guard house, Morrison explained to Captain Gordon that he 
would heed “no white officer,” but obey “only as far as he was mustered.”79 The nineteen 
                                                
76 Charges and specifications, Ellsworth testimony, and Morrison statement in the general court-martial of 
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year-old former waiter from Hamilton, Ohio had succinctly pinpointed the degree to which 
Northern blacks’ participation as citizens in the antebellum political culture of self-
government engendered their sense of rights while in uniform.80 Morrison merely echoed the 
same argument as other Northern black soldiers in the Massachusetts regiments about 
unequal pay: it violated the promise extended to them at muster-in that they would be granted 
the same privileges and rights as other soldiers mustered by the state into Federal service. 
And like the Northern black protest tradition generally, it was framed both in terms of race 
and within the broad political culture of the antebellum North. Furthermore, he laid claim to 
a legal right of interposition from his colonel specifically by virtue of his soldier status. In 
these ways Northern black citizen-soldiers drew on the same popular constitutional tactics as 
the men of the Anderson Cavalry, the 9th New York, or the 133rd Pennsylvania in Chapters II 
and III. 
Historians who have seen the equal pay crisis only from the perspective of race must also 
recognize its rootedness in Northern black soldiers’ sense of themselves as loyal citizens 
fully competent in the habits of self-government. Their military protest actions such as 
mutinies and insubordination during this critical period in turn reflect the pay crisis as a key 
wartime expression of antebellum Northern political culture, not only the strivings of a single 
race for greater equality. 
More conflict concerning the extent and application of officers’ authority over citizen-
soldiers erupted two days later between Lieutenant Ellsworth and Private Wallace Baker. The 
action unfolded again on the public space of the parade ground and began like the incidents 
involving Goliah and Morrison over the violation of camp regulations. On this occasion it 
                                                
80 Private Richard Morrison, 55th Massachusetts Infantry Regiment (Colored), CMSR. 
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was Baker’s tardiness to inspection without his equipment in proper order. Ellsworth ordered 
Baker back to his quarters until called to perform his punishment of knapsack drill supervised 
by the orderly sergeant.  
If there had been such a unit in the 55th Massachusetts, Baker might have been a 
candidate for the company’s “awkward” squad, a practice used in some regiments to assign 
additional instruction and drill to men who literally could not stand straight in line, march, or 
perform the manual of arms properly. One comrade found him not “very rational” and 
another admitted, “he was thought simple in the company.” He also had a reputation for 
talking back after the orders of sergeants, “because he thought he ought not to be ruled by 
another man.”81 
Baker said he would not hurry to comply and, when ordered to his quarters, he took a far 
different tack from Morrison two days earlier. Baker removed all of his equipment and 
reappeared in the ranks for inspection. His comrades burst into laughter. His return to 
inspection with no equipment ridiculed Ellsworth’s authority through his own ridiculous 
response. But his protest of mockery also had rational underpinnings. It occurred publicly on 
the parade ground. Baker took an unreasonable step to shed light on the unreasonableness of 
the lieutenant’s treatment of the men. It occurred only two days after the disgust recently 
engendered within I Company by Lieutenant Ellsworth’s unreasonable treatment of 
Morrison. Furthermore, it challenged the legitimacy of a new white officer like Lieutenant 
Bean, whose arrest of Sampson Goliah less than two weeks earlier had sparked the shipboard 
mutiny, itself rooted in the broad military protest movement initiated with the pay boycott. 
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When Ellsworth finally ordered Baker to begin the punishment the private echoed Goliah 
and Morrison: “I won’t stand to attention for you or any other damned white officer.” 
Ellsworth grabbed Baker by the collar before he retaliated with two blows to the face. A 
desperate struggle unfolded in which both men traded blows until Captain Gordon 
intervened. Gordon dispersed the crowd that had gathered. Embarrassed and angry, Ellsworth 
seized Baker by the throat. Still, the private refused knapsack drill; he preferred confinement 
at the guard house. Gordon convinced Ellsworth to agree. No sergeants appeared to take 
Baker to the guard house, and it fell to the two officers. The sergeants’ refusal to escort 
Baker to the guard house probably manifested their own discontent with the lieutenant. Baker 
ended his mutiny confined at the guard house and bucked (tied so that he could not move) 
indefinitely. 
All of these mutinies in the 55th Massachusetts had in common that Northern black 
soldiers believed they had certain rights because they were soldiers; these were rights they 
could define; these definitions required defense; and that defense could include physical 
forms of protest. 
As a black Michigander in the 55th had explained at the year’s opening, Northern black 
men like him had enlisted “for the love of our country, and the love of a free government 
based upon terms of equality. We…were told that we would be accepted by the U.S. 
Government, on the same terms as her other Regiments.” Free government meant nothing to 
citizens in uniform if they could not have some say in their military lives. But if men in 
uniform did govern their own affairs, they might blaze a path for the entire race in 
mainstream society. Fighting in the Army served “not only to make men of ourselves, but of 
our colored brothers at home.” Their civic manhood gained practical expression by 
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exercising the attributes of “free government” enshrined in their soldier rights. Northern 
black citizen-soldiers saw the pay boycott and mutiny as legitimate means to secure such 
principles. As one of them stated, “It is the principle…that made us men when we enlisted.”82 
The unjustified arrest of Goliah and his illegal restraint by a white civilian ran contrary to 
these expressions of self-government and in turn, justified protest to press their status as 
citizens in uniform. The general grievances of the Northern black military protest 
movement—unequal pay, commissions, and unfair treatment—enmeshed soldiers’ specific 
complaints in the even older tradition of antebellum black activism on behalf of full equality 
for African Americans. The 55th’s July 1864 petition drive indicated more good evidence of 
this. Individual companies submitted petitions to President Lincoln reiterating the soldier 
movements’ well-worn grievances regarding equal pay. Enlisted as soldiers of the state of 
Massachusetts “in all respects as to pay on the footing of similar corps of the Regular Army” 
their lower rate of pay “was not according to our enlistment” and they were “enlisted under 
false pretence [sic].” Yet, they had left behind friends and kin “to fight for liberty, justice, 
and equality.” Undeterred by the events described above, the petitioners felt emboldened 
enough to promise a “resort to more stringent measures” if their “demanding our pay from 
the date of our enlistment & our immediate discharge” was not answered.83 
Much like the 55th Massachusetts, Company A of the 14th Rhode Island Colored Heavy 
Artillery (RICHA) served most of its war in dreary garrison duty, first on the Texas coast and 
later in Louisiana.84 Although assigned to the war’s margins, two protest actions in the 14th 
                                                
82 “Wolverine,” “A Letter from Our Soldiers,” The Christian Recorder (Philadelphia), 2 January 1864. 
83 “We, the members of Co. D of the 55th Massachusetts Vol.” to the President of the United States, 16 July 
1864, Folly Island, South Carolina, in Trudeau, ed., Voices of the 55th, 116-118. Seventy-four names are 
attached to this petition including Nathan Lane, acquitted for his role in the mutiny. 
84 Westwood, “Company A,” 160. 
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RICHA in 1864 give additional examples of Northern blacks’ definition of their soldier 
rights. The movement in 1864 of the First Battalion, 14th RICHA from its home state to 
Matagorda Island on the Texas Gulf Coast had kept it in advance of any paymasters. As a 
result, the men had not seen any pay since their $300 state bounty at muster-in. The soldiers 
in Company A, however, trusted the state’s 1863 call that had promised them the “same 
rights and privileges as are given to other soldiers.” Thus far no pay boycott had been 
initiated although they knew quite well that other black soldiers in United States service were 
receiving $7 a month.85 This confidence suddenly evaporated on St. Patrick’s Day when 
unexpected roll call brought the men of Company A onto the parade ground. They feared that 
by answering they would have been tricked into publicly assenting to decreased pay. When 
the sergeants answered the roll call with silence the privates followed suit.86 
Major Comstock, although sympathetic to the men’s fears, believed the “silent roll call” 
merited a firm response for the sake of the battalion’s good order. Yet he submitted charges 
not of insubordination or mutiny, but to the much less serious offense of conduct prejudicial 
to good discipline. Between 23 March and 1 April nearly all of the non-commissioned 
officers and privates involved received guilty verdicts. While the privates forfeited any pay 
and did three months of hard labor on Matagorda Island, the “noncoms” not only lost their 
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pay and rank, but earned hard labor for periods of six months to a year at Fort Jefferson in the 
Dry Tortugas, coral isles southwest of the Florida Keys.87  
In the midst of these court-martial proceedings, a dramatic mutiny occurred on the 
afternoon of 30 March 1864. This incident, like those in the 55th Massachusetts, arose from 
abusive treatment by the officer of the day, Second Lieutenant Charles H. Potter, when he 
struck two inebriated soldiers with a strap of rawhide and threatened to shoot them if they did 
not accompany him to the guard house. Soldiers stepped into the company streets to observe 
the commotion. Another former waiter, this time twenty-one year old Corporal Charles 
Cooley from New Jersey, rashly dared Potter to pull the trigger.88 
Potter’s person and position clashed with the complex sense of soldier rights among 
Northern blacks. Of course, his race severed his relationship to them as fellow citizens in the 
ranks. Furthermore, worse than being a newcomer to their company like Bean and Ellsworth 
in the 55th Massachusetts, he was an officer from an entirely different company.89 
Northerners’ beliefs about the corporate rights that belonged to voluntary associations were 
at work here. Company A had been Rhode Island’s original heavy artillery unit; organized by 
specific direction of the War Department prior to it authorizing an entire regiment. Although 
their company had been brigaded with other similar companies, its members nevertheless 
retained the integrity of their own organization. 
Defending these soldier rights in the military had enormous import for their claims to full 
citizenship in civilian life. Potter ordered Corporal Cooley to report to him later that day. As 
                                                
87 Westwood, “Company A,” 151-52, 154. The “strong fortification” there evoked an air of “solitude brooding” 
and seemed the very “idea of solitary imprisonment” instantiated in brick and mortar according to one 
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88 Westwood, “Company A,” 152-53, Charles Cooley, 11th United States Colored Heavy Artillery, CMSR. 
89 Second Lieutenant Charles H. Potter, 11th United States Colored Heavy Artillery, CMSR. 
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their voices rose and roused soldiers from their bunks, Private William H. Smith overheard 
the officer boast that on Rhode Island soil he would have shot Cooley for his earlier remarks 
without hesitation. Cooley countered that he doubted Potter “would have any better right to 
shoot him in Rhode Island for nothing then [sic] he did here.”90 Potter rose to thrash the 
private, enraged by his response. Cooley grabbed the lieutenant’s sidearm, but Potter fired a 
derringer into the back of his head and the corporal dropped to the ground. The gunshot 
brought additional men, like Corporal John Lane, out of their tents to witness Cooley 
bleeding out from the wound. He avowed, “If we are to be shot by our own officers I am 
willing to die now.”91 Sergeant William D. Harris questioned why white soldiers did not 
suffer such injustices. Smith, Lane, Harris, and others encouraged more men to occupy the 
company streets. Threats against Potter’s life soon filled the air.92 
Lieutenants Charles Chase and Rowland Hazard rushed from their quarters to calm the 
enraged soldiers who had gathered around. Concerned to prevent any violence, the subalterns 
worked hard to hustle the men back to their tents. Private William H. Smith told Lieutenant 
Chase, “We have stood this as long as we are agoing to, we are ready to die, and we will do it 
here.” He and many others refused to leave the streets when ordered. In the wake of the 
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courts-martial and burning with outrage over Cooley’s shooting, he symbolically rejected his 
contract with the government and any further obligation to obey. He shook his fist at the 
officer and began to remove his uniform coat. “This ain't agoing to do, this work has gone far 
enough by God I am ready to die.”93  
 News of the mutiny alarmed Gulf Department commanders enough that they marched a 
nearby regiment to Fort Esperanza to deter any further insubordination.94 The mutiny 
squelched, five privates, two corporals, and one sergeant faced general courts-martial on 8 
April. The court found all of these men guilty of mutiny and they received sentences like that 
handed down to William Smith: five years of hard labor at Fort Jefferson and the loss of all 
pay. Brigadier General FitzHenry Warren subsequently reduced his confinement to the end 
of his enlistment contract on 13 August 1866.95 
 Only two days before President Lincoln’s assassination, Smith addressed to the 
Secretary of War a “petition to you for my release.” By then incarcerated at Fort Jefferson 
nearly a year, this Ohio soldier profiled above made sure to contextualize his appeal within a 
framework of loyalty and allegiance. He had “vollunteered my service” as “my feble part to 
help crush this wicked rebellion” for the “maintainence of the nationality of our country.”96 
Smith retold his version of the Cooley shooting as a violation of their soldier rights. In so 
doing it was exemplary of the mentality Northern free blacks hoped military service would 
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stamp out and against which their boycotts, disobedience, and mutinies pointed. “Any man 
who has been living under a free government” and “serving my country as a soldier,” “knows 
what belongs to manhood.”97 Smith could have cited the twenty-fourth Article of War to the 
effect that, “no officer or soldier shall use any reproachful or provoking speeches or gestures 
to another.”98 Even more, self-government meant they “cannot but help but say something 
against such mode of treatment” to “which our men have been subject since we have been in 
the service.” Northern black soldiers had spoken not only with words, but with the pay 
boycott, with petitions, and with protest actions like insubordination and mutiny. Therefore, 
“I expected to be treated in a manner by our officers[,] who pretend to coinside with us in 
this struggle as men[,] which inspires vigor into a soldier,” not merely “living to the 
restoration of peace.”99 
Conclusion 
Association as officers and men in a regiment pledged to defend the promise of self-
government demanded Northern black citizen-soldiers reasserting, thorough mutiny when 
necessary, their individual and corporate rights of self-government. Military protest actions 
should not be dismissed as only about issues of fair and equal treatment of soldiers. Through 
the artifice of soldier rights, black volunteers and their community consciously linked this 
service to the nation and their race with their struggle for rights elsewhere. These soldiers’ 
protests—by Northern and Southern black comrades—became early declarations of the 
potent civic membership of all African Americans, and rested upon their creditable military 
service in the war for the Union. A scholar of black Civil War veterans observes that, 
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“African Americans never forgot their military service and never forgot that this duty 
occurred in a war that freed their race and made them citizens.”100  
The kinds of dissent within Northern black regiments paralleled Northern African 
Americans’ efforts at home to push for emancipation and civil rights during the war. In 
October 1864 African Americans at the National Convention of Colored Men held in 
Syracuse, New York, founded the National Equal Rights League and published an “Address 
to People of the United States,” arguing that blacks’ military service had “entirely swept 
away” the old “frivolous, but somewhat decent apology for excluding us from the ballot-
box.” Suffrage belonged to African Americans not only because of the natural equality 
espoused in the Declaration of Independence, but as the “conventional right” of a population 
who had “fully earned” their right of self-government through military service.101 
This wartime convention's specific claims echoed arguments made before the war. For 
example, the Philadelphia Convention of the People of Color in 1855 asserted the 
personhood of blacks under the Constitution’s definition of congressional apportionment in 
order to claim the Fourth Amendment’s protections “to be secure in their persons” and the 
Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of due process. Until slavery was “peacefully, lawfully, and 
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constitutionally” abolished, African Americans’ civil and political rights, including the 
franchise, would continue to be squelched.102 
The Negro Convention movement born in the antebellum years continued during and 
after the war. In September 1865 the National Convention of Colored Men created a new 
organization, the National Equal Rights League, to press for blacks’ civil and political rights 
made possible by the “loyalty, patriotism, and devotion displayed by colored soldiers during 
the conflict.” It encouraged emancipated slaves to pursue self-improvement along the lines 
Northern blacks had for decades. The “necessity” of “acquiring property,” “educating their 
children and themselves,” and “pursuing a course of conduct” that was respectable would 
“elevate” them above their current station.103 
William D. Forten, one of the most highly praised and well respected members of the 
black abolitionist cause, wove together self-government and loyalty when he addressed the 
League on the second day of its national convention in 1865. He echoed the mutual protest 
efforts of Northern and Southern blacks soldiers when he insisted African Americans across 
the country “must be a unit,” “must rally,” and effect “unison of action and intent” to 
“concentrate our energies and efforts with those of others whom we can influence.” Only 
then could “those rights which are ours” through “the sacrifice of thousands of our brothers 
on our country’s altar” be secured. Forten coined the stirring, potent motto “Freedom to all, 
and all enfranchised” to encapsulate need for a nationwide African American movement for 
citizenship. To this end, the national League would harness associational culture to assist the 
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creation of local bodies in order to “resist the overriding tyranny of a united, powerful, and 
unprincipled majority.” Forten declared that a national network of leagues “embodies our 
desires, and gives force and pertinence to that resistance to tyranny, which it becomes us to 
make, as a people resolved to be free.…and, in a word, makes us upright.”104 
Union victory and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment near the war’s end officially 
secured the long delayed dream of emancipation. The equally enormous project of defining 
freedom’s content lay ahead. It would not be consummated in the lifetimes of the Civil War 
generation. Nevertheless, at the time the North’s older black civilian leadership and a new 
cohort of citizens in uniform believed they stood on the verge of full citizenship under the 
law. As early as December 1865 African Americans in Washington, D.C., addressed 
Congress for the suffrage and took pains to note that, “out of a population of less than 
15,000, we have contributed three full regiments, over 3,500 enlisted men” compared to the 
1,500 white soldiers drawn from the District's population of 60,000. Military service had 
proven blacks’ wartime loyalty. Flushed with hope for the future, they extolled their 
qualifications for inclusion. “We are intelligent enought [sic] to be industrious; to have 
accumlated [sic] property; to build, and sustain churches, and institutions of learning.…and 
possess ourselves of the blessings attendant upon a life of industry, of self-denial, and of 
virtuous citizenship.”105 In the coming years many of these goals were realized, in some 
cases explicitly through the leadership of Northern black citizen-soldiers, such as the petition 
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of Iowa blacks in the 60th U.S. Colored Infantry that linked military service and the right to 
vote.106 
Northern blacks’ military protest actions and their cooperation with African American 
private citizens during the war revealed the complicated relationship between race and 
loyalty. Northern blacks came to the colors out of allegiance to the national government. This 
sense of loyalty stemmed from their participation in antebellum political culture. It had led 
them to see the possibilities of full citizenship within the web of associational rights and 
responsibilities under a federal Union. Nevertheless, loyalty to the country’s founding ideals 
had established a long tradition of protest against inequality and disfranchisement. During the 
war it turned them into critics of the national government’s policies toward black soldiers. 
Northern black soldiers reared in this culture fixed on their status as loyal defenders of the 
republic to claim a particular body of soldier rights. Wartime also drew their recently 
emancipated comrades into league with them. Allegiance to the nation had bestowed the 
status of soldier that carried with it an expectation of self-defined soldier rights. In Northern 
regiments both free and freed African Americans risked charges of disloyalty to defend these 
rights. Thus the associational logic attached to membership in the Army made possible 
military protest actions against the Army’s policies and the unjust authority some white 
officers exercised. Northern black soldiers resolved conflicting loyalties to the national 
government and to the national creed through military protest. 
Northern free blacks in and out of uniform contributed to carrying the Civil War beyond 
emancipation and abolition and implicated it in the American experiment with self-
government. Logan’s three identities of soldier, citizen, and legislator seem especially 
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appropriate for the Northern blacks who staged military protest actions made under the rubric 
of soldier rights informed by their own antebellum culture of dissent. Their actions 
contributed to tangible gains regarding pay, status, and treatment within the Army; gains 
which demonstrated African American citizens in uniform not only serving on an equal basis 
with white soldiers, but governing themselves like white soldiers always had. For this salient 
reason military protest actions by Northern blacks should be seen as a crucial link in the 
chain between antebellum protest culture and the efforts for full citizenship in Reconstruction 
and beyond. The following two chapters will move this story in exciting, but crucially 
unique, ways to the freedmen-soldiers who made up the bulk of the U.S. Colored Troops. In 
regiments across the occupied South they too performed stultifying garrison duty in places 
like Fort Jackson, guarding the approaches to New Orleans, Louisiana.
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CHAPTER V 
“WE WANT TO BE TREATED LIKE SOLDIERS”: 
FREEDMEN AND THEIR CITIZENSHIP AT THE FORT JACKSON MUTINY 
 
On the night of 9 December 1863 a “most violent excitement” had enveloped Fort 
Jackson, ninety miles south of New Orleans. Major General Nathaniel P. Banks, 
commander of the Federal Department of the Gulf, reported to general-in-chief Major 
General Henry W. Halleck that hundreds of formerly enslaved black soldiers in the 4th 
Infantry Regiment (Corps d’Afrique) had mutinied about thirty minutes after their 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Augustus W. Benedict, “struck and punished two 
soldiers with a whip.”1 In his report, Banks condemned the “degrading punishment of 
flogging,” but could not countenance a “mutiny against official authority.” A “few 
months’ instruction” by the Army could not instill “all that is required of citizens or 
soldiers.” The former slaves’ dissent gave proof in his mind that they could not “become 
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perfect soldiers” because bondage had suffocated the necessary “civil or individual 
rights” necessary for military service by citizen-soldiers.2  
This chapter turns Banks’s analysis on its head to argue that the soldiers at Fort 
Jackson mutinied precisely because they recognized that the Army’s regulations and the 
Articles of War provided them specific rights and protections due to their status as 
soldiers. These were the individual and corporate rights Northern citizens believed came 
from being members of a voluntary association. Freedmen-soldiers were a unique class 
of Union volunteers because they created a new standing as citizens via their soldier 
status and their enslaved past. Shaped by those origins, they gave specific form to their 
new found freedom by demanding the rights belonging to all citizen-soldiers in the 
service of the Union. 
Freedmen-soldiers’ path to citizenship from slavery passed through an important 
way station at Fort Jackson. It was not only, or even primarily, forged in battle through a 
partnership with white officers. As Fort Jackson demonstrates, it grew out of 
emancipated slaves’ own efforts to weld their preexisting beliefs about customary rights 
of membership to the protection of the rule of law offered by their status as soldiers. The 
drama and significance of the mutiny of Fort Jackson is also not in the legal protections 
of due process afforded to many African American soldiers in the Army’s courts-martial. 
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Rather it resides in the deliberate military protest actions that brought those trials about. 
It was on the parade ground where emancipated slave soldiers staked their first claim to 
a set of soldier rights which they themselves would see were enforced, something men 
like these had done even while enslaved through numerous confrontations for customary 
rights. In this way, the Fort Jackson mutiny is not only a benchmark for freedpeople’s 
progress toward citizenship but it serves as a definitive means of linking the formerly 
enslaved’s efforts at self-emancipation with the larger story of military Reconstruction 
during the Civil War. The Fort Jackson mutiny is an example of self-emancipation 
within the Union Army and of how newly free African Americans defined what freedom 
could mean.3 
While this chapter contends that the Fort Jackson mutiny is a window onto 
freedpeople’s citizenship formation, the soldiers’ protest also grew out of circumstances 
specific to slavery in the lower Mississippi Valley. To that end labor practices in sugar 
cultivation and the leverage slaves’ secured in relations with their masters’ authority are 
analyzed. Slaves had formed one part of a fictive household with their master through 
which they won customary rights over time through confrontation. Although they had no 
standing body of legally defined rights in bondage, freedmen gained exactly that as 
members of the Army. The process began before they donned the uniform, however, 
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because freedpeople continued to labor in Federally-occupied Louisiana. While living 
under Federal military law instead of the master’s whim they expected freedom to 
expand the conventions of reciprocity secured in the past. It structured the expectations 
for equal treatment that freedmen gained once they joined the Army. In light of these 
local contexts the mutiny reveals freedmen-volunteers’ articulation of their soldier 
rights. Freedmen believed their status as soldiers should allow them more, not less, 
control over their lives than when in bondage. In this way attainment of the status of 
soldier served as an important benchmark on the path to citizenship for emancipated 
African Americans. 
The Mutiny at Fort Jackson 
After the Union Army occupied New Orleans and the lower sugar parishes in April 
1862, the Gulf Department’s first commander, Major General Benjamin F. Butler, raised 
three regiments of Native Guards from the city’s free black population and the growing 
ranks of emancipated slaves seeking refuge within Union lines. Banks assumed 
command in December 1862 and purged the Native Guards of their black line officers. 
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Next he established the Corps d’Afrique and recruited enough emancipated blacks by the 
end of 1863 to fill nearly thirty regiments, including the 4th Infantry.4 
Ridding the Native Guard of black officers set the stage for Banks to issue General 
Orders No. 40, mandating white officers for the Corps d’Afrique.5 His vision of military 
service for the thousands of freedmen accorded with Northern racial attitudes. The 
freedmen were judged against a set of conflicting racial stereotypes that said blacks were 
violent yet childlike, shrewd yet simpleminded. After such attributes had been 
exacerbated by generational bondage their race stood unprepared, perhaps unfit, for 
citizenship. In the view of Anglos like Banks, segregation had so far prevented the moral 
degradation of Northern whites. The lines of racial authority needed to be enforced 
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within the military as well. Only at the foot of their white liberators might the 
freedpeople patiently learn their new place in the Republic.6 
Unfortunately, instead of sympathetic commanders like Alfred S. Hartwell of the 
55th Massachusetts or Thomas W. Higginson in the 1st South Carolina Native 
Volunteers, the men of the Corps d’Afrique often saluted men who despised them or saw 
them as mere instruments of pecuniary gain.7 Officer candidates came mostly from 
regiments occupying Federal Louisiana. One soldier wrote home that a regiment of New 
York zouaves routinely assaulted “the unlucky darkey that falls in their hands” whom 
they believed “will make very poor soldiers.”8 Others wanted nothing to do with the 
freedmen, like the Connecticut soldier who would have rather been a lieutenant of white 
artillery than a captain in the Corps d’Afrique.9 It was from this pool of men that General 
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and White Union Soldiers” in William J. Cooper, Jr. and John M. McCardell, Jr., eds., In the Cause of 
Liberty: How the Civil War Redefined American Ideals (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 
2009), 98-103. 
7 “Prejudice Against Colored Soldiers,” The Liberator (Boston), 30 January 1863 and Hollandsworth, 43-
45, relate a near mutiny by soldiers in the 13th Maine when a black captain from the 3rd Louisiana Native 
Guards tried to inspect their pickets. They stacked arms rather than obey. Banks used the incident to force 
these officers to resign rather than cause the Army further embarrassment. He did nothing with the Maine 
men. Noah Andre Trudeau, Like Men of War: Black Troops in the Civil War, 1862-1865 (New York: 
Little, Brown, 1998), 26, 34; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 124-25, 176-77. 
8 Michael Guinan to Eliza Guinan, 22 February 1863, MSS 289 Michael Guinan Papers, Folder 7, 
Historical New Orleans Collection, Williams Research Center, New Orleans, Louisiana (hereafter 
HNOC). 
9 Charles F. Sherman to father, 30 April 1863, MSS 114 Charles F. Sherman Civil War Letters, HNOC. 
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Banks appointed Colonel Charles W. Drew commander of the 4th Infantry on 29 
December 1862. Drew selected Augustus W. Benedict, a friend and fellow officer from 
the 75th New York, as his lieutenant colonel in January 1863.10 
As the first regiment of the new Corps d’Afrique, the 4th Infantry officially came into 
being on 10 February 1863. It quickly assumed the fatigue and garrison duty, “both day 
and night, for weeks without intermission,” that would typify black military service 
across the South. In May 1863 they manned the siege lines around Port Hudson until its 
fall in July. A six-month tour of duty as the garrison of Fort St. Phillip opened on 7 
August; occupation of neighboring Fort Jackson began at the start of December. 
Depressing physical conditions prevailed at these fortresses guarding the southeastern 
approaches to New Orleans from the Gulf of Mexico. Fort Jackson stood on swampland 
with a levee running to the wharf and the post hospital on the Mississippi River. It 
bisected pools of standing water around the walls that acted as moats as well as breeding 
grounds for “millions upon millions of mosquitoes.” Malarial infestation was 
compounded by a lack of fresh meat and vegetables despite constant demands to 
                                                
10 Year: 1850, Census Place: Brooklyn Ward 3, Kings, New York, Roll: M432_517, Page: 204A, Image: 
415, 1850 United States Federal Census [database on-line]; Historical Data Systems, comp., U.S. Civil 
War Soldier Records and Profiles both at Ancestry.com [database on-line] accessed 9.9.11, Provo, UT, 
USA; Colonel Charles W. Drew, 4th Infantry, Corps d'Afrique to Charles C. Dwight, 10 March 1864, Port 
Hudson, LA, folder 29, Box 2, Series I, MSS 4696, Gail and Stephen Rudin Collection of Civil War 
Letters, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library, Ithaca, NY; Lieutenant 
Colonel Augustus W. Benedict, 4th Infantry, Corps d’Afrique, Compiled Military Service Record, RG 94 
Office of the Adjutant General, NA; Headquarters (hereafter CMSR). 4th Infantry, Corps d’Afrique to 
Lieutenant Colonel Richard Irwin, Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Gulf, 5 January 
1863, Box 45, 76th United States Colored Infantry (hereafter USCI), Letters Sent, Feb. 7, 1863–Jun. 16, 
1866, Loose Regimental Papers, 75-78th USCI, U. S. Colored Troops, RG 94 Office of the Adjutant 
General, NA. This box of several hundred unbound regimental papers contains material outside of the 
stated dates of coverage. Benedict’s promotion came alongside the promotions of three other officers and 
the regimental sergeant major to higher commissions within the 4th Infantry. 
 188 
headquarters. Only three months before the mutiny nearly 20 percent of the enlisted 
personnel were on sick report and in November a medical inspector reported deaths from 
sickness and malnutrition at worrisome levels. Both forts, bombarded during the Federal 
assault on New Orleans, remained in dilapidated condition due to insufficient building 
materials. Officers and men had to erect tents on the parade ground or outside the walls 
beside the tumbledown permanent quarters. Yet the freedmen took great pride in their 
status as soldiers despite stultifying service according to general officers acquainted with 
the Corps d’Afrique. Banks claimed they had won “the commendation of all officers and 
citizens” throughout the fall of 1863.11 
Even as soldiers were lost to sickness and death, new additions from the population 
of emancipated slaves working as wage laborers on sugar plantations allowed the 4th 
Infantry to hover at close to 1000 men starting in the middle of August.12 Banks intended 
a full slate of officers to command each Corps d’Afrique regiment even though their 
establishment strength was 500 men—half the size of a fully-enrolled regiment. Only 
                                                
11 The quote about typical black military service comes from “A Soldier of the 55th Massachusetts 
Volunteers” to the Weekly Anglo-African (New York), 12 January 1864 in Noah Andre Trudeau, 
ed.,Voices of the 55th: Letters from the 55th Massachusetts Volunteers, 1861-1865 (Dayton, OH: 
Morningside, 1996); Frederick Dyer, “4th Louisiana Native Guard,” Compendium of the War of the 
Rebellion (Des Moines, IA: Dyer Publishing Co., 1908), 1214. Banks wrote approvingly of the 4th Infantry 
to Halleck, 17 December 1863, OR, 457-8. On the surroundings of the forts, see testimony of Major 
William E. Nye to a Military Commission, 12 December 1863, OR, 464 and Leonard G. Phenix, “Letter 
from Louisiana,” The Christian Recorder (Philadelphia), 25 March 1865. Phenix was a black sergeant in 
the 11th U.S. Colored Heavy Artillery stationed at Fort Jackson beginning in February 1865. Statement on 
the health of the soldiers comes from Captain William Liheffler, Commissary of Musters, who submitted 
muster rolls to department headquarters on 5 November 1863 for 14 new recruits to the 4th Infantry, 76th 
USCI Regimental Papers and Assistant Surgeon John Heon to Surgeon Richard H. Alexander, Medical 
Director, Department of the Gulf, 21 November 1863, 76th USCI Regimental Papers. The state of the forts 
themselves is described by Brigadier General William Dwight, commanding post of Forts Jackson and St. 
Philip to Brigadier General C. P. Stone, chief of staff, Department of the Gulf, 4 January 1864, Fort 
Jackson Letters Sent and by Phenix, “Letter from Louisiana.” 
12 Assistant Adjutant-General R. Irwin to Banks, 15 August 1863, OR, 684. 
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after sufficient drill and discipline had raised the men’s “soldierly qualifications” did he 
plan to combine them into regiments of a standard size. Critics of his plan included 
abolitionist-turned-soldier Thomas W. Higginson, one of the first commanders of 
formerly enslaved soldiers in South Carolina, who saw it as “calculated to destroy all 
self-respect in the soldiers” simply to satiate “the hordes of aspirants for commissions.”13 
Typical was a man from Dexter, Maine, who accepted a regimental surgeon’s 
appointment in the Corps d’Afrique for the increase in pay, a chance to practice his 
profession, and a reprieve from officers he disliked.14 
In the minds of General Banks and most of his subordinates, whites possessed the 
privilege of command because they were citizens and freedmen were not. Many agreed 
with his view that the freedmen’s “limited capacity, instruction, and self-possession” 
made them barely capable of being soldiers, much less officers.15 At the same time, most 
officers in the Corps could only countenance blacks as members of the same Army if 
they were military and racial subordinates.16 These attitudes and structures created a 
situation whereby emancipated slaves in uniform had to first accept the racial power 
                                                
13 Banks to Halleck, 17 December 1863, OR, 457-9. Banks’s inspiration for limiting regimental size may 
have been Major General David Hunter’s experiment on the South Carolina Sea Islands that created a 500-
man regiment of contrabands in May 1862, Willie Lee Rose, Rehearsal for Reconstruction: The Port 
Royal Experiment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), 147. Thomas W. Higginson, “General 
Saxton and the Colored Soldiers,” The Liberator (Boston), 16 September 1864. The piece is an extract 
from Higginson's controversial article, “Regular and Volunteer Officers,” Atlantic Monthly, September 
1864; also see “Department of the Gulf,” New York Times, 16 September 1863. William F. Messner, “The 
Federal Army and Blacks in the Gulf Department, 1862-1865” (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 
1972), 294-297, implies Banks held down roster sizes to create a corps of officers beholden to him for 
their commissions, Alternatively, Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 106, considers Banks sincere in his desire 
for the best-trained regiments possible. 
14 Surgeon’s Letter, 22 August 1863, MSS 260 Black Soldiers Collection, Box 1, Folder 5, HNOC. 
15 Banks to Halleck, 17 December 1863, OR, 457. 
16 Gary W. Gallagher, The Union War (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), 77. 
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structure before gaining practical recognition of their soldier rights under military law. 
When black troops refused to acquiesce, their commanders claimed a wide license to 
punish intransigence in order to restore military and racial order. 
This is certainly the case that obtained in the 4th Infantry, but it extended to other 
regiments of U.S. Colored Troops as will be shown in the following chapter. For the 
freedmen-soldiers in the 4th Infantry the regime of abuse began well before the 9 
December mutiny. Both Drew and Benedict (and certainly some line officers as well) 
practiced demeaning forms of punishment for minor infractions of dress, deportment, 
and camp discipline. This was treatment despised by Anglo soldiers reared in the 
tradition of antebellum soldier rights. Even General Banks admitted after the mutiny that 
it ran “contrary to the orders constantly given in this department.”17 Nevertheless, 
between August and November 1863 Colonel Drew kicked or punched numerous 
soldiers during inspections and allegedly flogged Sergeant Samson Matthews in front of 
his men.18 
By all accounts Benedict was even worse and the treatment he meted out to the two 
musicians on 9 December was merely of a piece. By that date he had already smashed in 
                                                
17 Banks to Halleck, 17 December 1863, OR, 457, 459. 
18 Testimony of Second Lieutenant Edward D. Mooney, Company A, 4th Regiment, Corps d’Afrique to a 
Military Commission, 13 December 1863, OR, 471; Nye testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 466; General 
Dwight enclosed charges against Drew in a letter to department headquarters as the court-martial 
concluded. He contended Drew beat an enlisted soldier with his own musket, slapped Private Charles 
Batese while on duty; threw a brick at Private Jefferson Gasçon’s face, and even after the mutiny, tied a 
soldier for refusing an order, Dwight to Stone, 28 December 1863, Fort Jackson Letters Sent; Charges 
against Drew, n.d., Drew CMSR; Drew to Colonel Charles Dwight, 10 March 1864, Cornell Library 
Special Collections; testimony of Captain James Miller, commanding Company D, 4th Regiment, Corps 
d’Afrique and officer of the day on 9 December, to a Military Commission, 12 December 1863, OR, 468; 
Knapp testimony, 13 December 1863, OR, 473. 
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a soldier’s face with the flat of his sword and when soldiers’ “brasses were not bright or 
their boots not polished” he would routinely “strike men in the face with his fist and kick 
them.” These punishments had created such “ill-feeling” among the soldiers that officers 
testified men came to them on several occasions to complain.19 While in temporary 
command at Baton Rouge in August 1863 he staked down a pair of soldiers stripped of 
their shoes and socks for two consecutive days. Louisiana slaves had endured similar 
barbarity, like the woman whose legs were broken after being staked to the ground or a 
group of slaves stripped to the waist and attacked by cats.20 These emancipated slave 
soldiers had their faces, hands, and feet smeared with molasses by officers obeying 
Benedict’s direct orders.21 Attacked by insects and nearly suffering heat stoke as they 
struggled to perspire, the men remained captive until sundown each day. According to 
officers’ later testimony, Drew and Benedict perpetrated these kinds of abuse “several 
times” while the 4th Infantry garrisoned the river forts.22 One reason officers likely 
                                                
19 Miller testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 467; testimony of Colonel Charles A. Hartwell, 5th Regiment, 
Corps d’Afrique and commander of the garrison at Fort St. Philip, to a Military Commission, 13 
December 1863, OR, 472; Mooney testimony, 13 December 1863, OR, 471. Quartermaster Sergeant 
George McFaul simply called Benedict’s style “rough” in his testimony to a Military Commission, 13 
December 1863, OR, 470. Only Lieutenant George H. Kimball claimed he never personally saw Benedict 
mistreat “any troops and had no soldiers complain” to him, Kimball, regimental adjutant, detailed as post 
adjutant at Forts Jackson and St. Philip, to a Military Commission, 13 December 1863, OR, 469-470. 
20 Richard Follett, The Sugar Masters: Planters and Slaves in Louisiana’s Cane World, 1820-1860 (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2005), 143. 
21 Mooney testimony, 13 December 1863, OR, 471; Miller testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 468. 
22 Testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Augustus W. Benedict, commanding 4th Regiment, Corps d’Afrique to 
a Military Commission, 13 December 1863, OR, 474; Mooney testimony, 13 December 1863, OR, 471. 
Mooney noted Benedict used this same punishment again at Fort St. Philip on 25 August. For the link 
between theft and running away, see Blassingame, Slave Community, 200; for the remunerative role of 
molasses in Louisiana slave culture, see Follett, Sugar Masters, 159-62 and Joe Gray Taylor, Negro 
Slavery in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: The Louisiana Historical Association, 1963), 77, 108. Miller 
testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 467. 
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remembered these details of cruel punishment so precisely was because they clashed so 
violently with the spirit and practice of antebellum volunteer companies. 
 The evening of the mutiny, 9 December 1863, closed with strong winds gusting in 
off the Gulf of Mexico. They added to an atmosphere of reckoning brought on by two 
events during the previous 48 hours. First was the announcement from Gulf 
Headquarters on 8 December that the garrisons of the two forts would each be 
redesignated as a separate regiment in the Corps d’Afrique. Personnel would be 
distributed to make each close to the 500-man establishment strength. Colonel Drew 
remained at Fort Jackson and became commandant of the post embracing both 
fortresses. While the garrison at Fort St. Philip became the 5th Infantry, Fort Jackson’s 
remained the 4th Infantry henceforth under the permanent command of Lieutenant 
Colonel Benedict.23 When troops at both forts got the news, many petitioned their 
officers to avoid service at Fort Jackson.24 
Second was the bold demonstration in the late afternoon of 9 December by soldiers 
who lodged complaints about the Army’s pay policy. Although no exact details survive, 
it likely conformed to a similar confrontation in October when two sergeants led their 
                                                
23 Dyer, “4th Regiment, Native Guard Infantry,” 1164, and “4th Regiment Infantry, Corps d’Afrique,” 
1719, Compendium; Drew testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 460-61; Returns of Officers Present at Forts 
Jackson and St. Phillip, August and October 1863 and Post Return of the Garrison at Forts Jackson and St. 
Phillip, September November, December 1863 and January 1864, both in “Returns from U.S. Military 
Posts, 1800-1916,” National Archives Microfilm Publication M617, RG 94 Records of the Adjutant 
General’s Office, National Archives, Washington, D.C. (hereafter Returns from U.S. Military Posts). In 
November, Fort St. Philip had a garrison present for duty of 388 enlisted and non-commissioned officers, 
26 sick, and five in confinement (419 total). At Fort Jackson there were 383 present, 31 sick, and nine in 
confinement (424 total). In the past month five soldiers had been lost through desertion. The garrison at 
Fort St. Philip also included one company from the 1st Regiment Artillery, Corps d’Afrique. 
24 Captain Knapp testified men complained to him personally, 13 December 1863, OR, 473. Other officers 
said they knew of such complaints and petitions, Hartwell and Mooney testimony, 13 December 1863, 
OR, 471-72. 
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company to Drew’s quarters and expressed their frustrations. This incident took place a 
month prior to William Walker’s November 1863 mutiny in South Carolina over the 
same grievance. In both cases freedmen-soldiers condemned the rate of seven dollars, 
conscious of their membership in the same Army that paid white troops thirteen dollars. 
Drew arrested the two non-commissioned officers, but released them after the men 
expressed regret and gave their word it would not happen again. The October petitioners 
had expressed weariness at his urgings to be patient until Congress issued redress. On 9 
December the miserable living conditions, stultifying duty, barbaric discipline, and 
sudden changes prompted them to speak out again in spite of their promise. These new 
appeals came only four days after Secretary of War Edwin Stanton’s had issued his own 
request that Congress pass amendments to the Militia and Second Confiscation Acts to 
address the pay issue. Expecting African American troops to accept lower pay than 
white soldiers smacked of “inequality and injustice.” Using a language of associational 
membership that articulated their inchoate sense of soldier rights, Stanton declared that 
blacks were “entitled” to the nation’s “justice and beneficence” as “soldiers of the 
Union.”25 
                                                
25 The October incident only survives as a recollection in Drew’s testimony. He claimed to have assured 
the men, as he “had instructed the company officers to do before” him, that “the amount of their pay was 
not definitely settled, and would not be until Congress convened.” When asked if anything else might have 
caused the mutiny, Drew only cited “their pay” in his testimony, “which they spoke of on the evening of 
the disturbance.” Given that he claimed it “aggravated the matter [the mutiny]” but did not “immediately” 
produce it, it seems fair to conclude that he referred to two separate incidents on 9 December. Drew 
testimony, 12 December 1863, OR, 461, 463. Black soldiers also received less than freedmen assigned as 
assistant company cooks in white regiments ($10) and some plantation laborers ($8), Trudeau, ed., Voices 
of the 55th, 44; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 169; Wilson, Campfires of Freedom, 44. Black civilians hired 
as teamsters “at such salaries as are justified by the locality and the prevailing prices” could be paid even 
more, August V. Kautz, Customs of Service for Non-Commissioned Officers and Soldiers as Derived 
From Law and Regulations and Practiced in the Army of the United States (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 
& Co., 1864), 19, 39. Edwin M. Stanton, “Annual Report of the Secretary of War,” Volume 10, Part 1, 
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 Given the frustration and anxiety that gripped the post, Benedict’s decision to drag 
two “bad boys,” musicians Munroe Miller and Harry Williams, onto the parade ground 
at about five-thirty in the evening is stunningly myopic.26 Officers later speculated that 
the two musicians had earlier appeared at parade with their jackets unbuttoned although 
Benedict claimed they had been trying to leave the fort using fabricated orders to begin 
picket duty.27 Despite having been in command for less than twenty-four hours, 
Benedict’s answer to their infractions fit his pattern of discipline. He stripped the 
musicians of their uniform jackets and grasped a whip with a sturdy stock capped by a 
single, substantial tail of weathered leather like those used by Union Army teamsters to 
drive their draft horses. A knot of soldiers—divided about how to help their comrades—
gathered at the fort's entrance to witness the spectacle. Benedict damned the two men as 
troublemakers who deserved punishment. At this prospect one of the men begged, 
                                                                                                                                           
December 5, 1863, in Message of the President of the United States, and Accompanying Documents, to the 
Two Houses of Congress, at the Commencement of the First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Congress 
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1863), 8. 
26 “Those boys were bad boys, and I treated them as such,” Benedict testimony, OR, 474; Miller was 
twenty-five to twenty-seven years old and Williams was between eighteen and twenty-one, Munroe Miller 
and Harry Williams, CMSR. 
27 Hartwell testimony, OR, 472; Drew testimony, OR, 460; Nye testimony, OR, 465; Benedict testimony, 
OR, 474. The falling light also led to disagreement if both were whipped or which one. Most of the 
officers were in their quarters, Miller, testimony, OR, 468. Benedict testimony, OR, 474. Desertion had 
been minimal thus far, Garrison Returns for Forts Jackson and St. Philip, November and December 1863, 
Returns from U.S. Military Posts. 
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“‘Don’t! I won’t do it again!’” Benedict made no idle threat and landed four to five 
“severe” blows on each man’s back.28 
The soldiers looking on heeded Benedict’s orders and “quietly” returned to their 
quarters after helping Miller and Williams off the parade ground. As in the mutinies by 
Anglos and Northern free blacks, the company streets quickly became conduits for 
information, avenues for decision making, and aids to planning. From tent to tent, the 
freedmen spoke of nothing but the whipping for half an hour. Many hoped intimidation 
might force Benedict to leave. A few intended to kill him.29 To the recently emancipated 
soldiers the the grotesque whipping must have mimicked those handed out by overseers 
who exploited meek or slight individuals through a public form of domination and 
humiliation designed to intimidate all chattels into subservience. The broad 
determination to confront Benedict that emerged among them grew out of older 
convictions that displayed at times by enslaved persons determined to resist the lash, 
even to the extent of assisting a fellow who they felt was not deserving of such 
punishment.30  
                                                
28 Only Major William E. Nye reported Benedict “did not strike very severely,” but it roused Nye from his 
quarters to spectate, Nye testimony, OR, 464-66. Drew claimed in his testimony he wanted “to go and 
correct Benedict” then and there, but “decided to not rebuke him in front of the men, but to wait for 
private,” Drew testimony, OR, 460-61. Officers reported as few as two lashes to as many as twenty, 
Kimball testimony, OR, 469; McFaul testimony, OR, 470; Miller testimony, OR, 467. Kimball and 
McFaul said Benedict used “a wagon whip” or “an artillery driver’s whip;” John D. Winters, The Civil 
War in Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1963), 313. 
29 According to one officer the soldiers went to their tents and “plotted among themselves for a general 
insurrection,” Miller testimony, OR, 467; Major Nye’s black servant told him “the boys were going to 
shoot Lieutenant Colonel Benedict for whipping Harry [Williams],” Nye testimony, OR, 465; Drew 
testimony, OR, 460; Banks to Halleck, 11 December 1863, OR, 456. 
30 “All available sources refer to them, and every district, if not every large plantation, had one or two.” 
Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made (New York: Random House, 1974), 
307, 619-20. 
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Benedict might have sensed these feelings when he grabbed his sidearm out of his 
quarters and returned to the parade ground. As the men gathered outside their tents in the 
darkness some of the soldiers were at a loss for what was taking place saying, “‘I don’t 
know; I don’t know what the trouble is’” when asked to explain the actions of their 
comrades.31 Lieutenant George H. Kimball insisted, “‘There is a disturbance among the 
men” and “they are taking their arms,’” and Drew and his subordinates finally rushed 
onto the parade ground. By six o’clock the winter darkness provided a measure of 
anonymity for the roughly 250 men—half the regiment—who gathered on the parade 
ground. Over the next 30 minutes they “commenced shouting and firing” into the air 
“indiscriminately” without harming “persons or property.”32 
The words of the mutineers shouted over the din of rifle fire occasionally lighting up 
the dark parade ground are filtered through the testimony of their white officers to the 
military commission held days afterwards. In the confusion officers could only identify 
thirteen soldiers as ringleaders. Most often they related the speech of collections of 
anonymous soldiers. The mutineers’ collective voice repeatedly stated a fundamental 
demand: “‘We want to be treated as soldiers!’”33  
                                                
31 Nye testimony, OR, 464-66. It is also possible soldiers were dissembling, a well rehearsed tactic from 
slavery that “retained considerable utility in freedom as well,” Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and 
Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery to Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 142; see also Bertram Wyatt-Brown, “The Mask of Obedience: Male Slave Psychology in 
the Old South,” American Historical Review 93 (December 1988): 1228–52. 
32 Drew testimony, OR, 460; Banks to Halleck, 11 December 1863, OR, 456. The officers disagreed how 
many soldiers participated in the mutiny; judging from half to one-quarter, to just one-fifth, of the 
regiment. While Benedict wanted to believe eighty percent were “disposed to do right,” he also doubted 
they “could have been relied upon in putting down the others,” Drew, et al. testimony, OR, 460-74; 
“Department of the Gulf—The Mutiny in Fort Jackson,” New York Times, 6 January 1864. 
33 Miller testimony, OR, 467. 
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The mutineers at Fort Jackson understood themselves as new members of an 
institution offering a unique status and unfamiliar but specific rights and protections. The 
soldiers “fell in” on the parade ground, according to officers’ testimony. Its precise 
martial meaning of “to get into line, to take one’s place in the ranks, to parade” suggests 
the men formed into files with order and discipline. Furthermore, Colonel Drew 
witnessed them “in the act of loading” their rifles. Each of these seemingly insignificant 
details are pregnant with meaning. The freedmen employed the training and discipline 
which marked them as soldiers in order to defend their new status and its concomitant 
rights.34 
Their act of collective dissent was in fact strengthened by bearing arms like white 
citizen-soldiers. It would have been during musket drill that they would have practiced 
the specific, complicated steps to load their rifle-muskets observed by Colonel Drew. 
Rather than a routine of enslaved life, it had been learned as a soldier’s skill and 
practiced in the context of company drill. Maneuvers on the drill field were done in 
formation after soldiers “fell in” to their proper place in the ranks. According to one 
scholar of Civil War tactics, in formation “the closeness that each soldier felt to his 
comrades on either side gave him strength” during the moral and physical test of battle. 
Arranging themselves with the discipline of the battle-line also functioned as a potent 
symbol of the freedmen’s soldier status just as it viscerally connected Anglos with their 
status as soldiers protecting the Union and their civic liberties. This “psychology of the 
                                                
34 While Harrington and Messner seem persuaded by Major Nye’s belief that the men presented “a good 
deal of confusion and noise,” Nye’s testimony, OR, 464, has problems because he was unaccounted for 
during most of the mutiny and several officers suspected him derelict of duty. Oxford English Dictionary, 
2nd ed., s.v. “fall.” Drew testimony, OR, 461. 
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battle line” stiffened the resolve of the mutineers on 9 December.35 In the mutiny at Fort 
Jackson the soldiers of the 4th Infantry wrapped their claim to customary rights in the 
martial discipline of the parade ground. 
The habits and customs of soldiering even appeared in the enslaved’s antebellum 
insurrections. Revolts such as Gabriel's in Virginia in 1800, Charles Deslondes’ 1811 
rising in Louisiana, Denmark Vessey’s 1822 South Carolina plot, and Nat Turner’s 
violent 1831 rebellion in Virginia all had the “settled purpose of and actual destruction 
of the lives and property of local whites.”36 Deslondes, for instance, initially led 400 
slaves to burn sugar plantations in January 1811 and killed two whites. His forces 
marched to drum cadence as they accrued additional runaways and deployed in 
regiments 500 strong on their way to New Orleans before American troops attacked and 
killed 66 of them.37 The maroon communities—slaves living at large beyond white 
                                                
35 Earl J. Hess, The Union Soldier in Battle: Enduring the Ordeal of Combat (Lawrence: University Press 
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Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989), 91-116; Brent Nosworthy, The Bloody Crucible of Courage: 
Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (New York: Carrol & Graf, 2003), 30-33. 
36 John W. Blassingame, The Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Antebellum South (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1979), 215; Herbert Aptheker, “American Negro Slave Revolts,” Science and 
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slave children,” 412, and the 1811 revolt was in part an attempt to forge racial solidarity in the face of the 
new American regime’s attempt to demote the status of Louisiana’s free blacks, 420-24, Laura Foner, 
“The Free People of Color in Louisiana and St. Domingue: a Comparative Portrait of Two Three-Caste 
Slave Societies,” Journal of Social History 3, no. 4 (July 1970): 406–430; Blassingame, Slave Community, 
216-7; Aptheker, “Slave Revolts,” 523; Harvey Wish reports they employed “disciplined companies,” 
“American Slave Insurrections Before 1861,” Journal of Negro History 22, no. 3 (July 1937): 299-320 
(319). 
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settlement—were a permanent feature of antebellum slavery and comprised another 
dramatic form of resistance to the institution that sometimes took military forms. Hoping 
for emancipation, they had fought with the British during the Revolution and maroon 
communities had frequently appeared along the boundaries of Spanish Florida. During 
the United States’s struggle to “pacify” the Seminole after Florida’s annexation in 1819, 
a white American officer observed that for the maroons who had sought refuge with the 
tribe, “surrender would be servitude to the whites; but to retain an open warfare, secured 
to them plunder, liberty, and importance.”38  
The dissenters also took possession of spaces that represented the unjust authority 
they now challenged. At least three non-commissioned officers joined the action as well 
as members of the guard detail. A squad of mutineers appeared at the guard house and 
released the soldiers confined within. Others went outside the walls, joined with 
comrades from some of the companies quartered there, and staked claim to the wharf. 
They searched for Benedict along the riverbank near the steamer Suffolk. Others briefly 
occupied the post hospital.39 
The mutineers’ disciplined presence and rapid commandeering of the environs of 
Fort Jackson convinced the officers that quelling the mutiny with “any force” would 
have been “very injudicious.” They refrained from drawing any personal weapons and 
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instead gathered the loyal black non-commissioned officers as interlocutors. With them 
the officers dispensed “advice;” urging the mutineers to put down their weapons and go 
back to their quarters.40  
Tensions ran high despite the self-discipline of the battle line. Fearing their officers 
might turn the fort’s cannons upon them, some mutineers made threats they hoped would 
compel Benedict’s release to them. Soldiers rushed at Major Nye, “shouting as they 
went, ‘Kill him, shoot him; kill the son of a bitch,’” before continuing down the levee to 
the hospital. Captain Miller had men urge him to, “‘Go away; we didn’t wish to hurt 
you, but if you don’t go away we will kill you.’” Other men simply warned they would, 
“‘Kill all the damned Yankees.’” In only two reported cases, however, did soldiers 
perpetrate acts of violence. One man grabbed Major Nye by his uniform jacket, threw 
him to the ground, and threatened to bayonet him. Captain Miller reported that Private 
Frank Williams yelled, “‘God damn you! I have been looking for you all night’” before 
he “made two thrusts at me with his bayonet, striking me on the belt-plate.”41 
Colonel Drew and his officers’ distilled the mutiny’s cause to Colonel Benedict’s 
punishment of the two musicians when they recalled men shouting, “‘We did not come 
here to be whipped by him. Kill Colonel Benedict; shoot him.’” Undoubtedly the 
                                                
40 The shock generated by the mutiny along with the time of day led to confusion about who was present 
and how they were armed, but probably most of the whites assisted Colonel Drew and did so without their 
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41 Nye testimony, OR, 464-65; Miller testimony, OR, 467-8; Drew testimony, OR, 460-1, 464; Hartwell 
testimony, OR, 472; only in “Department of the Gulf—The Mutiny in Fort Jackson,” New York Times, 6 
January 1864, is it reported that some men might have burned Benedict’s tent. 
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flogging did function as the primary complaint for those mutineers who promised “‘We 
will not stop firing until we have him.’”42 Colonel Drew and his fellow officers believed 
the mutiny was “spur of the moment” although the issue of unequal pay had 
“aggravated” its intensity.43 
Benedict’s punishment resonated most deeply with the freedmen-soldiers as a 
reminder of the life they thought lay behind them. Not only did slaves fear whipping’s 
physical pain, but it tore asunder any of the carefully arranged “threads of kinship and 
custom” which could “redefine the master-slave relation” within the common 
household.44 All of these feelings rushed to the surface and combined with a new reality. 
No longer were customary rights being violated, but legal protections conferred on them 
through their status as soldiers. It flouted General Thomas’s personal interdiction against 
flogging, transgressed a Federal statute, and violated military law governing absence 
without leave. Unauthorized absence had to be tried by general court-martial and, if 
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convicted, most soldiers could expect a short stint in the guard house along with a fine, 
but not physical punishment.45 
Alongside these statements focused narrowly on Benedict’s actions are others that tie 
the mutiny to the freedmen’s understandings of their soldier rights. “‘We know what 
General Grant told us,’” they repeatedly said. Most students of the Fort Jackson mutiny 
have accepted the white officer’s interpretation of this slogan: that the men meant the 
speech of General Thomas discussed above. It is also worth considering that perhaps the 
soldiers meant what they said. General Grant’s 22 June 1863 communique to 
Confederate General Richard Taylor demanding proper treatment of black solders 
captured after the Battle of Milliken’s Bend, Louisiana, promised “The Government and 
all officers serving under the Government are bound to give the same protection” to 
black soldiers “that they do to any other troops.” Grant transmitted a copy of the 
communique to General Thomas as well.46 Thomas may very well have read it to the 
troops at Fort Jackson or incorporated some reference to it. The black citizen-soldiers 
would have recast it for themselves as additional evidence the government had promised 
equal treatment. It justified rising against a local system of command that had failed to 
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protect the rights outlined in military law. The Army offered the chance to overturn old 
patterns, but it took moments like the Fort Jackson mutiny for citizen-soldiers to effect 
the transformation. 
Colonel Drew initially warned “they would get themselves into trouble,” but as the 
mutiny intensified he conceded that Benedict “had done wrong.” Still, by mutiny “the 
men had done greater wrong” and they must accept he “was the proper person to settle 
the difficulty.” From this tentative compromise, Drew and his officers patiently assured 
familiar individuals that each would be “protected in his rights.” Only then did the 
mutiny begin its denouement.47 The mutineers’ display of military discipline facilitated 
assembling the regiment in “a hollow square” around Drew who reiterated that 
Lieutenant Colonel Benedict “had done wrong, and that he would see justice done.” 
Most soldiers, satisfied they had made their point, now “acted very peaceably” and 
returned to their tents. By the 8 o’clock tattoo “everything was quiet, and nearly all the 
men answered to their names at roll-call.”48 
Emancipated African American soldiers had forced a powerful white to at least 
acknowledge some portion of their definition of freedom. Unlike Drew’s demand that 
the pay complainants be patient, the mutineers had forced him to explicitly concede that 
as soldiers they possessed certain individual and corporate rights. Furthermore, these 
were not simply the customary rights they had traditionally wrangled from their masters. 
These rights under the Articles of War had a political-legal status endowed by Congress. 
                                                
47 Miller testimony, OR, 467; Benedict testimony, OR, 474; Drew testimony, OR, 461-2. 
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They were intended to preserve a measure of civil rights that citizens in uniform did not 
forfeit even in the Army. For emancipated African Americans military service codified 
some of their customary rights to pay and rations; offered legal protection from 
punishments they had routinely resisted; and gave them new rights to petition, education, 
due process, and the rule of law. In this way soldier status conferred the accidents of 
citizenship, if not formal title. 
Slave Resistance and Accommodation 
In Louisiana, South Carolina, and elsewhere emancipated slaves grasped early on 
that wearing the uniform entitled them to something better than a replication of their 
years in bondage. They also grasped that the ways enslaved people like themselves had 
found over the years to challenge the master’s atomizing power could be redeployed to 
define the meaning of their soldier rights. 
As newly freed blacks negotiated the place made for them in a white Army, they 
made sense of it through their relationship to whites in the institution of slavery. On the 
sugar plantations of Louisiana the harvest season stretched from mid-October to 
December, sugar cane processing consumed December, followed by putting down the 
crop for next year before Christmas. Sugar cane cultivation in Louisiana faced an 
extremely compressed agricultural cycle, being more susceptible to frost damage in 
these temperate latitudes. Moving from planting to harvest “involved extensive and 
arduous work.” Planters sought some cushion from these climatic factors by embracing 
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mechanization. To make this adaptation profitable the planters needed “the mills to run 
from morning to night” during processing.49 
Like elsewhere in the South, the enslaved labor that made such “agro-industrial” 
production possible was structured through the paternalist relationship masters 
established with their human property. In this scheme the enslaved served as “inferior 
members of their extended households” who received the masters’ protection, but owed 
obedience and labor.50 In reality, sugar planters could and did enforce this system 
through the “customary models of antebellum labor discipline” like whipping, 
confinement, and sale. Overseers also routinely went beyond even this and employed 
clubs and paddles, punched and kicked slaves, and beat them with tools. In a few cases 
even more degrading punishments arose such as stripping slaves to the waist prior to an 
attack by cats.51  
Enslaved African-Americans never completely accepted this arrangement while 
using their membership in this fictive household to gain access for themselves to 
customary protections and privileges. They avoided falling completely under the 
master’s sway and built lives of their own to varying degrees. They sustained their hopes 
for eventual freedom through Christianity’s promise of redemption for the lowly52 and 
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nurtured their human dignity through the substantive relationships created within kin and 
family networks.53 
This process was characterized by degrees of confrontation, the most threatening to 
slavery’s myth of control being slave revolts and the survival of maroons on slavery’s 
periphery. Revolts and fugitive communities were dramatic but intermittent forms of 
opposition to the system. The enslaved achieved more far reaching and permanent gains 
against its paternalist control through accommodation, chiefly by daily resistance and by 
turning the features of its labor arrangements to their advantage whenever possible. 
First described by Eugene Genovese, accommodation was a cultural stance by which 
the enslaved accepted “what could not be helped without falling prey to the pressures for 
dehumanization, emasculation, and self-hatred.”54 Aided by their families and their own 
religion African Americans resisted the personal dependence at the root of paternalism. 
Most commonly this happened in connection with the central reason for slavery’s 
existence—economic production. In one form this appeared as “daily resistance” like 
dissembling, stealing, and confrontation and even murder, infanticide, and arson. Yet, 
according to historian Steven Hahn, these were bold, occasional efforts by which “slaves 
resisted becoming creatures of their master’s will.”55  
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Accommodation could frustrate the master’s power and reinforce his control because 
although legally property (not persons) slaves were nevertheless members of the 
master’s household with personal ties to him. Even so, structures of power such as slave 
trade and the slave patrol hindered, but did not entirely prevent, the enslaved’s ability to 
build bonds of identity across space and time with one another. Accommodation to the 
paternalist mindset of the master and slave as one household also intervened 
psychologically to hinder the possibilities of racial solidarity against white authority. 
Still, self-assertion was at work in the slaves’ efforts to use their membership in the 
master’s extended family to avoid perpetual abuse and remind him of his obligations to 
protect and provide for them.56 
Outright acts of resistance and rebellion were less effective in this than the more 
mundane but thoroughgoing culture of “production, provisioning, and exchange” that 
characterized an internal economy between master and slave. Historians have uncovered 
how the enslaved strived to establish a customary system of obligations, privileges, and 
even rights vis-à-vis the master that would protect their fledgling dreams of freedom. 
When refusing en masse if ordered to work on a Sunday or gathering to insist on extra 
rations typically granted for overtime, the enslaved rarely sought to fundamentally 
challenge the institution of slavery. The enslaved knew full well that the plantation could 
only function properly with their collective presence, that the master could not 
practically do without them. Over a span of decades a community of slaves might win 
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concessions from their master through confrontations to establish kin-based work 
parties, free time on weekends, personal gardens to grow and sell produce and keep the 
proceeds, and routines of paid labor. All such reciprocities came as a consequence of 
slaves’ membership in a paternalist unit of household production allowing for a specific 
set of customary obligations and expectations negotiated between master and 
bondspeople.57 The freedman-soldier therefore did not have to come so far in 
understanding that his membership in a military association might afford him customary 
rights as well.58 
These patterns of exchange and production created norms for the common household 
producing direct, occasionally desperate, forms of resistance when disregarded by the 
master. Plantation journals record enslaved people opposing overseers, and sometimes 
even masters, who resorted too quickly to the lash. Even slaves whom masters 
considered loyal, dependable servants could be as prone to physical confrontation as 
those classified as shirkers and ne’er-do-wells. Collective sanction of such actions grew 
out of slaves’ collective accommodation to paternalism and the “rights” it conferred. The 
risks entailed by this mode of resistance called forth a level of solidarity among the 
enslaved on a plantation that one historian has termed “the collective judgment of the 
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quarters”59 based on their understanding and experience of what membership in a 
particular common household conferred. 
Louisiana planters also recognized the endemic limitations on production imposed 
by accommodation and the culture of exchange: work slowdowns, destruction of tools, 
periodic confrontation, and running away. They could not afford such resistance within 
the short agricultural cycle that had led to the mechanization of grinding and pressing in 
the first place. They needed the enslaved members of their fictive households to “labor 
long hours without bringing the entire production process to a halt.” An incentive system 
of direct payment, holidays, and personal time intended as carrots to foster the 
enslaved’s intrinsic motivation arose as their answer to this dilemma. 
 These incentives amounted to a “pittance” compared to the cost of production. They 
strengthened the “web of duties and obligations,” and “tightened the slaveholders’ bonds 
of exploitation.” The cane planters had bought off resistance through “direct payment for 
work conducted after the end of the working day,” wages for piecework, extra pay for 
increased pace of work, and end of the year bonuses in credit at the plantation 
commissary or in kind. “Incentives of this type provided slaves with a modest income 
while encouraging self-policing and the chastisement of shirkers.” 
By the beginning of the Civil War, Louisiana slaves in the sugar parishes were quite 
familiar with working for wages and had become adept at negotiating for “Christmas 
bonuses, extra food, and payment for the produce of their garden plots and overtime 
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work.” They brokered with their masters for “specific holidays, improved housing, and 
the provision of whiskey and other goods for post-harvest celebrations.” Slaves took 
these arrangements even a step further by earning overtime pay for producing timber, 
corn, or livestock on their own initiative. A rhythm of reciprocity governed the 
functioning of Louisiana’s sugar plantations and its slaves came to expect “payment for 
their wood and corn just prior to the grinding season [mid-October and November], and 
on most plantations slaves entered the harvest with their demand for disbursable income 
at least partially satiated.”60  
Mechanization and the incentive system, therefore, created a situation within which 
enslaved African Americans could claim “some very basic rights for themselves and 
their families.”61 With incentives the enslaved could purchase “food, clothing, household 
goods, and tobacco” beyond their subsistence provisions from the planter.62 In the areas 
around Fort Jackson, in fact, enslaved men and women hunted, fished and raised “green 
vegitables [sic]” which they sold for “a great source of their livelihood.” Once Union 
soldiers arrived this produce from the internal economy even served “as a great 
convenience to these ‘Forts’” according to one officer. The enslaved turned direct 
payment and extra time not only into a customary expectation within their membership 
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in the plantation household, but engaged in “small businesses” offering them at least 
limited degrees of control over their own lives.63 
Black soldiers continued as best they could the system of exchange and distribution 
they knew from their lives as slaves that had allowed them to gain control of their lives 
for brief periods. Soldiers slipped by camp guards to barter for better provisions, like 
“soft wheat bread” among the laundresses, kin who might accompany USCT regiments, 
or even whites living nearby. Once soldiers had finished their nighttime foraging they 
might have sequestered themselves and “talked right smart” some moments before 
returning to the regimentation of camp.64 While absent the testimony of Benedict’s 
victims, if they had been attempting to slip beyond the boundaries of the post they likely 
were engaging in just this kind of behavior. By sharing resources and information, 
freedpeople continued in new circumstances “the obligations and responsibilities of 
kinship” that had helped them survive slavery. In turn emancipated black soldiers could 
draw sustenance for their freedom struggle inside the Army.65 
 These former slaves from Louisiana sugar country also harbored an expectation of 
additional compensation created by the incentive system during the most frenetic months 
of the agricultural cycle. Wages, bonuses, and holidays had become “rights” the 
enslaved expected to be honored by the master within the rubric of accommodation. 
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They found an equivalent to one facet of the incentive system in the wages promised to 
them once they became members of a new institution, the Army. When these wages 
were found to be different from what other soldiers received, their frustration with the 
inequality of wages was not so different as that felt by Northern free black soldiers who 
initiated the pay crisis in South Carolina discussed in the preceding chapter. Yet, the 
men at Fort Jackson understood the question of unequal pay more deeply as a rupture of 
the rhythms of mutual obligation that had structured their former lives. The government 
had made a promise to pay them at a certain rate (along with their clothing, quarters, and 
rations) in order to provide for their subsistence. New freedmen-soldiers found 
themselves in much more precarious circumstances with none of the traditional supports. 
They were removed from the plantation and stationed at a post with living conditions 
that were difficult, to say the least, without the incentives of food that were often in  
addition to the master’s distributions of provisions.  
The confrontation over soldier rights and membership in the Army that unfolded at 
Fort Jackson had its deepest origin in the nature of production endemic to the sugar 
parishes of Louisiana and the culture of reciprocity it engendered. For these erstwhile 
slaves wearing blue uniforms early December would have traditionally been the end of 
the harvest and grinding seasons and the approach of their Christmas holiday. Extra 
work pay and other incentives like additional molasses, pork, and liquor might have 
already been distributed. Instead in 1863 they had not been paid in months, drew spartan 
rations, and lived in frigid tents on the edge of a malarial swamp.66 Worse yet, they had 
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endured months of physical punishment little different from what they had received from 
overseers. 
 The Fort Jackson mutiny exemplifies how military protest actions by freedmen-
soldiers were simply a new field of confrontation where new protections and 
reciprocities had to be won. The insubordination, mutinies, and even political speech in 
Army courts-martial by freedmen-soldiers drew on a tradition of customary rights won 
through confrontation with the master. Membership in their master’s household unit of 
production—however exploitative—had also provided avenues for encounter, 
negotiation, and confrontation that over time produced reciprocal obligations and 
customary privileges. After slavery they had a new status as soldiers and access to 
codified rights and judicial protections residing primarily in the Articles of War and the 
Army regulations. The reality of their life at Fort Jackson forced a familiar 
confrontation: defining the meaning of membership. Their new status as freemen in 
uniform during a revolutionary time linked their quest for the rights of soldiers with the 
military decrees, executive proclamations, and congressional acts that together shaped 
the story of how ordinary freedpeople first defined the content of their eventual 
citizenship. It would be membership no longer in an imagined household, not even only 
in a volunteer regiment, but in a sovereign body politic. 
Freedpeople under the Federal Occupation 
Demonstrating the role of Louisiana’s emancipated slave soldiers in these 
circumstances necessitates situating them within the historic changes that unfolded there, 
specifically their introduction to military law and Northern white political and racial 
 214 
ideology. Federal forces occupied New Orleans in April 1862 and spread their control 
over the surrounding parishes. Thousands of slaves fled into Union lines and that ground 
sugar production to a halt. Lincoln’s concern to secure the support of loyal whites 
necessitated restarting the sugar economy. Sensing this pressure, Banks instituted a free 
labor system during 1863 designed to keep most of the freedpeople on the plantations. 
Working for one to three dollars a month, men obtained an acre of land for personal use 
along with housing, food, and clothing for them and their dependents.67 Free laborers 
and their employers (often their former masters) immediately became subject to military 
law. Provost marshals investigated disputes; courts-martial adjudicated them. Flogging 
was prohibited and, among other rights, freedpeople gained protection against double 
jeopardy, a two-year statute of limitations, and access to judicial appeal.68 
The reality was not so clear-cut. Provost marshals in the parishes could be 
manipulated by employers through racist appeals and failing this, with bribes. Trumped-
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up charges of theft, unauthorized absence, and insubordination could be fabricated. 
Many provost judges placed African Americans on public work projects for months of 
hard labor or in confinement for weeks on the plantation following daily labor. All of 
this compromised the rule of law in favor of the prejudices of Northern lessees or 
“Unionist” former masters. Laborers, however, no longer had to simply accept such 
travails. Emancipated blacks regularly exercised their freedom and left plantation 
employment they viewed as unjust, resisted demeaning labor discipline, or ignored 
unreasonable orders from unsympathetic employers. Freedpeople’s complaints to the 
provost marshals about whipping, lack of provisions, and uneven pay could just as often 
result in fines against white employers. A Louisiana freedman captured the ambiguity of 
their new lives: “Wese ony jess tasted de hard tack of de Yankees, but wese had nuff to 
know dat wese goin’ to eat no more hoe cake in de slave cabin.”69 
Military law offered great potential to give form and substance to black freedom by 
protecting emancipated blacks’ movements, bodies, and speech. Masters had stood 
essentially above the law. Slaves in antebellum Louisiana could not enter a civil 
complaint or press criminal charges against whites. Courts only intervened at the behest 
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of owners needing to sue irresponsible overseers whose abuse or murder of slaves 
jeopardized their human property. Although slaves technically had protection in 
Louisiana’s Black Code against cruel punishment, flogging, hog tying, and confinement 
were excluded from its definition.70 
In contrast, freedpeople assumed expansive rights and protections under military 
law’s auspices. A provost marshal described African Americans with a “spirit of 
indepedance [sic]” that spurned “the same treatment…they have heretofore quietly 
submitted to.” In Plaquemines parish, slaves insisted on wages from their former owner 
before the free labor system was in place. They went on strike to make their point, going 
to so far as to hang the master in effigy. The work stoppage combined with a threat of 
personal violence finally served to institute wages.71 In 1863 a Northern newspaperman 
reported that plantation laborers near the Gulf Coast “respectfully” complained to their 
“proprietor” about an overseer’s “reputation” for indiscriminate flogging and harassing 
black women. They insisted he fire the man. When he refused, the freedpeople “packed 
up their little bundles, and started on the road to Fort Jackson” for jobs as camp hands 
and laundresses rather than return to the fields. The former owner was stunned that what 
he had once “stigmatized as ‘things’” now “‘know their rights, and knowing, dare 
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maintain.’” He met their request and the freedpeople went directly back to work.72 
According to historian Steven Hahn, these “contests and accommodations” took place 
across the South and “after 1863 increasingly yielded the sort of arrangements that 
seemed to acknowledge the passing of an old order and the emergence of a new one.”73 
The “rights” the owner alluded to were of that new order: a combination of the privileges 
and incentives blacks had achieved in bondage and the new legal protections extended to 
them under military law. When they complained of whippings by the overseer’s 
penchant for the lash, they knew it had been outlawed and they would no longer tolerate 
it as freepeople. Marching on the road to Fort Jackson was not only for employment but 
to make a report to the military authorities there. How tellingly ironic that black soldiers 
garrisoning the post would mutiny in December 1863 over precisely that breach of 
military law. 
These conflicts between employers and laborers frequently led to charges by Federal 
officials who supervised the plantations. For example, in the parishes of Plaquemines, 
St. Martin’s, St. Mary’s, and St. Bernard in November 1863 to July 1864 all the charges 
against employers were for whipping or assault on African Americans. Fines were 
usually imposed in the range of fifteen to thirty dollars, a substantial sum of money in 
1863. The Army was quite quick to pounce on examples of abuse against black laborers 
if for nothing else than fear it would disrupt calm on the plantations. For the same reason 
it dealt sternly with laborers who shirked, deserted, or refused orders. 
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Black laborers in the four sugar parishes were found guilty at only a slightly higher 
rate (80 percent) than that for all Union soldiers (76 percent) despite a smaller 
percentage of African American soldiers standing trial than whites. They were found 
guilty of several crimes: 39 percent of the charges against black laborers were for dissent 
(insubordination, mutiny, or mutinous conduct). Another 33 percent were for theft, 17 
percent for desertion, and 11 percent for violent crimes. By comparison, in all of the 
Army’s general court-martial cases over the entire war dissent was 46 percent and 
desertion another 36 percent. Together theft and violent crimes accounted for 18 percent. 
The higher incidence of theft indicates black laborers who continued to use it as a 
resistance tactic retained from slavery. The data also reveals that black laborers, like the 
anecdotes cited, opted for confrontation over escape thrice as often.74 Emancipated 
blacks in Louisiana both in and out of uniform lived under a system of law that charged 
them and determined guilt in a fair manner compared to what soldiers, white or black, 
experienced in the Army. 
Race played a disproportionate role, however, in the sentences for both emancipated 
black civilians and those in uniform. According to one scholar, black soldiers bore 
sentences of hard labor or death “at a higher percentage than white soldiers.”75 
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Punishment at hard labor certainly was a fact of life for black laborers found guilty. The 
provost judge handed down a sentence of hard labor or confinement in 71 percent of the 
cases in the four parishes. And the length of those sentences averaged twenty-two days 
for hard labor and twelve nights for confinement.76 Labor and confinement’s 
predominance ensured a tractable labor force necessary to serve the needs of the Federal 
war effort while placating employers who were skittish about the prospects of social 
revolution after emancipation. These discrepancies in punishment would be in effect for 
the men found guilty of the Fort Jackson mutiny. 
Yet, various efforts that acquainted them with the rule of law had already begun to 
lay some of the groundwork for later military protest actions. It had started for some of 
these men as free laborers on the sugar plantations living under military law before they 
enlisted. The education these men received while in the Army also sowed seeds of self-
government. General Banks created an “accessible version” of the Articles of War in 
order that freedmen-soldiers might know for themselves the laws which governed their 
new lives.77 At least a few company officers in the 4th Infantry also followed their 
obligation to regularly read their men the Articles of War.78  
 These developments determined that emancipated slave soldiers would understand 
Drew and Benedict’s regime of abuse not only through the prism of enslavement, but 
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through the rights attached to their status as soldiers. This process received important 
additional support shortly after Benedict’s outrages at Baton Rouge. Adjutant General 
Lorenzo Thomas, inspector of all the colored troops in the Army, visited the forts in 
September 1863. During his speech to them, Thomas promised to discharge any officers 
who violated the guarantee made to former slaves in Louisiana and elsewhere that they 
would not be flogged. In one sense, Thomas was simply broadcasting what Congress had 
already made law in August 1861.79 In another, Thomas was reassuring his audience that 
their soldier rights would not be honored only in the breach. According to none other 
than General Banks, this was a right the soldiers of the Corps d’Afrique had made a 
“condition” of their service from the beginning.80 Here was a specific instance of how 
erstwhile slaves continued their practice of “turning privileges won into rights to be 
defended”81 after they achieved the status of Union soldiers protected by military law.  
Unfortunately for them, their conviction that they had soldiers’ rights shielding them 
from unusual punishment did not alter the reality of their lives in the 4th Infantry. 
Confident that exercising their rights under the Articles of War would effect change, 
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some men questioned their officers why they had to obey Lieutenant Colonel Benedict if 
he would not obey General Thomas. Several objected vociferously about the abuse under 
which they lived. Such complaints had sanction under the thirty-fifth Article of War: if 
any soldier “thinks himself wronged by his Captain or other officer, he is to complain 
thereof to the commanding officer of the regiment, who is required to summon a 
regimental court-martial, for doing justice to the complainant.”82 Increasing evidence 
that their rights as soldiers, and their newfound freedom, were in jeopardy eventually led 
to their protest action of mutiny to restore military law’s role as a shield against tyranny, 
not solely as a prod to obedience.83  
Freedmen-soldiers stepped into a new institution that promised them a sphere of 
heretofore denied rights backed up by statutory protections, yet the institution failed to 
make good on its promise. They recognized their commanding officers’ punishments as 
akin to the world of the slave, not the world of the free man. In response they harnessed 
the “politics of slaves” to their brief schooling in Northern political culture, their varied 
acquaintance with the Army regulations and Articles of War, and assurances from 
general officers about proper treatment. Protest actions like the Fort Jackson mutiny 
bridged black soldiers’ hopes for freedom conceived in bondage and the practical 
possibilities of citizenship offered as members of the Army. 
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All African American soldiers lived not only with their discrepancy in pay compared 
to the thirteen dollars for whites, but also the absence of the higher pay extended to 
white non-commissioned officers, the insult of having money deducted for clothing 
rather than the clothing allowance white soldiers enjoyed, and occasionally officers’ 
embezzlement of their pay. What “aggravated” these petitions to Colonel Drew was a 
sense that the “freedom” they were living in the 4th Infantry preserved so much of the old 
system of exploitation with none of the security they had once obtained through 
accommodation. They organized a demonstration of resistance on 9 December to 
demand the government meet its obligations of “beneficence.” Their complaints and 
Drew’s responses gave an implicit acknowledgement to the soldiers’ membership in the 
body politic. The mutiny sprang from the mentalities of slavery wedded to the potent 
context of citizens who had been denied their equal rights under the mainstream 
American constitutional principles of popular sovereignty, citizen consent, and the rule 
of law. 
Louisiana freedpeople in and out of uniform contended not only with abuse and 
disdain from officers or provost marshals. Their civilian teachers and ministers along 
with the Army chaplains and surgeons also represented white authority despite not 
having military or legal suasion. All of them promoted mainstream Northern cultural 
values. Chaplains and ministers preached the moral self-control of Northern evangelical 
Christianity that sometimes clashed with a slave Christianity emphasizing liberation. 
When their sermons counseled surrender to God’s will and deference they sounded to 
the freedpeople like the old preaching of white ministers who had prayed obedience to 
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the master above all. Surgeons practiced according to middle-class values about hygiene 
and good health. Surgeons and chaplains typically judged black moral and hygienic 
values as deficient and so blacks remained, as under slavery, objects of manipulation for 
whites.84 
Freedpeople’s well-documented desire for education meant Northern white teachers, 
often women, also played a crucial role. Freedpeople deemed literacy so vital that they 
petitioned General Banks in the summer of 1863 for schools if their labor on the 
plantations were to continue. Beginning that fall schools for black civilians began to 
arise in nearly every garrisoned town, colored regiment, and contraband camp. Within 
the Corps d’Afrique, a captain oversaw a regimental school, requisitioned the necessary 
books, and supervised the curriculum of reading, writing, and basic mathematics with 
the goal that all soldiers be able to read and the non-commissioned also be able to 
write.85 Despite some strides made towards literacy, many of the freedmen in uniform 
remained functionally illiterate. They depended on their literate comrades and their 
white company officers to interpret and explain their duties and protections under the 
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regulations and Articles. Thus, the influence of Northern ideas about soldiers’ rights 
through their white officers played a formative role.  
Education by white teachers reinforced and gave intellectual form to freedmen-
soldiers’ inchoate ideas about freedom. While their teachers tried to inculcate Northern 
middle-class values like personal independence, ambition, perspicacity, sobriety, the 
readers and spellers used for instruction “constantly reaffirmed the central political 
symbols of individualism and the triumph of Will.” Educators pushed blacks “to change 
individually, to embrace new models, to think along new lines” in order to “turn their 
backs on the past and the traditional ways of thought and action.” Education put 
freedmen-soldiers in touch with Northern political ideals of self-government and 
personal independence. A soldier’s speech on the occasion of his first Christmas as a 
free man calls attention not only to his liberty, but to his new status as a member of the 
Union Army. “I say for myself….We was down in de dark land of slavery. And 
now….We are free men, and soldiers of de Unite States.”86 A free man could speak for 
himself and with that voice he could define the meaning of his freedom; particularly in 
his new role as a soldier of the republic. 
The training and drill they received as soldiers also introduced the freedmen to 
Anglo American ideas about the arms-bearing citizen in uniform. Significantly, the 
freedmen employed the training and discipline that marked them as soldiers in order to 
defend their new status and its concomitant rights. They gave substance to their protest 
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action by bearing arms like white citizen-soldiers—even in collective dissent—against 
violations of their soldier status. They had daily practiced the specific, complicated steps 
to load their rifle-muskets observed by Colonel Drew during musket drill. Rather than a 
routine of enslaved life, they had acquired it as a soldier’s skill. They had honed it not as 
individuals but in formation during company drill on the very parade ground where they 
staged their protest. In formation “the closeness that each soldier felt to his comrades on 
either side gave him strength” during the moral and physical test of battle. This 
“psychology of the battle line” stiffened the resolve of the mutineers on 9 December. 
Arranging themselves in formation served as a potent symbol of the freedmen’s new 
soldier status just as it buoyed Anglo citizen-soldiers defending the Union and their 
existing liberties. At Fort Jackson the mutineers wrapped their claim to customary rights 
as soldiers in the martial discipline they had acquired from the very white officers who 
thought it impossible for former slaves to do so. 
The effect of all these Northern influences was, therefore, complex. Northern racism 
on a number of fronts showed blacks that their new independent spirit would be stifled if 
left untended by their own efforts. Education and vicarious contact with Northern values 
and practices, however, suggested a body of political ideals that could justify their 
claims to freedom. All of these vectors of social influence collided with the preexisting 
mentalities of slavery. Confrontation and negotiation had given them a tool set for 
construction a rough freedom within a capricious institution. Military law became a 
preexisting framework of specific rights and protections born of white political values 
that freedpeople in and out of uniform began to harness to the old “politics of slaves.” 
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The application of military justice against newly free African Americans in 
Louisiana was likewise filled with contradictions. They could realistically expect that 
abusive employers would be punished, even if only by fines. They possessed as much 
chance of gaining acquittal as a white soldier, yet they faced much more difficult 
sentences if convicted. Freedmen-soldiers came to know these same challenges. At Fort 
Jackson their dissent from within the ranks, however, forced the Army to take its 
promises of protection and justice for all citizen-soldiers that much more seriously. The 
experiences of civilian freedpeople with military justice compared to its operation within 
the Army cautions against an interpretation of black dissent as simply redress against 
racist treatment. Emancipated black soldiers’ military protests occurred because they 
grew frustrated that their status as soldiers did not protect them any better in freedom 
from the same kind of abuses they had known in slavery. 
The Aftermath 
Only days after the mutiny, Private Frank Williams tried to stand upon the rights that 
he and the mutineers believed they had won. Williams had been the only soldier to 
threaten violence against an officer during the affair. Seemingly in contempt of his 
promises, Drew arrested and confined Williams in the guard house before he ordered 
charges be proffered for threatening the life of an officer. Williams promised that he 
“‘would be damned if he would go until he knew what he was sent for’” and promised to 
escape or die trying. It is unlikely that Williams understood he invoked habeas corpus, 
but he appeared to grasp that as a soldier in the 4th Infantry he had a right to go free if 
there were no formal charges against him. Captain Nye testified that long-standing 
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procedure at the fort dictated that “unless charges are preferred within twenty-four hours, 
or before the next guard-mounting, the new officer of the day has orders to release” any 
prisoner.87 Furthermore, when Drew later faced arrest and possible trial for his role in 
mistreating the soldiers, he protested that a copy of the charges against him had not been 
furnished and that he had been kept under arrest in violation of Federal law specifying 
all persons in the service of the United States under arrest be given a copy of any charges 
within eight days or be released.88 Williams, like his post commander, stood on his 
soldier rights, rights recently defended by the mutiny, a military protest action born of 
the enslaved’s own longstanding efforts to establish customary privileges and 
protections. 
The Williams affair also exposed Drew’s fundamental opposition to these aspirations 
(what he condescendingly termed their “triumph”) despite his promises in the heat of the 
moment. After all, he ultimately saw to it that Williams would be court-martialed for his 
actions on the parade ground. Drew’s primary concern, and that of the Army high 
command, remained the restoration and maintenance of order. He confined Benedict at 
the mutiny’s outset only to not “prolong the mutiny” and conceded to the mutineers 
reluctantly once his authority seemed attenuated. Although he dispatched Benedict to 
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Gulf Department headquarters in New Orleans the next morning, he also encouraged 
him to quickly resign in hopes of obtaining an honorable discharge.89 
A reflexive need for order consumed the imaginations of whites at Banks’s 
headquarters, in New Orleans, and beyond. Drew argued that the mutineers believed 
Benedict had fled seeking escape on a steamboat docked at the nearby wharf on the 
Mississippi River and intended to march on New Orleans to locate him.90 These spurious 
reports probably led to Banks’s initial dispatch of the white 83rd Ohio to secure Fort 
Jackson under gunboat escort when he heard nothing from Drew after reports of gunfire 
reached him. Fearing the worst, he relieved the colonel and tasked Brigadier General 
William Dwight with restoring order at the post.91 Once in command Dwight divined 
that, “Indeed the whole object and scope of the mutiny in its conception was to march to 
New Orleans to present their grievances and ask protection and redress.”92 
In addition, exaggerated stories spreading from the Crescent City likely aggravated 
Banks’s fears. New Orleans correspondents for major Northern papers presented the 
mutiny as a localized affair by black soldiers who “had never intended to create mutiny 
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or shed blood.”93 Hyperbole abounded, however, in Southern and border state 
newspapers. They eagerly printed any rumors—even as they occasionally discounted 
them—which might present the mutiny as exemplary of emancipation’s hypocrisy: the 
Yankees had no idea how to manage such a gullible, degraded race and were now the 
victims of their own misguided attempts to bestow an undeserved freedom on the blacks. 
While the mutiny could be read as mindless mobbing, it also was frighteningly familiar 
when dressed as a slave uprising. According to one distorted fantasy, the forts had as 
many as 6,000 black troops who eventually killed two hundred white officers, destroyed 
the magazines, and disabled the cannon. To mollify their readers, many Southern 
accounts reprinted a rumor that the blacks had handed the forts over to rebel prisoners 
held inside, though no Confederates were there. These accounts turned the mutiny into a 
demonstration by loyal slaves who had come to their senses and resumed their proper 
place of subordination. Yet, it was the Memphis Daily Appeal that came the closest to 
appreciating the freedmen-soldiers’ true attitude. It observed that the blacks were 
“demoralized by the gift of nominal freedom” and had grown “impatient for larger 
liberty.” The Tennessee paper also was alone in making any connection to slavery’s role 
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in fostering resistance, observing that the approach of Christmas had made the men 
yearn for “their customary holiday.”94 
 The mutiny had indeed been a bid for “larger liberty” and the soldiers’ continued 
efforts to this end prevented life at Fort Jackson returning to the status quo ante. Some 
individuals responded defiantly at reveille on 10 December, but every soldier did answer 
his name at roll call according to regulations. The relief of Lieutenant Colonel Benedict 
was only a small relief for his soldiers. The root issue had merely become glaringly 
exposed: their rights as soldiers must be respected under military law.  
General Dwight believed a state of “passive mutiny” nevertheless continued.95 This 
man was no stranger to commanding African Americans. At the siege of Port Hudson 
earlier in the year, the besotted officer had commanded a division embracing the all-
black 1st and 3rd Louisiana Native Guards. His orders for a frontal assault to salvage the 
initial attack by white soldiers on 27 May 1863 resulted in heavy casualties and retreat. 
Official reports and newspaper accounts that emphasized the men’s bravery and tenacity 
had encouraged white support for further black enlistment.96 Dwight’s opinion of 
freedmen-soldiers, however, had remained unchanged. Blacks “are more brutal than the 
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whites,” “they do not yet know what to do with their power and liberty,” and “they 
mistake the nature and use of both.”97 
Dwight could recognize, however, a failure of military leadership when he saw it. As 
he spent time around the 4th Infantry at Fort Jackson he came to believe that Drew had 
been complicit in Benedict’s regime of abuse and “unwise at times in the past” about 
“kicking and striking his soldiers.” The brigadier proffered charges against Drew, though 
he later withdrew them for lack of evidence. Soldiers greeted news of the charges, 
however, as evidence that they now had the Army’s attention in the mutiny’s wake. 
Dwight’s consideration encouraged them to bring further complaints to him about six 
officers who continued to sexually harass the black laundry women who lived outside 
the fort. Like their Northern black counterparts, these freedmen-soldiers linked service in 
the Army with protection of their dependents, specifically against the perpetuation of 
plantation-style sexual domination. In response, Dwight charged these men with conduct 
unbecoming and initiated a court-martial in February 1864.98 In spite of his own racial 
prejudice, Dwight recognized the trampling of soldiers’ rights as an “abuse of power” 
that was not “military discipline.” Drew and Benedict’s system of “physical terror” was 
“degrading to the officer who uses it and to those who suffer from it.” Such “unlawful, 
unnecessary, and ill-judged violence” had gone beyond “physical endurance” and 
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“caused the late mutiny.” The colonel had to be dismissed or else his “ill-judged 
unlawful violence will again produce the same result.”99 
 Yet Dwight, like the military hierarchy of which he was a part, remained convinced 
that emancipated African Americans could become useful soldiers only through the 
strictest military discipline. While they might have certain rights as soldiers, properly 
dispensed force was “the only notion they know for right, order and obedience.” The 
guilty officers and the mutineers had both indulged in “power and liberty without law” 
that resulted in “crimes and license.” He advocated executing the guilty in the presence 
of the regiment as an object lesson. After that they could again “be trusted entirely” if 
placed under commanders who would see “the means of discipline alone changed.”100 
Dwight, like so many Northern officers, misunderstood the reality of the institution 
of slavery. The enslaved in Louisiana had patiently carved out customary rights for 
themselves through “political skirmishes”101 with the master class long before the 
Yankees arrived. This formative experience of organizing and acting to secure privileges 
pegged to their bondage prepared them to fend off encroachments on their newfound 
freedom after emancipation. The freedpeople continued these efforts living under 
military law while still laboring. Those who donned Union blue carried the struggle into 
the Army. In both circumstances they looked to rule of law to shield them from unjust 
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power and protect their liberty. It was because as soldiers they expected that their rights 
would be more secure that they engaged in mutiny at all. From this perspective 
emancipated blacks, like Northern Anglos, used military protest actions to secure their 
soldier rights. Many of these particular rights were the same even if the deeper 
motivations were not. Anglo volunteers knew that defending their soldier rights 
delineated their existing status as citizens. Recently freed blacks in uniform, however, 
created the first outlines of their citizen status with their “political skirmishes” against 
unjust pay, abusive discipline, and racist treatment. 
Like their fellow plantation laborers, freedmen-soldiers experienced law’s coercive 
power more immediately than its liberating potential. Within days of the mutiny’s 
conclusion General Banks ordered a preliminary inquiry through a military commission. 
Based on its findings, he convened a general court-martial at Fort Jackson to try 
Benedict. A second general court-martial tried thirteen enlisted men with whom officers 
had personal confrontations during the mutiny or considered its ringleaders. Brought to 
trial under the seventh and eighth Articles of War, the mutineers faced “death, or such 
other punishment as by a court-martial shall be inflicted.”102 
The judgment and sentences rendered by the court are a complex mix of clemency 
and severity. Although possessing authority to sentence all the mutineers to death it 
assessed only two capital sentences. It followed Army practice and handed down 
sentences of hard labor—the most common form of punishment—to the remaining 
defendants. At the same time, Benedict received the maximum sentence for his offense 
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and suffered dishonorable discharge. Nevertheless, the court’s merciful hard labor 
sentences were no easy yoke to bear. The average sentence for the Fort Jackson 
mutineers was eight years. No man received a term less than a year. Three earned terms 
of ten years or more, including Private Julius Boudro who lost all his pay and faced 
twenty years at hard labor. Over the whole war only 23 percent of soldiers who received 
hard labor had terms longer than two years and only 13 percent had terms of five years 
or more. In 1863, a slight majority of soldiers sentenced to hard labor faced a term of 
three months or less. These lengthy terms were combined with confinement at the 
Army’s prison at Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas for six of them. Four of these also 
lost all their pay.103  
Alongside the difficult sentences for the men found guilty were the acquittals of four 
soldiers and General Banks’s disapproval of one conviction for “conflicting and 
unsatisfactory” evidence. Scholarship would suggest this is evidence that the defendants 
received procedural due process at the general court-martial. They likely exercised their 
soldier rights to provide testimony in their own defense and, if enough officers were to 
be had, benefit from defense counsel. Access to counsel would have furthered enlarged 
their trial rights through questioning and cross-examination of witnesses and the 
submission of physical evidence.104 
Banks not only dismissed one guilty verdict, he also suspended the capital sentences 
of privates Frank Williams and Abraham Victoria, leaving them confined indefinitely. In 
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contrast, Lieutenant Colonel Benedict received no clemency from the commanding 
general. Convinced that Benedict’s behavior was condemned “by the considerations of 
humanity, the articles of war, the orders of this Department, and the honor of a 
gentleman,”105 Banks approved his sentence under the ninety-ninth Article’s broad 
prohibition against conduct “to the prejudice of good order and military discipline.”106 
Banks’s handling of the sentences in the Fort Jackson affair fit with that of department 
commanders during the war who approved general court-martial sentences “as issued” 
nearly 80 percent of the time. Nevertheless, the eight guilty soldiers began their time at 
Fort Jefferson facing unusually long terms. They did not receive clemency until special 
orders from Washington and the Department of the Gulf remitted the remaining portions 
of their sentences in 1866. Yet such treatment meant dishonorable discharges and the 
loss of any pay while confined. This left them destitute when they entered the new world 
of the postwar South and probably forced them to accept the meagre terms for 
agricultural labor on the Louisiana sugar plantations.107 
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General Banks also needed to limit the mutiny’s political repercussions on his clout 
within the Union command structure.108 It was “of incalculable injury to the service” and 
would “disturb the whole country,”109 but it must not “impair the confidence of the 
Government in the efficiency and reliability of black troops.” To these ends, he carefully 
shielded himself from blame for the mutiny and patronizingly shifted it to the soldiers. 
He saw his mote of clemency justified by the freedmen’s failure to “comprehend…the 
duties of citizens which are readily understood and accepted by white men.”110 What 
Banks judged as ignorance, the emancipated African Americans considered to be their 
proper interpretation of the soldier rights offered by the Army, especially its consequent 
promises about treatment and pay. 
Ambiguity about the legal status of the freedpeople’s citizenship persisted nearly 
eighteen months after the Militia Act had freed slaves in the service of the Union Army. 
An Eighth Amendment protection served as the grounds to cashier Benedict. This 
validated the men’s understanding that military law provided the citizen a standing to 
justify their protest that the Army apply to black soldiers the fullness of the rule of law. 
But did ordinary law yet extend to them? The prohibition of flogging had been an act of 
Congress, passed to revise the Army’s fundamental law. Emancipated blacks‘ roles as 
soldiers gave them a strange status. The establishment of their civil rights broadly 
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defined seemed assured, but possibly bereft of the many specific protections enshrined in 
ordinary law which allowed those rights to flourish in civil society. 
In many ways the outcome of this mutiny in a small corner of the Civil War presaged 
the sad history of Reconstruction and Jim Crow. The three famous amendments to the 
Constitution are rightly considered major achievements. For many white Americans at 
the time these seemed to be enough and a host of equally pressing concerns increasingly 
consumed their postwar attention. As a result, the promise of the amendments receded 
without the creation of ordinary law beyond the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875. The 
acts themselves suffered from inadequate Federal enforcement. And in this the mutiny is 
also instructive. The Army’s promise of equal treatment had foundered on shortcomings 
blacks experienced in command and pay, treatment owing to the same culture of 
Northern racism that eventually inhibited enforcement of Reconstruction’s gains and 
opted instead for accommodation with the forces of Southern redemption.111  
Conclusion 
As the Civil War continued, the part played by African American soldiers gained 
increasingly salience. By war’s end there were 140, 313 blacks under arms amounting to 
some 10 percent of the Union Army.112 These men gained gradual confidence that 
military service could not only secure rights for them within the Army but be a path to 
full citizenship. While Northern free blacks drew on a tradition of political protest 
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developed within antebellum public culture, emancipated slaves continued to rely on the 
formula outlined by the Fort Jackson mutiny. Taking this incident as a starting point, 
three additional episodes of freedmen-soldiers’ military protest analyzed in the following 
chapter will provide additional nuance to the dynamic of slaves’ politics and soldier 
rights as well as the increasing sophistication of their military protests over the course of 
the war. 
Customary, reciprocal expectations established by countless political skirmishes with 
masters led the newly free to undertake a similar effort in the shadow of military law, 
whether as plantation hands or soldiers. Newly freed blacks spoke out when they sensed 
threats to the modicums of personal autonomy they had carved out during bondage. 
Emancipated blacks in uniform recoiled in protest when they recognized aspects of 
Army life that compromised an emerging definition of their solder rights. This definition 
synthesized the customary relations worked out during bondage with the rule of law 
promulgated through the Articles of War and the Army regulations. When the freedmen 
of the 4th Infantry took to the parade ground, they opposed not only a horrific method of 
slave correction, but the violation of a specific, legal protection due them as soldiers. In 
this respect, the dissenters of Fort Jackson were both wary of the Army’s power over 
them and at the same time eager to claim their new rights within it. 
Anglos practiced self-government within their voluntary associations as members 
who could craft their own constitutions and by-laws. Emancipated slaves, however, were 
on the cusp of an entirely new membership as citizens within the nation, but with no 
formal tradition of self-government. Only through their culture of confrontation with the 
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master class had they enjoyed even the most customary rights. This had prepared them 
for the greatly expanded horizon of consent when they escaped from the peculiar 
institution. One of the most immediately accessible demonstrations of self-government 
was selecting membership in the Army in order to destroy slavery. Participating in that 
institution founded on the rule of law provided avenues to turn the employment of 
resistance toward “influencing American politics” and expanding the definition of 
citizenship in the United States. By laying claim to their soldier rights in military protest 
actions they exercised self-government as members of the Army. 
When officers perpetrated abuse, ignored military law, or discounted their men’s 
frustrations they transgressed the emancipated blacks’ soldier rights just as much as if 
they were Anglos. Exploitation and the abuse of authority grew. In response, soldiers 
tested the official channels of redress or relied on techniques of resistance and 
accommodation learned in slavery. Collective dissent erupted when justice through 
either channel remained frustrated. These “hard fought political controversies” (to 
borrow historian Christian Fritz’s characterization of self-government) in turn built upon 
the enslaved’s experiences in questioning the master’s authority. Freedmen-soldier 
dissent offers scholars concrete examples of wartime emancipation that unites studies 
privileging blacks’ efforts to free themselves with those emphasizing the extension of 
freedom by the federal government. Military protests such as the Fort Jackson mutiny 
and those discussed in following are come were alternate channels toward protecting and 
defining the soldier rights attached to their membership in the Army. In the process, 
emancipated black soldiers created a unique expression of American self-government. 
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Soldiering and its associated rights was a critical waystation on the road to full 
membership and sovereignty within American society for emancipated African 
Americans. It represented the first time in their lives that their privileges and protections 
did not depend on the caprice of the master, but had the force of law. And from the first 
moment, emancipated slaves began to shift from resisters into legislators by defining the 
scope and meaning of military law’s application to them. The men of Fort Jackson won 
an important victory in forcing the Army to expel in shame an abusive commanding 
officer, not a mere junior subordinate. Still, the mutiny’s leaders paid a heavy price and 
spent months in grueling imprisonment; for claiming their soldier rights to timely and 
equal pay, to responsible commanders, and to authority and discipline that conformed 
with the law. 
What drove these men to revolt was never the simple fact of physical abuse—it was 
only the proximate cause of the mutiny. The institutions, cultural practices, and social 
conventions of slave societies had long reinforced blacks’ subordination and made 
physical abuse routine, but slavery’s destruction offered new possibilities. As soldiers, 
they could even claim to be the eradicators of their own bondage and the makers of their 
own freedom. Membership in the Army made the possibility they could exist on the 
same plane as the white man believable. The experience of freedom outlined thus far for 
plantation laborers and black soldiers in Louisiana was a cautionary tale. Nevertheless, 
two paths seemed clear. Either the black man was a contraband piece of property to be 
used selfishly by a new master or he was an autonomous individual capable of 
exercising and enjoying the rights of a citizen. When lived as a seamless reality, flogging 
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and unequal pay trampled on the privileges owed to them as laborers and the rights due 
them as soldiers. In this way the mutiny became an act of political protest that grew out 
of bondage and pointed the way forward to citizenship.
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CHAPTER VI 
“WILLING TO DO ALL I CAN FOR YOU AS A SOLGER”: 
THE LIMITATIONS AND POSSIBILITIES OF SOLDIER RIGHTS 
FOR EMANCIPATED SLAVES IN UNIFORM 
 
“No human power can subdue this rebellion without using the Emancipation lever as 
I have done,” professed President Abraham Lincoln on 19 August 1864. “Freedom has 
given us the control of 200,000 able bodied men,” he argued, “born and raised on 
southern soil. It will give us more yet.”1 The Fort Jackson mutiny runs as a counter-
narrative, however, to Lincoln’s idea of “control.” It demonstrated that emancipated 
slave soldiers recognized the implications of their new membership in the Union Army. 
The legal rights provided them in military law sanctioned a military protest against 
unjust discipline that was also rooted in the tradition of slaves’ confrontations with their 
masters over customary rights and duties. At Fort Jackson, mutiny became a way station 
on the path towards the consent and self-government belonging to citizens of the 
Republic. 
Joining the Union Army became one of the first ways emancipated African 
Americans participated in the republican experiment of self-government. Emancipation’s 
power as a lever for victory through freedmen’s military service also gave the war aim of 
Union increasing salience in their own cause of citizenship. They defended self-
government against rebellion, but also against the abuse of power within the Army. Its 
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regulations and Articles of War provided freedmen-soldiers with legal, constitutional, 
and ideological justifications under the rule of law to elevate the resistance of slaves into 
the political dissent of citizens. 
The military protest actions by emancipated slaves in uniform against unauthorized 
treatment was the seedbed of a larger revolution that eventually extended citizenship to 
some four million freedpeople. The examples below serve as additional “vignettes of 
contestation”2 that link a heritage of slave resistance with freedmen’s possession of 
soldier rights as members of the Union Army. The events demonstrate specific actions 
that the formerly enslaved took to move themselves from emancipation into citizenship 
during the era of the Civil War.  
In this chapter, three episodes of soldier dissent by emancipated blacks further 
illuminate the dynamic interaction of slave culture, soldier status, and military law 
analyzed in the previous chapter on the Fort Jackson mutiny. In May 1864 a mutiny in 
the 33rd U. S. Colored Infantry Regiment (USCI) against ill treatment occurred as part of   
the unfolding political story of military emancipation within another specific subculture 
of slavery, that of South Carolina’s Sea Islands task system. A mutiny in the 49th USCI 
in June 1864 led emancipated slaves in un.iform to exercise the civic right of petition in 
order to resist the logic of an Army inspection regime that clashed with attitudes learned 
in the slave quarters. Finally, the strange contours of Kentucky Unionism positioned 
freedmen-soldiers in the 119th USCI to assist in the acquittal of an immigrant, 
abolitionist officer on trial in July 1865. 
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Coming from across the South, freedmen-soldiers challenged unjust treatment with 
increasing sophistication. Taking such action, they gained confidence that military 
justice could be leveraged to secure their soldier rights by employing the tactics learned 
in the complex process of accommodation to slavery. At the same time, newly freed 
blacks quickly recognized the sometimes great gulf between their new, regimented lives 
as soldiers and the personal autonomy carved out within the circumscribed boundaries of 
bondage. 
The experience of slave resistance remained a source of vitality and inspiration for 
defining the rights that flowed from their status as soldiers rather than as members of the 
master’s fictive household, even when it did not yield lasting victories against the 
prejudice and inequality the men faced from the beginning of their military service. 
Within these rather limited horizons, however, emancipated slaves in uniform made it 
clear that they served in the war for the Union and racial freedom only by their consent. 
Furthermore, their service made it clear that Union was the vehicle for achieving 
permanent membership as citizens of the nation. Mutinies laid the groundwork for 
freedmen-soldiers’ exercise of self-government from emancipation’s initiation even 
though it did not immediately transform the existing boundaries of American citizenship. 
“I Was Better Treated When with the Rebels”: Edmund’s Brown’s Protest in the 33rd 
U. S. Colored Infantry 
On the morning of 16 May 1864, Second Lieutenant Asa Child, Company H, 33rd 
USCI, inspected the picket detachment at Port Royal, South Carolina as officer of the 
guard. This was the brigade’s advance guard deployed several miles in front of Union 
lines to give first warning of any movement by Confederate forces. Picket duty called for 
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vigilance and preparedness. Officers deemed proper equipment and functioning weapons 
essential. Lieutenant Child’s positive report endorsed their discipline and conduct as 
proper soldiers. During the afternoon inspection, however, Sergeant Daniel Williams, 
also of Company H, chastised Private Edmund Brown for failing to maintain his rifle.3 
Williams put Brown on “knapsack drill” and ordered it performed outside the tent of 
their company commander, Captain W. W. Sampson, to drive home the point.4 
The nineteen-year-old did not cooperate. “‘I’ll be d_____d if I’ll wear it for you or 
any one else.’” He escaped the knapsack, but earned a night in the guard house from his 
captain. Sampson released him the next day and ordered the officer of the day, Second 
Lieutenant Mirand W. Saxton, to complete the punishment. Brown maintained his 
innocence and questioned the lieutenant's authority: “‘G_d d__n you! What right have 
you to interfere?’” while brandishing a stick and threatening anyone else who tried to 
make him comply. At this act of disobedience, Lieutenant Saxton ordered Brown bound 
and gagged.5 
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Brown believed he done his duty. His weapon had been inspected and found in good 
order. How could a sergeant find him at fault after the lieutenant certified his rifle was 
clean? The contradiction was redolent of slaves’ difficulties with black plantation drivers 
who sometimes identified with the master, eager to promote their own station over and 
against the slave community. Brown’s initial complaints against unjustified punishment 
quickly evolved into condemnations that the regiment’s officers—Northerners all—
betrayed the freedmen’s best interest and their nascent personal independence: “‘All they 
came down here for was to humbug us.’”6 
Officers throughout the Union Army used such camp punishments to imprint on the 
minds of their men habits of order, efficiency, and discipline. As shown above among 
Anglo soldiers, camp punishments exerted humiliation and shame. If camp punishment 
represented Regular Army tyranny to Anglo citizen-soldiers, for the formerly enslaved 
in uniform they felt like a return to bondage; like freedom forfeited. The gamut of 
sanctions soldiers endured included “striking with swords, whipping, tying up by the 
thumbs, and bucking and gagging.” All “could border on sadism.” Historians emphasize 
that freedmen-soldiers despised these “slave modes of correction.” Black soldiers tried 
in various ways to define their rights as members of the Army by continuing to employ 
forms of confrontation practiced in bondage. In freedom, however, these means of 
resistance became steps toward citizen dissent. Complaints up the chain of command 
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about unequal treatment seemed too often to fall on deaf ears. This might lead to 
frustration, then intensified protest, and finally mutiny. The authorities might silence 
such dissent for a period of time through imprisonment and even death. The freedmen-
soldiers examined in this chapter practiced some, if not all, parts of this strategy.7 
The close relationship between traditions of confrontation and military protest 
resulted from the brief distance in time between erstwhile bondage and membership in 
the Union Army following emancipation. In the case of Edmund Brown it began with 
the tortuous creation of the 33rd USCI. The Union Army occupied the South Carolina 
Sea Islands after capturing the deep-water harbor at Port Royal on 7 November 1861. 
Rebel plantation owners fled and tried to take their bondspeople with them. Presaging 
Louisiana in 1862, most Sea Islands slaves ran to Union lines where they became some 
of the first “contraband of war”—neither slave nor free. Sheltering near Union camps, 
they worked as servants and laborers while Christian missionaries, both Northern whites 
and free blacks, arrived to offer them the rudiments of an education.8  
The requirements of war, however, took precedence over such humanitarian 
concerns. Major General David Hunter, commander of the Department of the South, 
explicitly tied together emancipation and military service when he proclaimed martial 
law and, without official sanction, proclaimed all slaves in Florida, South Carolina, and 
Georgia free on 9 May 1862. A draft soon followedembracing all African American 
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males on the Sea Islands between eighteen and forty-five soon followed. It produced a 
regiment he designated the 1st South Carolina Colored Volunteers. Officers to command 
it proved scarce owing to existing prejudice and the escapees did everything they could 
to avoid enlistment, many fearing conscription was simply a ruse to sell them back into 
slavery on the Spanish island of Cuba. Careful not to offend a so far latent southern 
Unionism or lukewarm Northern Democrats, Lincoln countermanded Hunter’s decrees 
on 20 May 1862. The damage to African Americans’ trust in the Yankees done by 
conscription and the separation of families that came with it dissipated only slowly.9 
Furthermore, official confusion put the men wearing blue in legal limbo, without pay 
to support their kin, and uncertain of the future. Prior to Lincoln’s decision Secretary 
Stanton had already dispatched Brigadier General Rufus Saxton, a staunch 
Massachusetts abolitionist. Answering directly to the War Department and Hunter, he 
was to manage the captured Sea Island plantations and the “inhabitants remaining 
thereon” in order to restart the local cotton economy. As Washington continued to dither 
in regards to approval or pay of the 1st South Carolina through the spring and into the 
summer of 1862, Hunter released all but a single company.10 
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But by August 1862 the government's new commitment to make war on slavery 
changed the landscape of black freedom in the Sea Islands yet again, this time into a 
promising seedbed. In language functionally the same as that which empowered 
Governor John Andrew in January 1863 to raise the 54th and 55th Massachusetts 
regiments, Saxton wrung from Stanton authorization to organize 5,000 contrabands as 
military laborers and an identical number as soldiers. The soldiers would “receive the 
same pay and rations allowed by law to volunteers in the service.”11 Freedom, pay, and 
provisions, as well as protection and shelter for their families, encouraged many 
previously reluctant black men to volunteer for what by October 1862 carried official 
designation as the 1st South Carolina Volunteers. He selected the prominent 
Massachusetts abolitionist Thomas Wentworth Higginson as its colonel. 
Higginson believed deeply in black enlistment’s ability to effect abolition. He touted 
the freedmen as paragons of obedient soldiers because of their enslaved past. At the 
same time, his conviction that courage belonged to the citizen told him their supposedly 
natural obedience would be insufficient to withstand combat. He and his fellow officers 
would have to model the manly qualities of self-control, personal independence, and 
public virtue central to Higginson’s republican sense of citizenship. He created a 
command structure based in mutual self-respect between officers and men. Together the 
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men and their officers became the guarantors of the Articles of War and the Army 
regulations while guarding against any violations. Higginson’s confidence in the officers 
as mentors of citizenship carried a presumption that blacks graciously welcomed a 
magnanimous authority but had no preexisting notions about freedom.12 
Higginson’s views about command reflected his class’s ideas about authority 
generally. He and many of the 33rd USCI’s officers came from the elite class of New 
England Brahmins: the oldest, best families who had lead its transition through the 
Market Revolution. The officer directly involved in Edmund Brown’s mutiny, Captain 
William W. Sampson, had family ties to Abington, Massachusetts, with ancestors 
stretching back to the Pilgrims.13 He mustered in as a second lieutenant in November 
1862, faced combat with the 33rd USCI on its Florida Expedition and the capture of 
Jacksonville in late 1862, then was promoted to captain and gained company command 
on 30 October 1863. In the months after the court-martial of Edmund Brown, he 
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assumed numerous capacities with the Department of the South. By all accounts he was 
a responsible, dedicated officer.14 
 The Brahmin officers in the USCT regiments stationed in the Sea Islands also 
carried an unequivocal adherence to the Articles of War and the Army regulations. The 
Regular Army embodied the order, efficiency, and regimentation they trusted. Captain 
Sampson reacted to Brown’s defiance not only as a commissioned officer, but as one 
who likely found moral and social value in military order. He believed Brown’s protests 
threatened to unravel the regimentation necessary to school the men in citizenship.15 
A quite opposite view belonged to Brown and his comrades. “‘I was better treated 
when with the Rebels than since I've been in his G_d d____d company. He [Sampson] 
punishes us all for nothing.’” Indignantly, Sampson related that Brown declared he had 
been “better off with the master than in this damned regiment.” They had proved 
themselves in combat and expected treatment as soldiers who had specific rights and 
protections under the rule of law established by the Articles of War and the Army 
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regulations. The status of soldier and membership in the Army should have ensured 
them against the arbitrary judgement about the rifle and the capricious punishment 
which followed. In bondage Brown might have found a way to confront this injustice or 
at least retaliate at a later date through indirect resistance like work slowdowns or the 
destruction of tools.16 
Brown’s confidence that he should initiate a confrontation also reflects the methods 
of resistance peculiar to the Sea Islands, especially as a consequence of the task system. 
Even after 1865, its blacks maintained their distinct identity and way of life that included 
the Gullah dialect. The patterns of labor established there had also meant a greater 
separation between the enslaved and the master class usually absent during the malarial 
summers. The production of long-staple cotton under the task system allowed an 
ambitious, diligent bondsperson to finish the assigned tasks for the day in four or five 
hours and turn to tending a personal plot, minding a small number of hogs and chickens, 
and even hiring out on occasion.17 Enslaved women had the possibility to sell their 
produce and keep the profit. In fact, some Sea Island slaves were able to amass quite 
impressive kinds of personal property including horses. Any provisions they produced 
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on their own time counted in addition to those provided by the master, not as a 
substitute. Historians have shown that moveable property ownership was fairly 
widespread though customary and small-scale among slaves across the South. While 
claims to ownership necessarily needed the acquiescence of individual masters, on 
another level they depended on the witness of neighbors. These kinship and quarters’ 
based validations of property ownership among enslaved people strengthened 
community ties.18 
Even though the task system lent a particular structure to power relations within Sea 
Island slavery, certain customary rights that arose there paralleled those established 
within the sugar parishes of Louisiana. The “slave’s ‘time’ became sacrosanct,”19 even 
an “expectation” in return for completing their assigned labor.20 Certain tasks like hoeing 
or threshing, however, were harder than others. In a constant “war” with their overseers, 
the enslaved “hammered out” the limits of “a fair day’s work.”21 Even while in bondage, 
Sea Island blacks had a custom of bringing complaints about particularly onerous work 
schedules or capricious overseers to their masters. The task system’s advantages in time, 
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provisions, money, and property meant that freedpeople continued it whenever possible 
after emancipation.22 
Given the pliant labor system from which they came, Sea Island freedmen-soldiers 
experienced a rude awakening. The bugle call ordered their days on a rigid schedule 
filled with recurrent drill, fatigue, and inspection. Between these activities they ate 
spartan rations of hardtack, salt pork, and coffee. Time evaporated to supplement their 
rations or their pay. Much as it had for the men at Fort Jackson accustomed to their 
wages for overwork and holiday distributions, these frustrations came on top of the 
inequity of their pay from the Army and disrespect from certain officers. 
The form of bondage from which they emerged was instructive about what their 
soldier rights should mean. Bringing complaints against their overseers found 
equivalence in their rights under the Articles of War to petition their company or 
regimental commanders against abusive treatment. Beliefs about the proper balance 
between labor and personal privileges constituting a fair day’s work informed their 
opinions of the treatment and pay they deserved for military obedience. Subject to strict 
schedules and sometimes capricious camp judgments from their officers soldiers found 
the grounds for protest against the disappearance of the sorts of circumscribed self-
direction they may have enjoyed “while with the Rebels.” 
When coupled with his recent humiliation, the social and cultural context of Sea 
Islands slavery prompted Brown to warn that “the company can't stand it long.” Sergeant 
Hamilton joined him to contend that “there was advantage taken of the company and 
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something should be done about it.” Indeed, historians’ assessments arguing that 
homesickness and nostalgia among Union soldiers could lead to deep bouts of 
depression and despair helps to explain why Brown went so far as to threaten he would 
“shoot and kill” Captain Sampson and Lieutenant Saxton if his comrades failed to act.23 
In these respects then, Brown’s protest of unwarranted punishment provides a “vignette 
of contestation” to analyze the transition of an African American male from slavery to 
freedom. It reveals the underlying tensions within a black regiment, commanded by 
prejudiced officers.  
At Brown’s general court-martial, which opened 27 August 1864, the judge 
advocate, Captain William D. Crane, and three other USCT officers composed the seven 
member court. Brown faced charges of attempted assault, intention to foment a mutiny, 
and the personal threat against Lieutenant Saxton. To each charge he pled not guilty. 
During the trial the freedmen-soldier cross-examined black and white witnesses, 
including his company commander, Captain Sampson, hoping to cast doubt on the 
justness of the punishment and their claims about what he said. He closed the trial with a 
simple statement that he neither threatened the two officers nor intended to desert.24 The 
court found insufficient evidence to rule Brown guilty. In his mandatory review of the 
case the department commander recorded that Brown committed every crime charged 
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except inciting a mutiny. That single charge could have obtained the death penalty, but 
the court showed restraint and also ruled out capital punishment despite finding him 
guilty of violence against a superior officer. Like penalties imposed at Fort Jackson, 
Brown’s earned the harsh sentence of hard labor for two years wearing a twelve-pound 
ball at Fort Marion in St. Augustine, Florida, and loss of $10 of his monthly pay during 
that time.25 
Courts-martial in the Union Army dispensed a brand of justice to black soldiers that, 
while satisfying procedure, resulted in harsh sentences. Blacks availed themselves of 
equal access to and protection of the rights afforded within courts-martial, but as covered 
in Chapter V they faced longer imprisonments and a higher percentage of executions. 
Proceedings also show white officers’ convictions that black soldiers as a group needed 
to be chastised by having examples made of their comrades. Although the previous 
chapter demonstrated how these sentences deviated from the widespread application of 
justice within the Army, a local example from the Department of the South makes the 
point even better. 
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The same court that convicted Brown considered the case of Corporal Henry 
Johnston, an Anglo in the 54th New York Infantry. Johnston was charged with mutinous 
conduct for threatening to desert, boasting he would never fire his rifle against an enemy 
soldier, and routinely not loading his rifle with a lethal round. These remarks made his 
actions not only mutinous, but also traitorous. Yet he was acquitted, largely because he 
was able to produce witnesses on his own behalf who effectively undermined the 
prosecution’s case.26 In Edmund Brown’s case he produced one witness in his defense, 
Private August Brown, who made the court aware that Lieutenant Child had earlier 
approved Brown’s rifle and August also testified he was not present when Edmund made 
his mutinous statements. While the testimony likely saved the defendant’s life by 
negating the charge of inciting a mutiny, it also could have been used to show that 
Edmund Brown had a legitimate grievance with the camp punishments. Despite this 
conflicting evidence, the court decided to convict. These were military officers, 
however, charged with forcing a race of men unfamiliar to them to obey their orders. 
Along with feelings of natural superiority, circumstances made considerations of 
military order weigh more than the protean liberties of freedmen-soldiers. 
The Fort Jackson mutiny had erupted from a clash of expectations about 
compensation and punishment. Edmund Brown’s case illuminates similar unspoken 
assumptions that black soldiers from the Sea Islands brought to their military service. 
These men were accustomed to levels of personal autonomy that could rival a Northern 
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factory worker whose clock-controlled day was much closer to the regime of bugle calls 
ordering military life. Securing those boundaries had required the slave’s constant 
struggle with the master. Slaves brought similar approaches to protecting themselves 
from the worst parts of military life. The unspoken class assumptions of Northern white 
officers had a major bearing on race relations in this episode. An affinity for stern 
discipline by the officers escalated a situation produced by the self-assurance of a 
freedmen-soldier that he had adhered to the regulations regarding picket duty. Although 
the Articles of War and the regulations provided new levels of legal protection against 
capricious treatment, freed black soldiers nevertheless contended with chains of 
command whose interpretation of military law could at times be as arbitrary and highly 
personal as the plantation system they left. That is to say, if he had the influence, the 
position, and the inclination to do so, a single officer could make a soldier's life 
unbearable. This arbitrary type of authority helps to explain why African-American 
military protest actions so often erupted over a single individual’s actions that they 
deemed to be unjust. In this sense, then, freedmen-soldiers served in an Army whose 
demanding modes of discipline did as much to squelch their newly realized sense of 
freedom as to foster it.  
Nevertheless, freedmen-soldiers became members of an Army that promised 
statutory articulation of their rights. Once in possession of that membership, a much 
clearer path opened towards eventually securing the full panoply of rights inhering to 
citizens. Dissent by emancipated slave-soldiers replayed the familiar moves of 
accommodation and confrontation within a new institution. In the Civil War, however, 
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these moves did not simply shield blacks from exploitation. They also became occasions 
for emancipated African Americans to practice citizenship and gain increasing 
sophistication in its performance. The challenges endemic to this path notwithstanding, 
Army life and law provided an important field upon which newly free African 
Americans could practice a “politics of freepeople.”27 
“Until We Can Have the Promise of Better Treatment”: Privacy and Petition in a 
Mutiny of the 49th United States Colored Infantry  
Sergeant Giles Sims sat confined with some two dozen comrades on the muggy night 
of 13 June 1864, but promised them no “white man” would keep him there come 
morning. He had landed in close arrest because of his role earlier that day as the central 
character in a mutiny at Vicksburg, Mississippi; a military protest action that put the 
freedman-soldier in danger of losing his life.28 
Scene of arguably the war's single most significant campaign and certainly its most 
important siege, Vicksburg, in 1864 housed a population of Union troops and attendant 
civilian laborers bigger than its native population. No longer the “Gibraltar of the 
Confederacy,” it had become a “garrisoned town” that projected Union influence over 
the surrounding area through patrols, foraging expeditions, and sweeps by provost 
marshals. The immediately surrounding countryside was a “no-man's land” subject to 
Confederate raids but within Union forces’ gravitational pull. Further afield loomed the 
“Confederate frontier” where Union forces only ventured on raids or counter-insurgency 
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forays, but for all intents and purposes it counted as enemy territory. Black regiments 
stationed in garrisoned towns, therefore, could be called upon for occasional duty that 
might involve contact with conventional Confederate units, or more likely, partisans. For 
example, on 10 July 1864 two brigades of black soldiers left Vicksburg on a five-day 
expedition carrying several days rations and ammunition. Even during fatigue and guard 
duty the enemy was never out of mind. Attention to military discipline, continued 
training, and promptness remained essential.29 
The 49th U. S. Colored Infantry made up a portion of these forces. Emancipated 
slaves from Louisiana and Mississippi populated its roster. The organization that some 
of them had originally joined was the 11th Louisiana Infantry Regiment (African 
Descent) created at Milliken's Bend, Louisiana, in May 1863. It made up part of the 
African Brigade that held against repeated Confederate attacks during the battle of the 
same name on 7 June. The Union victory ended a Rebel attempt to cut General Ulysses 
S. Grant's supply lines and contributed to the eventual capture of Vicksburg on 4 July 
1863. Like most African American regiments it was redesignated the 49th Regiment of 
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U.S. Colored Troops on 11 March 1864 and spent the remainder of its war in 
Vicksburg’s garrison until muster out on 27 March 1866.30 
Giles Sims, the man at the center of the mutiny, was wounded in action at Miliken’s 
Bend after running to Union lines and mustering into the regiment on 21 May. He hailed 
from nearby Grand Gulf, Mississippi, was thirty-one years old, and a former field hand. 
He was promoted on 3 April 1864 after the sergeant in his company died. His age, 
married status, and the honor attached to his wounds likely marked him as a soldier with 
demonstrated attributes of loyalty, bravery, and leadership.31 As with all human beings 
when looked at individually, he defies easy characterization and in trial documents 
comes across as quite human: passionate yet indecisive, idealistic yet craven. In many 
respects he seems like an unusual candidate to lead a mutiny, but this is a reminder that 
dissent by freedmen-soldiers was grounded in their fundamental loyalty to the Union 
cause. They understood Union victory was the best guarantee of their freedom. That 
made it all the more critical to define freedom as more than the simple absence of 
slavery. 
Sims was internally conflicted about possible actions he might employ to define and 
defend the rights that his membership in the Army had provided him. He encouraged his 
fellow soldiers on 13 June to take the step of mutiny, even calling some men who would 
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not participate “‘cowards.’”32 But Sims, Private Street Humphrey, and three others soon 
thought better of confronting their captain and did not go to his tent to stack arms.33 
Sims’s reluctance must also be understood within the context of the responsibilities 
non-commissioned officers exercised in black regiments (of both Northern freemen or 
former slaves). “Non-coms” bridged the cultural chasm between black enlisted men and 
white commissioned officers by virtue of their unique place in a black regiment’s 
hierarchy of command. In short, they were highly esteemed and highly valued by private 
soldiers and their officers alike. NCO’s took men’s complaints and needs to the 
company officers—often unofficially—also acting as cultural interpreters for the white 
image in the black mind. Furthermore, they had to interpret orders and the perspective of 
whites to the men while counseling caution and prudence to soldiers when they became 
frustrated with Army life or the discipline demanded by officers. A fellow non-
commissioned officer, Sergeant James Parker, did exactly this for Sims when he insisted 
they both “had no cause for being dissatisfied.” Effective command meant adopting at 
least some of the values of their commanders while interpreting directives for their 
soldiers relied on the shared experience of slavery and emancipation. Representing the 
interests of their men to the officers often brought them into conflict with the very rule 
of the law that they knew guaranteed their new freedom. Thus their rank forced them 
into a marginal zone where they endeavored to effectively integrate the values of the 
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white Army with those of the community of formerly enslaved blacks from which they 
came.34 Freedmen-soldier non-coms lived with a higher degree of personal and cultural 
dissonance than enlisted soldiers. 
These attitudes lay at the base of Sergeant Sims’s actions. It was not Humphrey's 
punishment that sparked the protest, but rather the accumulated violations of personal 
time and space that struck men as too much like what they knew from bondage. The men 
had at “different times” threatened to stack arms if “the Captain did not treat them 
better.”35 Given the static nature of their assignment in a rear area on fatigue duty the 
men had tried to make their living conditions more comfortable. Searching and seizing 
their personal property, controlling their personal habits, and violating their domiciles 
appeared to them as irrelevant to good military discipline and more to do with arbitrary 
control. 
During an inspection of the men's quarters several days before Sims’s call to arms, 
the white regimental surgeon had reported to the captain about foul smells coming from 
the non-regulation “boxes” the black soldiers had procured to keep extra food, uniform 
items, and housekeeping materials like candles. When Captain Hall investigated he 
found rotting food and soiled clothing. He burned the boxes and removed the candles. 
                                                
34 Wilson, Campfires of Freedom 35; Glatthaar, Forged in Battle, 114-15; Samito, Becoming American 
Under Fire: Irish Americans, African Americans, and the Politics of Citizenship during the Civil War Era 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 85, notes non-commissioned officers could face additional 
charges if they incited a mutiny or did not act to stop it. Parker testimony, Giles Sims court-martial. 
Lawrence W. Levine, Black Culture and Black Consciousness: Afro-American Folk Thought from Slavery 
to Freedom, 30th Anniversary Edition (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007 [1977]), 138-140. 
Levine credits Bell Irvin Wiley, Southern Negroes, 1861-1865, 2nd. ed. (New York: Rinehart, 1953), 109, 
with applying the notion of cultural marginality to the plight of the formerly enslaved. 
35 Stafford testimony, Giles Sims court-martial. 
 264 
After the noon roll call on 13 June 1864 he announced his actions of the previous day to 
his company. Henceforth no soldier could possess anything beyond what he could carry 
in his pack. The future discovery of new boxes would mean automatic punishment. The 
men believed Hall “had treated them as though they were thieves.”36 
Questions of property ownership and living standards came into play. While 
enslaved, men such as these from outside Louisiana would have been “in a state of 
complete dependence” on the master for provisions and household items except for 
perhaps a minor garden plot. For soldiers who may have come from the Louisiana sugar 
parishes, like the men at Fort Jackson, they had been used to possibly higher level 
material provision and were doing their best to make due under the Army’s restrictions 
of their personal possessions. For freedmen from both circumstances, life in the Army 
continued a level of dependence (as all soldiers would have testified). It was the Army 
that determined their rations and their personal effects. Sims, Fontaine, and the others 
believed freedom should mean the right to some personal property and privacy. After the 
end of the work day as enslaved laborers, back in their quarters with their families they 
could enjoy some relief from the interference of their masters, although their space was 
never entirely their own. They clearly believed that although slave quarters might have 
been trampled on by the master, surely their quarters as freedmen-soldiers should have 
been respected. Finally, perhaps most offensive to the men's existing attitudes about 
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privacy and personal space, Captain Hall had entered their quarters and destroyed their 
possessions on a Sunday—their traditional holiday and a jealously guarded privilege 
they had won for themselves from their master.37 
Their bid to receive better treatment began when Sergeant Sims strode from tent to 
tent shouting the same specific order of “‘fall in’” issued by the mutineers at Fort 
Jackson—meant to form the company in ranks for drill.38 Soldiers turned out complete 
with their rifles and equipment into their company street.39 Sims marched the company 
to the tent of Sergeant Parker whose moral and physical authority Sims wanted on his 
side in making this dangerous move. Instead Parker talked Sims out of leading the 
column. When a few other soldiers also dropped out of the ranks, a private, Washington 
Fontaine, assumed command of the company. He promised his comrades that although 
“Sergeant Sims backed out he would not.” The private bellowed “Right Face!” and 
“marched” the company to the tent of Captain Hall.40 There they stacked their arms with 
order and care symbolic of their refusal to do any further duty as soldiers. Fontaine 
stepped forward from the ranks and with perfect military discipline gave the officer a 
sharp salute before presenting him with an ultimatum. “Captain, we have stacked our 
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arms and are not going to do any more duty until we can have the promise of better 
treatment from you.”41 
Hall immediately reported the mutiny to the regimental commander, Colonel Van E. 
Young, who ordered a detail under the command of First Lieutenant P. Marshal Mills to 
march the mutineers to the guardhouse and collect their weapons and equipment. 
Colonel Young instructed Mills to “shoot the first man that attempted to escape, as they 
were mutinous.” He then demanded Sims admit his role in the demonstration, though he 
claimed “he knew nothing about it.”42 But several hours later in response to the arrest 
and confinement of his comrades Sims had organized five other men into a squad with 
their accouterments to resume Fontaine’s initial protest action. Within a matter of 
minutes the colonel also placed Sims and his followers under arrest. 
Like the Fort Jackson mutiny only six months before, freedmen in uniform had 
employed the military arts they had acquired through membership in the Army to bring 
about a protest action defending rights they believed accrued to their status as soldiers of 
the Republic. They claimed rights that were foundational to how they defined their 
newfound freedom. Sergeant Parker, although he did not approve the action, reported the 
mutiny’s purpose in his testimony: “They were going up to the Captain’s to give up their 
guns, and accoutrements, and get him to treat them better.”43 
Yet, this demand was not a blanket condemnation of military authority. In his 
testimony for the prosecution, Sergeant Buck Stafford explained the focused nature of 
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the protest. They did not take issue with the concurrent punishment of Private Street 
Humphrey, who was wearing a barrel for his tardiness to that day’s noontime company 
roll call. Humphrey was merely enduring a camp penalty doled out to Anglo and 
immigrant soldiers for similar breaches of conduct. In this respect, this protest action did 
not meet the Army’s definition of mutiny. It did not question the legitimacy of their 
commander’s disciplinary authority. Rather it hoped to correct it and bring it back within 
the proper boundaries of the rule of law and humane conduct toward free men.44 
By demanding “better treatment” the soldiers assumed a critical posture standing 
athwart their old lives in bondage and their new lives in freedom. In terms of personal 
time, privacy, and petty property, Army life may seem to have fallen short of their 
former lives. Of more importance, soldiering had so far failed to deliver the control and 
possession over their own lives that they had dreamed freedom would obtain for them 
while enslaved. The mutinies led by Fontaine and Sims were flesh and bone 
instantiations of the same verbal reminder offered to white authorities by a black 
chaplain speaking for newly emancipated soldiers under his spiritual care: “The 
discipline of the service ought to present to them a contrast to the irresponsible cruelties 
of slavedriving, instead of a too faithful reproduction of them.”45 
Other soldiers in the 49th USCI saw the status which bestowed their rights, calling 
them to oppose their mutinous comrades. As in the the slave quarters of old, the 
collective judgement of the company streets rarely resulted in a unanimous vote for 
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protest. Even better than what can be gleaned from the case at Fort Jackson, the mutiny 
in the 49th USCI exposed the internal disagreements that arose whenever men decided to 
challenge authority and risked life, limb, and pay. Several black soldiers readily testified 
for the prosecution. Sergeant Parker testified he had flatly told Sims that, “he or I had no 
cause for being dissatisfied.”46 While the charge of theft was never openly discussed, 
these loyal black soldiers may have known that the men’s boxes contained pilfered 
items. In their minds the hoarders had failed to be responsible, law-abiding members of 
the institution and thereby jeopardized all blacks’ claims to their soldier rights. Some 
freedmen-soldiers resorted to collective dissent to protest illegal search and a right to be 
secure in one’s person and possessions. Other members of the same organization 
defended the status quo in order to maintain their own sense of faithful allegiance 
against disloyalty. 
The reality of these political disagreements within the ranks showcases the 
persistence and the evolution of a “politics of slaves” into the “politics of freedpeople.”47 
The enslaved person who undertook confrontation had to weigh the customary right at 
stake against the likelihood and intensity of the master’s punishment. In reality, no slave 
could withdraw his membership in the fictive household because his was a relationship 
of subjugation. But freedom’s tacit acknowledgement of volitional membership in the 
Army was supposedly shielded from abuse by the rule of law. When authority 
overreached its legal grasp, the member could legitimately rescind his pledge of loyalty 
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until redress was obtained. At the same time, another member might decide that the 
institution providing protection needed to be supported against usurpers distorting the 
common good for their own benefit. Thus, even as freedpeople in uniform defended the 
Union they replayed within their own local institution the tension of antebellum 
associational politics that had fostered civil war. 
The clashing impulses of membership played themselves out in the mutineers’ court-
martial, which opened 4 June 1864 at Vicksburg. It exhibited many laudable examples of 
the procedural protections the Army regularly extended to all troops. Courts could be 
composed of officers from a defendant’s regiment as long as they were not party to the 
case. The officers on the court all hailed from the U.S. Colored Troops, but the brigade 
commander ordered Captain Hall temporarily to recuse himself from the court during the 
trial.48 Soldiers also had rights under military law to dispute the court’s composition and 
to rely on defense counsel, though these defendants availed themselves of neither. 
Sergeant Giles Sims and Private Street Humphrey, however, did cross-examine two of 
the black soldiers who testified against them although they chose not to question the 
officers.49 
At the same time, the court-martial also exhibited how black soldiers’ chances for 
justice were more lessened when some protections were not ensured. Two of the officers 
on the court, Captain William M. Dungan and Second Lieutenant J. Frank Miller, came 
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from the 49th USCI. Miller, assigned as judge advocate, strayed at points from his 
responsibility to protect the defendants from inappropriate questioning. Most notably, he 
failed to provide the defendants with their right to make a closing statement in their own 
defense. Soldiers usually took this opportunity as a way to introduce further mitigating 
circumstances or pleas of previous good conduct.50 
All of the defendants pled not guilty to the charge of mutiny and two specifications: 
the first concerned its genesis and execution and the second stipulated the failure of any 
defendants to halt the mutiny or warn their commanding officer. The court found sixteen 
of twenty-one defendants guilty of the charge of mutiny and both specifications. Four 
others were guilty of inciting the mutiny and failing to stop it, but acquitted of taking 
part. Only Street Humphrey, relying on his alibi that he was already under arrest, went 
free. Seventeen men faced hard labor for life, forfeiting all pay and benefits. A single 
defendant, Robert Randall, received hard labor for the remainder of his enlistment. 
Major General O. O. Howard, the district commander, approved and confirmed these 
sentence on 3 July 1864—almost exactly a year from the triumphant capture of 
Vicksburg. Howard—a sincere advocate of the freedpeople, soon to be commissioner of 
the Freedmen’s Bureau, and later founder of Howard University—likewise confirmed 
the death sentences assessed to Sims and Private Washington Fontaine. Transported 
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back to Vicksburg, they were executed by firing squad in the presence of their regiment 
on 25 September 1864.51 
The execution of Sims and Fontaine contrasts sharply with General Banks’s 
suspension of the death sentences at Fort Jackson. In both cases the charge was the same. 
Arguably more grave issues of unequal pay and abuse prompted one mutiny, those of 
privacy and personal autonomy the other. Freedmen-soldiers in Louisiana were spared 
by a general whose larger policy never ceased seeing emancipated blacks as instruments 
in Union victory. Those at Vicksburg were sent to their deaths by an officer who spent 
much of his energy during Reconstruction protecting freedpeople from white violence, 
ensuring their access to impartial justice, and expanding their access to education. At 
Fort Jackson the mutineers sentenced to death had threatened the lives of officers. In 
Mississippi neither executed soldier employed violence and Sims had even hesitated at 
one point to follow through with his participation. 
These conflicting outcomes shed light on the tortuous path of race relations traced 
out during the Civil War. Freedmen-soldiers knew at every step the coercive power 
arrayed against them. Membership in the Army clearly meant a great deal to these men 
for they were willing to stake their lives upon the proposition that they enjoyed statutory 
rights like protection from cruel punishment and unjustified search. They found 
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conviction for this struggle in their tradition of confrontation. It prompted them to assert 
their soldier rights even when held in prison. 
The War Department remitted the remaining sentences of life at hard labor for the 
seventeen men confined at the Military Prison in Alton, Illinois, on 4 May 1865 after 
appeals to the War Department by officers from regimental to district command 
following the executions. The officers’ letters recorded a common theme: the men were 
remorseful, had acquiesced to military order, and should be returned to duty. The 
imprisoned soldiers believed they had the right to relate their side of the story which 
prompted them to write the Secretary of War. To prove their loyalty they offered to 
serve another three years in exchange for early release from prison. They claimed to 
have not been “acquainted with the proscribed laws & regulations of The United States” 
when they mutinied. They had never intended to “injure The government.” Mutiny 
served “The purpose of resenting the repeated ill treatment of our officers.” Their 
officers had treated them “in the most shamefull manner.” They had obeyed the Articles 
of War and complained repeatedly to the colonel about their company officers, but he 
consistently rebuffed them. Mutiny was the last straw by men who “intended to fight for 
The country expecting to be treated as human beings.”52 
The men’s claim of ignorance must be weighed carefully. The illiteracy of most 
newly free blacks contributed to a lack of familiarity with all one hundred-one Articles 
of War and the nearly five hundred pages of regulations. Yet, many Anglo and 
immigrant soldiers also had only an acquaintance with the Articles and regulations. The 
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enslaved’s practice of dissembling in order to frustrate the master’s power certainly 
remained as tactic for some even after they had donned Union uniforms. Before the 
mutiny, emancipated black soldiers at Fort Jackson, however, complained to their 
officers about mistreatment, a right provided for under the thirty-fourth Article of War. 
If the men had only some familiarity with the regulations it is likely they paid attention 
to Article I which demanded obedience by soldiers to their superiors, but insisted 
authority had to be applied with “kindness and justice to inferiors” by never employing 
“tyrannical or capricious conduct” or “abusive language.”53 
Freedmen-soldiers’ letters to President Abraham Lincoln make this case as well. For 
instance, one explained that “most all colored troop recruited in this department with few 
exceptions are egnorent men who know nothing more than the duties…as slaves…and of 
course are as totally egnorent of the regulations as a poor while [wiley] efrican is of 
gramer or algebra.”54 Another soldier confined to prison for insubordination had his 
copy of the regulations taken from him before he had been able to learn them.55 Finally, 
a soldier accused of desertion and insubordination but “asking for Jested [justice]” from 
the President explained that because “I am a colored man…I have no education I don't 
know nothing at all about law [but] I am willing to do all I can for you as solger or a man 
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if you pleas do all you can fer me.”56 At the same time these tactics did not completely 
offend military law. Although men could not use ignorance of the Articles of War to 
prevent punishment, they could argue it as an extenuating circumstance in the charges 
against them.57 
What stands out more strongly is that through their mutiny soldiers like Price 
Warfield and his comrades in the 49th USCI had evolved toward putative citizens. 
Directing their complaints all the way to a distant civilian head of the Army or the 
civilian commander-in-chief in the case of other soldiers was an enormous leap from 
slave confrontation towards citizen participation. The President and the Secretary of War 
did not have personal bonds of obligation to the soldier. Rather it was the freedman-
soldier’s voluntarily assented (usually) membership in the Army that formed the legal 
basis for so bold an act as newly-freed black soldiers to appeal the sentence of a valid 
military court to their representatives under the U.S. Constitution. 
The freedman-soldier’s presumption that he was capable of interpreting whether or 
not his commanders acted with justice was one part of the under appreciated 
revolutionary changes unfolding in the process of military Reconstruction and civil war. 
The vital public culture of antebellum civil society took seriously the citizenry’s right to 
judge the actions of the government, register its dissatisfaction with the government in a 
host of ways, and if necessary, withdraw its consent to be governed. African Americans 
practiced such popular constitutionalism when they engaged in collective dissent. They 
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brought their sense of justice with them from slavery and drew solidarity from the 
experience of soldiering. Here we find not just the roots but the very sprouting of 
African American citizenship.  
“I Think the Very Best Captain”: Kentucky Unionism and Freedmen-Soldiers in the 
Court-Martial of Captain Evan Kennedy, 119th U.S. Colored Infantry 
Soldiers in Company H, 119th Regiment of U.S. Colored Infantry had, in their 
company commander, Captain Evan D. Kennedy, an officer committed to their 
education and equal treatment. In 1865 the military protest actions of a group of 
Kentucky freedmen-soldiers witnessed a capability to defend their soldier rights going 
beyond mutiny. Their collective testimony during a court-martial in this regiment denied 
the falsehoods a cabal of anti-black, native Kentucky officers tried to foist on the Army 
against Kennedy—all in an effort to maintain the racial status quo in the state while 
putting a Yankee in his place. This incident within the 119th USCI provides an example 
of how freedmen-soldiers’ methods for asserting the rights belonging to their 
membership in the Army gained increasing sophistication over the course of the war. 
Not only had emancipated black soldiers more precisely defined their freedom, but this 
incident represents a growing belief in their personal independence and their equality 
with white citizen-soldiers. Unlike the men in the 4th Infantry, Corps d’Afrique, the 33rd 
USCI, or the 49th USCI, these Kentucky soldiers had only served for a short time under 
an officer, but grasped early on the panoply of rights conferred by their soldier status. 
They also recognized some officers within their command continued to serve for reasons 
at odds with their freedom and potential citizenship. They knew that disagreement 
festered amongst their white commanders about the proper relationship between black 
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officers and men. African American soldiers in the 119th USCI determined to disprove a 
charge of insubordination and misconduct against their ally, Captain Kennedy, at the 
same time they fully utilized their access to the rule of law by coming to his defense 
through the official channels offered within the military justice system.  
The 119th had a short history. It had only mustered into service in January 1865 at 
Camp Nelson, Kentucky, and was disbanded eighteen months later. Camp Nelson spread 
across the rich bluegrass land of Jessamine County—flanked by the towering Palisades 
of the Kentucky River and its tributary Hickman Creek—in seeming proportion to the 
war’s proliferation across the breadth of the United States. At Camp Nelson dusty parade 
grounds erased verdant pastures. Vast commissaries eclipsed humble barns. Row upon 
row of fly tents replaced fields of corn and oats. The camp’s brief domination of the 
landscape until the government closed it in April 1866 supplanted the region’s farming 
and its small amount of tobacco cultivation. The Army depot’s 300 buildings eventually 
took up the better part of 4,000 acres in order to service the 80,000 Union troops who 
mustered, entrained, drilled, quartered, recuperated, or died there during the war.58 
Eight regiments of freedmen-soldiers enlisted and trained at Camp Nelson. With the 
exceptions of small fights at Glasgow and Taylorsville, Kentucky, Camp Nelson formed 
the principal canvas on which most of the 119th’s war service unfolded.59 Kentucky 
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presented a unique case for black recruitment. It was a badly divided state where 
Unionist sentiment and slaveholding had a uniquely strong marriage, much like their 
most famous politician Henry Clay. Unlike Louisiana, South Carolina, and Mississippi, 
states experiencing emancipation (at least by degrees) beginning as early as 1863, only 
the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in December 1865 legally ended 
slavery everywhere within the borders of the Bluegrass State.60 Freedom came earlier to 
some of the enslaved, however, under the policies of military emancipation in 1862 
initiated through the Militia Act and Second Confiscation Act of 1862. Nevertheless, 
Democratic Governor Thomas E. Bramlette, the legislature, and the state’s master class 
stymied the Lincoln administration throughout 1863 and 1864 in its efforts to recruit 
blacks. Again and again they warned of emancipation’s deleterious effects on 
Kentucky’s loyalty to the Union.61 
By mid-1864 the success of the Union war effort in Tennessee, through the control 
of Nashville and Chattanooga, had contracted the Confederate frontier. The once 
omnipresent threat that Kentucky might be the scene of major military operations 
diminished accordingly. Once the national government grasped this new reality, its 
growing affinity for the emancipation lever and its continuing need for new sources of 
manpower made the imposition of black recruitment in Kentucky a logical development. 
That conclusion became law when amendments to the 1863 Enrollment Act declared 
that “all able bodied male colored persons, between the ages of twenty and forty-five 
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years, resident in the United States” were eligible for service as volunteers, substitutes, 
or conscripts. Furthermore, African Americans enslaved by masters loyal to the United 
States were transformed from property into freedmen by joining the Army. The revised 
law also stipulated that the federal enlistment bounty would be paid to the freedmen, not 
their former masters.62 
Lastly, the law mandated a draft if a state could not fulfill its quota through volunteer 
enlistments. In Kentucky this provoked white violence against slaves attempting to enlist 
at the same time other whites urged support for wholesale African American 
recruitment. These whites hoped black enlistment would shield them from conscription. 
As early as June 1863 the commandant of Fort Nelson, General T. B. Boyle, prophesied 
that black enlistment would “revolutionize” white Kentuckians against the national 
government, and do “infinite and inconceivable harm” to the Union cause in the state. A 
The political and racial tumult in Kentucky also increased the proportion of self-
interested white applicants for officer commissions in the proposed USCT regiments to 
come from the state. White males who were eager to avoid conscription, reluctant to face 
combat duty if drafted, or despondent about life as a private soldier came forward. Such 
men became officers in Kentucky’s black regiments regardless of their political 
sympathies about the freedmen. 
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The foregoing political context directly influenced the formation and service of the 
119th USCI. About 400 hundred of its soldiers were newly free Kentuckians with the 
other half hailing originally from Tennessee, the Carolinas, Georgia, or Virginia.63 Much 
like the 4th Infantry, Corps d’Afrique, white chaplains devoted considerable time to 
literacy training for many freedmen-soldiers who hoped they might correspond with 
distant families still in bondage. All Civil War soldiers experienced the emotional pain 
of separation from loved ones at home. Freedmen-soldiers had the added burden of 
knowing that their enslaved relations remained at risk of the peculiar institution’s 
physical pains. In this regard, correspondence did not always bring welcome news. For 
example, one Kentucky freedman feared for his enslaved wife’s safety when he learned 
the master had delivered a beating meant to declare that, “all the ‘niggers’ did mighty 
wrong in joining the Army.”64 
Soldiers’ families looked for any chance to escape from such abuse. Their letters 
urged kin to come to Camp Nelson. Unfortunately, enlistment in the Army had only 
legally freed draft-age, enslaved men. Women, children, and aged men remained in legal 
bondage. When they fled to Camp Nelson to join their male kin, therefore, they had no 
protection under the law. Their arrival prompted the government to create a Refugee 
Home adjacent to the military camp in response to various military officials issuing 
expulsion orders for the black camp followers from the camp’s environs no fewer than 
eight times between June and November 1864. After each reversal the escaped slaves 
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returned and more always seemed to follow; an apparently endless stream. In November 
the most heinous removal led to hundreds of African American civilians freezing to 
death. Outcry in the press and urgent inquiries by the government led to the termination 
of the commandant who ordered it and the creation of the Refugee Home. The existence 
of the Home acknowledged that soldiers’ families were indeed entitled to government 
protection. It became a key event for the March 1865 legislation that freed black 
soldiers’ wives and children.65 
Explaining the creation of the Refugee Home in June 1865, the superintendent 
grasped the revolutionary significance of the black enlistment that had brought it about: 
“these colored men for once in their lives dared to act for themselves; and offered 
themselves as a shield for the protection of the institutions of the country.”66 This basic 
dynamic was at work in freedmen-soldiers’ protests. Their direct actions defended the 
fundamental institution of the rule of law against the abuse of power. Initiated by 
volitional membership in the military, they were not sudden epiphanies brought on by 
freedom, but rather grew out of enslaved blacks’ traditions of confrontation and 
accommodation. The enslaved had long been acting to preserve spheres of self-
definition, however tightly circumscribed those may have been. 
At Camp Nelson in the late summer of 1865, however, the abuse of power faced by 
freedmen in uniform appeared in the guise of protection. Kentucky officers suspicious of 
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the challenge to race relations made possible by wartime and military emancipation 
sought to stem the tide. The incident in the 119th USCI was not a mutiny. Rather, by 
participating in yet another court-martial, the freedmen-soldiers resisted a reversal of 
their fortunes. This time they were only witnesses in the proceedings. The contestants 
were the regiments’ Anglo officers against an immigrant Scot, Captain Evan Kennedy. 
First Lieutenant John Wright, Company B, 119th USCI, preferred charges of 
disobedience of orders, conduct prejudicial to good military discipline, and conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman. He contended that Kennedy, commander of 
Company H, struck four black soldiers during drill.67 
The alleged victims formed part of the company’s “awkward squad,” a standard 
practice in the Army whereby by men who required additional drill in keeping step and 
displaying military bearing were temporarily reassigned to this remedial section.68 On 
the early morning of 28 June, Wright observed as Kennedy harangued the “awkwards” 
during drill, grabbed Private John Pittman from the ranks, and struck him a number of 
times with the hilt of his sword before returning him to the ranks.69 Some days later, 
Wright questioned some “awkward” privates, George Kennedy, Armistead Simmons, 
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George Stepney, James Watson, and Joseph Wilson, who admitted they too had received 
similar treatment for not keeping step, for talking in the ranks, and for not holding up 
their heads.70 He summoned the regiment’s white assistant surgeon, Dr. George C. 
Estabrook, to inspect the men for physical evidence of the abuse. Wright called 
Kennedy’s punishments “unwarranted,” a violation of their commanding officer, 
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Weaver’s, direct orders to invoke blows only against 
insubordinate or mutinous soldiers. Weaver demanded officers “not strike the enlisted 
men” especially during battalion drill or when soldiers failed to “perform the parts, or 
lessons of instruction given them.” While “not the general rule” of treatment in the 
regiment according to Wright, Weaver believed such practices too prevalent.71 Wright's 
charges also specified Kennedy failed as an officer when he neglected proper medical 
care for Private Eli Scott who later died. An example needed to be set. When the guard 
arrested Kennedy to await court-martial, Lieutenant Wright took command of his 
company.  
The court-martial opened on 22 August 1865. In it the emancipated slaves in uniform 
painted a picture of Kennedy entirely at odds with the one Wright wanted to display. Ten 
black soldiers, Dr. Estabrook, and Lieutenant Wright testified for the Army. The court 
called some of the men questioned earlier by Wright as witnesses for the prosecution. 
Others had been bystanders on 28 June but, uniformly, they cited their comrades in the 
awkward squad as chronic slouches. Private Wilson was “a very obstinate kind of chap.” 
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Pittman marched poorly and was “very troublesome” about drill, and his insubordination 
“bothered us a good deal.”72 Even Pittman, who Wright saw Kennedy strike, 
acknowledged he could not keep step. Every witness testified Kennedy rarely struck the 
soldiers under him, and when he did, it lacked anger or brutality. According to several of 
the men disciplined on 28 June, the blows were light and did not hurt. No soldier 
classified the corporal discipline as brutal, unjustified, or even routine. Estabrook 
certified he could find no evidence of abuse.73 
In the 6 July 1865 death of Private Scott, the court could not determine Kennedy's 
culpability due to conflicting evidence. Crucial exculpatory testimony came from the 
acting orderly, Sergeant Creed Carter, who revealed Scott might have been trying to 
avoid duty. Carter admitted he did not report Scott's worsening condition to the captain 
because Scott had confided that he did not want to visit Dr. Estabrook again as “‘he 
reports me for duty; I am not able for duty and it is no use for me to go.’” Carter’s 
admission that he neglected his duties as an orderly to appease Scott's stubbornness cast 
doubt on how much Kennedy knew and, therefore, could have done to aid his soldier.74 
Most importantly, the witnesses uniformly testified to Kennedy’s record of kind, 
conscientious command and sincere care for them. To give just one example, Private 
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Alexander Simmons considered Kennedy “a very fine man; I think the best Captain, at 
least I like him the best of any in the regiment; he is a kind man; he don't swear; and 
don't punish his colored troops; he is kind to them and favors them.” Kennedy had seen 
to the military and personal education of the ninety-eight freedmen in his company—like 
some other USCT officers he offered them elementary education each night for two to 
three hours. In his own words, he wanted “to be a father and a brother to every man in 
my company.” Even Surgeon Estabrook believed Kennedy had a reputation for being 
“unusually kind” to his men and they had never complained about him as far as he 
knew.75 
George Stepney gave the only impression of something approaching harsh discipline, 
but maintained he never saw Kennedy hit anyone else. On 28 June, Kennedy yelled at 
him to keep step. When he failed to do so, Kennedy struck him hard enough to make him 
stagger from his place in the ranks. Although “it bled a good deal” he “still drilled every 
day.” Stepney claimed he initially failed to respond out of ignorance; the captain had not 
addressed him by name.76 
Lieutenant Wright, in contrast, claimed Kennedy's reputation for treatment of the 
men among the officers was “very shameful.” Kennedy countered that many officers of 
the regiment struck soldiers with the flat of their sword. Colonel Weaver “seemed 
prejudiced against me from the beginning” and a Lieutenant Colonel Hanaford created 
“such opposition and such false impressions” with the officers that his reputation was 
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sullied immediately. While his alleged abuse of enlisted personnel were the grounds, the 
charges themselves concern Kennedy's conduct as an officer within regimental orders 
laid down by white authority. In a regiment of black soldiers, his conduct as an officer 
meant at the same time his conduct as a white. 
What kind of white authority had Kennedy crossed? What kinds of norms of white 
behavior had he “shamed?”77 Kennedy's background, experience, and attitudes all 
challenged the racial norms of Kentucky society. Although he settled in Louisville after 
the war to practice law, Kennedy was a Scot, born in 1825 in Moy, Inverness.78 It is not 
clear when exactly he emigrated to the United States, but he rallied immediately to the 
Union cause and joined the 79th New York Regiment in May 1861, mustering out as 
sergeant.79 His foreign birth and accented speech helped mark him as an obvious 
“other,” but it was likely his controversial ideas about slavery that raised the ire of the 
Kentuckian officers at Camp Nelson. After his discharge in May 1864 Kennedy spent 
the next five months in New York City to secure his naturalization as an American 
citizen, effective 19 October 1864. He left the bustling metropolis in late October or 
early November for Camp Nelson’s no less bustling grounds to assume the office of 
superintendent for colored refugees; to treat the freedpeople “as neighbors, to consider 
their interests as my mine and to look upon every man as a brother; to tenderly regards 
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their interests; their character, and their property as my own.” The missionaries and 
activists who worked alongside him at Camp Nelson praised him for the job he did 
rendering assistance with food and shelter to the families of black soldiers in addition to 
processing their requests for the back pay and pensions of soldiers killed or incapacitated 
while in uniform.80 
Kennedy's efforts to assist the formerly enslaved attain a position of dignity assumed 
a higher pitch when he became a captain in the 119th. He explained in his statement to 
the court that he had from the beginning sought to make his men's interests his own. A 
claim like this on first glance sounds like so much antebellum paternalism from Northern 
whites who saw blacks as, at best, children in need of guidance. What is striking about 
Kennedy's views is that he repeatedly adopted filial and communitarian language to 
describe his relationship to the men: “to consider them as neighbors” and “to look upon 
every man [in his company] as a brother.” These convictions that families and 
communities could, and should, be biracial along with Kennedy’s efforts to assist the 
African American refugees at Camp Nelson and his outsider status constitute what 
Wright had in mind as “shameful.”81 
                                                
80 Evan D. Kennedy, Soundex Index to Petitions for Naturalizations Filed in Federal, State, and Local 
Courts in New York City, 1792-1906, Microfilm Serial M1674, Roll 135, National Archives, Washington, 
D.C. According to the Naturalization Act of 1802, Kennedy would have had to have lived for five years in 
the United States and one of those in New York prior to naturalization, putting his arrival in America no 
later than 1859; Statutes at Large, II, 153-55; Kennedy closing statement, Kennedy court-martial; Sears, 
Camp Nelson, 172-74. 
81 Kennedy closing statement, Kennedy court-martial; Sears, Camp Nelson, 179-80. Contrast Kennedy’s 
attitudes with Reid Mitchell’s conclusion that segregated black military service “created fewer reciprocal 
bonds than it might have” and ensured “the image of the family remained white only,” Mitchell, The 
Vacant Chair, 68-9. 
 287 
If Kennedy's actions and attitudes towards the formerly enslaved challenged those of 
Kentucky-born white officers, then the commandant of the post in November 1864, 
General Speed S. Fry, was typified those Bluegrass officers. Fry came from Mercer 
County in the heart of the slaveholding Bluegrass region and from a family with 
significant property in land and slaves.82 Wright, Hanaford, and a significant portion of 
the officers in other Kentucky black regiments assembled at Fort Nelson, like Fry, came 
from the slaveholding society of the Bluegrass region.83 
Many of these Kentuckians had been staunch Unionists for most of the war. 
According to one historian, “Initially secession seemed to them a rejection of stability 
and order. Pro-secessionist fireeaters had abandoned the honor and loyalty to the 
Constitution—what had always been slavery’s best defense—demanded of a 
gentleman.” At the war’s outset, “large numbers” of such people “fought for the Union 
precisely because they thought it would best preserve slavery.”84 Writing in late 1861—
well before Emancipation became a war lever—a fellow Kentuckian wrote of the threat 
to loyal Kentuckians’ property and homes by Confederate guerrillas.85 Emancipation and 
black enlistment shifted these commitments. The social order conferred by slavery was 
part and parcel of that brought by Union. When emancipation became a reality at the 
                                                
82 William Henry Perrin, J. H. Battle, G. C. Kniffin, Vol. V, Kentucky Genealogy and Biography: Sketches 
from Adair, Boyle, Casey, Cumberland, Garrard, Green, Lincoln, Madison, Marion, Mercer, Nelson, 
Taylor, Washington Counties (Owensboro, KY: Genealogical Reference Co., 1970 reprint, original 1887), 
22. 
83 Profiles of Lieutenant John Wright and Lieutenant Colonel George A. Hanaford, U.S. Civil War Soldier 
Records and Profiles, Historical Data Systems, comp., Ancestry. 
84 Astor, “‘I Wanted a Gun,’” 31. 
85 Lewis, “‘All Men of Decency,’” 521-24. 
 288 
beginning of 1863 white Kentuckians logically saw the national government as the 
greater threat to slave property and social order. To participate in, much less encourage, 
emancipation and black enlistment was indeed “shameful” within this mindset. At stake 
was the survival of a Kentucky society and culture that made white men’s identity, 
power, and control possible.86 
The speed, breadth, and intensity of black enlistment in Kentucky portended a truly 
revolutionary upheaval to its white population. Nearly 60 percent of Kentucky’s 
military-age African American males joined the Union Army in less than twelve months. 
The majority of these new freedmen-soldiers acted as garrison troops and thereby 
became visible, daily reminders that the relationships of subordination between black 
and white had been overthrown. Emancipated slaves in uniform “represented an affront 
to prevailing white conceptions of citizenship.” In donning the Union blue “they had the 
audacity to claim the prerogatives of equal citizenship commensurate with a Union 
soldier.”87 
These same factors also created a remarkable episode of solidarity between a recent 
immigrant and black soldiers. Like the men he commanded, Kennedy knew a level of 
prejudice and opposition from the regiment’s officer corps. Both were outsiders in 
Southern white society. Kennedy’s efforts at uplift among his black soldiers offended the 
racial sensibilities of the regiment’s Kentucky officers enough to initiate a conspiracy 
against him. In a letter of 19 May 1883 to the Judge Advocate requesting a copy of the 
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transcript to learn the “facts of the trial,” he described the court-martial as “the 
inconvenience of having charges concocted against me by a worthless ring in the 
regim[ent], the 119th U. S. Col’d Infantry.” The court-martial of Captain Evan D. 
Kennedy presented late-war black freedmen-soldiers defending not only themselves 
through the military justice system, but a white ally as well. Their efforts succeeded. On 
the strength of their testimony, the court acquitted Kennedy except for a neutered first 
specification of the first charge. It acknowledged he struck the men on parade with his 
sword, but denied he would “shamefully mistreat and abuse” his men “in a brutal 
manner.” He was released from arrest and returned to the command of Company H.88 
The episode in the 119th USCI presented a wartime example of the kind of solidarity 
possible at times during Reconstruction among black citizens and white “carpetbaggers.” 
The conspiracy against Kennedy may have been intended to shame him into leaving the 
regiment, especially because his abolitionist sentiments had brought him to Camp 
Nelson as a superintendent of black refugees and informed his conduct as an officer. 
Kennedy’s black troops derailed white supremacist Kentuckians from using military law 
and military regulations against an officer whom they favored and could plainly see had 
made genuine efforts to assist both them and their families on the road to freedom. Even 
if exceptional, this formal exercise of their soldier rights under military law within the 
walls of a courtroom exemplified how the emancipated slaves’ possession and 
interpretation of their rights of membership in the Army served as a crucible for eventual 
black citizenship. 
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Yet, even if the court-martial of Kennedy can be interpreted as an example of 
freedmen-soldiers frustrating the efforts of racist whites to stem the revolutionary tide of 
emancipation, there remain elements of a more bitter reality. First, in the realm of 
jurisprudence, one student’s claim must be taken with reservation that, “Rather than 
sanction a different disciplinary scheme for African American troops, the federal 
government held black soldiers entitled to the same application of military justice and 
court-martial procedure that whites enjoyed.”89 Kennedy cross-examined every single 
witness, the judge advocate recrossed witnesses, and the defendant gave a lengthy, 
persuasive closing statement. Years after the trial Kennedy availed himself of the right to 
obtain a copy of the court-martial proceedings. No black court-martial involving 
emancipated blacks as defendants approached this kind of a vigorous defense. Even after 
their own efforts at literacy, their attempts to master the Army’s laws, and their 
participation in military justice, they remained at a great disadvantage to mount vigorous 
defenses of their own within an Army courtroom. Tried and prosecuted at the same rate 
as whites for essentially the same distribution of offenses, freedmen-soldiers consistently 
faced much harsher penalties and met death a greater percentage of the time. 
White officers continued to believe that African American soldiers must have the 
importance of obedience enforced through harsh measures because they lacked 
civilization. Cultural factors on the part of the slaves also contributed. Bereft of a 
sufficient level of education, acculturation, and citizen confidence to turn court 
proceedings to their benefit, performances such as those in the Kennedy court-martial 
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were rare. This left emancipated slave-soldiers exposed to sentences that could have 
been mitigated through a more full explication of circumstances and an effective 
creation of doubt in the minds of the court. In the end, African American soldiers’ few 
victories came through acts of military resistance on the parade ground, not dramatic 
efforts in a courtroom. Freedmen-soldiers’ dissent functioned as bridges between the 
hopes for freedom born in slavery and the possibilities of a citizenship under a 
reconstituted Union. 
Conclusion 
The minute gains and immense personal costs that freedmen-soldiers endured reveal 
the multifaceted challenges they faced in their bid for freedom. In Kentucky from 1864-
1866 numerous instances of white violence took place specifically targeting African 
American soldiers while Kentucky civil law continued to bar black testimony.90 In South 
Carolina, emancipated slaves strove hard to establish themselves as subsistence farmers 
who supplemented their surplus crops with hunting. They sought to avoid above all 
becoming wage laborers tied to an industrial workday despite the pressures of well-
meaning Northerners and their former masters.91 In Louisiana the wrangling for freedom 
and autonomy on the plantation initiated in 1863 continued, “but the turmoil of 
occupation and Reconstruction opened up some space for the freed people to gain 
ground in their struggle with former masters.” Once Louisiana planters and former 
Confederates regained control and Northern resolve had weakened, “strikebreaking was 
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endorsed by the state militia, and waves of repression and disenfranchisement completed 
the task of silencing workers in the cane.”92 
In each of these denouements, market society’s definition of American citizenship 
allowed emancipated blacks freedom from abuse alongside freedom from beneficence. 
Enlistment was a contract—a legal document which most signed with only their mark—
not an organic relationship of mutual obligation. For unskilled laborers like emancipated 
blacks, Northern social attitudes made their contracts equivalent to the wage laborers of 
its burgeoning factories and workshops. The laborer’s refusal to work meant breach of 
contract and merited harsh penalties. The employer’s interest was to enforce discipline in 
order to realize a profit. Emancipated slaves stepped out of a world in which, although 
exploitative, abusive, and degrading, they had created a few fragile spheres of self-
definition including the family, religion, and labor practice. What they stepped into was 
one of contractual freedom that offered new alternatives, but still demanded obedience 
without paternalism’s familiar social practices of obligation and beneficence.93 
Still, the Fort Jackson’s mutineers’ stand against exploitation led to the dismissal into 
civilian life of their tormenter, burdened with dishonorable conduct in a society sensitive 
to a man’s reputation. A small positive repercussion also resulted when General Banks 
definitively decreed in February 1864 that whipping was absolutely outlawed for 
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plantation laborers. Coming so soon after the mutiny of the 4th Infantry, its events and 
their complaint were fresh in his mind.94 Kentucky black soldiers’ reprieve of an 
immigrant officer from punishment acknowledged that African Americans had secured a 
standing in law locally powerful enough to buttress even in a small way the 
revolutionary social changes promised by emancipation and black enlistment. In other 
episodes of dissent, formerly enslaved soldiers’ actions served as warnings and moments 
of pause to the Army. Again, these were singular but signal victories. Military protest by 
the recently emancipated had the greatest significance in its ability to integrate his two 
worldviews: the enslaved and the freedman. The bond between those two mentalities 
was the fact of membership in the Army. Soldier status conferred individual and 
corporate rights under the rule of law. Freedmen-soldiers became local legislators like 
Anglo citizen-soldiers when they gave vigorous definition to and defense of these rights 
through military protest actions. In the process, they laid part of the foundation for an 
African American vision of citizenship grounded in consent and equal treatment. 
Freedmen-soldiers’ protest actions were important, but incomplete, efforts to transform 
their soldier rights into a citizenship that could achieve equality and preserve their 
security in the midst of nineteenth-century America’s bleak definition of freedom.
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CHAPTER VII 
“TRUE FRIENDS OF THE UNION”: 
MUTINY IN THE 20TH NEW YORK, THE “TURNER REGIMENT” 
 
A mutiny by the German American 20th New York Infantry at the outset of the Battle 
of Chancellorsville in April 1863 ended in the court-martial of 201 men. This chapter 
demonstrates how one set of ethnic soldiers employed dissent to protect their soldier 
rights to membership, state affiliation, and a calendar of service. Throughout, they 
maintained an acute awareness of their ethnic difference, as evidenced by their 
reiterations of patriotism. Thus, the Turners’ decision to mutiny is not offered as a 
consequence of their ethnic identity. Nor is it suggested as evidence of some form of 
alienation from the cultural mainstream. In fact, it is a piece of evidence that even the 
Union’s ethnic soldiers had drunk deeply from the font of associational culture. At the 
same time, these associational ties gave the mutiny’s denouement a distinctive quality 
because of the regiment’s ethnic identity. 
 Their voluntary association, the Turnverein, was a distinctly German creation. The 
regiment’s German character and membership flowed from the association. At the same 
time, the Turnverein was organized in the United States along thoroughly American 
lines in what could be termed ethnic associationalism. The regiment’s moniker, the 
“United Turner Rifles,” evinced the ties between citizens in association and citizens in 
uniform. In the months that followed the soldiers’ mutiny, these associational ties 
generated calls within the ethnic community for a pardon. The campaign orchestrated by 
the Turnvereine leveraged state and party affiliations as it employed the popular 
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constitutional methods of scrutiny and interposition for a successful appeal. Through the 
mechanisms of antebellum American self-government present in ethnic associationalism, 
these German American citizens reaffirmed their basic patriotism and commitment to the 
Union, just as their members in uniform had done. The mutiny and aftermath of the 20th 
New York mutiny sheds light on the complex interaction between ethnicity, federalism, 
and associational culture during the Civil War era. 
The 100,000 Germans and German Americans living in New York City during the 
two decades before the outbreak of the war had founded fraternal orders, churches, 
mutual-aid societies, and a German-language press. Some of the most prominent of these 
institutions for maintaining ethnic cohesion were the Turnvereine: athletic societies for 
young German males begun in Germany before the 1848 revolutions. They provided 
intense camaraderie, some exposure to military drill, and practice in sport shooting. 
More than a mere fraternal association, they were ubiquitous reservoirs of German 
identity and culture in the immigrant communities. Immigrant Turners committed their 
stateside vereine to the versions of freedom, self-government, and democracy that had 
motivated them as revolutionaries of 1848. These ideals then drew them into the Free 
Soil and Republican movements. Unlike the mass of Germans Americans, the national 
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association endorsed Lincoln in 1860 and the New York Turnverein (NYTV) 
contributed a Republican presidential elector, Sigismund Kaufmann.1 
Their associational practices also fit perfectly into the American milieu. Founded in 
1850, the NYTV acquired a charter of incorporation from the state that, like Anglo 
associations, gave it legal powers to hold and dispose of property in common. Members 
drafted and approved a code of by-laws to collect dues, choose officers, and govern their 
own everyday affairs. New members had to be proposed and approved by current 
members. In effect broadly similar to the power men in the Anderson Troop had to 
approve with whom they would serve, the NYTV’s admissions process conferred 
attendance, voting, and speaking rights to those who passed. Crucial powers of self-
government included nominating, electing, and petitioning adhered to members as well. 
Furthermore, in their corporate person as the “general meeting” they could propose 
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changes to their “statutes.”2 The Turnersoldaten emerged from an ethnic association as 
self-governing as any Anglo’s. Committed Unionists and Republicans, they founded 
sixteen “Turner” regiments across the North. At the same time, their associational ties 
simply amplified the desire among German Americans to prove their loyalty. As 
historian Stephen Engle observes, “Germans considered the war an opportunity to 
demonstrate their deep affection for their adopted home and its constitutional freedoms.” 
Many of those freedoms were lived out in their new homeland’s public culture. The 
Turners of New York City, especially, took these rights and duties seriously enough that 
their local association and its mechanisms of self-government created the skeleton 
volunteer regiment and, in cooperation with the state government, directed its 
organization. Actions such as these across the Union were at the heart of why 
volunteers—ethnic and Anglo—could justifiably claim the founding rights of 
membership, state affiliation, and a calendar of service.3 
Only days after Lincoln’s enlistment proclamation of 14 April 1861, the NYTV’s 
president submitted appeals for volunteers to the German-language press of the city. One 
of those who responded was Erhard Futterer, a New York Turner, who explained his 
enlistment as springing from “a spirit consistent with my origin, experience, ideals, and 
love for the Union and Constitution that promoted and protected the individual rights of 
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all men.”4 The Turnverein voted on 20 April 1861 to treat “the foundation of a Turner 
rifle-regiment” as “a matter of the Verein.” In a few days more a large crowd attended a 
public meeting at the Turnhalle (“Turner Hall”); 200 members volunteered for the 
proposed regiment on the spot. Votes were taken to create an organizing committee and 
within two weeks, they had assembled the 740 men necessary for the state to designate a 
regiment. In order to feed and clothe these volunteers the Turnverein requested German 
families in the city to provide quarters and it garnered roughly $3000 in donations for the 
troops’ subsistence.5 The Turner societies of Newark, New Jersey and Baltimore, 
Maryland also each contributed a company.   
Under the New York state law of 16 April 1861 asking 30,000 volunteers to serve 
for two years, the state mustered all the Turners by 29 April.6 Quartered by state 
authorities at the Turtle Bay Brewery on 45th Street until their departure from the city, 
the NYTV facilitated the work of women’s charitable arm the “Turner Sisters” who 
                                                
4 Futterer, Der Turner Soldat, 41. Futterer’s memoir must be used with care, however, in understanding 
the mutiny because he was a member of Company B, which contributed no defendants to the court-
martial, and the mutiny is absent from his recollections of service. Thus, his highly ideological motivation 
should not be imputed to all members of the regiment while at the same time granting that Turners as a 
movement were indeed highly motivated, patriotic, liberal democrats of their era. 
5 New York Bureau of Military Statistics, Third Annual Report of the Bureau of Military Records of the 
State of New York (Albany: New York Bureau of Military Statistics, 1866), 145–46; meeting minutes, 
special session, 20 April 1861, Signature: 3.3, trans. Nora Probst, General Membership: Minutes (1858-
1864), New York Turnverein, Turnverein Collections, Max Kade Center for German-American Studies, 
University of Kansas, Lawrence. 
6 Colonel W. F. Rogers, 21st New York Infantry to Adjutant General of the Army Lorenzo Thomas, 13 
April 1863, in papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial; Anders Henriksson, ed. and trans., “The Narrative 
of Friedrich Meyer: A German Freiwilliger (Volunteer) in the Army of the Potomac,” Civil War 
Regiments 6, no. 2 (April 1996), 1; “Turner Rifles,” New York Tribune, 7 May 1861; Special Orders No. 
165, 11 May 1861, Adjutant-General’s Office, General Head-Quarters, State of New-York, Albany, in 
papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. Only with Special Orders No. 165 did they receive official 
designation as the 20th New York. 
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gathered lint to make bandages and undergarments sufficient for each man.7 In July, the 
Turnverein authorized financial support to every mother and child of the regiment’s 
soldiers.8 
When orders arrived for the regiment’s deployment, the city’s German Americans 
publicly celebrated their “United Turner Rifles” on 13 June 1861 as they accompanied 
its march through the streets to waiting transports with a jubilant send-off rivaling those 
for Anglo regiments. The Turners carried the Stars and Stripes of the United States and 
the black-red-yellow tricolor of the failed Frankfurt Parliament of 1848. The flags 
symbolized what the German American Republican, Frederick Kapp, expressed as their 
“twofold responsibility”: to ensure the liberty guaranteed by Union and to demonstrate 
“that the German ranks among the first champions for liberty” worldwide.9 Competent 
former officers from European armies commanded them. Their original colonel, Max 
Weber, was a former professional officer and a Forty-Eighter from Baden. He was 
promoted to brigade commander in April 1862 and suffered severe wounds at Antietam. 
During the mutiny the well-regarded former Swedish officer, Colonel Baron Ernst von 
Vegesack, commanded. Having fought in the First Danish–Prussian War (1848-51), he 
                                                
7 New York Bureau of Military Statistics, Third Annual Report of the Bureau of Military Records of the 
State of New York (Albany, NY: New York Bureau of Military Statistics, 1866), 146. 
8 Meeting minutes, 9 July 1861, Signature: 5.2, trans. Nora Probst, Board Meetings: Minutes (1858-1864), 
New York Turnverein, Turnverein Collections, Max Kade Center for German-American Studies, 
University of Kansas, Lawrence. 
9 “Testimonial to Colonel Weber of the United German Rifles,” New York Herald (New York), 1 June 
1861; William L. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers: The Union's Ethnic Regiments (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 1998), 177-78; Öfele, True Sons, 57, notes the tricolor flag evoked the 1848 revolutions’ 
devotion to “the fight for personal liberty and national unity.” 
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led from the front at the Seven Days (for which he later won the Medal of Honor) and at 
Antietam.10 
The 20th New York began active service with the Union forces that captured Fort 
Hatteras, North Carolina, and then joined the Army of the Potomac’s Seventh Corps for 
the Peninsula Campaign and the Seven Days Battles. It took significant losses during the 
Battle of Savage Station on 29 June 1862. The soldiers of the regiment took greatest 
pride in the part they played in the Battle of Antietam where it suffered 134 casualties 
during the fighting that raged near the Dunker Church and the Sunken Road on 17 
September 1862.11 Nearly two years after the Turners’ departure for the “seat of war,” 
final victory still eluded the Union in the Eastern Theater. Major General Joseph Hooker, 
the Army of the Potomac’s newest commander, believed he had devised a bold plan of 
campaign to decisively defeat Robert E. Lee’s field army near Chancellorsville, 
Virginia, in April 1863, but according to one of its students, success required moving 
“before very many more of the short-term troops departed.” Hooker allocated a large 
portion of his field army for his planned right wing envelopment of the Confederates, 
first held in place by a feint from his left wing.12 
The Turner Rifles were one of thirty-eight New York regiments—nearly one-third of 
Hooker’s forces—with two-year enlistments ending. On 19 April, Hooker met with 
                                                
10 Öfele, 43, 58; Henriksson, ed. and trans., “Narrative,” 21 (n22); Henriksson, ed. and trans., “Narrative,” 
9-10, 15, 21 (n23). 
11 Frederick Dyer, “20th New York Infantry,” Compendium of the War of the Rebellion (Des Moines, IA: 
Dyer Publishing Co., 1908); Henriksson, ed. and trans., “Narrative,” 3-4, 13-15, 21-22 (n31); testimony of 
Colonel Ernst von Vegesack, commanding, 20th New York Infantry, proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. 
court-martial. 
12 Stephen W. Sears, Chancellorsville (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 131-35.  
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President Lincoln and General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck to determine exactly when 
national service ended for these regiments. Expressed in General Order No. 44, they 
fixed the end of the calendar of service “at the expiration of two years…from the date of 
their actual muster into the service of the United States.” That still put muster-outs 
dangerously close to the campaign’s start. The order mandated that the Army’s offer be 
read to each company because it reiterated the incentives for reenlistment ($50 bounty 
and a thirty-day furlough to commence immediately) offered in War Department 
General Order No. 85, 2 April 1863, the first attempt at rectifying these complications.13 
The Turner mutineers joined a chorus of Anglo New York regiments that disputed 
the Army’s calculations of their calendar of service. In 1861, the constituent companies 
of particular regiments had mustered in for varying lengths of national service. 
Acknowledging the national government’s requests in August 1861 to retain three-
month companies, the state had extended them by fiat for two years of Federal service. 
Among the dissatisfied Anglo regiments were the 21st and the 26th New York—raised 
around Buffalo and Oneida, respectively—in the Army of the Potomac’s First Corps. 
Writing in April 1863, Colonel W. F. Rogers of the “First Buffalo” wrote to the Adjutant 
General of the Army that they had been mustered by company into state service for two-
years between 1 and 10 May 1861, formally assembled as a regiment, then accepted for 
three months of Federal service on 20 May 1861. On 2 August 1861, Special Order No. 
                                                
13 General Order No. 44, Army of the Potomac, 20 April 1863, The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation 
of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Series I, Vol. XXV, Part II, 233-34 
(hereafter OR and all references are to Series I unless noted otherwise); see also Sears, 103-04. This action 
was itself a presumption by the national government that it could resolve the question on its own authority. 
If anything, this would have been an arena of concurrent constitutional powers. 
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324 of the State of New York directed they would continue in Union service for the 
remainder of their state enlistment. The men had duly served those two years, but Rogers 
emphasized that no additional muster had been called for the extension of their service to 
the national government. He claimed their two-year enlistment must expire based on the 
date of their original muster into state service; no later than 10 May 1863. Likewise, one 
hundred men of the 26th (“Second Oneida”) refused marching orders on 28 April 1863, 
were put under guard, forced to give up their rifles, and marched in the rear of their 
brigade. Even after a second chance to obey, very few did, and close to thirty comrades 
joined them the next day.14 
In these same turbulent days, the 20th New York formed part of the Army of the 
Potomac’s Sixth Corps. Hooker arrayed these troops under the command of Major 
General John Sedgwick for an intended feint at Fredericksburg. It would keep the 
Confederates in place while his smashing blow landed from the right at 
Chancellorsville.15 Like their Anglo comrades, the men of the 20th New York held the 
same convictions about their calendar of service. On 29 April 1863—two years to the 
                                                
14 Colonel W. F. Rogers, 21st New York, to Adjutant General of the United States Army Lorenzo Thomas, 
13 April 1863, in papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial; Paul Taylor, Glory Was Not Their 
Companion: The Twenty-Sixth New York Volunteer Infantry in the Civil War (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 
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that the Conscription Act had extended their length of service. 
15 Philip W. Parsons, The Union Sixth Army Corps in the Chancellorsville Campaign: A Study of the 
Engagements of Second Fredericksburg, Salem Church, and Banks’s Ford, May 3-4, 1863 (Jefferson, NC: 
McFarland, 2006), 5-19; James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1988), 639–40. 
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day of their muster into state service—201 men stacked their arms in protest and refused 
to do any further duty.16 
The Army’s response was swift. A general court-martial on 1 May 1863 tried the 
participants for mutiny “in the face of the enemy.” Colonel von Vegesack attested that 
the 20th New York was part of the Third Brigade concentrated in a forest about 1.5 miles 
from the Rappahannock River in column by divisions on 29 April. Firing was heard 
across the river and that it was well known among the men that action was imminent.17 
Even without such added ignominy, a conviction for mutiny carried the maximum 
sentence of death according to the seventh Article of War. Yet, the court sentenced them 
instead to the loss of all pay and benefits, dishonorable discharges, and hard labor for the 
duration of the war.18 In the Army’s view, forgoing capital punishment in spite of the 
enemy’s presence was sufficient mercy for misguided, but not disloyal, soldiers. 
Conscious of their ethnic identity the defendants had made sure to present 
themselves as such in their written statements to the court. They were loyal citizens in 
uniform who had “served faithfully and honestly.” The root cause of the mutiny, 
however, arose from the same right to determine the calendar of service claimed by the 
Anglo regiments of the Empire State. In the case of the 20th New York, all of its 
companies had been mustered into state service for two years commencing 29 April 
                                                
16 Testimony of Lieutenant Albert Hottenroth, 20th New York, proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. court-
martial. 
17 OR, XXV, I, 165, 190; charges and specifications, Colonel Ernst von Vegesack testimony, 20th New 
York, proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
18 Verdict and sentence, proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. The division commander, Major 
General A. P. Howe, approved the proceedings and the sentence. 
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1861. For reasons that remain unclear, on 6 May 1861 companies A, B, C, D, and E 
were mustered for three months of national service while F, G, H, I, and K signed for 
two years. At the conclusion of the three-months service in August 1861, however, there 
had not been another muster to continue the first five companies in Federal service. 
Instead, the extension of their national enlistments had been accomplished by fiat with 
Special Orders No. 326 from the state Adjutant General, dated 2 August 1861. Like the 
orders for the Anglo regiments, it decreed that they would remain in national service 
until the expiration of their two-year state enlistment. Even at that time, the three-month 
companies had briefly refused pay (itself a species of mutiny according to the Army) 
before complying with the New York state order, but the sources give no indication as to 
what led the men to acquiesce.19  
The mutineers, however, never claimed that New York had no right to transfer their 
two-year enlistments to the national government after an initial muster-in for three 
months of Union service. Their point of contention was that beyond 29 April 1863 the 
state “was not justified to transfer” them for United States service. In a telling example 
of the importance of state affiliation—even its supremacy—the Turners argued that 
whatever portion of their two years remained it must date from their New York, not their 
                                                
19 Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt to Secretary of War Stanton, 21 July 1863, papers of the Seiffart, 
et al. court-martial; testimony of Lieutenant Colonel Englebert Schnepff, 20th New York Infantry, 
proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial; Special Orders No. 326, 2 August 1861, Adjutant-
General’s Office, General Head-Quarters, State of New-York, Albany, in papers of the Seiffart, et al. 
court-martial.  
 305 
Federal muster. With that conviction firmly in mind, they explained to the court, “Our 
term has expired, we ask you for the kindness to let us have our discharge.”20 
The makeup of the mutiny’s participants reinforces this point and differentiates the 
20th New York’s protest from their Anglo counterparts. More than half of the mutineers 
(139) came from the companies mustered for two years of national service in 1861. If 
the basic grievance of the Turnersoldaten had been primarily in the lack of a proper 
muster to set a contractual date for the beginning of their national service (the complaint 
of the 21st New York’s colonel), the majority of mutineers should have come from the 
first five companies. What appears to have mattered most to the Turners was the 
chronological period of two years—two years in uniform and two years away from their 
families—whether for the state or the nation. In addition, this tied the right of a calendar 
of service back to the basic associational right of membership. The Turner soldiers had 
organized themselves in companies in 1861 to meet a threat to their lives as citizens of 
state and nation. According to the New York laws under which they organized, they 
agreed to become citizens in uniform for a two-year period. As a parent of the soldiers 
argued to President Lincoln, “A man makes a contract to serve 2 years, he serves same 
faithfully and then believes himself free from that contract.”21 
The Turners’ grounds for mutiny placed them squarely in the American citizen-
soldier tradition, but it is a tradition that cannot be encompassed solely within the 
                                                
20 Exhibits “A” (statement by the “undersigned members of Company A,” Germans of Newark, NJ) and 
“B” (statement by “the undersigned members of the different companies” of the 20th New York), 
proceedings of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
21 Ricardo A. Herrera, “Self-Governance and the American Citizen as Soldier, 1775–1861,” Journal of 
Military History 65, no. 1 (January 2001), 31-32; Joseph Solomon to President Abraham Lincoln, 28 July 
1863, papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial, emphasis added. 
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shorthand of contract. Their associational affiliation made the regiment especially close 
to the New York German American community. In their letters, soldiers and their 
families revealed that expectations had been raised at home for the regiment to return at 
the end of April. As a nexus for community information the Turnvereine broadcast these 
misplaced hopes. The Newark Turners explained that “joyful excitement” prevailed over 
the “return of husbands, brothers, and sons…expected by their families.” The NYTV’s 
meeting minutes for April reveal detailed plans arrange for meeting the returning 
soldiers, conducting a march to the Turnhalle, where a homecoming celebration would 
fête them with “carts” of beer, two hired bands, and a capella singing by the Society’s 
liedertafel.22 
When these hopes soured the associations and the ethnic community both directed 
petitions and letters to government on behalf of the Turnersoldaten. Their arguments 
spoke to soldier rights of membership, state affiliation, and the calendar of service. In 
these appeals, utterances of patriotic loyalty were stock in trade. One motive was to link 
the plight of the Turner soldiers through their German identity with Lincoln’s desire to 
rally the support of German America. A second reason was the particular circumstances 
following the battle. The Chancellorsville debacle had aroused a renewed atmosphere of 
nativism in the Anglo press. German regiments in the Army of the Potomac’s Eleventh 
Corps were excoriated for the retreat on the Union right on 2 May that turned into a 
                                                
22 Petition of the Newark, NJ Turnverein, [May 1863], to President Abraham Lincoln, in papers and 
proceedings of Seiffart, et al. court-martial; Meeting minutes, 14 April, 21 April, 28 April 1863, Signature: 
5.2, trans. Nora Probst, Board Meetings: Minutes (1858-1864), New York Turnverein, Turnverein 
Collections, Max Kade Center for German-American Studies, University of Kansas, Lawrence. 
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rout.23 The trial took place only the day before and news of the verdict arrived home in 
the weeks during which the mainstream press were the most derisive of Germans’ as 
soldiers and a loyal population. In response, therefore, the mutineers’ various defenders 
uniformly made ethnicity concomitant with patriotic duty and party loyalty to both blunt 
nativism and curry administration favor. 
Thus, the New York state Turnerbund noted their soldiers were “Germans of New 
York” state who “sprang to arms in the front rank” of 1861’s volunteers out of patriotism 
and party loyalty. The Newark Turnverein were “appointed by the loyal Germans” of 
that city and identified themselves as “true friends of the Union.” Considering it a “case 
deeply affecting many of our fellow-citizens,” they petitioned the president for clemency 
rather than condoning “the extreme hardship of the Law.” The forty men who remained 
at home to sustain the “patriotic Turner association” of Baltimore hoped to offer 
President Lincoln some “excusatory facts” about their associates in uniform in 
consideration of “the German population loyal and faithful to the Government.” That 
loyalty had been displayed as early as 18 April 1861 when the bulk of the Baltimore 
Turners had enlisted, traveled to Washington, and protected government installations 
even as mobs in the Baltimore riots destroyed their own meeting hall. They now asked 
the president to bestow a pardon on their “misguided unhappy friends” as a byproduct of 
the Baltimore Turners “performing truly our duty.” The mutineers’ “mistaken” ideas 
                                                
23 Christian B. Keller, Chancellorsville and the Germans: Nativism, Ethnicity, and Civil War Memory 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 75-122. He also argues, “Anglo American journalists had 
made such a stark and negative distinction between Americans and Germans” in the aftermath of 
Chancellorsville that the German American press asserted that Anglo elements of the Eleventh Corps were 
most responsible for the retreat while espousing with renewed vigor that Germans Americans’ possessed 
superior patriotism, ibid., 114. 
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about their enlistment termination only stemmed from their lack of “authorized 
information” to accurately determine their calendar of service and thus be fully apprised 
of their rights connected with military service.24 
Germans not only took action within their associational confines. Their dismay about 
the treatment of their countrymen spilled over into a community-wide demonstration of 
solidarity aimed at intensifying the remonstrances already directed at the national 
government. Three thousand German Americans of New York City submitted their own 
petition to President Lincoln. Leading off with proclamations of loyalty, they exalted 
their Turner soldiers as sons of “the community capable of furnishing the best of 
material for the army of the Union.” The citizens’ petition understood the regiment’s 
records of meritorious service and combat loss as a reflection of such refined patriotism. 
Their sons and fathers had “voluntarily assumed” military service like other loyal 
citizens to the United States, but had spent the war “bleeding and dying for the country 
of their choice.”25 The petitioners linked the immigrant’s freely given loyalty to the 
United States with membership in the Union Army. This elevated the immigrant’s 
patriotism and citizenship above that of the native-born. The Newark Turners had 
likewise argued that, “hardly have men enlisted for this war, animated by a spirit and 
                                                
24 Petition by the Turner Associations of New York to the President of the United States, May 1863; 
petition by the Newark, New Jersey Turnverein to President Abraham Lincoln, May 1863; the Turner 
Association of Baltimore [Maryland], “To the President of the United States,” 15 June 1863, all in papers 
of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
25 Petition to the President by the Germans of New York City, Seyforth, et al. court-martial, emphasis 
added. The German newspaper Washingtoner Intellignezblatt wrote on 7 July 1860 that Anglo Americans 
were “demoralized physically and spiritually….They are unworthy of freedom, the inheritance of their 
fathers.…To us immigrants it is reserved to save this land from destruction. And we will do it!” quoted in 
Öfele, True Friends, 34. 
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inflamed by a purer Patriotism” than German Americans in uniform.26 All of these 
protestations of loyalty were intended to assure the president that he could trust the 
motives of citizen-soldiers who were “tenacious of what they deemed to be their rights.” 
Disputed muster-out dates and complaints about officers might be “insubordination,” but 
they did not necessitate the full force of military punishment. Rather, they presented the 
Turners’ soldier rights as legitimate and believed their actions in defense of them 
merited clemency because of the soldiers’ demonstrated loyalty to the government and 
the nation. 
“Appointed by the Germans of New York,” the prominent German Republicans 
Frederick Kapp and Sigismund Kaufmann authored their own appeal Secretary of War 
Edwin Stanton for clemency. They personify the nexus of German ethnic identity, 
associational membership, and Republican loyalty that characterized the Turnvereine. 
Explicitly anti-slavery, Kapp was one of the earliest German members of the Republican 
Party. A respected writer and historian, he had collaborated with Carl Schurz to rally 
New York’s Germans to the party in the 1860 election. Kaufmann helped found the New 
York City Turnverein and was instrumental in directing the national Turner convention 
to officially denounce slavery in 1855. A Jewish Forty-Eighter and socialist, he 
                                                
26 Petition by the Turnverein of Newark, NJ, to President Abraham Lincoln, May 1863, papers of the 
Seyforth, et al. court-martial. 
 310 
remained an influential anti-slavery voice in New York with claims on the Republican 
patronage network.27 
Stanton’s German Republican correspondents’ began by using the political context 
of May 1863 to the mutineers’ advantage. Patriotic German American citizens were at 
that very moment sensitive to the revived “prejudices with which native Americans 
regard them” as “foreigners.” They might readily “misconstrue” the mutineers’ sentence 
as “one of uncalled for severity,” especially in light of the regiment’s previous service. 
In fact, like “the majority of their countrymen,” the Turnersoldaten felt “deeply attached 
to the Institutions.”28 
“Institution” in its meaning of “an established custom” first gained currency in 
America just after the adoption of the Constitution and by the 1830s was increasingly 
used in reference to the system of slavery.29 Kapp and Kauffman’s use of the word 
harmonizes with the definition given by German American jurist and philosopher, 
Francis Lieber. According to Lieber, 
An institution is a system or body of usages, laws, or regulations of 
extensive and recurring operation, containing within itself an organism by 
which it effects its own independent action, continuance, and generally its 
own farther development. The idea of an institution implies a degree of 
                                                
27 Friedrich Kapp and Sigismund Kaufmann to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 22 May 1863, papers 
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Archives (June 1949): 11; Nadel, “Jewish Race and German Soul,” 16-18; Miller and Steinlage, eds., Der 
Turner Soldat, 38, 110. 
28 Friedrich Kapp and Sigismund Kaufmann to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 22 May 1863, papers 
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self-government. Laws act through human agents, and these are, in the 
case of institutions, their officers or members.30 
 
Thus, the soldiers’ patriotism flowed from their participation in the country’s 
institutions of self-government, especially their Turnvereine. 
Once inside the institution of the Army, they became “tenacious of what they 
deemed to be their rights.” These rights derived from their status as soldiers through 
their muster-in “first prescribed by the Legislature of New York.” Any authority of the 
“general Government” over them resulted from its “understanding with the State to 
which they belonged.” The citizen’s soldier status depended first on his state citizenship, 
that in turn granted him rights such as a calendar of service. Kapp and Kauffman were 
willing to admit, unlike the mutineers, the various Turner associations, and the citizen 
petitioners, that the 6 May muster-out date was valid and left matters at the 
Turnersoldaten simply “supposing honestly” that their term expired “on the date of the 
first enlistment.” The two German leaders put their confidence in securing a pardon not 
the justifications of soldier rights, but rather on the loyalty to party and nation of the 
volunteers and the ethnic community. Hence their juxtaposing Germans’ bona fide 
adoption of American political values against the cries of nativism. In light of these 
political realities, they believed Stanton would arrange a pardon from the president in 
order to have “a most beneficial effect upon the further enlistment of the German 
element into the service.” It would counter German Americans’ fears of nativism and 
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reinforce their faith in the institutions of America’s associational politics. Increased 
German American support of the Union and the party would be assured.31 
To further their efforts, Kapp and Kauffman used the ties of party to call on the 
assistance of former Republican governor of New York and sitting U.S. Senator, Edwin 
Morgan. Ironically, Morgan had collaborated with the Lincoln government and the 
Army in 1861 to extend his New York regiments’ calendars of service without a second 
muster-in while governor. Now his cover letter to Stanton brought together ethnic 
solidarity, party loyalty, and state affiliation to deliver a potent dose of interposition on 
behalf of the Turner mutineers. Forwarding their letter “unconditionally,” Morgan 
described the two men as “influential with soldiers of their own nativity” and he 
reminded Stanton in closing, “Both gentlemen were presidential electors in 1860.” 
Intervening as one of their state’s elected representatives, he linked the continued loyal 
service of men who were his constituents, his fellow countrymen, and his party 
colleagues with a just disposition from their national political leaders. Pardoning the 
Turners would “create a good feeling that will result in great advantage to the 
Government with this large class of our soldiers.”32 
Two additional German leaders from the national Turnerbund, the American 
umbrella organization of the local Turnvereine, instructed Secretary of the Treasury 
                                                
31 Friedrich Kapp and Sigismund Kaufmann to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 22 May 1863, papers 
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Salmon P. Chase on 16 June 1863. Reinhold Solger and Charles F. Schmidt made a case 
for the justice of the men’s rights to the calendar of service, however. The men never 
received clear “instruction” in the transferring of their service, which besides there “had 
been no swearing in” on 6 May. Solger and Schmidt reiterated the necessity of the 
muster being the only definitive way for the “citizens having freely volunteered” to 
know when their martial obligations began and ended. Without it, New York had “no 
right” to “cede them to the U.S. for any term beyond their oath to the state” which had 
commenced with a proper mustering in. Echoing previous petitioners, Solger and 
Schmidt explained that these Turner soldiers had “come forth first of all” in 1861. They 
had not broken faith, rather “the U.S. had not kept faith with them” through either a 
proper second muster or releasing them on the date of their state muster.33  
During May and June 1863, therefore, the mutineers and their relations at home 
appealed for clemency from the national government. The Turnvereine’s contribution to 
American associational culture aided their cooperation immensely. Furthermore, their 
appeals stood on claims of soldier rights familiar to any Anglo: membership in a state-
affiliated regiment being a shield against centralized authority, and a basis for popular 
constitutional defenses of their calendar of service. At the same time, these markers of 
an American political consciousness worked in harmony with their ethnic identity. True, 
they deemed it wise to proclaim their loyalty brashly even as they suggested that as 
patriots of choice, not birth, their desire for justice was as pure as the native’s. These 
German Americans from three eastern cities, under the auspices of their Turnvereine, in 
                                                
33 Reinhold Solger and Charles F. Schmidt, “on the part of the Turner Associations & others,” to Secretary 
of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase, 16 June 1863 in the papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
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fact used their ethnicity as a gambit for gaining government and party recognition of 
their claims.  
Once confined, the men made no further demonstration against military authority. 
Rather their “prompt and cheerful compliance with orders” convinced Provost Marshal 
W. R. Patrick that “the remainder of their sentence should be remitted.”34 Stanton 
requested an opinion from Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt on the clemency 
request.35 Holt acknowledged the confusion regarding enlistment contracts, but averred 
“one of the gravest crimes known to the service” had threatened “military discipline.” A 
pardon would suggest that “the opinions of enlisted men were allowed to determine” the 
force of military authority.36 Nevertheless, the president went ahead and on 10 August 
1863 pardoned the Turners “for the unexecuted part of their sentence”—which 
unwittingly made it necessary for them to seek final justice forty years later. The provost 
                                                
34 W. R. Patrick, Provost Marshal General, Army of the Potomac, to R. Solger, Esq., Department of the 
Treasury, Washington, D.C., 16 July 1863, papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
35 Stanton to Morgan, 23 May 1863, papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial, relayed to Morgan his 
ignorance of any recent courts-martial, but assured him “the case shall receive a prompt disposition.” 
President Lincoln also directed the judge advocate general to investigate the case on 17 June 1863 after 
reviewing a letter from the New York Turner Association to Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase; 
Endorsement of Abraham Lincoln, 17 June 1863, on Solger and Schmidt to Chase, 16 June 1863, papers 
of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
36 Opinion of Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 21 July 1863, 
papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. Holt’s opinion on the mutiny stands in contrast to his 
recommendation for clemency in the case of Pennsylvania soldier who deserted to care for his ill father 
after a pass was not granted him. Holt’s biographer cites it as an example of his capacity to “be flexible 
when it came to analyzing the circumstances that lay behind a charge of disobedience of orders,” Elizabeth 
P. Leonard, Lincoln’s Forgotten Ally, Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt of Kentucky (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 172-175. 
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marshal released the 201 mutineers from custody on 31 August 1863 and furnished them 
transportation home.37 
The scale and vitality of the response by New York’s German American community 
in defense of its soldiers depended on ethnic cohesion and pride for its effect. This 
returns the case to its point of origin in the experience of ethnic soldiers. Those who felt 
compelled to prove their loyalty through military service also demonstrated they should 
fully participate as citizens alongside native-born Americans. In their minds, volitional 
allegiance had as much, if not more, claim to loyalty as birthright citizenship. Faithful 
military service was the test. Yet, the pursuit of faithful service could not be allowed to 
threaten fundamental rights that inhered through membership in the Army. The Turner 
mutineers claimed particular founding and procedural rights, because they were New 
Yorkers and volunteers. Their ethnic identity gave them no special claim to rights. It 
functioned only as a ground for associational self-government. The volunteers’ military 
service took shape in the context of the Turnverein and the Turnverein was the most vital 
organ of defending their rights of soldier membership.  
In this regard, the mutiny and its aftermath reflected miD.C.entury America’s 
confidence in the fundaments of the compound republic; encapsulated by two scholars as 
its “older ideals, namely localism, self-government, and the public ordering principles of 
common law.” In their view, “The Civil War and Emancipation forged a new 
                                                
37 Endorsement of Lincoln originally attached to handwritten copy of the court-martial proceedings, 10 
August 1863; his language was duly included in the official order enforcing the pardon, Special Orders 
No. 360, Adjutant General’s Office, War Department, 13 August 1863; both in papers of the Seiffart, et al. 
court-martial; few of the Turnersoldaten reenlisted; most resumed their civilian pursuits for the remainder 
of the war. Miller and Steinlage, eds., Der Turner Soldat, 101. 
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constitutional relationship between the individual and the state in which unmistakeable 
increases in central state power accompanied extensions of the idea of national civil 
rights.”38 Yet mutinies by Anglo and ethnic soldiers seem to be moments when Northern 
citizens in uniforms resisted the tides of change and clung to the rights and protections 
carved out through associational membership, state affiliation, and soldier rights. 
At the same time, the mutiny makes plain how the Civil War served to raise the 
stakes and importance of national citizenship through the demands placed on the unitary 
nation-state (e.g., the resort to conscription) and the claims it could place on the 
resources and citizens of the constituent states. 
Indeed, the cause of disagreement that provoked the mutiny was the national 
government’s assertion that it had a superior claim on state volunteers’ time in uniform. 
Furthermore, any discrepancies with state promulgations could be expediently wiped out 
by decree. In a pointed challenge to such centralizing tendencies, the men of the 20th 
New York and their citizen allies called on associationalism to direct appeals and 
petitions just as had the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry. In ways even more impressive than 
the ad hoc public meetings of the Anderson Cavalry’s hometown allies, however, 
standing cooperative institutions like the Turnvereine served as vital conduits of 
individual and collective demands for justice on the behalf of ethnic citizens in uniform. 
Associational ties facilitated the personal interventions of high-profile German American 
leaders—within the Republican Party and in the Turner movement—directly with 
officials of the national government. The Turnvereine’s associational solidarity 
                                                
38 Sawyer and Novak, “Emancipation and the Creation of Modern Liberal States in America and France,” 
472–73. 
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conveyed the concurrent assistance of Republican Party ties to the German mutineers, in 
this case by encouraging national officials to remedy the Army’s decision. Furthermore, 
the mutineers used the ties of party to enhance their state affiliation and thereby garner 
the unqualified support of one of New York’s senators. 
These were the multifaceted aspects of ethnic citizenship in associational culture. It 
made it possible for the Turners’ sympathizers to play persuasively on the party’s desire 
for the German vote. In this respect, associationalism and ethnicity came together in a 
particularly potent call for interposition. Ethnic associationalism leveraged state and 
party affiliation to instruct the legislative branch to require action from the executive. 
Ethnic associationalism also served to demonstrate that German Americans could be 
loyal citizens and party members even as they opposed the centralizing tendencies of 
national authority during the Civil War. In these ways, ethnic Union soldiers inhabited a 
space on the continuum of soldier rights between Anglos and freedmen. Like Anglos, 
they acted in order to protect citizen rights of self-government threatened by military 
service. At the same time, they used their mutiny as a moment to reiterate their loyalty to 
the Union even as they articulated more precisely what rights their citizenship should 
entail.  
Postscript: The Rehabilitation of the Turner Mutineers and the Evaporation of Ethnic 
Associationalism 
Nearly three years after the events of the mutiny, a number of the participants 
petitioned Secretary of War Stanton to reverse their dishonorable discharge and make 
them eligible for their lost pay and bounties. They claimed that on the day of the mutiny 
several officers had stated that, “having served their full time” the men “were not 
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obliged to…participate in the attack unless they so wished and that it was entirely a 
voluntary matter with them to do so or not.” They had trusted their officers’ advice 
because many soldiers had “but a very limited knowledge of the English language.” 
Promises to loved ones “to whom they had written saying when they would be at home” 
also influenced their decisions. They claimed this dissent to be “right and justifiable and 
not breaking any law civil or military, but only making a choice that they had a perfect 
right to do.” In fact, if they had know that their choice would have led to court-martial 
for mutiny “they would most cheerfully have fallen in and marched to the attack.”39 
Although General Ulysses S. Grant recommended clearing the men of all 
wrongdoing in 1866, the War Department would not commute sentences already 
executed in 1863. The dissenters did not secure honorable discharges until the passage of 
a special 1905 law. From this vantage point, the mutiny and its postwar legacy tell 
another complex story that demonstrates how ethnic communities leveraged their ethnic 
identity provisionally—setting it aside when politically expedient and harnessing it when 
it could amplify their claims to full membership and participation in the body politic. 
In 1863, Republican political alliances and ethnic associationalism had functioned in 
synergy to overturn the court-martial’s verdict. Historians have typically portrayed 
postwar German Americans shifting towards cultural pluralism: outright resistance to 
Americanization by promoting the German language along with unique cultural and folk 
traditions while claiming membership in the nation due to costly support of the Union 
war effort which confirmed antebellum declarations of unadulterated patriotism. 
                                                
39 Petition by Members of the 20th New York to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, 3 March 1866, 
papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
 319 
Criticism in the Anglo press during the Civil War of the German hero Franz Sigel and of 
German soldiers’ bravery, nevertheless, left a lasting sensitivity to revivals of nativism 
in mainstream society.40 The Turner veterans’ campaign to obtain honorable discharges 
fits this paradigm only initially. Before the war’s end some of the pardoned soldiers’ 
inquired about back pay due them while under provost guard, but these entreaties fell on 
deaf ears. The War Department explained they had nothing forthcoming: the 
dishonorable discharges, enforced at their court-martial, fell outside the pardon for their 
unexecuted sentence.41 Undaunted, in March 1866 Turner soldiers petitioned Stanton 
and general of the armies, Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, to reverse the decision.42 
                                                
40 Kathleen Neils Conzen, “German Americans and the Invention of Ethnicity” in Frank Trommler and 
Joseph McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans: An Assessment of a Three-Hundred Year History, vol. 
1: Immigration, Language, Ethnicity (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), 139-40; 
Keller, Chancellorsville and the Germans, 137-67; Margaret Creighton, The Colors of Courage: 
Gettysburg’s Forgotten History (Cambridge, MA: Basic Books, 2005), 173. On Sigel and German 
American identity, see Stephen Engle, Yankee Dutchman: The Life of Franz Sigel (Fayetteville: University 
of Arkansas Press, 1993), 229-32, Engle, “Yankee Dutchmen,” 38-40; Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 211; 
Öfele, True Sons, 137. 
41 As an example, see W & J. E. Fitch & Co., Attorneys at Law on behalf of Henry Hahne to Stanton, 18 
March 1865; “by the approval of the proceedings, and the confirmation of the sentence in May 1863” 
according to Major A. A. Hosmer, Judge Advocate in absence of Judge Advocate General Holt to Stanton, 
28 April 1865, endorsement on Fitch letter; both in papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. 
42 In 1866 they claimed, having been among the first wave of volunteers “to preserve the integrity of their 
adopted country” and given three months in defense of the nation, they “consented” for a full two years of 
Federal service. The veterans avoided the legal complexities of the transfer of their contracts. After 
recapitulating the circumstances leading to the court-martial, they emphasized they had been simply 
released from the custody of the provost marshal by order of the President. They claimed they should be 
“honorably discharged” from United States service “to receive their arrears of pay and bounty,” petition by 
members of the 20th New York to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, n.d., papers of the Seiffart, et al. 
court-martial. An endorsement on the petition by the adjutant general of the Army referring the matter to 
the judge advocate general is dated 6 March 1866. The 9 March 1866 petition to General Grant is noted in 
House Report No. 2257, 27 May 1902, 57th Congress, 1st Session, United States Serial Set (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1902), 8:4 (hereafter, House Report No. 2257). 
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As in 1863, the Turners once again convinced the War Department of their case; a 
special order of 4 April 1866 honorably mustered them out and granted their back pay.43  
As some Union veterans approached old age, they stepped into the debates in the late 
1880s over proper pensions for them and their dependents. They cheered Congress in 
1890 for enacting a new system of service pensions.44 In response to these 
developments, the 20th New York’s dissenters or their widows and dependents queried 
the government about their eligibility.45 The War Department responded during the 
nineties that the 1866 order had attempted to change the status of men who “were 
beyond the reach of its influence…having been separated from the military service” with 
“no nearer or other relation to that service than civilians who never had been in the 
Army.” Ironically, here the principles of contract regarding length of service on which 
the men had based their dissent seemed to deny any eligibility for pensions, even under 
the 1890 law’s generous stipulations.46 
                                                
43 Special Orders No. 152, War Department, Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C. in House 
Report No. 2257, 4. 
44 The act passed 27 June 1890 considered only the veteran’s honorable discharge, whether he or his 
widow reached a specified age, and possessing some disability that made work impossible (though it did 
not have to be from military service). The original pension law passed in 1862 only covered veterans 
injured or disabled in military service, their widows, and their dependents, William H. Glasson, Federal 
Military Pensions in the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, American Branch, 1918), 
125-26; Amy E. Holmes, “Widows and the Civil War Pension System” in Maris Vinovskis, ed., Toward a 
Social History of the American Civil War: Exploratory Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1990), 171-74; Theda Skocpol, Protecting Soldiers and Mothers: The Political Origins of Social Policy in 
the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 106-07, 132-35. 
45 For example, Senator John H. Mitchell took up the case of Philip Weber’s widow in 1895. Mitchell was 
a Republican senator from Oregon and Weber a citizen of the state, House Report No. 2257, 5. 
46 Colonel F. C. Ainsworth, Chief Record and Pension Office to Senator John H. Mitchell, 30 April 1895, 
in House Report No. 2257, 4. Secretary of War Daniel S. Lamont confirmed the Judge Advocate’s opinion 
and directed Ainsworth to inform the veterans of the Department’s decision, of which this letter was used 
in the House report as a representative example. 
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The national effort for a generous pension bill had enlisted the politically influential 
Union veteran organization, the Grand Army of the Republic (G. A. R.), and its allies in 
the Republican Party. The Turner veterans relied on support from those quarters—with 
no visible role for the German American community—in requesting relief through 
congressional legislation from their dishonorable discharges.47 House and Senate 
Republicans authored several bills in committee beginning in 1901 titled only, “Relief of 
Certain Enlisted Men of the Twentieth Regiment of New York Volunteer Infantry.” Not 
until 1905 did the legislation become law, assure the Turners of honorable discharges, 
and make them pensionable. The sponsorship of these bills lacked obvious links to the 
German American community.48 The men who guided it through Congress were Anglo 
American Republicans—Representative Richard Parker (IL) and Senator Russell Alger 
(MI). Alger was commander-in-chief of the Grand Army of the Republic in 1890 during 
the final drive for passage of the pension bill.49 German Turner and Anglo veterans alike 
engaged claims attorneys in their earlier individual efforts at adjustment of their war 
                                                
47 Glasson, Federal Military Pensions, 238, notes, “While the G. A. R. remained avowedly non-partisan, it 
was generally conceded that Democrats were rather scarce in the organization.” In 1890 the G. A. R. had 
just under 394,000 members, Unofficial Proceedings in Connection with the 24th National Encampment, 
Boston, August 11-16, 1890 (Boston: E. B. Stillings, 1891), 18. 
48 True, in 1901 Representative Jacob Ruppert (D–NY), a second-generation German American from the 
Bronx, reported the bill to the House Committee on Military Affairs. But Ruppert made no other 
substantive contributions; report of bills to committees, 17 December 1901, 57th Congress, 1st Session, 
Congressional Record, House, Vol. 35, 376; “Jacob Ruppert, Jr.,” Mitchell Charles Harrison, comp., New 
York State’s Prominent and Progressive Men: An Encyclopaedia of Contemporaneous Biography (New 
York: New York Tribune, 1900), 2:177, 297-98. 
49 On Alger see Representative Samuel W. Smith, “Life and Character of the Late Russell A. Alger,” 24 
February 1907, 59th Congress, 2nd Session, Appendix, Congressional Record, Senate, Vol. 41, 79; “Gen. 
Russell A. Alger,” Henry W. Moulton, Moulton Annals, Claribel Moulton, ed. (Chicago: Edward 
Claypool, 1906), 114-21; Thomas E. Sebrell, II, “‘The "Fighting Fifth’: The Fifth Michigan Infantry 
Regiment in the Civil War’s Peninsula Campaign,” Michigan Historical Review 35, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 27-
51.  
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records, without regard to ethnic ties.50 For example, Jacob H. Dewees represented 
Gustave Seiffart. Dewees, of Welsh ancestry, had been colonel of the 13th Pennsylvania 
Cavalry and a post commander in the G. A. R.51 
When the 1904 bill made it to the floor of the House of Representatives, Anglo 
American Republicans took up its passage.52 They mentioned the veterans’ ethnicity 
only once in passing. Only Richard Bartholdt (R–MO) had any ties to the German 
American community: a German immigrant born in the town of Schleiz in 1855. He 
recalled that four years earlier Sergeant Edward Roehr of Brooklyn, “by the way, a 
cousin of mine,” had written him for support of the original 1901 legislation. “I did not 
pay particular attention to the matter…because it was a New York case and did not 
                                                
50 On claims attorneys and the charges of corruption often leveled against them, see Skocpol, Protecting, 
143-48; Glasson, Federal Military Pensions, 215-17, 235. 
51 Dewees had commanded George G. Meade Post, No. 5 in Washington, D.C., Journal of Proceedings of 
the Fifty-Second Annual Encampment of the Department of the Potomac Grand Army of the Republic 
Held at Washington, D.C., February 18th, 19th, and 20th, 1920 (Washington, D.C.: Beresford, 1920), 9; 
Dewees to the Judge Advocate General, 24 January 1898, papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. An 
example of a Turner soldat active in the G. A. R. and early involved in the effort to attain first a proper 
muster out and later honorable discharges was Private Edward Oertle. As early as 1866 he and his 
comrades were the petitioners who led the War Department to issue its 4 April 1866 order, John Jolliffe to 
Stanton, 27 February 1866, papers of the Seiffart, et al. court-martial. Oertle was eventually a senior vice 
president of his Grand Army of the Republic Post, No. 233 in Brooklyn and a delegate to the national 
encampment in 1900, Abstract of General Orders and Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual 
Encampment Department of New York, G. A. R., Held at Utica, May 16-17, 1900 (Albany, NY: J. B. 
Lyon, 1900), 183 and Abstract of General Orders and Proceedings of the Fifty-Fifth Annual Encampment 
Department of New York, G. A. R., Held at Binghamton, June 23, 24, 25, 1921 (Albany, NY: J. B. Lyon, 
1922), 127. 
52 Of the sixteen representatives who spoke, thirteen were Republicans and only two were Civil War 
veterans, Debate on H. R. 1860, “Relief of Certain Men, Twentieth Regiment New York Volunteer 
Infantry,” 11 February 1905, 58th Congress, 3rd Session, Congressional Record, Vol. 39 (hereafter, CR, 58, 
3, 11 February 1905), 2418-2422. The prominence of Republicans leading these efforts is also surprising, 
given that so many German Americans by the turn-of-the-century had left the Republican party, prominent 
among them being both Carl Schurz and Franz Sigel, see Engle, Yankee Dutchman, 221-27. 
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concern either my district or my State.”53 Bartholdt’s sense of priorities, typical for a 
Congressman at that time, stands in stark contrast to the wartime pardon campaign. In 
the early 1900s, the Turner soldiers and their dependents welcomed Republican Party 
assistance, leveraged ties built through the G. A. R., and muted their ethnic identity. 
The floor debate in 1904 cared not a wit for ethnicity, but rather for the obligation 
both government and citizen had to the service contract. James Mann (R–IL) led the 
opposition to the bill on several fronts. Mann’s most vehement complaint charged that 
“they deserted in the face of the enemy, and now because forty years have passed away 
they propose the Government shall give them some money because they deserted and are 
alive.”54 Against these statements, Richard Prince (R–IL) rejoined that the soldiers had 
“believed their time of enlistment was out” while Richard Crumpacker (R–IN) cited the 
government’s obligation of “keeping faith” with the men who had come to its defense. 
Adin Capron (R–RI) viewed the matter as “tardy justice” to veterans who had a “right to 
what the President of the United States accorded them” in 1863.55  
Framing these debates was the national memory of the war as one fought by 
honorable, faithful soldiers—on both sides—which made postwar reconciliation 
                                                
53 Berchtold, CR, 58, 3, 11 February 1905, 2421. Biographical information on congressmen taken from 
United States Congress, Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, 1774-2005: The 
Continental Congress, September 5, 1774, to October 21, 1788, and the Congress of the United States, 
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(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2005), passim. 
54 Mann, CR, 58, 3, 11 February 1905, 2418-21, found the bill redundant given laws already provided 
relief to men incorrectly given dishonorable discharges; overly narrow as it covered a single regiment; and 
vague because “men who deserted are treated as squarely as men who did not.” 
55 Prince, Crumpacker, 2418 and Capron, 2419, all in CR, 58, 3, 11 February 1905. 
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possible.56 Deserters and cowards benefitting from the nation’s honest efforts to provide 
for deserving, courageous veterans could scandalize that memory, hence Mann’s 
condemnation had likely little to do with a subtext of nativism. According to one student 
of Anglo attitudes about Germans at the close of the nineteenth century, “most 
Americans considered the Germans to be a desirable people.” Although ethnocultural 
conflict over prohibition, parochial schools, and Sunday laws could at times rally 
German American political solidarity,57 such issues remained divorced from the debate 
over pensions and Civil War memory. 
Given these trends, the Turner mutineers made use of the most effective avenues of 
influence for support in finally securing honorable discharges. While German Americans 
did adopt cultural pluralism in the postwar years, the odyssey of the 20th New York 
suggests that German American cultural pluralism was highly provisional in the political 
arena. During the Civil War calling public attention to their ethnic identity and 
harnessing the political influence of their ethnic group to the war effort and the 
Republican Party could reap great dividends. Without it, the Lincoln administration 
would have been unaware of the Turners’ predicament. Ethnic solidarity during the war 
                                                
56 Gary Gallagher, Union War, 153-59, terms this “situational reconciliation” by which the public memory 
of the war relied on “commonalities of valor and steadfastness among Union and Confederate soldiers” to 
reunite the nation even while “condemning secession.” Gallagher uses the speeches and monuments on the 
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with its English translation (“In remembrance of our fallen comrades erected by the survivors of the 
regiment.”), nothing about the monument, caped with a wreath and soldiers’ accoutrements, differentiates 
it from similar dedications to Anglo regiments, Miller and Steinlage, eds., Der Turner Soldat, 108. 
57 Frederick C. Luebke, “Images of German Immigrants in the United States and Brazil, 1890-1918: Some 
Comparisons” in Trommler and McVeigh, eds., America and the Germans, 209-10. Luebke suggests too 
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set the table for a final rectification of the matter at the turn of the century, but that same 
ethnic solidarity had given way to tactics closer to the assimilationist paradigm in their 
reliance on veteran and partisan ties. Indeed, the localism and ethnic pluralism had in 
some ways given way to an even greater reliance on the mechanism of federal 
intervention in citizen affairs. At the same time, the older advantages of associational 
membership remained through the networks of assistance offered by the G. A. R.
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CHAPTER VIII 
“PATRIOTS OF ALL NATIONS! AROUSE! AROUSE! AROUSE!” 
THE AMBIGUITIES OF ETHNIC ASSOCIATIONALISM AND MILITARY 
PROTEST 
 
Philadelphian William Blackburn, an Anglo soldier in the Anderson Troop, 
complained in early 1862 about Captain William Jackson Palmer’s repeated violations of 
their terms of service. “All we want is for him to be a little more affable and treat us as 
our position in society demands and not like a company of irish or mere ordinary men.” 
According to Blackburn, Irish (and presumably other naturalized Americans) did not 
merit the familiar, egalitarian relationships forged through the compacts and contracts of 
associational membership. The corollary of this viewpoint was that only natural-born 
citizens reared in America’s self-governing, associational culture possessed the dignity, 
personal independence, and good sense to insist on their just treatment by authority. 
Incensed that “every particular” of the company’s plan of organization “has been 
violated,” Blackburn did exactly this. He claimed “the satisfaction of expressing my 
opinion and that of the troop in a very plain…manner in the non-commissioned officers’ 
tent” where “the Captain heard almost all I said and it could not have been very pleasant 
to him.” If necessary, “I shall take the first opportunity to call upon him and 
reiterate…that instead of the members doing the duties assigned them from a sense of 
pride for the troop, they only do so for the reason that they are compelled to and act only 
as slaves.” But, Palmer had “shown unmistakeable signs of improvement…since the talk 
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I spoke about in my last [letter],” and “I am glad he was an auditor. The guard has been 
reduced and he now speaks much more cordially to the men when he meets them.”1 
Blackburn believed that his act of individual dissent materially improved the 
common good of his fellow citizens in uniform. Self-government at times required the 
individual to be the first line of defense against incursions on the rights of the 
community. Blackburn and those like him might have been surprised to learn the extent 
to which ethnic soldiers exhibited such similar behaviors and attitudes. German, Irish, 
Scottish, and other European ethnic volunteers went to the same lengths to defend their 
soldier rights. In the preceding chapter, Germans in the 20th New York relied on their 
ties of ethnic identity for solidarity and citizen dissent. And earlier chapters 
demonstrated how Anglo volunteers drew on America’s foundations of federalism and 
localism. Running through both, however, were Northern society’s bedrocks of self-
government and associationalism. 
This follow-on chapter to ethnic soldier rights considers two additional mutinies of 
ethnic soldiers. It also looks at additional examples of individual and collective protest 
action by the Union’s ethnic soldiers during the Civil War as a way to further develop 
the links between insubordination and mutiny explored among Anglo soldiers in Chapter 
2. As with the example above, ethic volunteers’ individual dissent involving questions of 
soldier rights can shed light on issues and pressures that led to mutinies. Dissent carried 
greater risks for ethnic soldiers than it did for Anglos because of the ever present charge 
                                                
1 Private William Blackburn to My Dear Bro, 2-3, 11, February 1862, emphasis added, Anderson Troop, 
n. p., William Blackburn Letters, Society Small Collection, Collection 22B, Historical Society of 
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia (hereafter HSP). 
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of treason that could be attached. The 20th New York mutiny exemplified ethnic 
soldiers’ conditioned response to this social reality: employing frequent explanations of 
their loyalty, especially in moments of dissent. This only makes the previous chapter’s 
argument about associational culture more significant. On one hand, the soldier rights 
that grew out of associational culture provided ethnic soldiers with grounds for dissent 
that reflected the society’s ethos of self-government. On the other hand, the self-
governing tradition presented the citizen volunteer bearing arms to defend the Republic 
as the apotheosis of civic loyalty. Loyal service meant defending the Constitution and 
the Union against the Rebellion but it also required that, even while in uniform, 
immigrants and naturalized citizens continued to exercise the duties and rights of their 
individual state and of the United States. This leads to the most striking contrast between 
ethnic soldier protest and that of Anglos. Absent among the ethnic soldiers encompassed 
by this study is the kind of direct gauging of the Union’s prospect’s relative to the 
strength of self-government within their own organizations. Ethnic soldiers herein 
appear soldered firmly to the Republic’s banner of war. Instead, military protest actions 
intensified ethnic soldiers’ attachment to their adopted country as well as their 
application of its hallowed civic principle of self-government. 
“Governing the Affairs of the Regiment”: The 79th New York’s Mutiny, Ethnic 
Identity, and Self-Government 
At the war’s outbreak the 79th New York represented the hopes of Gotham’s 
Scottish immigrants and their descendants for the proof of valor and evidence of loyalty 
to the nation. Originally the 79th New York State Militia organized in 1859. It included 
Scottish transplants like Captain Evan Kennedy who went on to serve in the 119th U.S. 
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Colored Infantry and David Ireland born in Forfar, Scotland, in 1832. Ireland arrived in 
New York in 1840 with his family. American citizenship waited until 1860, but he had 
joined the state militia eight years prior. By the time Ireland and his family landed on 
American shores there thrived a small, elite and conspicuous Scottish community in 
New York City extant prior to the American Revolution. 
At that time Scottish immigrants had entered New York’s skilled laborer and 
professional ranks all the while establishing various churches and founding numerous 
voluntary associations like the St. Andrew’s Club, the Caledonia Club, and various 
Masonic halls. Like the Germans and Irish, Scottish Americans had a distinct ethnic 
identity and a cohesive community that was perpetuated by a rich family and 
associational life. Out of this matrix came the creation of a Scottish American regiment 
of the state militia in 1859 as part of both sections’ response to the worsening political 
climate. In homage to the famous Highland regiment of the British army, it took the 
designation as the 79th New York State Militia. Ireland became its adjutant in 1860 
under the command of Colonel James Cameron, the brother of Lincoln’s first Secretary 
of War, Simon Cameron.2 
The 79th did not enter federal service as a three-month regiment until 14 May 1861. 
Organization for the regiment to serve during wartime lagged among the small Scottish 
community of New York City and its companies increasingly filled with Irish Americans 
                                                
2 H.A. Barnum, et al., Resolution, 10 September 1864, [on the death of Col. David Ireland, 137th New 
York]; New York (County) Court of Common Pleas, Certificate of Citizenship, 24 March 1860, to David 
Ireland; Appointment, 13 December 1860, Albany, of David Ireland as adjutant of the 79th Regiment, 4th 
Brigade, 1st Division of the New York State Militia, all found in the David Ireland Papers, X18023, New 
York State Library, Albany (hereafter NYSL). 
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who became the dominant nationality and, according to most modern authorities, 
inevitable ethnic tensions resulted.3 How the mutiny unfolded, however, gives reason to 
doubt this conventional analysis. The 79th’s mutiny in 1861 demonstrates the power of 
ethnic identity leveraged to further the cause of regimental self-government. In a way 
similar to how the Anderson Cavalry used the ties of localism to gain citizen advocates 
against the Army and national government for its cause, the Highlanders used the 
binding ties of Scottish ancestry to access their own powerful civilian intermediaries. 
The mutiny also indicates the idiosyncratic interfaces of particular ethnic identities 
within the larger stream of American culture. 
Similar to the Anglo regiments that mutinied in the wake of the First Battle of Bull 
Run, the camp of the 79th New York roiled with dissent on 14 August 1861. The 
Highlanders had been one of the few units to cover the retreat of Union Major General 
Irvin McDowell’s Amy of Northeastern Virginia all the way back to the defenses of 
Washington, D.C., on 21-22 July. It had already performed numerous assaults on Henry 
House Hill and seen most of its leaders cut down. The regiment did not break off contact 
with the enemy until other units beside it began to give way. One of the battle’s 
survivors and the principal primary source for the mutiny, Lieutenant William 
Thompson Lusk, explained to his mother, “The shock we received in the last battle was 
very great.…six Captains and nine Lieutenants, nearly half of the entire number, were 
                                                
3 Terry A. Johnston, Jr., “From Fox's Gap to the Sherrick Farm: The 79th New York Highlanders in the 
Maryland Campaign,” Civil War Regiments, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1998), 58; Ella Lonn, Foreigners in the Union 
Army and Navy. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1951), 130; William L. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers: The 
Union’s Ethnic Regiments. (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), 163. 
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lost to us that day.”4 By battle’s end they had endured 198 casualties including the death 
of Colonel Cameron.5 
Historians have attributed the mutiny of the 79th to numerous causes, usually 
drawing in varying degrees from the regiment’s official history composed in 1886 by 
erstwhile Lieutenant William H. Todd. Devastating combat losses and the elimination of 
its charismatic leader depressed morale. And these factors no doubt ushered in the 
desertion of some 140 men after the Highlanders returned to the national capital. Yet as 
seen among Anglos and the 20th New York, mutiny required something more. There had 
to be evidence of affronts to the citizens’ sense of good government and violations of 
their soldier rights. For the Highlanders these came in quick succession in the forms of 
retractions of expected furloughs, of slow pay, of unelected officer replacements, and of 
disputes over enlistment terms. But it was alcohol that provided the spark, or rather the 
spine, to their protest against such manifest violations of soldier rights.6 
On 10 August 1861 the Highlanders were paid for the first time after three months of 
service (but a month late). According to Lieutenant Lusk, “the men contrive to obtain 
liquor, and when intoxicated are well-nigh uncontrollable, so that the utmost vigilance is 
needful.”7 In a complaint echoing those uttered by the Anderson Cavalry, he observed, 
                                                
4 William Thompson Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 5 August 1861, William Thompson Lusk, War Letters of 
William Thompson Lusk, Captain, Assistant Adjutant-General, United States Volunteers, 1861-1863, 
Afterward M.D., LL. D. (New York: privately printed, 1911), 67. 
5 Lonn, Foreigners, 131. The losses for the 79th amounted to over a quarter of its strength, Johnston, Jr., 
“From Fox’s Gap,” 60. 
6 Lonn, Foreigners, 130-31; Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 161-62; Johnston, Jr., “From Fox’s Gap,” 61; 
Martin W. Öfele, True Sons of the Republic: European Immigrants in the Union Army (Westport, CT: 
Prager, 2008), 96-97. 
7 Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 11 August 1861, War Letters, 70, and 17 August 1861, War Letters, 77. 
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“As it is now,” after the 79th’s battlefield losses, “whole companies are with out 
officers.”8 The dearth of commissioned officers also led directly to a growing disjuncture 
in the minds of some of the men between their associational rights to elect their new 
commander and the Army’s apparent prerogative to simply appoint one. 
The new colonel provided by the Army arrived the same day as their pay. When 
Colonel Isaac Ingalls Stevens, the territorial governor of Washington and an officer of 
the Regular Army, arrived at camp with orders from the War Department to take 
command, six officers immediately resigned in disgust. A mere ten officers remained in 
the entire regiment.9 Trouble like that which had engulfed the 15th Pennsylvania Cavalry 
appeared to be in the offing. The resignations protested how the Army contravened 
earlier orders on 7 August from the New York Militia that directed the regiment to elect 
a new colonel. Even before Stevens’s arrival, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel McKenzie 
Elliot had made plans to hold the officers’ election of a new colonel on 13 August.10 
These orders were a welcome answer to a petition drafted at the end of July by Elliot, the 
other surviving officers, and many non-commissioned officers. The petition with the 
endorsement of their division commander in the militia, Major General Charles W. 
Sandford, requested Secretary of War Simon Cameron to return the shattered command 
to New York for recuperation and the recruitment of new levies. In his account, Lusk 
                                                
8 Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 5 August 1861, War Letters, 68. 
9 William H. Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders: New York Volunteers in the War of the Rebellion, 
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1864, Washington, D.C., James Gilmore Letter MSS 15787, Manuscripts and Special Collections, NYSL. 
10 Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, 58–9. Elliot forwarded to the regiment’s officers the state’s order 
for an election appended to his orders scheduling the vote. 
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adds that Lieutenant Colonel Elliot had called on Cameron personally.  The secretary of 
war transferred the regiment to a new brigade, endorsed the petition, and penned orders 
to dispatch the 79th to New York to acquire replacements.11 
On 1 August, however, the War Department ordered that only Lieutenant Colonel 
Elliot return as a recruiter to New York and it referred to a “Colonel Stevens” as the new 
commander.12 In his correspondence from this time, Lusk began to doubt the regiment 
would return to Gotham. There were rumors that the military authorities now viewed it 
as injurious to the morale of other regiments.13 And Todd is quite explicit in the official 
history that the men’s desire for a rest and refit at home depended on the patronage they 
believed they could claim from Secretary Cameron, the brother of their martyred 
colonel. These confusing circumstances combined with the terrible losses of Bull Run to 
convince Lusk that , “The men feel that they were wronged, and are discontented; 
officers feel that they were insulted, and have resigned.”14 
Thus, Colonel Stevens’s intention to take command flew not only in the face of the 
understanding of membership in the hearts of the officers and men, but directly 
transgressed explicit orders from their state and disrupted the implicit cooperation they 
felt entitled to from the national government by way of ethnic association. These 
convictions of violated rights prompted the officer resignations that precipitated a break 
                                                
11 Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, 56–57; Lusk, 68. 
12 Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, 56–8, explains that the order was never read to the regiment or 
circulated among the officers. 
13 Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 11 August 1861, War Letters, 70, and 17 August 1861, War Letters, 77. 
14 Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 5 August 1861, War Letters, 68. 
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down in camp discipline, especially in maintaining the camp guard properly. These 
circumstances set the stage for what became the red letter day of 13 August. 
Instead of the planned election that would have reaffirmed a measure of self-
government in the unit continued to exist, the appointed commander issued orders 
making it starkly clear who was in charge. Colonel Stevens circulated a directive that 
tents would be struck and knapsacks filled with rations and clothing in preparation to 
march at six in the morning, 14 August. The planned departure was not northward for a 
return to New York, but south into Virginia and possible renewed combat. On the night 
of the thirteenth, many soldiers snuck out of camp, ostensibly to drown their sorrows, 
express their outrage, and foment resistance. A few of these smuggled liquor back into 
camp to stiffen the will of their comrades. By morning a crowd of drunken Scottish 
American volunteers were ready to offer a spirited, collective protest to the wishes of 
their unwelcome colonel and the meddling Army that had put him there.15 
The contravening orders about the regiment’s leadership illustrate the tensions of 
federalism at work in organizing the Union Army. The national military establishment’s 
priorities of recruitment and a reliable chain of command flew in the face of the state 
militia leadership and the citizen-soldiers’ concerns about processes of self-government, 
associational membership, and connection to home and community. Particularly galling 
must have been the sense that by defending their adopted nation in its time of crisis, 
rights of association so central to the normal functioning of their organization, such as 
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electing their colonel, could be trampled under foot by the power of the central 
government they were risking their lives and livelihoods to preserve. 
Roused at dawn on the fourteenth, only two companies followed Colonel Stevens’s 
orders to prepare for a march into Virginia. In the others, drunken ringleaders, confident 
in the regiment’s just cause against the government, encouraged their comrades to refuse 
striking tents—equivalent to stacking arms—and symbolic of their intention to remain 
on Union soil. The standoff lasted until noon. Colonel Stevens made personal appeals to 
the men to obey and directed a cohort of loyal non-commissioned officers to compel 
each mutineer to declare his submission to authority as well as his intention to strike 
tents as ordered. In intent this was identical to Colonel Harai Robinson’s tactic of 
physically separating the Rhode Island cavalrymen during their consolidation with his 
Louisianans as described in Chapter III: attenuating the corporate identity of the 
regiment through individuation. This plan backfired and nearly every man answered 
with a sharp, “No, sir!”16 
The responses in the negative brought on the mutiny’s climax. Stevens answered 
their defiance with determination. First, he visited each company to proclaim the 
Articles of War. He probably read the first page of the Regulations followed by Articles 
7, 8, and 9 pertaining to mutiny and mutinous conduct. Next, he ordered the officers to 
begin striking tents and sent word to higher command of the deteriorating situation. 
Using “names neither poetical, decent, or complimentary,” the soldiers berated the 
handful of officers Stevens detailed from the loyal companies to bring down the tents. 
                                                
16 Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, 61-65. 
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Among them was Lusk. The officers persevered “amid the jeers, the taunts, and the 
insults of an infuriated mob,” including soldiers promising “one officer at least to die.” 
Lusk found it “more trying than the musketry or cannonading of Bull Run.” Certain of 
the mutineers remained so resolute to stand their ground that a strange game of cat-and-
mouse developed whereby they would re-stake their tents after officers had moved onto 
another part of the camp.17 
As news of the mutiny made its way up the chain of command, the new Army of the 
Potomac’s commander, Major General George B. McClellan, moved swiftly to counter 
an early test of his authority and legitimacy. In a communiqué delivered to the camp of 
the 79th, he questioned if there was a “true man” among them. Thus far their conduct had 
been “disgraceful in the extreme.” McClellan denigrated their “alleged grievances” as 
“frivolous and unfounded.” At the same time, however, Stevens inquired of the men 
what grievance drove their actions. Some of the leaders explained that they resented 
being denied furlough to New York and especially that the officers’ election of a new 
colonel had been cancelled.18 
Before Stevens had time to respond to this information, McClellan had dispatched a 
large provost force to the 79th’s camp. It included several unattached companies of 
Regular infantry, two companies of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry and an artillery battery ready to 
fire canister into the Highlanders. Like General Rosecrans made clear for the 15th 
Pennsylvania Cavalry mutineers, McClellan gravely emphasized to the commander of 
                                                
17 Lusk to “My dear Mother,” 17 August 1861, War Letters, 73–74. 
18 Todd, The Seventy-Ninth Highlanders, 61-63. 
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the provost guard, “You are authorized to use force, if necessary, to accomplish the 
object.” When it arrived, Stevens’s orders were repeated and under the loaded rifles and 
cannon the regiment was made to fall in. Colonel Stevens addressed his men in the most 
uncompromising terms. He cited his combat experience on the frontier and in the 
Mexican War as evidence that, “I have been…in far greater danger than that surrounding 
me now.…I am your Colonel! And again I say you must obey me! Fall into the ranks!” 
In the face of determined authority and the threat of deadly force, the mutiny collapsed. 
Highlanders formed into column and began a march to a new camp near the Maryland 
Insane Asylum, “not a very strange coincidence,” according to Todd. Thirty-five 
ringleaders were shackled and confined at the Washington Navy Yard aboard ship. Most 
humiliating of all, the regiment’s battle-scarred and tattered colors were revoked until it 
submitted to Army authority and proved itself in future combat. After a month, fourteen 
were released and the remainder were shipped to the Dry Tortugas for imprisonment at 
Fort Jefferson. In February 1862 these twenty-one men also gained their release and 
were reinstated to the Highlanders.19  
When Stevens had addressed the Articles of War to the companies, Lusk noted that 
the men were unmoved, because “they had been told that they had the law on their side, 
and if they only persevered, they would be able to return home as a militia regiment.” 
Like the problems in the Anderson Cavalry and the 10th New York Cavalry, these 
convictions stemmed from what Lusk believed was the genesis of the mutiny: it was the 
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“legacy of a quarrel” from before Bull Run about “governing the affairs of the 
regiment.” After the battle a faction of officers resigned who “resolved to undermine the 
Regiment itself.” These beliefs about “governing” the regiment can be read along two 
vectors. One is that of federal relations: who controlled the regiment’s service, the state 
of New York or the national government. The other is that of associational membership: 
did the members themselves structure the regiment’s internal affairs or the Army? 
The officer faction circulated rumors that elevated the regiment’s status as State 
Militia in national service, suggesting that “they were entitled to return home at the 
expiration of three months service” to a hero’s welcome and those “who were ready to 
re-enlist for the war, would be entitled to the re-enlistment bounty of $30.” These claims 
were erroneous, of course. The 79th had been mustered as three-years soldiers, but like 
the 20th New York and so many other Empire state regiments, enough confusion reigned 
about the lines of state and national allegiance that such allegations could stick for a 
time. When the State Militia’s orders that the regiment return to New York were 
countermanded this was enough proof for many of the soldiers that central authority had 
usurped the proper governance of their organization. 
The disgusted officers also suggested a conspiracy involving Colonel Stevens. They 
charged that he had been paid $10,000 by “the Government” to “sell you all for the war, 
and to cheat you of your rights and privileges.”20 The most important of these rights was 
electing a new colonel to replace Cameron. This was the second vector of governance. 
The internal order and structure of the regiment belonged to them as members. Having 
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elected their company officers, those officers now had the responsibility and authority to 
choose a new leader from within the membership who would attend to the common 
good. Moreover, drawing leaders from within served to close the circle of ethnic identity 
and ensure that leaders were amenable to character of the organization and likely from 
the home community. This would in turn ensure that the bonds of membership would 
temper application of military law in the regiment. 
Perhaps the most surprising part of Todd’s history of the mutiny is that he makes no 
mention of a distinction between Irish and Scots in the ranks nor does he use it as an 
opportunity to lay the blame on the Irish. Contrary to the views of modern historians, 
conflicting ethnic loyalties appear not to have been at issue in the mutiny. Rather it was 
their claims about self-governance related to terms of service, pay, and officer elections. 
Drunken dissent by a proportion of the regiment propelled a mutiny by most of the rank 
and file to defend self-government over their organization. In one sense, the actual 
grounds of the mutiny had little to do with the soldiers’ Scotch ancestry or their Scottish-
American ethnic community. Yet, if not for the regiment’s tie to the Cameron family and 
the Secretary of War which depended on Scottish identity, there would have been no 
hopes that it might be returned to New York. Nevertheless, the majority Scotch ancestry 
of the soldiers and their connections to one another through the Scottish American 
community of New York did provide a measure of solidarity. That led to their 
confidence in asserting their own plans for the regiment’s future in the immediate 
aftermath of Bull Run. 
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At the same time, the Highlanders’ mutiny lacked the explicit appeals to loyalty so 
evident in that of the 20th New York. By the 1860s Scottish-Americans stood near the 
end of their journey, along with English and Welsh migrants, to forming the country’s 
pool of “invisible immigrants.” Due to affinities of language, religion, and customs, 
British immigrants and their progeny appeared less and less as the “other.” Yet Charlotte 
Erickson’s unrivaled assessment of these groups emphasizes that intact, self-conscious 
communities like the New York Scots were central to how individuals successfully 
navigated the Atlantic transition.21 In an ironic way, therefore, Scottish-American 
citizen-soldiers could avoid the Turners’ frank acknowledgement of their loyalty 
because of their ethnic community’s continued cohesion just as German-Americans 
needed the integrity of their ethnic institutions in order to make those necessarily vocal 
claims of patriotism. In this, these two mutinies suggests how the wider context of 
antebellum ethnic politics left its own mark on incidents of citizen-soldier dissent.  
“You Have No Right to Command Me”: Ethnic Associationalism and Rights of 
Membership Prompted Soldier Dissent 
Alcohol provided the trigger for the Highlanders’ mutiny in spite of the legitimacy of 
their associational complaints. This is a reason to delve further into the links between 
insubordination and mutiny. Chapter 2 established that Anglo volunteers could find 
room in Army regulations’ Article 1 to confront what were understood to be unfit 
officers according to their basic notions of associational self-government. Along these 
same lines, ethnic soldiers, even when emboldened by alcohol consumption, could 
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engage in insubordination best defined as “drunken dissent.” That is, like the 
Highlanders who mutinied, ethnic soldiers protested in various modes against what they 
recognized as unjust military authority and discipline against the soldier rights issuing 
from the bosom of ethnic associationalism. In these crises ethnic officers acted prudently 
when they leveraged associational ties to bring soldiers back into line and avoid full-
blown mutinies. As in the case of Anglos, that was often the difference between 
insubordination and mutiny.22 
Certainly there are examples of ethnic soldiers who from sensibilities closer to 
associational concerns refused the orders of line officers from outside their company or 
regiment. Privileges of membership, especially election of officers, were their lone 
check on the potentially untrammeled authority of commanders under the Articles of 
War. All the more reason for them to be wary of taking orders from officers over whom 
they had no redress. In these cases ethnic soldiers acted similarly to native-born Anglos 
jealous of these same founding rights of membership. For example, Private John 
Bogenschutz, in Company E of the 27th Pennsylvania, confronted 2nd Lieutenant Adolph 
Schaefer from Company G. As the regiment returned from a reconnaissance sweep near 
Aldie, Virginia, on 20 July 1863 Schaefer found Bogenschutz straggling and ordered 
him to fall in. Bogenschutz, however, objected to Schaefer’s presumption of authority 
over him. “You can only speak to me when I ask you. You have no right to command 
me. I got my own commander. I would sooner speak to a dog as to you.” Conflicting 
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evidence led the court to acquit Bogenschutz,23 but in so doing it acknowledged the 
implicit associational limits drawn around officer’s authority. A line officer’s power to 
command might not extend beyond those men who had freely consented to form 
themselves into a company and then bestowed that power on one of their own number 
whom they had elected. Accordingly, attempting to give orders across company 
boundaries could be an exercise in frustration for officers,  
On the other hand, command authority in its proper sphere could also protect self-
government. Another act of insubordination among Germans and German Americans 
helps clarify how at times this could rise to the level of defining and defending 
associational membership. In January 1863 Private John Meyer of the 41st New York, 
“De Kalb Regiment,” had converted a log cabin at Aquia Creek, Virginia, into a 
blacksmith’s shop on orders from his regimental quartermaster. Hours later 2nd 
Lieutenant C. L. Allstaedt approached and told him to vacate immediately. Allstaedt 
planned to employ it as a guardhouse for his company of Germans from a different 
regiment, the 54th New York, “Schwarze Jäger.” He pressed charges alleging that Meyer 
threatened him with a rod of iron and refused his orders. 
Had Meyer been ordered by an Anglo it might be reasonable to explain this as a 
collision of nativism and ethnic identity. Like the Bogenschutz example above, two 
Germans pitted command authority from the Army against rights of regimental 
membership. By signing the muster roll of his regiment Meyer had consented to the 
command of its officers. He followed the orders of his quartermaster in establishing the 
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shop at that location. Absent the bonds of membership, the orders of an officer from an 
unconnected organization were not binding. Meyer explained he would only relinquish 
possession of the cabin if Allstaedt could provide a letter from the 41st’s colonel. Instead, 
Allstaedt produced Meyer’s own lieutenant colonel, Ernst von Holmstedt. According to 
eyewitness testimony from the trial, on von Holmstedt’s arrival “all was made up, and 
the blacksmith kept the shop.” Although the court found Meyer guilty of the charge, it 
sentenced him merely to be reprimanded by his colonel and “cautioned not to lift up a 
weapon to any one [sic] hereafter.”24 
Meyer’s trial, echoing those of Anglos in the 9th New York, shows how soldiers’ 
insistence on their rights of membership affected the application of the Articles of War. 
But this dynamic also required sensible officers, especially ones who shared those bonds 
of identity. Insubordination in these circumstances has a popular constitutional 
dimension if understood in light of Army regulations’ Article I.25 Ethnic affiliation also 
appears to have contributed to Meyer’s light sentence, as state affiliation operated in the 
mutiny of the 9th New York. The members of his court served in the German regiments 
of the Eleventh Corps’s First Division, including the 41st and 54th New York. Meyer’s 
fellow Germans on the court appear to have defined the boundaries of regimental 
membership as a legitimate defense against external authority and could reasonably 
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argue that Allstaedt had not been properly “appointed” over Meyer. Therefore they 
released Meyer from strict obedience. 
Soldiers’ concerns about personal autonomy emerged in conflicts over ideals of 
manhood—passionate physicality or genteel self-control—that shaped the application of 
discipline and prompted an increase in punitive violence within the Army. The 
Jacksonian confidence that all men should be treated equally coexisted with divergent 
views about what constituted authentic manhood according to differences in class, social 
status, and ethnicity. Relations of authority between officers and soldiers brought these 
tensions especially to a head. Particularly worrisome for middle-class Anglo volunteers 
of 1861 was the influx into the Army after 1863 of significant numbers of conscripts and 
immigrants. Their versions of aggressive, passionate manhood threatened the genteel, 
self-controlled, moral manhood of the veterans. Violence, disobedience, and courts-
martial increased as the Anglo veteran volunteers and the Army hierarchy struggled to 
bring these “roughs” to heel.26 
The immigrant soldiers in these episodes, however, did not enter the Army in 1863 
but were among the volunteers of 1861.27 The use or threats of physical violence along 
with contemptuous, derisive speech were characteristics of the “roughs.” At the same 
time, these disputes between German American officers and soldiers, recruited from the 
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same local communities, reveal the extent to which associationalism informed their 
understanding of military service in defense of the Republic. Acts of insubordination 
reported in court-martial records are simply the residue of the daily encounters with their 
officers that citizens in uniform regarded as moments to judge their commanders’ 
continued right to command. Bogenschutz claimed he had his “own commander” and 
Meyer only desisted after he had secured the intervention of an officer from his own 
regiment. While expressed coarsely these sentiments are not different in substance from 
the Anglos of the 133rd Pennsylvania who desired to replace their incompetent 
lieutenant with one of their own from the ranks. Judgments like these by the sovereign 
members of a company or regiment counted more than shoulder straps in the egalitarian 
culture of ethnic associationalism. The daily challenges to soldiers’ spheres of 
independence and self-governance under Army life required vigilance and when that was 
not enough, action.  
Which offers a reason to reassess the perennially referenced image of the besotted 
ethnic soldier in the Union Army. Adding drink into the relations of camp created 
additional opportunities for soldiers to test the limits of officers’ authority. Nativist 
stereotypes about free drinking Irish and Germans soldiers have wormed their way into 
the historical record as at best instances of ethnic soldiers’ distinctive character and at 
worst explanations for battlefield ineffectiveness. In some cases, ethnic membership led 
prudent officers to use the prisoner’s intoxication to secure him clemency. At other 
times, alcohol produced “drunken dissent” when soldiers’ insubordination was still 
aimed at protecting soldier rights. These two facets of the interface between alcohol and 
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insubordination only reinforce alcohol’s nuanced place in the subcultures of ethnic 
Americans that continued in their military camps. 
Cases of insubordination or mutinous conduct involving alcohol should not, 
therefore, be deemed unworthy of analysis on principle. Even in incidents involving 
drunkenness, insubordinate soldiers still insisted firmly (sometimes violently) that they 
had the same competence to place limits on their obedience as the men in the examples 
above. These can become moments when men who might not have otherwise, expressed 
their dissatisfactions with being a citizen in uniform. 
In general, historians have made the intoxication that did occur among ethnic 
soldiers more visible than in Anglo regiments. Conviviality temporarily enlivened a 
camp life that in the words of an Irish American soldier, “really is monotonous and were 
it not for the tremendous interests of the country which are at stake, one would soon tire 
of it.”28 The presence of alcohol lent a distinctive touch to early war camp life in German 
regiments. Already distinctive because German served as the primary mode for 
command and administration, distinctive foods, music, camp song, and even camp 
layouts also reflected German tastes. Perhaps second only to language in distinctiveness 
was the number of German regiments allowed by the Army to enjoy a beer ration at the 
war’s outset. Certain regiments tapped dozens of lager kegs at a time.29 
                                                
28 James B. Turner [88th New York] to “My dear Mother,” 26 June 1861, Arlington, Virginia, Box 1, 
James B. Turner Papers, SC 12613, Manuscripts and Special Collections, NYSL. 
29 Joseph Reinhart “Introduction” in A German Hurrah!: Civil War Letters of Friedrich Bertsch and 
Wilhelm Stängel, 9th Ohio Infantry, Joseph R. Reinhart, trans. and ed. (Kent, OH: Kent State University 
Press, 2010), 14-15; Lonn, Foreigners, 356; Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 87-89, also notes, following 
Carl Witke, that sutlers selling lager in the camps of Louis Blenker’s German brigade earned up to eight 
thousand dollars each month. 
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Alcohol abuse, however, affected the entire Army and undermined its discipline, 
morale, and effectiveness. In German regiments, in Irish units, and in predominantly 
native-born organizations, alcohol could be source of irritation and disorder in camp. 
German and Irish American officers dealt with intoxication as a negative force in 
military discipline as much as has been reported in Anglo regiments. Drunkenness either 
as a charge or a circumstance pervaded many trials of individual insubordination or 
mutinous conduct in both Anglo and immigrant regiments. Eighteen percent of all 
general courts-martial involved alcohol, although drunkenness was not itself a 
punishable offense. Such behavior often put men before general courts-martial on trial 
for disrespect of a superior officer, disobedience of orders, or mutinous conduct. In the 
Army’s view the actions and words of drunken soldiers were what got them crossways 
with the law. Alcohol, however, could either be a mitigating or condemning factor from 
case to case.30 It also temporarily liberated soldiers from obedience to military discipline 
and their officers. 
For instance, Private Anson Ziegler, when accused of drunkenness by a sergeant 
retorted, “Kiss my ass!” before assaulting him. During Ziegler’s court-martial the strong 
bonds of association due to the ethnic character of the 41st New York produced an 
outcome remarkably similar to what happened after the mutiny of the Anglo 9th New 
York. Although finding him guilty, the officers of the court wrote an appeal for 
clemency to Major General George McClellan that the private had been a good soldier 
and shown remorse for his actions during the trial. Officers themselves in the German 
                                                
30 Steven V. Ramold, Baring the Iron Hand: Discipline in the Union Army (De Kalb: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 2010), 156-164; Foote, The Gentlemen and the Roughs, 29-30. 
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“De Kalb” regiment and others of Brigadier General Louis Blenker’s German division, 
they balanced a responsibility to military law with upholding the good reputation of 
German American soldiers. The private’s truculence and willful independence brought 
on by tippling was an exception to his soldierly conduct, and of Germans generally.31 
Intoxication could likewise induce some soldiers to protest minor privations of camp 
life like unpalatable food that had gone on too long. Drunkenness is the trigger for 
protest, rather than the root cause, in these cases. As in civilian life, alcohol could loosen 
the bonds of propriety and good judgment that usually restrained a soldier from 
protesting what he internally considered mistreatment or injustice. Such was the case of 
Private Hermann Temps in the 45th New York. He admitted to intoxication after he 
excoriated the cook for rotten food and declared he would eat gruel no longer.32 
Likewise, in a New Jersey ninety-day regiment in May 1861 Anglo and Irish American 
soldiers and officers threw over tables in the regimental mess in protest. According to 
Irishman James Turner, “The food that day was wretched and the quantity very small—
some of us having sat at the table ten minutes and still no sign of getting anything to 
eat.”33 In these soldiers’ minds, insisting on better food comported with soldiers’ 
demands about pay, uniforms, and equipment as markers of the Army’s commitment to 
fulfill its contract. Ethnic soldiers in myriad, small ways such as these integrated 
                                                
31 Private Anson Ziegler general court-martial, 15 November 1861, 41st New York, II655, RG 153 Records 
of the Judge Advocate, NA, Washington, D.C. 
32 Hermann Temps general court-martial, 45th New York (Veteran), LL2691, 9 July 1861, RG 153 Records 
of the Judge Advocate, NA, Washington, D.C. 
33 James B. Turner to My Dear Parents & Sisters, 11 May 1861, Washington, D.C., Box 1, James B. 
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themselves into the Army just as incompletely and uncomfortably as their Anglo 
comrades. 
But drunken dissent could quite easily move on to weightier matters. One Irish 
soldier’s critique exposed a deep dissatisfaction with the quality of leadership in his 
regiment after drink loosened his tongue. Private Michael Flanegan in the 88th New 
York, one of the three original regiments of the Irish Brigade under the command of 
Brigadier General Thomas Francis Meagher, pled guilty to threatening and abusive 
language towards 2nd Lieutenant Edward Nagle, the officer of the guard on 13 April 
1863. Assigned guard duty that day, he refused Nagle’s orders to take his shift. Drunk in 
the middle of the day, he called Nagle a “son of a bitch.” Nagle ordered him tied up to a 
tree, but Flanegan continued his tirade, threatening to shoot the OOD and “did not care 
for any god damed [sic] officer of the regiment.” During the trial, Flanengan apologized 
for his behavior and assured the court he would never have refused orders or been 
insolent “had I been sober.” He felt it pertinent to buttress his remorse with proof of his 
loyalty and faithfulness. “I have never insulted an officer before. Have been in every 
battle until Fredericksburg.” The court, with only one officer from the Irish Brigade, 
found him guilty and ordered he forfeit ten dollars each month for three months.34 
At the trial Flanegan’s sober claim of faithful, brave service up until Fredericksburg 
juxtaposed against his condemnation of the regiment’s officer class, betrays the lingering 
damage done to the regiment’s morale even after coming through the battle. Survivors 
from the brigade described the battle as a “slaughter-pen” and a “wholesale slaughter.” 
                                                
34 Private Michael Flanegan general court-martial, 88th New York, 15 April 1863, LL705, RG 153 Records 
of the Judge Advocate, NA, Washington, D.C. 
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The entire brigade suffered 950 casualties among its officers and men during the battle; 
the 88th New York alone experienced 127 officer and enlisted casualties. Most dreadful 
for its cohesion and identity, the brigade had fifty-five officers killed at Fredericksburg 
in addition to the twenty-four lost thus far.35 Flanegan’s remarks can be read as an 
indictment of regimental officers who pushed the men up towards disaster at Marye’s 
Heights or disgust with officer replacements who did not meet the measure of the leaders 
that came before. More importantly they suggest that he and his comrades had no part in 
choosing new officers in spite of having proved their fitness for self-government in the 
heat of battle. 
Officers on a general court-martial from within the organization or from the same 
ethnicity as the accused could see intoxication as a mitigating factor. In the 88th New 
York Private John Wallace pled not guilty to insubordination. Testifying for the 
prosecution, Sgt. James Fox defended Wallace and clarified that Wallace said, “I got out 
[of his tent] as soon as I was ready” and that he addressed his captain “in the usual tone” 
not in a “contumacious” manner according to the charges. Fox went on to submit that 
Wallace was otherwise a “splendid soldier” which was sufficient to acquit him. 
Although the same court reduced Corporal Cornelius Ahern to the ranks for missing 
picket duty while drunk.36 
                                                
35 Bruce, The Harp and the Eagle; Öfele, True Sons of the Republic, 130-31. Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 
124-25, notes James Turner reported to the Irish-American that 545 out of 1,300 Irish Brigade soldiers 
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36 Corporal Cornelius Ahern, 4 April 1863 and Private John Wallace, 21 March 1863, both of the 88th New 
York, general courts-martial, LL705, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, NA, Washington, D.C. 
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In the case of Private William Reeves, 28th Massachusetts (part of the Irish Brigade), 
he received clemency only because he had fellow Irish officers who could ascribe his 
crimes to alcohol rather than evil intent. He had joined his regiment in August 1863, 
likely as a substitute or a conscript. After tattoo on 16 January 1864 he lashed out 
violently and assaulted the regimental adjutant, Lieutenant Michael Kinley, throwing his 
hat in the mud and punching him. Reeves then took on the guard sent to arrest him and 
also struck Lieutenant Colonel George H. Cartwright. Later he escaped from the guard 
tent with a weapon, found the lieutenant colonel’s tent, and tried to bayonet him while 
calling him a “son-of-a-bitch” and a “mean hound.”37 The trial revealed Reeves to be 
severely drunk at the time and not in control of his faculties. The lieutenant colonel went 
to great lengths to mitigate the soldier’s actions, downplaying the threat he posed with 
the musket and pointing out Reeves could not have known he was confronting a 
lieutenant. The officers testified to his record of previous good behavior. Composed 
mainly of fellow Irish or Irish American officers from the brigade, the court acquitted 
him of assaulting an officer and instead charged him with the lesser offenses of 
drunkenness and riotous conduct. Perhaps recognizing the financial motives driving 
Reeves’s service, they forced him to forfeit ten dollars from his monthly pay for three 
                                                
37 Private William Reeves general court-martial, 28th Massachusetts, 20 April 1864, LL2178, RG 153 
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months.38 Although Reeves’s actions are emblematic of the drunken ruffian soldier, the 
court’s ruling treated him more like a wayward member of the home community and it 
sought a means of correcting his behavior that while still painful and serious was 
preferable to death. If anything the testimony of the officers and the actions of the court 
looked to mentor Reeves and modify his future behavior, not unleash punishment for its 
own sake or the example of comrades. 
Officers exercised similar prudence in the German regiments. They came to an 
accused’s defense if they could offer declarations of past good behavior and temperate 
habits. In the 54th New York, Corporal Netz landed in the guard house “totally 
intoxicated,” but continued to argue with Sergeant Zimmermann. Told to pipe down by 
Lieutenant Vogel (officer of the day but from a different company), Netz derided him as 
a “son of a bitch” and a “scoundrel.” During the trial Lieutenant Luckhardt insisted that, 
“I know Corporal Netz well….He is a very good soldier and has behaved good before. 
He is not in the habit to be intoxicated.”39 
The guilty verdict Netz received came with strings attached. He was busted to 
private, ordered to do thirty days of hard labor, and lost a month’s pay. The court also 
remanded four months’ wages to his wife. In African American regiments, soldiers 
worried openly for their families’ survival absent their wages—sacrificed as they were in 
the protest against unequal pay—and often found their officers hesitant to come to their 
                                                
38 Verdict and sentence, Reeves general court-martial. 
39 Charges and specifications, general court-martial of Corporal Netz, 54th New York, 28 December 1861, 
II655, RG 153 Records of the Judge Advocate, NA, Washington, D.C. The first name of Netz does not 
appear in the court-martial papers. 
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aid. In contrast locally based Anglo regiments or ethnic units like the 54th New York had 
organic connections to their home communities, especially early in the war. Even after 
years of service, many immigrant soldiers still remained members of their ethnic 
communities separated only by space, writing home from the field asking loved ones to 
remember them to, “the Feldmanns, Bohlens, Althaus, Muellers, Schuttes, etc.” at 
home.40 
The officers considering Netz’s case made sure his breach of military law did not 
punish his wife and family. Ties of kinship, neighborhood, or religion probably helped 
influence the sentence. (Sergeant Zimmerman, on the other hand, had no witness speak 
on his behalf; his sentence was identical to Netz’s but with no acknowledgement of his 
family.) Communal spirit and solidarity kept the hearths that had released their sons and 
fathers for service to the regiment in officers’ minds even when dispensing sentences. 
Small episodes of “drunken dissent” such as these can shed light on the lingering 
effects of battle, ethnic cohesion between the home and military communities, and the 
effects of military discipline on the mentalities of individuals and the psychologies of 
entire units. Alcohol surely acted as an escape mechanism, but it also gave power to 
soldiers who normally were too constrained by fears of nativist backlash or desires to be 
faithful citizens. Intoxication, in the face of officers and policies that soldiers believed 
threatened them or heedlessly compromised their citizen privileges, could give soldiers 
courage to address their just demands and preserve their soldier rights of membership 
and procedure. 
                                                
40 Charles Herzog to Hildegarde Herzog, 14 April 1865, Herzog Letters, Civil War Miscellaneous 
Collection (hereafter CWMC), USAMHI, Carlisle, PA. 
 354 
But “drunken dissent” also reveals how important the ethnic ties between officers 
and men were to the functioning of Civil War regiments. In the cases above officers who 
recognized the exculpatory role of intoxication in a soldier’s crimes because they too 
lived in the same culture of conviviality kept the peace. The law was enforced and 
procedures observed but when possible courts sought the least painful and shameful 
sentence. In the Scottish 79th New York, intoxicated soldiers escalated to mutiny in part 
because they doubted the intentions of the Army to respect their terms of service and 
they believed that their rights to self-government through election and selection had been 
trampled when the Army forced Colonel Stevens upon them. Turning to the mutinies in 
the multiethnic 39th New York, its officers could not compensate for the regiment’s lack 
of an ethnic associational structure, either through keen consideration of their soldiers’ 
rights or through inspiring leadership. In light of the examples of ethnic officers’ subtle 
reactions to drunken dissent, the seeming ignorance of the commanders in the Garibaldi 
Guard to the demands of self-government made the mutinies possible. 
The Multiple Mutinies of the Multiethnic Garibaldi Guard and the Absence of Ethnic 
Associationalism 
Another 1861 mutiny among a truly ethnically diverse regiment had more genuine 
roots in ethnic tensions. The first of New York’s three-year regiments, the 39th New 
York contained more than seven different nationalities. Spurred initially by Gotham’s 
Italian, Spanish, and Swiss communities’ unsuccessful attempts to form their own 
regiments, these ethnic companies were later brought together with companies of 
German, Hungarian, and French volunteers. Historian Catherine Catalfamo’s analysis of 
the regiment’s descriptive books makes clear that Germans clearly predominated in raw 
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numbers, and along with Magyars. Thus, when the Guard mustered into state service on 
17 May 1861, there were four German companies, two Hungarian, and one each French, 
Italian, Spanish, and Swiss. At the same time, even within each company there were 
significant minorities of certain populations, chief among them being the Irish.41  
A Hungarian soldier-of-fortune, Frederic George D’Utassy, commanded them. His 
real surname was Strasser. Prior to immigrating to America, he had either been a rider in 
the Franconi Circus, a professor of romance languages, or possibly both.42 Lacking a 
competent leader to tamp down the ethnic rivalry that threatened the unit’s cohesion, the 
Guard also suffered from D’Utassy’s warped internationalist vision. Rather than bearing 
a United States flag and an Italian flag in honor of their namesake, he also arranged for 
the carrying of Hungarian colors and this merely added to ethnic jealousy. Aligning each 
company on paper with a nationality turned the ethnic groups’ loyalty away from the 
regiment to their own status within it. This in turn fractured companies when large 
enough cohorts of officers and men found themselves as ethnic outsiders serving among 
comrades of a wholly different nationality. 
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The regiment’s polyglot makeup plagued any attempt to form a cohesive unit 
identity.43 One possible source of unity could have been the transatlantic republican 
ideology many of its members carried with them from Europe. For example, Lieutenant 
Colonel Alessandro Repetti, a Genoese revolutionary who had participated in the 
abortive Roman Republic of 1849 and emigrated to America in 1853. Such an idea was 
at least alluded to in the honor paid to the great Italian republican and revolutionary 
Giuseppe Garibaldi with the regimental moniker.44 And it appears to have been a feature 
of the regiment’s earliest recruiting. A poster screamed in their native tongues, “Italian 
Patriots! Defenders of Hungary! Friends of Liberty [in French]! German Freedom 
Fighters!” all beneath a full color Stars and Stripes. Below it in English came the 
revolutionary appeal: “Patriots of all nations! Arouse! Arouse! Arouse!”45  
Unfortunately, the dissolute and irresponsible leadership of D’Utassy made basing 
the regiment’s identity upon the republican and romantic nationalist creeds of 1848 
nearly impossible. He abrogated his military responsibilities to Repetti, looked for any 
opportunity to enrich himself at the regiment’s expense, and had a debilitating habit of 
womanizing. All of these are means of accounting for why the regiment’s lack of ethnic 
associationalism led to chronic indiscipline and several mutinies.46  
                                                
43 Burton, Melting Pot Soldiers, 174; Öfele, True Sons of the Republic, 55. 
44 Frank W. Alduino and David J. Coles, “‘Ye Come From Many a Far Off Clime; and Speak in Many a 
Tongue’: the Garibaldi Guard and Italian-American Service in the Civil War,” Italian Americana, 22, no. 
1 (Spring 2004), 47–49, 51[47–63]. 
45 “Garibaldi Guard,” poster, PR-055-3-150, Civil War Posters Collection, New-York Historical Society, 
New York, NY (hereafter NYHS). The salutation read: “Patrioti Italiani! Honvedek! Amis de la Liberte! 
Deutsche Freiheits Kæmpfer!” 
46 Alduino and Coles, “‘Ye Come From Many a Far Off Clime,’” 53. 
 357 
This is not to say, however, that most of its rank and file would have been veterans 
of the revolutions that made up the Guard’s mythos. Nearly half were under the age of 
twenty-five. The largest number of volunteers had been artisans in private life followed 
by another significant number self-identifying at muster-in as laborers.47 Like the 
Scottish Americans of the 79th New York, these immigrant soldiers insisted on electing 
their own officers. The predominant ethnic groups of each company demanded they 
supply the officer candidates for election and this often led to friction about procedures 
of self-government. Such complaints were not unique to the Guard of course. The 
colonel of the German American 9th Ohio ordered completely new elections when 
complaints about the legitimacy of results threatened mutiny.48 In the 39th New York, 
complaints about officer elections heightened ethnic pride and loyalty to destabilizing 
levels.49 Petitions from officers and soldiers inundated Colonel D’Utassy during the 
regiment’s formative months. For instance, José de Barcellos Boom wrote the colonel to 
demand “the nominal title and honors” of the commission he first secured then lost. He 
had been elected a first lieutenant in one of the regiment’s Italian companies. When they 
were consolidated for lack of recruits, D’Utassy appointed him captain of the Spanish 
Company, but the soldiers refused “having preferred to have a leader of their own 
nationality” in Captain José Torrens. D’Utassy followed the sentiment of the soldiers 
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and ordered Boom home because he had become an officer without a command.50 The 
colonel appeased other officers’ claims for ranks of prominence in the regiment with 
honorary titles and commissions.51 
The regiment’s rank and file also found numerous aspects of military life that 
loomed as violations of their service terms. Absent the organic associational framework 
so endemic to most of the Union’s ethnic regiments, their soldier rights faced even 
greater exposure to either casual trampling or premeditated violations. One of the most 
visceral rights was that of timely and sufficient pay from the Army for their time in 
uniform and physical separation from their dependents. This right of membership as it 
pertained to ethnic soldiers is significant enough to merit developing some context for 
understanding its place in his military experience. 
While equal pay was arguably the preeminent matter of soldier rights for African 
Americans, all Union soldiers knew the difficulties caused by late pay. And ethnic 
soldiers, because of their predominant backgrounds in the urban artisan and laboring 
classes, felt the resultant pressures keenly. When soldiers had sufficient funds they did as 
the Germans in the 9th Ohio who remitted tens of thousands of dollars to loved ones in 
Cincinnati to purchase food, pay overdue rents, and settle heating and cooking fuel 
bills.52 
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Union soldiers of all kinds had to give sometimes lengthy explanations for why they 
could send home nothing at all or only a pittance, but ethnic soldiers who came more 
often from the working classes, were particularly hard hit. Lieutenant James Turner in 
the Irish 88th New York was already complaining in late 1861 of not receiving his back 
pay from his earlier ninety-day New Jersey service. He would be unable to send home 
any pay by early January 1862 so the soldier-correspondent for New York’s Irish-
American recommended his father look for a job with a printer he knew to make ends 
meet.53 August Schoch, a German American soldier in the 45th New York, explained that 
he had only a little money left to send home from a recent pay day because he had to 
lend some to his tent mate, “a man from Harzburg,” who was a recent addition to the 
regiment. The paymaster explained the man would have to wait until the next payday. 
Schoch’s charity combined with the expenses of laundering and writing paper left him 
with one dollar to send home.54  
Service in the Army was a major economic sacrifice because an enlisted soldier’s 
pay did not approach what even laborers working at fifty cents or one dollar a day could 
provide at home. Schoch was a 36-year old German immigrant from Baden. For urban 
artisans and skilled laborers like him, a shoemaker in private life with four dependents, 
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the sacrifice was even greater.55 By way of comparison, a shoemaker in Lynn, 
Massachusetts in 1860 could earn $260 per year,56 but a corporal’s pay in 1863 only 
amounted to $156.57 Tragically, the pressures of wartime only increased for Schoch’s 
family when they received word that he was killed on the first day of Gettysburg. 
Military service exposed these families to the male head’s death or disfigurement and 
deepened their economic marginalization. 
Military pay, when it did arrive and could be sent home, failed to arrest the economic 
squeeze most laboring families felt during the war. Schoch’s pay in 1863 could not have 
secured his family of five, subsisting on $600 per year, ten years earlier. In the urban 
areas of the North, wages did not keep pace with prices. In New York City by 1863 
prices for necessities had increased 60-100 percent in two years while wages had grown 
a mere 25 percent. Immigration continued, expanding the labor market and holding 
wages down.58 
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The effects of these economic realities shows themselves in the dissent of Corporal 
Jacob Staudinger of the 74th Pennsylvania who urged his comrades to demand their full 
pay from the U.S. paymaster on the night of 24 January 1863. The paymaster explained 
that he was only authorized to pay the men for six months: 1 May to 31 October 1862. 
Those had been months with intense combat—Cross Keys and Second Bull Run—and 
stultifying garrison duty around the capital. All done without pay.59 Recruited in 1861, 
Staudinger and his regiment were German Americans from Pittsburgh and Allegheny 
County. Many had been members of volunteer militia companies there before the war. 
Now they were in winter quarters with their brigade around Stafford Courthouse, 
Virginia, some 60 miles north of Richmond.60 
Staudinger’s wife had written him only days before warning that the family could not 
survive the winter without all of his pay. He waited with his company in the cold as they 
filed into the paymaster’s temporary office to collect their pay. Men came out with only 
six months of back pay rather than eight to bring them current through the most recent 
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pay period. Disgust grew as they stood shivering.61 Staundinger finally excoriated the 
paymaster when he entered to receive his pay envelope: “I will rather die on the 
spot.…We want our full pay up to December 31st; we are bound to get it; and if you 
don’t pay us, we will take it with force.” Shouts of support and commotion from the men 
alerted Colonel Albert von Hartung to a mutiny in the making. Immediately he 
summoned the guard and Staudinger relented. At his court-martial the revelation of the 
news from home lessened his culpability. Still, tried by a court composed of only two 
German officers and found guilty of disobedience of orders (but not mutinous conduct), 
Staudinger was nevertheless reduced to the ranks and reprimanded.62 
As Staudinger demonstrated through his dissent, late pay could act like an open 
wound on regimental morale because it not only afflicted soldiers’ self-worth as their 
families’ providers, but offended their civic sensibilities about their rights in uniform. 
Not only was the soldier absent from the hearth, but he had given up wages significantly 
more than what the government paid him to shoulder a rifle. By putting on the blue 
uniform the citizen became dependent on the government for pay, clothing, food, and 
shelter for himself. His family in turn came to depend on the pay he sent home. 
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The gravity of late pay for ethnic soldiers and their domestic dependents created yet 
another reason for dissent within the 39th New York in July 1861. In this case, a notion 
of soldiers’ rights to timely, dependable pay forged a brief, multiethnic effort at insisting 
it be honored. Married soldiers from three companies grasped the implications of the 
new relationship of dependence emerging from even the earliest attempts to mobilize the 
population to defend the Union. In petitions to Colonel Frederic D’Ustassy they 
explained that their families looked to the financial assistance promised them by the 
Union Defense Committee “in the absence of their natural protector.” Every 
Guardsman’s wife was to receive three dollars and half a dollar for each of her children. 
Yet after three months of service no aid had materialized. Now their wives and children 
faced hardships unforeseen and unforgiving. They demanded he resolve the matter. In a 
compact statement of soldiers’ right to timely pay they wrote as soldiers who “consider 
it their duty to fight for a noble cause.” To the same degree, “their respective states 
ought not to forget that their first duty is to provide for the support of their families.”63 
These immigrant soldiers displayed a keen understanding of the American law of 
association by linking the failure of a voluntary organ to the authority of the state. Civic 
associations thrived in America because of their legal charters of incorporation. Because 
charters equipped associations with certain powers and obligations with legal weight, it 
by extension empowered the association’s members and any citizens who benefitted 
from its operations, in this case the families of New York’s volunteers. The UDC’s 
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failure to disburse aid was nothing short of abrogating its responsibilities to the citizens 
of New York that had been devolved upon it by the state government. Now the state 
needed to recognize its duty and compel the UDC to meet its burdens or take over those 
burdens itself.64 
Therefore, late pay was no mere bureaucratic blunder. It was a tangible failure by the 
government to the volunteer who had pledged his life to protect the nation as an arms-
bearing citizen. The citizen dependent on the government over which he was sovereign 
was forced to choose, in this case, between his domestic and civic responsibilities. The 
absence of a thoroughgoing structure of organizational identity or ethnic 
associationalism exacerbated these tensions. In a bid to recover the citizen’s claim to 
self-government of his family and of his republic, the volunteer soldier opted for dissent 
and a challenge of authority. 
Ethnic chauvinism was able to be set aside briefly in the matter of pay, but only a 
month earlier it had contributed to a mutiny over a violation of what might appear to be 
one of the regiment’s most negligible terms of its service: the issuing of muskets to the 
regiment instead of rifles. On 31 May the companies marched to the Federal armory in 
Washington. They expected to finally receive their state-of-the-art Nealls breech-loading 
rifles which they learned had been recently purchased earlier in the month by the UDC. 
The regiment had been publicized to potential recruits and the wider reading public as an 
elite organization of skirmishers to be trained as expert marksmen, able to maneuver 
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rapidly in loose order, and armed with rifles. Instead antique muskets had been brought 
out—completely inadequate for the terms of service as the men understood them.65 
Protests over the quality of weapons were a not uncommon occurrence and happened 
in Anglo regiments too. In the 23rd Ohio commanded by future president Rutherford B. 
Hayes, soldiers threw down their old muskets they judged to be inferior in quality and 
workmanship when issued. Some stomped back through their company streets deeply 
offended. Hayes staved off a mutiny through a combination of cajoling and patriotic 
exhortation until the men relented and returned to duty assured that the situation was 
only temporary.66 In both these instances soldiers equated muskets with a second-class 
status. The Anglos in the 23rd Ohio looked upon their service as no less valuable than 
that of any other regiment, therefore neither should the Army. If other volunteer units 
merited rifles then so did they. Anything less was an affront to citizen values of equality, 
a contravention of their service terms, and a revocation of contract by their government. 
Admittedly the 39th New York’s “musket mutiny” grew out of the regiment’s 
complicated identity, but these same civic concerns about soldier rights lay at its heart. 
Traditionally, historians have seen it as evidence of the ethnic tensions within the unit67 
and how the mutiny unfolded does demonstrate conflict among ethnicities. Also, 
D’Utassy’s weak leadership must again be entered into the balance sheet. The regiment’s 
paymaster informed him later in June— after the “musket mutiny”—that 7 of the 10 
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companies had circulated petitions for the resignations of the colonel and of Lieutenant 
Colonel Repetti. Major George Waring, an Anglo American officer recruited to the 
regimental staff, insisted that, “In matters of discipline” the colonel “was practically 
useless.”68 
But the mutiny also provides evidence that the ethnically homogenous companies 
offered an informal version of ethnic associationalism, which stiffened the resolve of 
soldiers to defend their terms of service. Examples from previous mutinies demonstrate 
how associational culture originated with the individual company in many cases. 
Therefore, it is no surprise to see the largely homogenous companies of the 39th New 
York find in that identity the basis of a nascent ethnic associationalism. 
The Italians who joined the regiment are a useful example of the roles played by 
print culture and ethnic associationalism in creating volunteer units of Italians. Shortly 
after the shelling of Fort Sumter, publicist G. F. Secchi de Casali, former diplomat Luigi 
Tinelli, and erstwhile revolutionary Repetti advertised for recruits in New York’s Italian 
language newspapers and used the existing Guardia Nazionale Italiana military 
company as a cadre. Additionally, through their prestige and contacts in the Italian 
American community they convinced a number of former soldiers and revolutionaries to 
join up as well. In the end, it was their miniscule numbers that determined New York’s 
Italian denizens would only organize a company rather than an entire regiment.69 
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Ethnic associationalism at the company level within a multiethnic regiment also 
ensured chaos even as certain groups of soldiers believed their actions were in defense of 
their soldier rights. The predominant German membership intended to hold out for the 
promised rifles even as the Spanish and French companies were content to temporarily 
accept them. Moreover the Germans felt confident in their preponderant physical 
presence that they could compel the other companies to join their boycott. It worked 
temporarily. José Torrens, the captain of the Spanish company, blamed non-
commissioned officers from the German company for encouraging the Spanish and 
French companies to refuse the muskets offered. Officers from the French company 
complained that German soldiers tried to wrangle their muskets from their men, resulting 
in a brawl.70 Yet even Torrens, while blaming the Germans for the mutiny to begin with, 
made sure to remind Colonel D’Utassy that his men stood “ready to receive the arms that 
may be given to us until the Government may be able to furnish our regiment with 
rifles.”71 Here then is at least reason to believe that across ethnic lines there existed a 
common understanding of the Guards’ soldier rights even though within their ethnic 
associations they had settled on different tactics and timing in defending them. No one 
favored receiving substandard equipment contrary to the regiment’s terms of service, but 
whether that necessitated mutiny was an open question. The mutiny exploded among 
men who also were late on receiving their pay and whose officers had yet to be officially 
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commissioned—further evidence that soldier rights fueled the mutiny rather than ethnic 
antagonism. 
The men involved in the “musket mutiny” explained their motives in a regimental 
court-martial. The officers on the court came from the German and Hungarian 
companies, but none hailed from the Spanish or French companies. Major Waring 
presided over the court as president. The participants on trial claimed ignorance of some 
Army regulations, but like African Americans and Anglo soldiers in episodes of dissent, 
these mutineers of the 39th New York also claimed specific rights as members of their 
particular regiment, if not company. 
Representing the interests of his comrades to the non-commissioned officers in his 
German company, Hermann Engel urged them to complain to Colonel D’Utassy that 
they would not march over the Potomac as ordered on account of being issued inferior 
weapons. Engel disputed the Army’s position that the men had no choice but to accept 
the smoothbore muskets, despite promises that upon enlistment they would be equipped 
with modern rifles. 
Placing this complaint in the wider context of soldiers’ rights under their terms of 
service connects it to the same line of thinking that motivated the mutiny of the 20th New 
York. In both mutinies German volunteers considered their consensual obligations 
severed by arbitrary violations of their solider rights. Moreover, like so many officers in 
the cases of drunken dissent above, Engel’s captain, Joseph Wiegand, testified to the 
man’s patriotic motives for wanting the Guards to only have the best equipment. 
Wiegand essentially claimed that Engel had lodged his complaint as a form of popular 
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constitutional instruction to the Army. Within the logic of ethnic association the 
company’s members could claim a privileged position to stipulate the extent to which 
the Army honored the letter and spirit of their contract.72 
But by 6 July the officers from across the regiment’s ethnic companies united all of 
these complaints to the colonel in a petition, in fact, following on the pattern of officers 
vouching for ethnic soldiers’ concerns exhibited in the cases of drunken dissent. At last, 
a sense of membership that could transcend the ethnic jealousies had been fashioned out 
of revulsion at D’Utassy’s dissolute character, his negligence of command, and his cases 
of outright fraud of regimental funds. It gave scandal to the regiment’s officer corps who 
took it as an occasion to amplify the soldiers’ smoldering resentment at the trampling of 
their rights. The officers demanded D’Utassy produce their commissions within seventy-
two hours, as well as their back pay and the promised rifles, or else they would 
encourage their companies to refuse duty.  
In the days that followed more soldiers were moved to mutiny, refusing to let the 
matter of the regiment’s arms rest. Some of the petitioners were the Italians’ Captain 
Cesaer Osnaghi, the Spaniards’ Captain José Torrens, and the Frenchmen’s Captain 
Louis Tassilier. All three had enforced the issuing of muskets to their companies at the 
end of May as a temporary measure. But Captain Franz Takats of a Hungarian company, 
also a petitioner, had not. Now on 9 July, in the midst of the petition campaign, he led 
his men to take more drastic measures.73 Takats assembled his company and marched 
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them in the direction of the capital. Once in the city they encamped on the grounds of the 
Smithsonian and issued another petition for D’Utassy’s resignation and the fulfillment of 
their enlistment terms. Only after they had been cordoned off by troops sent by the 
commander of Washington, D.C., Brigadier General Joseph Mansfield, did the mutinous 
company return to Camp Grinnell under guard. In disgrace, Takats resigned rather than 
be cashiered.74 At the same time, his mutiny accomplished many of its goals. Within a 
few days the regiment received its promised rifles and its first pay.75 Furthermore, 
Takats’s example emboldened Captain Louis Tassilier of the 10th Company on 10 July 
to write the colonel a letter even more damning of his leadership than the even-tempered 
officers’ petition. He claimed to speak for most of the earlier petitioners and now 
demanded D’Utassy’s resignation posthaste. Making many of the same complaints as the 
petition, he added charges that D’Utassy physically abused the soldiers using blows to 
their faces and violent intimidation with his personal weapons. These affronts to the 
sanctity of the volunteers’ membership in the regiment went hand in hand with 
Tassilier’s complaint that D’Utassy was so free with his condemnations of the American 
republic that it undermined the regiment’s morale.76 
It was not until the spring of 1863 that the unethical and even criminal actions 
alleged by D’Utassy’s officers resulted in his court-martial. While he managed to evade 
conviction on some charges of fraud and faulty leadership enough charges stuck that the 
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Army dismissed him from the service and sentenced him to a year of hard labor. The 
Guard by this point had been reduced through combat and disease to a mere battalion. It 
fought at Gettysburg and in the Overland Campaign. During these years it was no longer 
the multiethnic experiment of 1861. Increasingly it took on the complexion of a 
predominantly Irish and Irish American unit in the ranks and most of its original officers 
were also gone. In fact, by the end of 1863 ninety percent of its original members had 
left the 39th New York through death, desertion, or injury.77 Nevertheless, despite its 
rather depressing denouement the 39th New York remains a convenient avenue for 
considering how ethnic associationalism in a multinational setting could at once advance 
the cause of soldier rights and self-government yet create circumstances that undermined 
the bonds of membership between soldiers of different linguistic groups.  
Conclusion 
Immigrant/ethnic soldiers intended their service to prove their loyalty to the nation, 
questioned as it was by nativism and xenophobia prior to the war. Substantial numbers 
of the ethnic populations of the North—from the Irish and Germans to the Italians and 
Swedes—were already bona fide citizens of the nation. According to Carl Schurz, it was 
critical that “the immigrant citizen did not stand behind the native American in its 
devotion to fight for the Union.”78 By proving their loyalty while assisting the Union to 
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win the war, immigrant and ethnic soldiers staked a claim that naturalized and birthright 
citizenship were equally valid.79  
The 20th New York mutiny demonstrated how this claim of equal citizenship could 
manifest itself in a mutiny to defend citizen-soldiers’ perceived rights. It provided ethnic 
soldiers with a moment to apply the principles and tools of self-government. Additional 
mutinies surveyed in ethnic regiments could erupt from ethnic loyalty, manipulate it, or 
even undercut it. They were episodes of severe group tension concerning loyalty to 
community and nation. Yet like individual dissent, the motive force behind mutinies 
came from ethnic soldiers’ conviction that acting in defense of their soldier rights was a 
fundamental expression of their citizenship and of self-government in their adopted 
country. The circumstances of Army life—alcohol abuse, breach of contract due to late 
pay, terrible food, monotony, the terrible excitement of battle, separation from home, 
and authoritarian officers—shaped when and how individual ethnic soldiers policed the 
boundaries of self-government. These forms of individual dissent could lead entire 
commands into mutiny, a form of collective dissent, if volunteers deemed their soldier 
rights at risk and the bonds of association encouraged corporate action. The mutinies in 
the 39th New York were perhaps the most convoluted demonstration of ethnic 
associationalism. Its strength at the company level dogged the entire regiment. Officers 
who respected its dictates and the demands of their companies about soldier rights 
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became sources of factionalism that severely hampered the smooth functioning of the 
unit. Yet, the various mutinies in the 39th New York did serve to check to some degree 
the irresponsible authority and power of D’Utassy. In that way they functioned exactly 
as the seedbed of self-government. 
A more tantalizing observation is that ethnic associationalism in these examples led 
ethnic citizens in uniform to treasure their individual and corporate rights as soldiers 
more than among Anglos. That is, preserving their foundational and procedural rights 
was not only a function of self-government but doing so demonstrated that they could 
indeed act as citizens. Immigrant and ethnic soldiers earned their membership in the 
nation by shedding their blood on the battlefield. But in the long view, they also proved 
through military protest actions their capacity for a thoroughgoing, lived commitment to 
the nation’s democratic culture. This observation in no way obviates the conclusions of 
scholars who have explained the Civil War as a launching pad for greater German 
American pluralism or greater Irish American integration.80 For both, it suggests another 
component beyond battlefield sacrifice and visible uniformed service that laid to rest the 
xenophobia that had plagued Germans and Irish before (and during) the war. The point is 
not that these protest actions were celebrated or publicized at the time as evidence of 
ethnic soldiers’ capacity for self-government. On the contrary, the New York papers 
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excoriated the Garibaldi Guard as disloyal in the weeks after the mutinies.81 Rather, this 
conclusion posits that the fact of ethnic military protest is additional evidence for their 
participation in antebellum public culture and for their adoption of long-established 
American norms about the form and content of individual and corporate rights.
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CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This project presents the first scholarly treatment of mutinies in the Union Army 
during the Civil War. In addition, it has considered forms of individual and corporate 
protest with political overtones that, while not mutinies, fall within the penumbra of 
military protest actions. The contemporary military jurist Stephen Vincent Benét defined 
mutiny as “resistance to lawful military authority.” It could take the form of “extreme 
insubordination, as individually resisting by force, or collectively rising against or 
opposing military authority.” More than anything, it was characterized by “a murmuring 
or muttering against the exercise of authority, tending to create disquiet or dissatisfaction 
in the Army.”1 
With a string of microhistories in tow, it is evident why Benét’s definition left so 
much discretion to the superior officer authorized to proffer charges. In several 
instances, mutinies in the Union Army were the most public form of volunteers’ popular 
constitutionalism in defense of their soldier rights. Moreover, those soldier rights defined 
a line between freedom and servitude. Words from freedman-soldier Price Warfield 
underscored the extreme nature of such political expression. Mutiny was simply the last 
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straw of men who “intended to fight for The country expecting to be treated as human 
beings.”2 
Many black, German, and Anglo mutineers would have agreed with Warfield. All of 
their protest actions sought to protect a modicum of dignity against the institutional 
power of the Army. Across the board, soldier rights remained in tension with the Army’s 
organic law. The times and manners in which soldier rights and military law collided 
were not identical across ethnic and racial divides, or even from regiment to regiment 
within an ethnic cohort. Nevertheless, running throughout are the twin threads of 
membership and self-government. 
This project examines selected military protests’ origins, their course, and their 
effects across the Army’s representative ethnic groups. These “vignettes of 
confrontation” reinforce the reality that commissioned and non-commissioned officers at 
the company and regimental levels led only with the consent—to varying degrees—of 
the nation’s citizen-soldiers. Soldiers from Northern communities carried with them 
interpretations of associationalism, active sovereignty, and volitional allegiance that 
convinced of their right to govern the affairs of their small units. Anglo citizens, for 
instance, ranged across the spectrum of rank believed their rights of selection and 
election handed them the right to regularly judge the fitness of men in command over 
them. Yet, the examples of protest actions in the 4th Corps d’Afrique and the 49th USCI 
were evidence of the freedmen-soldiers’ presumption that they too were capable of 
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interpreting whether or not commanders acted with justice. And in a climax that would 
have pleased the Anglo cavalryman Asa Story, the Fort Jackson mutineers were 
successful in removing their tyrannical commander. Even a handful of these legally 
supported judgments of commanders as at Fort Jackson and at Camp Nelson by former 
slaves are further examples of the still under appreciated changes brought about by 
military Reconstruction and civil war. 
Chapters II and III showed that Anglos took associationalism seriously while in 
uniform and fought to preserve their most expansive community of membership, the 
nation. Ties to their local communities remained crucial to the varying successes of 
several military protest actions, especially the almost triumphant outcome in the 
Anderson Cavalry. When Anglo soldiers mutinied they found an instrument that could 
harness memberships in their local company or regiment to define and preserve their 
soldier rights. These actions drew on the associational bonds of self-government that 
they continued in uniform and of which they could still avail themselves through citizen 
allies at home. The successes of these military protest actions tied soldiers more 
intensely to the nation and the larger struggle to preserve the Union. The feedback 
between a healthy sense of self-government within the Anglo soldiers’ regiment or 
company and greater confidence, not in the necessity of Union, but rather of its 
prospects for survival, suggest that the Union meant the privileges and benefits that 
came with a citizen’s participation in his local community and membership in his 
immediately available voluntary societies. 
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Chapters VII and VIII analyzed the developments of protest actions and mutinies by 
the Union’s adopted citizens. Not unlike the Anglos with whom they crossed paths in 
antebellum streets and byways, ethnic citizens clung to membership in their 
neighborhood or district most intimately. European ethnics from Germans and Scots to 
Irish and Italians had quickly appropriated Northern society’s print and associational 
cultures. They put them to use both protecting and assimilating existing cultural forms in 
their new society. The New York Turner Association is exemplary in this regard. It 
transplanted a unique German form of voluntary association to the United States while 
adopting the conventions and habits of associationalism. It then acted as the conduit for 
the 20th New Yorkers’ scrutiny of the Army’s action against the regiments. The civilian 
association rallied other ethnic, civic organizations as well as private citizens to press the 
national government for redress. For European immigrant soldiers who may have been 
full-fledged members of their voluntary society, their membership in the nation 
remained qualified before the war. Mutinies and military protest actions demonstrated to 
immigrants themselves—if to no one else—that pulling the levers of self-government 
could produce positive results. 
Chapter IV delineated the experience of free African Americans from Northern states 
in a new light by explaining their military protest actions not only in the context of the 
black freedom struggle but also as artifacts of associational culture. Northern black 
soldiers’ carried themselves in these mutinies as the apotheosis of Republican culture. 
Claiming to fight not only for the freedom of their race but to raise the ideals of the 
nation’s founding to their true status. Isolating the soldiering experience of Northern 
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blacks highlighted their attachment to print culture and its importance to their freedom 
struggle. It also made clear their repeated invocation of the principle of membership both 
in the Army and in their state. Put into the context of associationalism, very often their 
statements could be read as placing the emphasis less on being due the same pay and 
benefits as white soldiers, but rather that those rights belonged to all soldiers—white and 
black—enlisted by their state under a specific call for recruits. This provides a quite 
surprising interface between associationalism, race, and membership. In this respect it 
contrasts immigrant soldiers’ convictions which seemed to actually put a greater stress 
on their ethnic identity put at the service of the nation as a ticket to the wider society’s 
recognition of them as a loyal population. 
Finally, chapters V and VI developed the remarkable transition from slavery to 
freedom through the mutinies of recently emancipated slaves in uniform. Their struggles 
for customary rights in places like Louisiana, Mississippi, Kentucky, and South Carolina 
against the master class while fictive members of the plantation family structured their 
later military protest actions in the Army. Membership in an institution of laws, albeit 
not as capacious as civil society, conferred a panoply of promulgated rights. Mutinies 
drew on the tradition of confrontation over defining capricious rights while in bondage 
and pointed them toward defending their new soldier rights. The newly freed recognized 
that Union victory was essential if their legal status was to remain permanent. 
At the same time, much was particular to only emancipated slave soldiers. 
Punishment fell harder on them as a result of their mutinies than on soldiers from the 
other groups. In fact, unlike the freedmen-soldiers, Anglos like the Andersons routinely 
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escaped without any sanction by the Army except a few months of stopped pay. The 
unsanctioned executions in the 2nd Rhode Island Cavalry demonstrated how precarious 
the rights of soldiers could become when the relationships between officers and men 
were torn from the ordering principles of membership, self-government, and localism. 
Indeed from this vantage point a failure of associationalism might also account for some 
abuse and misconduct by officers in the USCT, who like Colonel Robinson were 
wielding command over alien men and with whom they, as white officers, usually felt 
deeply estranged. 
Furthermore, emancipated African Americans could not avail themselves of the right 
to alienation because separation from the Army along with the tumult caused by the end 
of the plantation systems left the former slave nowhere to turn. Likewise the protective 
and productive assistance of civilian advocates from their home communities were also 
absent for the same reasons. Therefore, emancipated slave soldiers had to rely on 
sympathetic officers in the Army hierarchy, the good will of Anglo officials in the War 
Department, and the outcries of the abolitionist press, both white and Northern black. In 
this climate, mutiny did not present itself so much as a last resort, but as possibly the 
only tool to defend their soldier rights.  
Nevertheless, despite these differences individual and corporate rights belonged to 
Anglo, ethnic, and African American volunteers in the Union Army as a result of their 
soldier status. The initial character of that status depended on the diverse array of rights 
and membership possessed by the social groups within the political community of the 
United States from which these volunteers came. Mutinies revealed how soldiers at the 
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local level of their regiments made the war into a struggle to secure the Union and self-
government from erosion. Membership in the Army had expanded self-government to 
increased numbers of members of the nation and, by extension, revitalized the Republic. 
Soldiers in blue did not carry out their highest duty of citizenship—to defend the 
Republic—in isolation. They did it communally, by committing themselves alongside 
their fellows to a self-governing, martial organization based on clear, mutually-agreed 
terms. Lest they accept tyranny, the Army could not be allowed to change the rules 
unilaterally. Possessed of inalienable rights instilled by a Creator, not government, 
citizens in uniform had the prerogative to use extralegal measures to restore the 
government’s correct relationship to the people. In defense of their soldier rights they 
were not limited to the paths of redress offered through the Articles of War any more 
than were civilians restricted to constitutional procedures alone.3 
Looking at mutinies and ancillary military protest actions zeroes in on an aspect of 
what made the Civil War so transformative. Even as it intensified the participation of so 
many heretofore “outside groups” in the politics of self-government and it expanded the 
meaning of membership in the nation and access to it, it was the last gasp of a society 
whose boundaries for membership and self-government relied on citizens’ engagement 
in associationalism, exercise of popular constitutionalism, rootedness in localism, and 
the creation not reproduction of an authentic democratic print culture. Running 
throughout these mutinies is the insistence that regimental membership conferred rights 
                                                
3 The religious foundations of American popular constitutionalism are forcefully argued for in T. H. Breen, 
American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the People (New York: Hill and Wang, 2010), 
241-74. 
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which military law should not override in the pursuit of order and expediency. These 
volunteers questioned the degree to which those values were essential to winning the 
war. Perhaps there is a basis offered here for linking Civil War soldiers’ confrontation 
with the expansive institution of the Army to postbellum Americans’ search for order 
vis-à-vis monopoly capital, urbanization, and most pertinently, the demise of the 
country’s island communities.4
                                                
4 Robert H. Wiebe, The Search for Order 1877-1920 (New York: Hill and Wang, 1967). 
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